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1. Introduction: Transmission of Law  
 
When studying medieval European law, the similarities between texts from completely 
different periods and different geographical areas are sometimes striking. In early to high 
medieval legislation, the existence of related concepts of law seems evident. How laws from 
different jurisdictions and periods came to share legal aspects is not always clear, but one 
cause may be a transmission of law. The similarities can take the form of shared concepts and 
coincident developments, but there could also be verbatim repetition of rules. We can thus see 
many hints of influence and loan in the legal sources, but can we identify transmission of law? 
Researchers often comment on possible influences on legal texts, and finding the origin of a 
text could be the aim of their studies or might merely be complementary to those studies. 
Although studies often point to agreements in laws that are far apart, scholars rarely conduct a 
broad examination of these similarities between legal sources that are distant in both time and 
space. To get a fuller overview of common features of European legislation, a wide-ranging 
comparison is necessary. By involving legal sources from more than two regions, we may be 
able to assess how transmission of law occurred. By studying rules on a particular topic in 
legislation over several centuries, we may be able to see the legal development more clearly. 
This thesis will deal with the transmission of law in the period from AD 400 to 1350, and it is 
centred on the two themes of inheritance systems and compensation for homicide.  
Society changes, and secular legislators have been occupied with different challenges 
in their rule and society. But two topics are constant: inheritance and homicide. The transfer 
of wealth and the existence of deadly violence are necessary topics to address in any society, 
to have rules on, and which even constitute the very reason for making law.1 Consequently, 
these topics are recurrent in written law as well. For this reason, inheritance and compensation 
for homicide form rewarding objects of study when covering a long period of European legal 
history. 
 A wider comparison of medieval laws can illuminate the connections and signs of 
influence between geographical areas and over time. Legal activity was high during the 
waning of the western Roman empire and in the succeeding European states.2 Following the 
                                                 
1 For example, see the Danish Book of Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes. Danmarks gamle 
Landskapslove med Kirkelovene, ed. by Johannes Brøndum-Nielsen and Poul J. Jørgensen, vol VII, Valdemars 
Sjællandske Lov, Arvebog og Orbodemål, ed. by Erik Kroman (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske boghandel, Nordisk 
forlag, 1932-1936). Hereafter DgL. 
2 Maurizio Lupoi, The Origins of the European Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 
41. 
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Roman model, written law became the norm for medieval authority; this also applied within 
the Church, which amassed a substantial legal corpus together with increased power in the 
early Middle Ages. Moreover, legal thinking was transformed from the late-eleventh century 
onwards. The evolving university studies of Roman and canon law would bring new vigour to 
royal law-making activity across Europe. Students from many of these European states were 
influenced by the methodological legal studies. Students returning from their legal studies at 
university might have brought new ideas that led to legal reform in some of these states, for 
example, in the Scandinavian realms in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Major research on 
the origins of canon law has provided knowledge of the bond between church and society, and 
of the Church as a legal institution.3 The trail of secular law comprises another fruitful object 
of study from the perspective of transmission. Both the legislating authority and the subjects 
of law relate, possibly differently, to the system of inheritance distribution and the settlement 
of conflict in the case of homicide in a society. The authoroties in the emerging states all had 
a concept of written law, which would form their own authority.  
 
1.1 Aim and scope  
It is important to turn our attention now to the demarcation of the project in more detail. The 
main aim of this thesis is to test whether it is possible to identify transmission of law in the 
two chosen topics of inheritance and compensation for homicide, within the written secular 
laws of western medieval Europe. To elaborate on this further, the thesis will investigate in 
what way legislation pertaining to the system of inheritance and to compensation for homicide 
was subject to influence from laws and ideas outside its own jurisdiction in early and high 
medieval Western Europe. 
 In order to limit the task, I have centred my focus on the legal development in the 
European regions that fall under the cloak of the western Church, which I have labelled the 
Latin spheres: the late Roman empire, and the Germanic, Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian 
kingdoms. However, the early Scandinavian laws originated outside kingly power. Laws from 
the medieval republics of Iceland and Ireland will not be included in this thesis other than as 
                                                 
3 Important examples, although not giving the whole field of research, include: Stephan Kuttner, Repertorium 
der kanonistik (1140-1234), vol. 1 (Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1937, reprint 1981); Jean Gaudemet, Église et 
cité: histoire du droit canonique (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, 1994); James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London: 
Longman, 1995); Bruce Brasington and Kathleen G. Cushing, eds, Bishops, Texts and the Use of Canon Law 
Around 1100: Essays in Honour of Martin Brett (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). 
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examples.4 I have also restricted the source material mainly to law that survives as a law code 
or as a collection of laws. The selected laws all originated, to some degree, in the process of 
state formation. The reason for this is, first of all, that many of the secular law codes of the 
European states originated in a period of consolidation, even if they sometimes endured for a 
considerable time. Second, in such a process, law-making would be a defining feature of the 
legitimation of power; therefore, we can expect a certain consciousness in relation to the 
contents, from the legislator and from the legal advisers of all shapes and sizes around the 
authority with legislative power. The demarcation of the topic and source material described 
above makes this more of a diachronic comparison than a regional one, since the state 
formation process and therefore the laws appear at different points during the time span from 
the late-fifth to the early fourteenth century. A break in European legal activity can be 
detected in the tenth century, giving rise to theories of a break in the continuity of legal 
systems and thought.5 That may be, but the written laws that survived would still have the 
power to influence later legal thinking. The sources are presented in detail in chapter 2. 
The geographical demarcation thus excludes significant areas of European legislation 
and state consolidation, but includes some of the laws of the Heptarchy, the Lombard, 
Burgundian, Visigothic and Frankish kingdoms, and the Scandinavian kingdoms. Arguably, 
several other languages within these areas are more dominant than Latin in medieval written 
law: there are, for instance, vernacular texts from England and Scandinavia, not to mention 
the Celtic texts that are left out of the present study for linguistic reasons. My definition of the 
Latin sphere is that which is opposed to the Greek and Slavic linguistic regions on the 
Continent, which I have left out of this study. Apart from occasional digressions into 
Byzantine law, sources from these latter regions will not be part of the comparison. 
 Using the term ‘state’ in the early medieval context is of course contested. One can 
hardly get around Max Weber’s definition of the modern state, which encompasses the 
administration’s ability to claim a monopoly on legitimate violence and an ability to maintain 
the monopoly within a given territory.6 In opposition to this, Weber noted that ‘in the past, the 
                                                 
4 Irish law originated in the same period as the Germanic laws. Although the laws show a multifaceted 
development in the many chiefdoms on the island, a common legal culture seems to have developed. Maurizio 
Lupoi sees similarities between Irish law and other early medieval law, but he has provided arguments as to why 
it is difficult to compare Irish law with the early medieval legal development, such as lack of literary 
supplementing sources and uncertainty of origins. Lupoi, Origins, pp. 123-24, 131-32, 193-94. The main reason 
to me is linguistic, as the Irish laws were written in the vernacular. See also Fergus Kelly, A Guide to Early Irish 
Law (Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1988), pp. 232–38. 
5 Lupoi, Origins, pp. 3-4; Patrick Wormald, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, 
Legislation and its Limits, vol. 1 (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), p. 483. 
6 Max Weber, ‘Politics As a Vocation’, in Essays in Sociology, ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-128 (pp. 3-4) 
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most varied institutions (…) have known the use of physical force as quite normal’.7 Using a 
much-modified version of Weber’s definition of the state, I believe that it is fruitful here to 
use this term in relation to the separate geographical unities under investigation.8 Medieval 
states can be defined as encompassing, to a degree, the functions of common boundaries, 
territory, taxes, defences and law.9 In the forming state, every above-mentioned feature would 
only be present to a certain degree. A forming state would make claims to common 
boundaries and a given, but possibly changing, territory. It would make attempts at taxation of 
its subjects, aspire to a defence system, and most interesting here, aspire to a legal system and 
laws shared by its subjects. A number of scholarly discussions regarding use and definition of 
the term ‘state’ for pre-modern unities emphasise the importance of different features.10 While 
pointing to the connection between Christianisation and state formation in Norway, Sverre 
Bagge argues: ‘we should distinguish between unification and permanent unity. It is a normal 
phenomenon that political units formed by conquest dissolve again, so normal that the real 
question about state formation is not why the unit in question was formed but why it 
continued to exist.’11 The relevant point to this study is that the continuity of the unity is of 
less importance than the activity, and specifically the legislative activity happening during the 
period of formation. Bagge continues: ‘For continued existence, institutionalization and 
ideology are probably more important than direct physical power.’12 The legislation can be 
seen as both a marker of the state-formation period and one of the reasons for its prospective 
success. We find all shades of these features in the medieval states examined in this thesis. 
However, the interests of a legislating authority in a state-formation period can further 
contribute to our understanding of law and society in medieval Europe. 
 The present study will focus mainly on content, meanings and motivations behind the 
laws and rules, and will not consider the manuscripts or perform a linguistic analysis. A 
linguistic analysis would reveal much more, but such a project would involve another level of 
                                                 
7 Weber, ‘Politics’, p. 3. 
8 As has been done by Susan Reynolds, ‘The Historiography of the Medieval State’, in Companion to 
Historiography, ed. by Michael Bentley (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 117-38. 
9 As, for instance, in Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, trans by Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2000), pp. 256-61, 268-77, 344-47. Elias uses as examples the state-formation processes from the eleventh 
century onward, but his theories are transferable to earlier states. 
10 See, for instance, John G. Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International 
Relations’, International Organization, 47, 1 (1993), 139-74; Reynolds, ‘Historiography’; Rhys Jones, ‘Man and 
Men in a Medieval State: The Geographies of Power in the Middle Ages’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 24.1 (1999), 65-78. 
11 Sverre Bagge, ‘Christianization and State Formation in Early Medieval Norway’, Scandinavian Journal of 
History, 30, 2 (2005), 107-34, (p. 127). 
12 Bagge, ‘Christianization’, p. 127. 
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detail. There would be no space left to discuss the legislators’ motives for regulating 
inheritance and homicide in their laws, or the degree of transmission in the legislative process, 
which are the primary objectives. Detailed studies of the language and physical creation of the 
different laws have been carried out for several of the periods and regions included in my 
survey.13 
 Given the limitations of a doctoral thesis, a broad comparison must be done at the 
expense of details about context. The present study can only cover a long period of time at the 
expense of exploring the in-depth context to each legal source. A study with this perspective 
might provide answers to some of the questions of what, why and how law was incorporated 
into legal texts outside its original context.  
Demarcations of time and space are dependant on each other. I will focus on a given 
time in the history of each region during which the legal activity was in an important phase, a 
point at which the legislation and the formation of authority came together. In this way we 
will travel through the different regions at different times. The project will therefore take the 
form of an overview of legal development in Western Europe. Another more mundane reason 
for this approach is that there are few possibilities of a synchronous comparison of the legal 
development across all the regions. After Roman law, secular law is first found in the 
successor states on the Continent, with the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms soon following, while the 
Nordic regions generated written laws centuries later (from the ninth century, albeit mainly in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries). However, there are periods of internal legal development 
in each region, varying in lengths of time. The internal diachronic development will be 
studied in relation to legal transmission and influences. This will be explained further in 
chapter 3, on methodology. 
 A key point is that this is a study of the transmission of laws-in-books, not laws-in-
court. The aim here is to compare the written material of the European legal systems, leaving 
out the practical use, or lack of use, of the same material in actual cases.14 Legal transmission 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Julius Ficker, ‘Das Langobardishe und die skandinavishen Rechte’, MIÔG, 22 (1901), 1-50; 
Michael Jacoby, Germanisches Recht und Rechtssprache zwischen Mittelalter und Neyzeit unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des skandinavischen Rechts: Gegenthese zu J. Grimm und zu romantischer Auffassung im 20. 
Jahrhundert, in Lexemdistribution und Lexemverhalten in Textsorten und Dialekten innerhalb historischer 
Sprachstufen, vol. 1 (New York: Lang, 1986); Felix Liebermann, Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, hrsg. im 
Auftrage der Savigny-Stiftung, 3 vols (Halle a. S.: Niemeyer, 1903-1916); Dorothy Whitelock, English 
Historical Documents I, c. 500-1042 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968) (hereafter Whitelock, EHD); Erik 
Kroman, ‘Danmarks gamle love. Deres Alder og indbyrdes Slaegtskab’, Acta Philologica Scandinavica, 29 
(1971), pp. 111-126: Wormald, Making of English Law; Bjørg Dale Spørck, Kong Magnus Lagabøters 
kristenretter: Innhold, språk og overlevering (Oslo: Unipub, 2006). 
14 For studies of evidence of these laws in use, see Patrick Wormald, ‘Leges Barbarorum, Law and Ethnicity in 
the Late Roman West’, in Regna and Gentes: The Relationship Between Late Antique and Early Medieval 
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as it is revealed by jurists or by judges’ implementation in their work of ius from other regions 
will be brought into the discussion through secondary sources, but will not be treated 
separately. The reason for excluding the ‘reality’ of the laws in use is that its inclusion would 
make the project too ambitious to achieve its aims. In addition, the law codes were not always 
used in their given jurisdiction, and they were not even necessarily made for use.15 The main 
task of the laws was to legitimise the right to rule of those who issued them. Hence, written 
law formed the platform of their authoritative plan for society, whether this was ad hoc or 
well planned. Finally, many of the legal sources lack evidence of being applied in court. Even 
so, the question of whether the laws were intended for practical application impacts on our 
understanding of the legislator’s motives for including relevant rules. Thus, the link between 
theoretical rules and practice will be addressed in the analysis. 
 In choosing how to approach legal history, John Hudson has suggested that the 
approach presented above, examining the ideology behind the legislation espoused by 
legislators, tends ‘to emphasise the conscious ideas of those involved, as revealed by language 
and practice’ and is commonly found among historians.16 He points to general approach found 
among legal historians, who study the ‘legal ideas’ in law and ‘their transformation often over 
periods longer than those treated by historians interested in matters involving law’.17 My 
intention is to follow both these approaches in this study: examining the ideology of those 
involved in law-making, and – if not only the transformation – the transmission of these 
ideologies over a very long period of time. The agenda behind these approaches is to avoid 
the traditional division of history into periods, and possibly to discover long-term influences 
in secular legislation in Latin Europe. 
 
Inheritance and compensation for homicide  
 
The thematic focus of the thesis is on laws on inheritance and laws concerning wergild as 
compensation for homicide. Wergild means the value of a man, Gmc: wer + gilda = man + 
                                                 
Peoples and Kingdom in the Transformation of the Roman Word, ed. by Hans-Werner Goetz, Jörg Jarnut and 
Walter Pohl, Transformation of the Roman World, 13 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 21-54 (pp. 45-46).  
15 Patrick Wormald, ‘Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis: Legislation and Germanic Kingship, from Euric to Cnut’, in 
Early Medieval Kingship, ed. by P. H. Sawyer and I. N. Wood (Leeds: University of Leeds, 1977), pp. 105-38 
(p. 107).  
16 John Hudson, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 2, 871-1216 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 4. 
17 Hudson, Laws of England, p. 5. Hudson credits S. F. C. Milson, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 37. 
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price. These topics have been chosen because of their frequent occurrence in law, and because 
of their relationship to the process of state formation. The rules related to wergild and to 
inheritance could, I believe, illustrate the connection between the consolidation of power in 
society and legislation applicable to that society. 
 Generally speaking, we can say that all laws have one of two purposes: there are 
preventative laws that aim to control human interaction relationships and prescribe procedures 
for different situations, and there are laws that set prohibitions and impose sentences for 
breaches of them. The intent of the law is, again put roughly, to regulate these two purposes in 
order to create the rule of law in a society, and the institutions of inheritance and wergild, 
respectively, represent them: Inheritance anticipates a fixed distribution of land and wealth 
from one generation to the next, and compensation for homicide settles interpersonal 
conflicts.18 
 Laws on inheritance and wergild both reveal aspects of a society’s structure of kinship 
and the position of the extended family in relation to the state structure. Inheritance regulated 
how land and resources were distributed, and how this was understood by the central power. 
The distribution of wealth could follow both lines of the family (cognatic), which indicates 
that the principles of inheritance were orientated in systems of kindred groups, or it could 
follow just one (agnatic) – usually the male – on the principle of linear groups. Linear systems 
of inheritance have been seen as an indicator of a weak central power. Laws on inheritance 
could thus represent how the lawgiver saw the reproduction of society by regulating the 
frames of kinship and family. It is therefore interesting to examine how the state authority as 
legal authority treated this, or influenced concepts of kinship through the laws on inheritance. 
Many studies in the last two decades have focused on family strategies relating to marriage 
and inheritance.19 This study will take the legislator’s point of view, and seek to expose the 
motives of the legal authority and the influences and pressures to which it was subject in the 
law-making process.  
 The study comprises details of the inheritance systems as they appear in written law. 
The systems used here derive from the Nordic research on family structures and strategies, 
which present us with two main models of inheritance distribution, called the parentela 
system and the gradual system. These are further presented in chapter 4. A comparison of the 
                                                 
18 This is expressed regarding inheritance by, for instance, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: 
Historical-Critical Edition of De la démocratie en Amérique, vol. 1, ed. by Eduardo Nolla, trans. by James T. 
Schleifer (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010 [1835]), p. 11. 
19 See Lars Ivar Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og sosiale strategier i nordisk middelalder’, Collegium Medievale, 
7, (1996), 103-154 (pp. 103-04) for further outlines and references. 
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systems reveals congruence between the separate legislation processes from different times 
and places. Regarding transmission, the similarities are interesting to follow. As the 
hypothesis stated at the beginning, all societies must have some system of inheritance. The 
question is then whether similarities in the written systems were a result of transmission or 
were due to societies arriving at obvious systems which leave traces in written law.  
 There are different theories concerning how to read the concept of wergild and 
compensation in the laws: whether it was traditional custom or new legislation regulating 
private conflicts, whether it was included in written law as punishment or as a basis from 
which the parties involved might try to reach agreement. We could ask what the governing 
purpose was of including the compensation in written law. Compensation for homicide or 
other violence is connected with the authorities’ attempts at coping with violence. This is 
sometimes read as a civilising process in the forming states of Europe.20 In my view, it is 
problematic to read the legislation on violence in general, and on homicide in particular, as a 
conscious programme of civilisation, either from a ruling legislating king or a legislating 
administration. Rather, the attempts to regulate violence through written law were primarily 
about establishing control, a virtue of necessity to maintain authority. To regulate violence 
through the law is part of a claim on a monopoly of legitimate violence and an aspiration to a 
law system and legislation shared by its subjects. Norbert Elias saw the monopolisation of 
state functions mentioned above as a process with two phases.21 First, there is a phase of 
competition and elimination, secondly, a phase of consolidation that can evolve into public 
functions. However, Elias was not attentive to the function of legislation when discussing his 
theory of the civilisation process in the medieval (and modern) period, but legislation 
constitutes a central part of his second phase, particularly legislation to regulate violence, 
including homicide. 
 In the case of compensation for homicide, it is significant to examine whether 
relatives, according to secular law, had a duty to contribute to compensation paid by a killer 
of their kin group. A personal responsibility ascribed to the killer could indicate that the 
state’s control of the individual was stronger than that of the family. The individual’s actions 
were of concern to the state, and the family therefore lost some of its significance as the 
monitoring and restricting institution. Compensation has often been viewed as being 
presented to a society as an alternative to feud, and therefore as indicating the presence of 
                                                 
20 Ole Fenger, Feide og Mandebod, Studier over slægtsansvaret i germansk og gammeldansk ret (Copenhagen: 
Juristforbundets Forlag, 1971), pp. 9-10: Elias, The Civilizing Process, pp. 257-344. 
21 Elias, The Civilizing Process, pp. 276. 
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centralised power. Alternatively, wergild is argued to be an influence of the Church in a pre-
state society. In some laws, part of the wergild was paid to the king or the treasury. Allowing 
some of the wergild to profit the state meant that the wergild was a source of governmental 
income and, therefore, a manoeuvre to strengthen central power by extending legal 
intervention in the state formation process. Such theories will be examined further in chapter 
9. 
 Legal historians often name compensation for homicide as the concept of wergild. In 
most cases, wergild and the compensation for homicide are identical, as law prescribed that 
the wergild of the victim was due if someone killed someone else. In some laws, however, the 
legislators prescribed compensation with a basis in the wergild, but the sum could be x times 
the wergild or a fraction of the wergild. Compensation was the conflict resolution alternative 
to vengeance and continued violence, or an alternative or completive to other solutions, such 
as public prison or corporal punishment. Although most of the societies where these laws 
applied had no policing authority and little possibility of prosecution, secular law was 
recorded in written form with the thought that it would establish power. Written law was in 
itself a tool of governance. 
 The present study is based on the hypothesis that concept of law in early medieval 
Western Europe was based on an awareness of the existence of ‘crime’, the potential of law 
and the power of legislation. Compensation has been seen as a sign of an undeveloped system 
of punishment, rather than based on the idea of crime, a point that Patrick Wormald believes 
to be a misunderstanding in historical research.22 According to this view, the idea of crime in 
the early Middle Ages was not the same as in later periods, because compensation was not a 
‘proper’ punishment.23 The motive of the legislator to provide a monetary solution for 
homicide is thus interesting in view of transmission. How did written law present the act of 
homicide, and a solution through compensation? Regarding transmission, a comparison of the 
legislation concerning compensation may reveal similarities in motives or process, and it may 
be possible to assess whether the similarities reflect the influence of earlier rules, or whether 
any given law was original with the similarity to earlier legislation being coincidental, that is, 
one society independently arriving at the same solution as another one. 
                                                 
22 Patrick Wormald, Legal Culture in the Early Medieval West: Law as Text, Image and Experience (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1999), p. 61. 
23 Frederick Pollock and Frederic W. Maitland The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2 vols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899), I, pp. 46-48; II, pp. 449-52. 
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 The thematic focus on inheritance and wergild has been chosen because of the many 
factors that could influence the legislation on these matters. Inheritance is the most normal, 
and ideally the most peaceful, way of distributing wealth within the family; compensation for 
homicide follows one of the most extreme events within society and is a method of conflict 
resolution in relation to the broader family or kin group. The continuation and transfer of 
wealth between generations affects the stability of existing society. The transfer of wealth to 
outside groups as compensation also affects the stability of society, by way of peace 
regulations. Therefore, the authorities would have an interest in deciding and controlling the 
principles lying behind such transfers. The position of sons, daughter and other relatives, and 
the wealth of women, play a role in family strategies, and thus they would be of interest to 
those people subjected to the law. This is particularly true of the landowning classes. The 
Church would also have an interest in these regulations, for both ideological and pragmatic 
reasons, since keeping the peace was of interest to the organisation, as was the distribution of 
wealth. These are the main interest groups for regulations on inheritance and compensation 
for homicide. The source material is, as has been pointed out, from periods of state formation. 
Legislation on principles of inheritance and compensation for homicide could therefore shed 
light on the roles of kin and the state and their interplay in this period of transformation. In 
what way was law-making influenced by the re-defining of authority versus the interests of 
the subjects?  
 In other words, this project will examine legal transmission from a narrow perspective 
in a broad geographical and chronological field. The purpose of this approach is to explore 
legal development over time and to examine transmission of secular law within this scope and 
timeframe. In extension of this goal, the thesis aims to explore the possibility of transmission 
a transmission of a European legal thought between the barriers historians tend to construct 
between periods, as between the period of the Roman empire and the early Middle Ages, and 
between the early and High Middle Ages.  
 
1.2 Historiography 
In the present study, the subject of legal transmission is the overriding objective. Still, the two 
fields of inheritance laws and wergild will be discussed in depth, as they form part of the 
object of study. The thesis will cover medieval legal history, the history of state formation and 
the history of the family and marriage. Moreover, the invaluable research included on the 
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different historical periods is essential, consisting of research on early medieval European 
history, pre-Norman England and Scandinavia. A limited outline follows of some of the main 
works assisting this study.  
 
Studies on transmission and transnational perspectives 
 
Several works have examined one, or have compared a selection, of the regions that are 
included in the present study. However, there are few that have provided a broader picture of 
the legal landscape of Europe, from its early beginnings after Roman law on the Continent 
and in England, following this all the way through the legal revolution in the twelfth century 
as far as the later secular legislation in the later state formations in the Nordic realms. A 
strong advocate for studying transmission of law, was legal historian Alan Watson. In his 
work Legal Transplants, Watson argued that most law was a transmission from older legal 
sources.24 His unequivocal position, that most legislation is a legal transplant, has caused 
critical reactions from other legal scholars, among them Pierre Legrand.25 Watson’s theories 
and the debate on legal transmission will be discussed in more depth in chapter 3.  
In the late 1800s, several German legal historians made thorough comparisons of the 
different European and Scandinavian laws from the medieval period, with works by Karl von 
Amira and Julius Ficker among others.26 The nineteenth-century German school of proving 
transmission and contact was abandoned for decades due to the scholars’ affinity for the idea 
of a common Germanic Urrecht.27 In the Nordic countries, the prevailing view was that 
Nordic laws originated independent of continental legal culture, a view that was clearly 
affected by nationalistic trends and that was very tenacious.  
 Works exploring external influences on law have been a disputed field within legal 
history. Karl von Amira’s and Konrad Maurer’s research has revealed a relationship between 
medieval secular laws from the Continent, Britain and Scandinavia.28 Grand comparative 
                                                 
24 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants, An Approach To Comparative Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 
1974). 
25 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 111 (1997), 111-24. 
26 Karl von Amira, Das altnorwegische Vollstreckungsverfahren. Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Abhandlung 
(Munich: Ackermann, 1874), p. xviii; Ficker, ‘Das Langobardishe’.  
27 Or ‘primal “Germanic” law’ as formulated in Wormald, Making of English Law, pp. 11-12. 
28 For instance, in Karl von Amira, Nordgermanisches obligationenrecht, 2 vols (Leipzig: Veit & companie, 
1882-1895); Konrad von Maurer Vorlesungen über altnordische Rechtsgeschichte. 1-5, (Leipzig: Deichert, 
1907-1910). 
 12 
theories, such as Henry Maine’s primary work Ancient Law, revealed diachronic 
correspondences between early and modern law.29 Although many studies from the nineteenth 
century shed light on or suggested correlations between early legal systems, methodological 
difficulties of a comparative law approach led to such an approach falling into disuse.30 It was 
too difficult to conclusively determine the source of influences. Rather, legal historians 
studied the particularities of the individual systems. Then, in the 1960s and 70s, several legal 
scholars argued that a comparative approach nevertheless contributed to our knowledge of 
legal systems and their origin. The theories of Alan Watson, that changes in law mainly 
happens through transplants have already been mentioned. Others, as Bernard S. Jackson 
argued that comparative law of ancient systems could answer problems in modern 
comparative law.31 A comparative study with historical methodological approaches may 
contribute to the topic without the obstacles associated with comparative law.  
After historians from the 1960s turned their back on the hypothesis of originality in the 
Nordic laws, many pointed out different sources of influence on the Scandinavian and 
Icelandic laws. Roman influence on Nordic legal culture has been described by legal historian 
Ole Fenger.32 His work Fejde og Mandebod (Feud and Wergild) from 1971 is both an 
important discussion of the correlation between state formation and violence, and also one of 
the few works discussing several western European secular laws from the early and High 
Middle Ages. Fenger is sceptical of a comprehensive comparative study of law, but his work 
is still a broad comparative study both in time and space, and as such the work closest in 
method to the present study. He compares the Danish material with some Germanic, Anglo-
Saxon and Norman legislation on feud and compensation. However, he omits the south-
western continental laws of the Visigoths and the Burgundians, on the basis that they were 
incorporated into the Roman empire, and further omits other Germanic laws, except the 
Lombard and Frankish laws, on the basis that the king and the Church played a similar role in 
all these jurisdictions.33 Similarly, he excluded Nordic areas other than the Danish area, 
because he saw them as similar in content and exposed to the same influences.34 The Danish 
                                                 
29 Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern 
Ideas (London: John Murray, 1861). 
30 Bernard S. Jackson, ‘Evolution and Foreign Influence in Ancient Law’, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 16 (1968), 372-90 (pp. 372-73). 
31 Jackson, ‘Evolution’, pp. 373-74.  
32 Ole Fenger, Romerret i Norden, Berlingske leksikon bibliotek 119 (Copenhagen : Berlingske Forlag, 1977). 
33 Fenger, Fejde og Mandebod, p. 209.  
34 Fenger, Fejde og Mandebod, pp. 210-12. 
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legal historians Ditlev Tamm and Helle Vogt have discussed transmission in the Nordic laws 
with a focus on the influence of canon law.35  
 Studies of exchange in early legal culture mainly consist of works that focus on one 
law and its relationship with Roman law. Jill Harries’s various articles on the Visigothic legal 
material can serve as an example, as can Brigitte Pohl-Resl and Walter Pohl’s work on 
Lombard law.36 In 1994, the Italian jurist Maurizio Lupoi published the substantial work Alle 
radici del mondo giuridico europea in which he compares the development of the European 
legal systems from AD 600 to 1100. He demonstrates many kinds of contact and 
transmission, but mainly examines the development of jurisdiction. An English translation 
was published in 2000, as The Origins of the European Legal Order.37 Lupoi, although not 
believing in an urrecht, argues for a shared background for both Roman and Germanic law. 
And, he asserts that it is this ancient shared legal system, rather than adoption (or 
transmission), which explains shared features in the laws.38 Concerning medieval laws in 
general, some scholars, like Lupoi, have argued for the existence of a ius commune, also 
called the European common law, a shared European legal standard.39 But there are many 
questions still unasked and unanswered. Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde, among others, has called for 
a systematic analysis of transmission within the Norwegian medieval laws, in what he labels a 




                                                 
35 Ditlev Tamm, Dansk retshistorie, 2nd edn (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1996); Helle 
Vogt, Slægtens funksjon i nordisk højmiddelalderret – kanonisk retsideologi og fredsskabende lovgivning 
(KøbenhavnCopenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2005). Vogt is translated into English: Helle 
Vogt, The Function of Kinship in Medieval Nordic Legislation (Leiden: Brill, 2010). 
36 See, for instance, Walter Pohl, ‘The Empire and the Lombards: Treaties and Negotiations in the Sixth 
Century’, in Kingdoms of the Empire: The Integration of Barbarians in Late Antiquity, ed. by Walter Pohl 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 75-134; Brigitte Pohl-Resl, ‘Legal Practice and Ethnic Identity in Lombard Italy’, in 
Strategies of Distinction, The Constructions of Ethnic Communities 300-800, ed. by Walter Pohl and Helmut 
Reimitz, Transformation of the Roman World, 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 205-19; Jill Harries, ‘Not the 
Theodosian Code: Euric’s Law and Late Fifth-Century Gaul’, in Society and Culture in Late Antique Gaul, ed. 
by Ralph Mathisen and Danuta Shanzer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 39-51. 
37 See note 2, above. 
38 Lupoi, Origins, p. 23. 
39 Lupoi, Origins, p. 424.  
40 Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde, ‘Internasjonaliseringa av retten i mellomalderen – ei forskingsutfordring’, in Den 
juridiske komedien - Ein antologi over tanke og praksis i den norske rettskulturen si historie, ed. by Jørn 
Øyrehagen Sunde (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2007), pp. 54-71. See also Gudmund Sandvik, ‘Dei norske 
landskapslovene frå mellomalderen. Nokre aktuelle problemstillingar og forskingsoppgåver’, in Nordiske 
middelalderlover. Tekst og kontekst, Rapport fra seminar ved Senter for middelalderstudier, 29.-30. nov. 1996, 




The vast bulk of Roman law forms a backdrop for analysing transmission in medieval secular 
legislation. Understanding the motives behind the Roman legislation on inheritance and 
homicide from a time period of several centuries is necessary. Some useful works on Roman 
law shed light on how the content was formed and later interpreted. William Buckland’s 
classic textbook includes thorough discussions of relevant questions in this respect.41 One of 
the basic textbooks in English has been produced in a new edition. Jolowicz’s Introduction on 
Roman Law was published in 1932, and was revised by Barry Nicholas in 1972.42 By treating 
republican law, Jolowicz supplemented the work of Buckland. The revised edition also 
commented on the transformation of earlier law in late antiquity. More recent works of a 
similar note are by Georg Mosourakis, and, more directly concerning the legislative process, 
the basic but thorough The Sources of Roman Law: Problems and Methods for Ancient 
Historians, by Olivia F. Robinson.43 Many historians have explored the transitional period of 
the late Roman world and its law. Worth mentioning in respect of transmission and the topics 
of inheritance and homicide are Judith Evans Grubbs and John Matthews, who have 
identified, respectively, the motives behind changes in the laws of Emperor Constantine’s 
family legislation and the motives behind the Visigothic use of the Theodosian Code.44  
 Regarding early medieval law, some representatives for the nineteenth-century 
German Rechtschule has already been mentioned. An important contribution to our 
understanding of the Germanic legal sources is Katherine Fisher Drew’s translations with 
comments.45 Scholars are taking an increased interest in early medieval legislation, too. Law 
makes up much of the written sources for the years AD 400 to 800, and naturally they must be 
consulted. Even so, in recent decades, a group of historians have contributed to a renewal in 
                                                 
41 William W. Buckland, A Text-book of Roman Law: From Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1921). 
42 H. F Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972). 
43 O. F. Robinson, The Sources of Roman Law: Problems and Methods for Ancient Historians (London: 
Routledge, 1997); George Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law (Berlin: Springer, 2012). 
44 Judith Evans Grubbs, ‘Constantine and Imperial Legislation on the Family’, in The Theodosian Code: Studies 
in the Imperial Law of Late Antiquity, ed. by Jill Harries and Ian Wood (London: Bloomsbury Academics, 1993), 
pp. 120-142; Judith Evans Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity, The Emperor Constantine’s Marriage 
Legislation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John F. Matthews, ‘Interpreting the Interpretationes of the 
Breviarum’, in Law, Society and Authority in Late Antiquity, Shifting frontiers in Late Antiquity, ed. by Ralph W. 
Mathisen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) , pp. 11-32. 
45 Katherine Fischer Drew, trans., The Burgundian Code (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972); 
Katherine Fischer Drew, trans., The Lombard Laws (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996 
[1973]); Katherine Fisher Drew, The Laws of the Salian Franks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1991). 
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the field of Germanic law, through a series of international seminars leading to publications in 
which the sources are studied from new angles. A significant introduction to these new 
approaches was the anthology The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe, edited 
by Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre, including important contributions from Chris Wickham 
and Patrick Wormald, among others.46 In the series ‘Transformation of the Roman World’, 
Other major contributions to the field were made, such as the anthology Strategies of 
Distinction, The Construction of Ethnic Communities, 300-800 (1998), edited by Walter Pohl, 
in which Dietrich Claude, Wolf Liebescuetz, Hagith Sivan and others explored the 
multifaceted ethnic and legal identities of people in the former Roman provinces.47 Similar 
contributions have been published by, for instance, Jill Harries and Ian Wood, working on late 
Roman legislation and early medieval legal identity in the successor states.48 Walter Pohl and 
Brigitte Pohl-Resl have studied Germanic understanding of Roman law in the new 
legislation.49  
 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland’s legal classic from 1895, The 
History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I & II, has been a major work of reference 
for scholars of medieval English law.50 The work provides an important understanding of 
early English law, although it has a tendency to view early law as that which was later 
replaced by the origins of English common law and Norman law, rather than as having 
historical value in and of itself. Contemporary Felix Liebermann’s complete text of the 
materials for the history of English law, Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, is alone a towering 
contribution to the study of early English law.51 His critical comments provide insight into the 
variation and transmission of the manuscripts, as well as insight into the legislation behind 
them. An important contributor to understanding the medieval English, as well as European, 
laws is Patrick Wormald. In several publications, he provided new perspectives on both the 
legal sources and the legislators. An important contribution to the debate on early medieval 
laws as sources was his article from 1977, ‘Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis: Legislation and 
                                                 
46 Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre, eds, The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,1986). 
47 Walter Pohl and Helmut Reimitz, eds, Strategies of Distinction: The Constructions of Ethnic Communities 
300-800, The Transformation of the Roman World, 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1998). 
48 Jill Harries and Ian Wood, eds, The Theodosian Code, Studies in the Imperial Law of Late Antiquity (London: 
Bloomsbury Academics, 1993); Harries, ‘Not the Theodosian Code’. 
49 Walter Pohl, ‘Frontiers in Lombard Italy: The Laws of Ratcis and Aistulf’, in The Transformation of 
Frontiers, From Late Antiquity to the Carolingians, ed. by Walter Pohl and Ian Wood, The Transformation of 
the Roman World, 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 117-41; Pohl-Resl, ‘Legal Practice and Ethnic Identity’. 
50 See note 23, above. 
51 Felix Liebermann, Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, hrsg. im Auftrage der Savigny-Stiftung, 3 vols (Halle a. S.: 
Niemeyer, 1903-1916). 
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Germanic Kingship, from Euric to Cnut’.52 He discussed the origins of these laws, and 
claimed they should primarily be seen as forming the basis for kingship. He did, however, 
argue that Germanic codes cannot be dismissed as normative source material, as they reveal 
aspects of kingly ideology. Arguably, his most influential work, The Making of English 
Law, published in 1999, gave an account of the early English laws from the seventh to the 
twelfth century. The work is an unprecedented account of both the status and transmission of 
the legal manuscripts and a discussion of the thought behind the legislation. Wormald also 
compares the earliest legal remains of the Heptarchy to earlier and contemporary continental 
laws. 
 The Scandinavian provincial laws and national codes have also been a focus of interest 
from the mid-1800s, and an object of interest for the above-mentioned German recthschule. 
The legal sources constitute a large part of the relatively sparse medieval written material 
from Scandinavia. Thus, the laws have always been researched. However, these sources have 
been subject to a renewed scholarly interest in the last two decades.53 Nordic, but also 
international scholars have studied them from new perspectives. Scholars from both history 
and legal studies have contributed to a fruitful methodological approach and theoretical 
understanding of the legal sources and their origin. On the other hand, legal historian Helle 
Vogt studied all the Scandinavian provincial laws in her dissertation from 2005, Slægtens 
funksjon i nordisk højmiddelalderret, revised and published in English in 2010 as The 
Function of Kinship in Medieval Nordic Legislation.54 In her thorough survey and comparison 
of the rules concerning wergild, inheritance and marriage, she covers sources of outside 
influence. Vogt’s scope is, nevertheless, not the transmission of normative ideology, but the 
responsibilities of kin as they are portrayed in legislation, and the incorporation of canonical 




Inheritance laws as a field of research extend into several related fields, such as marriage, 
property and kinship. Nordic scholars have contributed to the wider field of inheritance 
legislation, both as regulations and as social phenomenon. By putting forward new ideas of 
                                                 
52 Wormald, ‘Lex Scripta’, pp. 105-38. 
53 A particular example is the series of conferences and publications from The Carlsberg Academy Conferences 
on Medieval Legal History, organised by Danish academics, from 2005 onwards.  
54 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon and Vogt, Function of Kinship. 
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strategies of social reproduction and strategies of kinship, social historians such as Lars Ivar 
Hansen and Birgit Sawyer, and legal historians like the above-mentioned Helle Vogt, express 
perspectives on medieval family strategies, and legislation concerned with these, both as a 
matter of the family strategies themselves and in relation to the interests of the Church and the 
secular authorities.  
Some scholars, including Alexander Murray, have studied the concept of kinship in 
certain Germanic societies as an expression of societal development.55 Others have studied 
inheritance legislation as a channel through which to study family relationships, or the 
position of women in medieval societies, such as Suzanne F. Wemple, who has studied 
Frankish women, and Constance Bouchard, who has studied marriages in the tenth and 
eleventh centuries.56 Anthropologically orientated scholars, such as Jack Goody, have 
communicated new perspectives on the family systems of earlier societies, for instance the 
function of different inheritance systems.57 In this thesis, inheritance legislation assumes the 
role of an expression of the legislators’ view of the reproduction of society. 
 
Wergild and compensation 
 
Patrick Wormald and Stefan Esders have analysed wergilds as they appear in law. Esders 
argues that the amounts of compensation stipulated had functions of complex status 
denominators, whereas the wergilds described in the Germanic laws assume the elite status of 
the warrior nobility of the Germanic settlers in continental Europe.58  
The late Lisi Oliver’s work was closely connected with wergild and compensation for 
homicide. In the book The Body Legal in Barbarian Law from 2011, Oliver made a thorough 
survey of the tariffs prescribed by secular Germanic law in the early Middle Ages.59 She 
                                                 
55 Alexander C. Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure: Studies in Law and Society in Antiquity and the Early 
Middle Ages (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983). 
56 Suzanne Fonay Wemple, Women in Frankish Society. Marriage and the Cloister 500 to 900 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981); Constance Bouchard, ‘Consanguinity and Noble Marriages in the Tenth 
and Eleventh Centuries’, Speculum, 56 (1981), 268-87. 
57 Jack Goody, ‘Inheritance, Property and Women: Some Comparative Considerations’, in Family and 
Inheritance; Rural Society in Western Europe, 1200 1800, ed. by J. Goody, J. Thirsk, and E. P. Thompson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 10-36; Jack Goody, The Development of Family and 
Marriage in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
58 Stefan Esders ‘“Eliten” und “Strafrecht” im frühen Mittelalter. Überlegungen zu den Bußen- und 
Wergeldkatalogen der Leges barbarorum’, in Théories et pratiques des élites au haut Moyen Âge, ed. by 
Bougard, François, Goetz, Hans-Werner and Régine Le Jan, Collection Haut Moyen Âge, 13 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2011), pp. 261-282. 
59 Lisi Oliver, The Body Legal in Barbarian Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
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reveals the many types of compensation for many types of injuries. Although she has 
provided some accounts of the individual wergilds that are less precise, she has made a 
valuable categorisation of the regional differences. Not many works have concentrated solely 
on the system of compensation in written laws, apart from the already mentioned works by 
Vogt. However, inevitably when discussing compensation and the concept of wergild, the 
related topics of feud and vengeance must also be discussed. Many scholars have contributed 
to the understanding of feud and the relationship between compensation and vengeance. One 
example is Paul Hyams, who, through his many works, has demonstrated the complexity of 
the feuding system as a system within medieval societies. Through earlier research by Max 
Glükmann, with his central work ‘Peace in the Feud’, and Wallace-Hadrill, with his book The 
Long-Haired Kings, scholars have touched upon the function of compensation as a tool for 
controlling vengeance.60 One intention of this thesis is to bring attention to the widespread 
legislation on compensation due to its connection with these other topics in respect of the 
relationship between people as described by the legislator. 
 
Conclusion 
Without having the intention of either proving a common legal origin for the German laws or 
following the idea of a European common law, I believe it is fruitful to examine these 
similarities more closely, with new approaches. To paint with broad strokes can reveal other 
connections in medieval law than thorough a point-by-point analysis. The desired contribution 
of the present study is to provide more points of reference for understanding European 




                                                 
60 Max Gluckman, ‘The Peace in the Feud’, Past and Present, 8 (1955), 1-14; John M. Wallace-Hadrill, The 
Long-Haired Kings and Other Studies in Frankish History (London: Methuen, 1962).  
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2. Sources and Context: Medieval Secular Law 
 
In search of transmission, a number of legal sources from the early and High Middle Ages 
will be examined. Laws issued, and law codes ordered, by royal authority are the main 
sources, although some of the extant laws analysed, such as the Scandinavian provincial laws, 
originated outside of royal power. Laws enacted by kings provide an image of kingly 
legislative power and say something about the motivation of the king as legislator. These 
laws, enacted through royal initiative, will also contain an element of state administration. For 
example, in the laws on inheritance and homicide, kings’ laws provide an insight into the state 
authority’s attitude towards its subjects’ private matters. The significance for this study of 
these sources lies not in how they functioned within the legal system, or whether they were 
even used, were outdated or were really just produced for display. Their significance lies in 
what they have to say about legal transmissions or legal originality, and it is for this reason 
they are included. Other legal sources are also examined, such as ius and works of normative 
content that are not law. 
 The term ‘law’ indicates more than one thing today, as was the case in the early and 
High Middle Ages. Law could be the custom and traditions experienced by a group, or it 
could be written rules, or it could be both. The heritage of Rome created the notion of written 
law in Europe. Both canon law and the different attempts at making or writing down law by 
secular rulers illustrate the surviving ideological virtue of making laws for humankind. Not all 
of the sources in the present study are considered unequivocally to be law. Some of them, 
such as the jurisprudence of the Roman jurists, did not have, or were not intended to have, 
legal authority, and some, such as some of the Danish provincial laws, may not have been 
promulgated.61  
 Regardless of whether the law was secular or canonical, the Christian clergy were 
involved in writing or advising on many of the laws. As others have pointed out, the Church 
probably only preserved those records serving its own interests, i.e., the records from which 
the clergy profited.62 We can assume the same was the case in the clergy’s role in law-making 
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and law-keeping, that they made laws which were in their interest. The laws were survived 
nevertheless, possibly because of the status written law held. 
 
Investigating the practical usage of law exceeds the scope of this thesis. What is relevant, 
however, to a discussion of the transmission of law is whether the legislator expected his rules 
to be used in real cases, and whether the rules were made for practical use. Wormald held that 
Germanic law was more of a ‘poster’ than practical legal works.63 The law was, he argued, a 
display window for the legislative strength of secular authority. 
 In some modern languages, there is a distinction between ‘law’ and ‘right’. In German, 
the words are Gezetz and recht, in French loi and droit, in Norwegian lov and rett, and with 
some ambiguity, in Latin the pair are lex and ius. Modern English does not have the same 
pairing with the same semantic content as these other languages. Loosely translated, there is a 
distinction between the law, as in the rules of law, and rights, as in legal concepts, the legal 
system and rights according to normative standards. In these languages, the term ‘right’ also 
has the antonym ‘unright’. As Sara M. Pons-Sanz has pointed out, riht can be found in 
Archbishop Wulfstan’s (†1023) canons as a synonym for law, lagu,64 although often the 
semantics takes more of the modern meaning of right, being the right to do something, or the 
right of God.65 In Old English, a division between law and right existed, with lagu and riht, 
possibly loans from Old Norse.66 But riht would be overtaken by lagu in the language, and 
riht seems to have fallen out of use. It is possible that riht has the semantics of right and 
obligations, and not law per se, except in Wulfstan’s works.67 Later English writings on law 
give the same variations. John Hudson points to the many meanings of both the Latin and the 
Old English words that are equivalent to the modern English word ‘law’; the word had many 
meanings and much wider fields of meaning than ‘a law’ or ‘a rule’, which is similar to the 
many ways in which the term is used in modern language.68 The term riht also had many 
meanings, although in many legal documents it meant a particular right. The Latin or Anglo-
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Norman words for law and right could take the same meaning, according to Hudson, and the 
two terms cannot automatically be interpreted as meaning different things. 
 In this thesis, I will use the term ‘law’ both in a wide sense, meaning normative 
concepts and scriptures, and in a narrow sense, meaning rules issued by a legislator conscious 
of the act. The status of a source will be clarified when needed. Moreover, the source material 
consists of written secular law. The legal sources will be read in their written context, 
described above as laws-in-books, as opposed to considering their possible or actual reception 
in real cases. 
 
2.1 Using normative sources: Law as image of ideal societies 
There are several pitfalls to using normative sources. As they are idealistic, the normative 
sources should not be taken at face value as a mirror of society.69 Thus, a law cannot represent 
the society it covers. To use normative sources as mirror of the norms in a particular society 
is also treacherous, because it is the creator of the law who sets the norms. One should try to 
disentangle the expectations of the subjects from the expectations of the legislators, in order to 
assess what has influenced the written law. Nevertheless, to use normative sources as a mirror 
of the norms of the legislator also calls for caution. The text could mirror the norms that the 
legislator wanted to be mirrored, or the loan of foreign laws possibly had coincidental results. 
To find the motives behind a section of a law, an edict or a law code will form the main goal 
of this study, though the task is fraught with difficulties. 
 The head of state expected to fulfil the role of Rex Iustus, while his learned assistants 
in all probability formulated the words or helped provide the right formulas. The law was the 
tool of kings, but it was made by advisers, notaries and scholars. This group of disparate 
agents involved in legislation is what Alan Watson has termed the ‘legal elite’.70 Watson’s 
assertion is that those who made the law do not have legislative authority. By contrast, he 
claims, those who were invested with legislative authority did not make the law, or did not 
have legislative competence. In evaluating this process, Alan Watson’s theory of the utility of 
legal transplants becomes relevant, presented in chapter 3.71 His point is how much easier is is 
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51, (pp. 335-39). 
 22 
and was to borrow existing law, than making new. Existing law would be useful for the 
creators of new rules. 
 When it is problematic to use normative material as a mirror of society, what can we 
read on transmission and originality from its context? Powerful groups could be a possible 
source of influence on the legislator. Another question is what the law represented to the 
society over which it had jurisdiction. Different laws had different functions other than being 
used in court. Constitutional legislation, for example, was meant for the absolutely highest 
political level, although in Visigothic Spain, for instance, it can be seen that the contemporary 
top elite disregarded even this.72 The rules may contain descriptions of family relationships, 
but they do not necessarily produce a valid image of family life in any given society, and they 
may not have been recognised by the majority of subjects. Many legislators comment on how 
the members of different classes should behave, but the actual conception of class and status 
in the relevant society may have been different. The normative material does, after all, only 
present a model of what society was or should be according to the creator of the text. What 
the sources most accurately represent is the mind and views of those legislating and writing 
down the legal texts. 
 But can we say something of how the legislator’s conceptions of society leave traces 
in the written law? For the subjects in a jurisdiction, the concept of justice presumably derived 
from their own experience. The norms or ideals of the legal elite also came from their views 
of the society around them. In the definition that Reinhart Koselleck gives of 
Erfahrungsraum, the space of experience, we can say that the space of experience of the legal 
elite would determine how their society was described.73 Thus, to follow Koselleck’s theories 
on the pre-modern conceptions of the relationship between the past and the future, 
Erwartungshorizont, the horizon of expectation, we can say that the horizon of expectation of 
the legislators was closely related to their past experience. In other words, the legal elite 
would describe society in familiar terms, even if their rules were innovative. The normative 
expectations of how law would work were connected to the legal elite’s expectations of 
change, or rather status quo. In most cases, we can assume that making law was about 
preserving established traditions, as Felix Jolowicz asserted was the case for the lengthy 
Roman legal development.74 However, in some cases, the idea of writing a law was a novelty, 
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or in development. In the latter instances, we could argue that the legislators sought to change 
the future by exercising law. The changes are still derived in the space of experience. Auður 
Magnúsdóttir gives a useful view of the problem of normative sources when she discusses the 
value of the rejected law code Járnsiða as source material.75 She asserts that although laws 
are normative in character, they rarely shed light on existing norms, and even less often on 
reality.76 An analysis of the legal texts can shed light on the conflicts surrounding the norms, 
and an analysis of the reception of a law can reveal it as an ‘expression of conflict between 
different interests in the society of which it is a product’.77 
 Pre-modern laws rarely described what was not allowed, but more often set out the 
proper approach to given circumstances, or the proper consequences for a crime. In the sense 
that there was no police force to execute the law, descriptions of procedure would be the sum 
of the capacity of the written law. Little real power could enforce a prohibition. In the present 
study, this is relevant to the rules on inheritance and homicide. An inheritance regulation 
would mainly contain instructions on how an inheritance should rightfully be distributed, and 
how to solve conflicts arising from this, if they came before the legal system. A regulation on 
homicide would mainly contain rules on how to assess the nature of the crime and how to 
punish and settle the crime. An exception might be Roman law, which was enforced with a 
certain authoritative apparatus, in the sense that crimes that were considered public offences 
would be prosecuted without the need for complaint from the injured parties. Still, most of 
Roman written law implies private action, although brought before public courts. Hence, the 
laws cannot reveal what people could or could not do, and they can hardly tell us any of the 
normative standards of society. A private agreement that went against written contemporary 
law would most likely not be checked by an official authority.78 Nevertheless, the creation of 
the texts that we commonly call laws had a meaning, a motivation or an agenda. If the 
legislator was not assuming that the subjects would follow the law, or was not imagining that 
he would have the power to enforce it, the rules nevertheless represented existing norms, 
possibly in society, but more definitely in the mind of the legislator. Who made the law is thus 
relevant, both the king who was ascribed credit for the law and his legal advisors, the obscure 
legal elite. 
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2.2 The legal sources and terminology 
The laws included in this study were chosen according to specific criteria: the law must be 
mainly a secular law constructed by some kind of secular authority; the law must survive in 
extended form, and not be entirely fragmentary or reconstructed; and the law must be part of a 
regional collection of laws that originate at different times and thus represent different 
legislation within overlapping jurisdictions, which can reveal developments over time within 
a region. The secular non-Roman source material on which I will mainly focus comes from 
three geographical regions with different time spans. These are the Germanic secular laws 
from the southern European kingdoms of the Visigoths, the Lombards and the Burgundians, 
together with the laws of the Salian Franks, all originating in the period from c. 475 to 800, 
then the laws from the Anglo-Saxon realms from c. 602 to 1028, and lastly, the Scandinavian 
medieval laws from c. 1070 to 1350. 
Therefore, some of the material overlaps in its date of origin. The regions also all have 
internal diachronic developments, which makes it possible to study the legal development of 
the region. In addition, these regions coalesced into states simultaneous with their internal 
diachronic development, a process which thereby invites a discussion about legal 
development and the transmission of law in the process of state formation. We can study 
whether an internal process of consolidation stimulated original legislation more than a stable 
territorial rule. As the remit of this thesis does not cover a thorough reading of manuscripts, I 
will rely on the printed editions of each law. In most cases, these are harmonised versions of 
the surviving material. Such an approach does not take into consideration all the varieties in 
the manuscripts and thus is likely to miss some of the evidence of legal transmission in 
different versions of the same law. It is worth noting, however, that the standard editions still 
include critical commentary which shed light on some of these varieties. 
 
Roman legal sources 
 
George Mousourakis has rightly criticised the usual treatment of Roman law en bloc, because 
the nuances of a period of legal development lasting over one thousand years are lost.79 
Roman law had three, if not more, lives: first, in its continuous development under the Roman 
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emperors; second, in a massive restructuring and revision under emperor Justinian; and third, 
in a revival in the medieval law schools and universities.80 In this comparison with the origins 
of later legal sources in Western Europe, the important Roman laws are those known by later 
successor states and those that were most prominent in later medieval culture. The 
Theodosian Code and Justinian’s compilation of the Corpus Iuris Civilis fall within this 
demarcation. The Digesta, which is a major part of the Justinian compilation, also represents 
legal discussion from the classical period.  
 Compared to the succeeding attempts at law-making, the huge quantity of Roman 
legislation can certainly be read as general, abstract norms, to fit the label of civil law.81 Law 
is by nature conservative, and, as asserted by Herbert F. Jolowicz, Roman law changed 
slowly.82 When examining legal transmission and Roman law, the point must be made that 
Roman law was not even transmitted throughout the empire. Republican Roman law applied 
only to the Italian peninsula. Local custom was applicable in the courts. Olivia F. Robinson 
calls this the ius commune of the empire.83 
 One of the earliest known written laws of Rome was the mythical Lex Duodecim 
Tabularum, the Law of the Twelve Tables, from 450 BC. This law became the core of Roman 
legal thinking, and, whether correctly or not, was referred to by Cicero, and even in 
Justinian’s laws in the sixth century.84 The ideals of Roman legal culture thus derived from 
the perception of this ancient source. 
 Throughout imperial Rome, in the first centuries AD, a large number of edicts, decrees 
and laws were issued by the senate and emperors. In the second century and the first half of 
the third, Roman legal culture was in what has been termed the classical period of Roman 
law.85 In this era, the jurists were at their peak. Their works were elaborate interpretations of 
valid law. Their comments achieved a high status, and Roman authorities validated the jurists’ 
commentary as law during late antiquity. Gaius (d. c. 180) was one of the most prominent of 
the jurists, and his comments are collected in the work we know as Gaius’s Institutions (Gai). 
Another, Ulpian (d. c. 228), produced one-third of what was included in the Digesta of 
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Justinian. Over time, laws were not suggested by the magistrates and approved by the senate, 
as earlier, but law or legal responses came directly from the emperor. After almost a 
millennium of legal production, the existing law was an enormous amount of ius and lex. No 
coherent set of laws was in force for the entire empire. Lawyers and judges did not have a 
formal collection to consult, and the same legal standards did not necessarily apply 
everywhere. Maybe because of this, several emperors attempted to make collections of the 
law in the third and fourth centuries, which have not survived.86  
 The earliest surviving collection was the compilation by the Emperor Theodosius II 
(401-450), the Codex Theodosianus (CTh), although much of it is thought to be lost.87 This 
code was the most successful in terms of transmission into Western Europe.88 Emperor 
Theodosius II ordered the collection of imperial legal acts, constitutiones or constitutions89 in 
order to create a code. Imperial constitutions are believed to comprise of the edicts, decrees 
and epistles of the line of emperors.90 The Theodosian Code contained imperial enactments 
from the reign of Constantine (r. 306-337) forward. At the same time, Theodosius invalidated 
all law predating Constantine, although this apparently had no effect.91 The Code was 
published in 438 and would spread to large parts of the Roman empire before the western 
provinces were lost later that century. For this reason, the Germanic groups succeeding to the 
earlier Roman territory would make use of the Codex Theodosianus as the law for their 
Roman subjects, and not least as the basis for their own legal development. One of these 
codes is the Visigothic Breviarum Alaricianus or, as the denomination used here, Lex Romana 
Visigothorum (LRV). This is a code with added interpretationes, interpretations by legally 
competent persons working for the Visigothic king from the sixth century.92 Another example 
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is the Lex Romana Burgundiorum (LRB), which was adapted for the Burgundian king 
Gundobad. Gundobad was also the royal authority behind the Burgundian code (LB) 
described below.  
 The success of the Theodosian Code did not avoid the need for another legal revision 
almost a century later. The compilers of the Theodosian Code, as mentioned above, did not 
include pre-Christian legislation, but they did include outdated and redundant laws. Whatever 
the reason, in 527 Emperor Justinian (r. 527-565) started the project that was to be the 
grandest and most influential in European legal history. This compilation of Roman law, 
which in the Middle Ages was named the Corpus Iuris Civilis (CJC), is a massive work using 
four independent legal sources.93 Justinian ordered his trusted adviser Tribonian and a group 
of jurists to collect, edit and revise all earlier law. The result were published in three 
collections throughout the 530s. These are the Codex (C), the Digesta (D) and the 
Institutiones (I). Justinian’s project was different from the Theodosian compilation because, 
according to Justinian’s introduction, it omitted and weeded out superfluous, contradictory 
and redundant law.94 The jurists’ comments were given authority in the Theodosian Code 
(CTh.1.4.3). In Justinian’s compilations, the jurists’ writings were edited and included in the 
Digesta, which is actually the largest of the three books of compiled law. 
 Justinian’s compilation is assumed to have been ‘too late but also too complex and 
sophisticated for the Germanic settlers to absorb’.95 The same was thought of legislation given 
in Justinian’s own name, the Novellae. Still, some of the early medieval legislation seems to 
have had knowledge of the particular regulations made under Justinian. Since it is difficult to 
pinpoint the exact people involved in and around Germanic law-making, comparing the 
contents of Germanic laws with later Roman laws could be a way of proving that the late 
period of Roman legal culture formed part of the pool of legal thought that could influence 
secular law-making in the early Middle Ages. The content of these works may illuminate 
what influences, if any, late-Roman law had on Germanic legislation.  
Justinian began his enterprise due to his interest in law and his dismay over the 
condition of the legal system.96 The Digesta consist of fifty books, sorted by subject, not 
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always following what would today be considered a logical pattern. The Codex was a 
collection of imperial enactments like the Theodosian Code. However, the imperial 
enactments that were included also predated Constantine, going all the way back to the time 
of Hadrian (76-138) and up to, but not including, those of Justinian. The Codex was also 
structured as a set of books, of which there were now twelve.97 It differed from the earlier 
collection by Theodosius, because each enactment was stripped of the rhetoric and the lengthy 
praefatio of the imperial responses. The Institutiones was both public and private Roman law, 
extracted and compressed and divided into four books. The plan behind the short version was 
that it would be the introductory curriculum at law schools, according to the preface of the 
Digesta by Justinian.98 The Digesta would be the second- to fourth-year reading for the law 
students, and their final year would be dedicated to the Codex. The Corpus Iuris Civilis was 
sanctioned as the only permitted legal work from the time of its publication.99  
 To avoid the confusion of the situation that existed before his codification, Justinian 
allowed only three redactions of it: a translation, a comparison and a résumé of the relevant 
rule.100 But even if editing was disallowed from then on, the emperor himself made at least 
168 new constitutions called the Novellae (Nov).101 These new constitutions amended or 
added to the regulations of the earlier corpus. Justinian even contradicted or annulled his own 
enactments in later Novellae.102 Besides, in the Roman empire, which now covered the eastern 
and, partly, Italian provinces that were long since centralised in Constantinople, the legal 
culture was changing.103 In the provinces of the east, different normative standards evolved, 
and another revision of prevailing law was due. This resulted in the Ecloga, issued around 740 
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by Leo III and his son Constantine V.104 The Ecloga is based on the Corpus Iuris Civilis, and, 
although it can be compared to the latter, it was issued in a much simpler version.  
 Much can be said about source criticism of the surviving Roman laws. Their 
transmission through the long centuries to modern times has obviously marked them. Still, 
there are remarkably full manuscripts surviving from the later part of the first millennium AD. 
Further, the grand scale of research into the Corpus Iuris Civilis and the Codex Theodosianus 
in legal studies conducted in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries has added another layer to the 
sources, a filter, which is hard for a modern scholar to reach beyond, back into antiquity. The 
editing done in the printed versions has been carried out with a different mentality from the 
original compilers, and affects our view of the sources. Tribonian’s group was not without 
errors, and, in particular, the speed at which it collected, selected and edited the legal body 
has been used as a critical argument. The names and dates of the enactments included in the 
Code are not necessarily correct.105 The Digesta contains a large bulk of what is still extant of 
classical law. The problem is obviously that this is the sixth-century version, edited and 
changed under the order of Emperor Justinian. Bluhme argued that the speed would suggest 
that the text was copied rather than edited, which makes the result true to the original jurists’ 
commentary, although it was cut up and put together again.106 The main feature of the texts of 
the jurists is that they are diverse and contradictory, and that they were allowed to be. The 
contents of the Codex and Novellae can be read as the responses or regulations of emperors 
and accepted as sources for a later compilation. 
 
The Germanic legal sources 
 
The legal activity on the Continent in the wake of collapsing Roman authority in the west was 
a multifaceted process over the fifth to the ninth centuries, both within different time periods 
over this span and geographically. The edited laws can be found in Monumenta Germaniae 
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Historica (MGH), in the third series of Leges and in the fourth series of Leges nationum 
Germanicarum.107 The emerging states in the West are, in modern scholarship, given the 
common name ‘Germanic states’, and the multiple groups the ‘Germanic people’. The 
accuracy of the term ‘Germanic’ can be questioned in many ways, as the apparent origins of 
the people roaming the European continent in the so-called ‘migration period’ are, more often 
than not, obscure. The theories of the origins of the same groups are even more obscure, 
deriving both from the groups own origin myths and from dubious place-name 
interpretations.108 As James A. Brundage has rightly pointed out: ‘We conventionally lump 
the invaders together as “Germans”, although not all of them were by any means “Germanic” 
in language, dress, customs, habits, or appearance’.109 Others, such as Jörg Jarnut, have called 
for making the generic term obsolete,110 while yet others, like Walter Pohl, have argued for 
the usefulness of ‘Germanic’ as a term in scholarly research.111 It is a useful common 
denominator for all groups who defined themselves as something other than Romans in late 
antiquity and the early Middle Ages. Moreover, to talk of groups of peoples in terms of gens 
or volk has been criticised in the past decades.112 Another term, still much used in the same 
way today, is ‘barbarian’. With a few exceptions, this term was shunned by the groups 
themselves because of the biased meaning associated with it as ‘the other’.113 The term 
‘Germanic’ is highly controversial too, for the obvious reason of the nineteenth- and 
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twentieth-century German nationalistic movement and the role played by these medieval 
groups in its nationalistic presentations of the past. The interest in Germanic history and the 
use of Germanisch in the establishment of a racist-based view of the superiority of some 
people at the expense (or extermination) of others gives the field of study an ugly heritage.114 
In the fields of history, archaeology, ethnology and others, theories of racism and 
evolutionism were implied in scholarship to establish the image of superior Germanic 
descendants.115  
 Some of the legislation termed Germanic law in this study has been labelled ‘vulgar 
law’ by some authors. Before recent decades, this was sometimes done with a negative 
connotation. 116 The reason is that early medieval laws were simplified – vulgar – versions of 
complex Roman law. The term is also used with a more neutral connotation, to describe the 
early medieval laws as a merger of the older Roman legal tradition and the new legal 
language of the successor states.117 Germanic law should still be studied as a legal enterprise 
in its own right. Although a comparison with Roman law is valuable when we are searching 
for influences, we should not view Germanic legislation as lightweight Roman legislation, but 
as a different, and new, kind of legislation. For the same reasons, the whole research field of 
the early Middle Ages, sometimes still called ‘the Dark Ages’, was kept at arm’s length by 
European scholars in the fields of archaeology, linguistics, history and so on. However, as 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, interest increased from the late 1970s, and what could 
be called a surge of interest occurred from the 1990s. But the term ‘Germanic’ has stuck with 
the field, and functions not as an ethnic denominator, but as a common noun to refer to the 
groups of non-Roman people existing in, or coming to, the European continent in late 
antiquity and early medieval times.118 When writing of the early medieval continental states, I 
will use the term ‘Germanic’ in this sense.  
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 Similarly, as when trying to cover these groups with one term, there are also 
arguments against treating the continental legislation from the first millennium as one entity 
in legal history. Although there are parallel developments and contents of law, the particular 
context of each law could reveal important developmental characteristics and contents 
explaining the separate Germanic laws as part of individual legal cultures.119 Still, there are 
good reasons to view the Germanic laws together, as parts of an overarching legal culture, or 
groups of legal cultures. The laws I have selected for this study can all be linked to / 
connected with the Roman empire in some way. The legal activity took place under the 
influence of Roman law, whether directly inspired by, or as a reaction to, Roman heritage. 
The originating process of the laws was parallel.120 Each of the kingdoms and its laws had a 
different relationship with the old empire, which in turn would influence their legal 
development. The groups seem to have been much more diverse than the groups termed 
‘ethnic groups’ today. The name of a particular group is just as likely to have been the identity 
of the current leader as to have represented a shared cultural identity and history of the group 
as a whole.121 Further, names were often labels arising from contact with Romans, such as 
army leaders, tax collectors or others. The groups moving about the landscape would in some 
instances have been bands of men, and not a whole community, with wives, children, oxen 
and slaves, on the move. The Goths have a long and changing history within the Roman 
empire. It is certain that pockets of people were left behind, and that others joined them. The 
settling population on the Iberian Peninsula defined themselves as Goths, because their elite 
men were Goths.122 And it is possible that the shared experience during migration, settlement 
and state formation could create a conception of a common cultural identity.123 The group 
names used in this thesis will therefore be the names given to or by the leaders of the 
authorities that were organised into consolidated entities, being first the foederati (confederate 
allies) or successor states of the Romans, or just states.124 The same is true of the names of the 
laws, whether they were given contemporaneously, or in later centuries. There are also serious 
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problems regarding the origin, dating and not least transmission of the legal sources,125 with 
the content of each bulk of leges containing revisions from later periods.  
 One relatively short-lived successor state in the western Roman provinces was the 
Burgundian kingdom. The first kingdom for the foederati was established in the early 400s on 
the Roman side of the Rhine. This was destroyed by the Huns, by invitation from the Romans, 
in 437. The second kingdom was established in Sapaudia, with the Burgundians taking land 
by the arrangement of sors, whereby the Romans ceded parts of their land to the newcomers 
after a certain distribution key.126 The Burgundians were overrun by the Franks in 534. The 
Burgundian laws form one of the earliest Germanic codes. The Leges Burgundionum (LB), 
also known as the Lex Gundobada or Liber constitutionum, consists of a series of enactments 
from the Burgundian king Gundobad (r. 474-516) and from his son and successor King 
Sigismund.127 The code consists of one hundred and five enactments and twenty-one 
additional acts (the Constitutiones Extravagantes). The ‘book of constitutions’ appears 
somewhat randomly put together, which can be the result of a chronological compilation of 
the enactments. Thus, it happens that laws on female succession come immediately before a 
section on theft and another on knocking out teeth. Compared with contemporary and later 
Germanic legislation, the laws of Gundobad and Sigismund survive in stylistic, short texts, 
possibly influenced by the Burgundian adaption of Roman law in the Lex Romana 
Burgundiorum (LRB).128 It is generally accepted that the Burgundians adapted well to Roman 
institutions and culture, while at the same time, they kept a distinct non-Roman culture 
themselves. As tributary under the Roman supremacy, the Burgundian kings held the title of 
magister militium or similar, meaning they had the role of high commander in the Roman 
army.129 The inclusion in the Roman system would pave the way for influence on a grand-
scale from Roman administration and indeed law. The Burgundian kings promoted 
Burgundian ethnicity, but allowed intermarriage with Romans (LB.12.5). The distinction 
between the two gens extended to jurisdiction, and Burgundians and Romans were not only 
subject to separate laws, but also had their own judges and courts (LB.22, LB.60). Paul 
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Barnwell believes that although we must reject the thought of a common Germanic urrecht, 
Roman law was the common model of all Germanic legal enterprises.130 
 The Lombards entered the northern Italian peninsula in 568, a few years after the 
Roman emperor Justinian had died and in the aftermath of the particularly devastating Roman 
wars against the Goths.131 Lombard legislation first emerged in written form in the 640s, 
when King Rothair issued a lengthy edict, Edictum Rothari (Rot), presented in typical fashion 
as ‘old law’.132 The edict addressed basic areas of private law, like marriage, inheritance and 
the rights and duties of kinsmen. Furthermore, it was comprised of criminal law, defining acts 
of theft, libel and violence, frequently with compensation stipulated for the victim. Thus, the 
law appears as a manual for judges and the king on how to settle disputes between subjects. 
Besides the standard decree on treason and revolt against the king (Rot.1-9), Rothair’s edict 
contains very few constitutional elements, and in any event it would be erroneous to look for 
this in early continental legislation. Those in a position of authority would either be powerful 
enough to sort out their own state of affairs, or would be dependent on the support of the 
nobility. The Lombards selected their kings, and there was fierce rivalry between the elite 
men holding the posts of regional lords in Italy after the invasions, if we are to believe the 
Lombard historian Paul the Deacon.133 On some occasions, the rule passed from father to son, 
but more often it did not. Rothair would be aided in his legal work primarily by Roman 
learned men in his court. The Edict was also placed within a traditional Roman frame through 
the citation of Justinian’s Novellae 7 in the introduction and the statement that Rothair was led 
by his wish of ‘amending all earlier laws by adding that which is lacking and eliminating that 
which is superfluous’ (Rot.intro). The sentence also resembles Justinian’s commission of the 
Digesta.134 Patrick Wormald has pointed to several occasions on which this sentence was 
borrowed in early medieval secular law, for instance by the English king Alfred (r. 871-
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899).135 This feature is also found in the Nordic laws, possibly caused by the revival of 
Roman law in the eleventh century. The legislation of Rothair appears descriptive and 
somewhat accidental. Fields are not thoroughly covered: for instance, we find many laws on 
abduction and adultery, but nothing on incest. There are laws on violence and breaches of the 
peace in abundance, but hardly any on the Church or secular authority, public areas or 
maintenance. There is, however, a kind of system in the laws, covering one theme at a time 
with sliding transitions into other themes. After inheritance comes plots against family 
members, and after marriage comes adultery. 
 Next to Rothair’s legal opus, we have the surviving laws of four of his successors up 
to the year 755.136 These can be reckoned as supplements to the Edict, although the long-
reigning King Liutprand (r. 712-744) made a substantial addition. These later laws take a 
more bureaucratic language and form. Wormald has suggested that they appear to be an 
attempt to make civil law, by suggesting prescriptiveness.137 Further, the law-making after 
Rothair provides a good picture of the changes Lombardian society went through in its 
cohabitation with Roman culture. The surviving legislation includes the laws of Rothair’s 
direct successor Grimwald (r. 662-671), who added a supplement of nine rules (Gri). The next 
extant legislation is that of Liutprand (Liu), consisting of 153 rules. King Ratchis (r. 744-749) 
and King Aistulf (r. 749-756) succeeded Liutprand, and amended the laws with, respectively, 
fourteen (Rat) and twenty-four (Ais) rules before the Lombard kingdom was incorporated into 
the Frankish empire in 774. When the Franks annexed the Lombard kingdom, they did not 
abolish Lombard law.138 This is likely to be the reason for its survival. Editing and glossing of 
the laws continued in the Ottonian era up to the eleventh century.139 The edited laws can be 
found in Monumenta Germaniae Historica (MGH).140 
 The Lombard laws have been seen as a reaction to Roman law, and an attempt to draw 
the line between the Germanic and Roman populations within the Lombard realm.141 Roman 
legal inheritance must have appeared superior. The classification of Roman citizens and 
Germanic citizens in the Lombard kingdom was carried out at the time of the conquest, in a 
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way similar to what can be seen in the Visigothic and Frankish realms. The law of the 
Lombards is one of the few that is outspokenly hostile to Romans and Roman culture, and 
effective legal discrimination was established in the rules of Rothair, who stipulated lesser 
compensation if the victim was a Roman (Rot.194). This discrimination had not lost any force 
more than 160 years after the occupation of northern Italy by the Lombards, when King 
Liutprand confirmed that Roman citizens had inferior rights to the Lombards (Liu.127.XI). 
This rule applied in cases between subjects from the two groups. Otherwise, Romans would 
follow Roman laws.142 For the Romans, that meant the Theodosian Code. The administrative 
apparatus seem to have been learned in both, judging by King Liutprand’s permission to 
notaries to make documents under either law (Liu.91.VIII). Birgitte Pohl-Resl asserts that by 
this Liutprand assumed that all subjects could use either law for their cases.143 However, the 
hostility in the Edict and the subsequent legislation from the Lombard kings, combined with 
the wording in the marriage legislation that Lombard women marrying Romans would follow 
Roman law, implies that each group answered to its respective law that was in force.144 
 In a late part of the Edict, Rothair reminded his audience of the purpose and tradition 
of the law (Rot.386). Here, the usability of the law was repeated, suggesting at least the idea 
that the law was intended for practical usage, although Wormald does not believe that it was 
useable. The lawmaker also stipulated that it should be accepted at an assembly, gairethinx. 
Romans lived according to Roman laws, but in the latter part of Rothair’s Edict, a rule 
demanded that foreigners entering the kingdom lived by Lombard law. Other Germanic 
individuals would fall under the territorial rule of the Lombards, then, and not Roman law 
(Rot.367). 
 The laws of the Salian Franks also provide the possibility of assessing legal 
development within a group of fairly continuous existence. The Pactus Legis Salicae (PLS) 
claims to be a code issued under the Merovingian king Clovis (r. 481-511), and a revision 
seems to have been made by Pepin and Charlemagne. The first laws were supplemented by 
the successors of Clovis and form an addendum known as the Capitularies. While the Pactus 
and the later Carolingian laws concentrated mainly on a monetary tariff system for different 
crimes and a description of process, the Capitularies appear more brutal in their regulation of 
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punishment. A stronger authoritative voice can be detected in the code. In these supplements, 
one can also detect influences from later Roman law.145 
 Questions have been raised about whether the Pactus Legis Salicae can be dated to the 
reign of Clovis. The manuscripts differ in their emphasis on who should be credited for the 
work, and four learned men with legal competence were also named as the deciders of right 
law in the PLS.146 Ian Wood convincingly asserts that the Pactus Legis Salicae must be 
younger than 507-11, which is the traditional date of the law.147 The earliest surviving 
manuscripts date from the eighth century. Moreover, there are signs of later revisions, 
particularly in the two versions of the prologue, the so-called longer and shorter prologues.148 
Nevertheless, the Capitularies contain evident references to the rules of the PLS, and therefore 
imply that a written code of this kind existed in the sixth century. The transmission of Salic 
law has a history that is different from the other early medieval continental laws reviewed in 
this thesis, mostly because of the sheer number of extant copies. Among the multiplicity of 
manuscripts of the Pactus Legis Salicae, there are clusters of manuscripts.149 The revision of 
the PLS in the Lex Salica Karolina (LSK) tampered only slightly with the separate rules. The 
numbering of the LSK will follow that of the so-called systemised version, Lex Salica S.150 
Most of the Carolingian version is a verbatim reproduction of the earlier code, only in a 
different order. Drew finds it striking that, although there was a thorough revision and 
systemisation, nothing was done to update the monetary system to ninth-century standards, or 
to incorporate the Capitularies into the original sixty-five titles.151 Rather, the old laws were 
moved about, some things were removed, and a few things were added. But there was no 
thorough revision of the individual sections themselves, and no changes were made to the 
principles to match the changed standards, for instance in the inheritance system. This, like 
the legal work of Justinian’s team, tells us that law is more easily copied than consciously 
altered or adapted. The errors of the early scribes were copied alongside the rest. The content 
of the Salic law revolves around the topics of criminal law, some private law and process. 
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Basically, the rules set out the fines for particular actions, with a specific set of tariffs. With 
the exception of the Capitularies, the Frankish laws are often considered the ‘most Germanic’ 
of the Germanic laws. This view is due to their compensation-based content and the lack of 
references to Christianity. 152 
 The sources from Visigothic Spain are, by and large, legal material, and there is much 
of it. This is in itself rewarding when studying law, but can be methodologically challenging 
when attempting to contextualise the enactments that reflect what a self-made image of the 
Visigothic rulers is. Visigothic society appears, as historian Chris Wickham fittingly 
comments, to have been law-abiding, and ‘arid as a result’.153 Thus, the kings have earned a 
reputation for creating a well-organised state, a view which was basically established through 
their laws.154 However, the Visigothic realm in the Iberian Peninsula was inhabited by a 
marginal group of Goths who set themselves up as rulers of a large population of several 
ethnicities and identities.155 After their long migration, the group of Visigoths established 
their rule in Spain in the fifth century. From their declaration of independence in 475 rejecting 
Roman supremacy, their control over the territory continued in close cooperation with church 
leaders.156 Nevertheless, the stability of this kingdom over the centuries is evidence of a 
successful government. According to Wickham, the Arab conquest of the peninsula in 711 
cannot be explained if there had been a weakened state.157 
 The Visigothic code Leges Visigothorum (LV) from 650 survives in comprehensive 
versions. The kings Reccesvint and Chindasvint who were behind the collection included 
many of the clauses from the first Germanic law, that of King Euric I (r. 466-484), and also 
many of the legislative works of King Leovigild (r. 569-586). The laws from the two earlier 
kings form the backbone of the code. The originals, alas, only survive in fragments, and can 
only be reconstructed with reservations from the LV of 650. Some of the extant remains of 
Codex Euricianus (Eur), the laws numbered 275 to 336, are preserved in a seventh-century 
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manuscript and are included in the MGH.158 The Roman notary Leo of Narbonne probably 
provided the legal knowledge behind the enterprise of making the first written secular law for 
a non-Roman ruler.159 This project was apparently initiated by Euric in 471, four years before 
he declared independence for the Visigoths from the status of foederati of the Roman empire. 
An essential discussion continues about the jurisdiction of the Codex Euricianus – whether 
the code had jurisdiction in the Visigothic territory or exclusively over the Visigothic 
people.160 The source itself is silent on the matter, but features from other jurisdictions have 
been used as arguments that the first Visigothic code was mainly ethnic. The Roman 
population under Gothic rule would then have been subject to the Lex Romana Visigothorum. 
This compilation, also called the Breviarum Alaricianum, the Breviary of Alaric, was made by 
Euric’s son Alaric II from the Codex Theodosianus to govern the Romans.161 The suggestion 
is that this was a move to please Roman citizens under Visigothic rule, given that Clovis was 
trying at this point to tempt Romans across the border to the Frankish realm.162 The 
constitutions in the Breviary were each supplied with an interpretation.163 The same has been 
suggested for the Burgundian laws of Sigismund. Wormald rejects the argument that the laws 
only applied to the people of the legislative kings Euric and Sigismund.164 He holds that the 
assumed subjects of the law would be the subjects of the kingdom, and that the native 
legislation and the adaptations of Roman law supplemented each other instead. Given the 
example of the Lombard legislation, such overlapping seems improbable. There are, however, 
many later examples of overlapping jurisdictions, and the Visigoths also had a different 
relationship with the eastern Roman empire from that of the Lombards. Thus, we should not 
rule out complementary legal systems and laws as a possibility. 
 The compilation dating from the middle of the seventh century by Chindasvint and his 
son Reccesvint was an extensive piece, divided into twelve books, with a total of 572 
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paragraphs. It included earlier legislation by Euric and Leovigild, which was labelled antiqua 
– ancient – in addition to new regulations from the two kings. The manuscripts were 
harmonised in the MGH with a critical commentary.165 This law was definitely territorial: this 
is explicitly stated early in the code and is ascribed to Reccesvint (LV.2.1.2). In addition, 
Visigothic law was made the sole valid law (LV.2.2.8-9). The laws of the Visigoths move 
towards integration of the Romans. Leovigild ended the ban on marriage between Romans 
and Goths (LV.3.1.1) that was apparently introduced and supported by Alaric II 
(CTh.3.14.1).166 The Goths seem to have, over time, approached Roman culture, and their law 
became ever more accepting of the Romans as peers of the Visigoths.167 
  
 The relationship between the early codes can be detected, as references to incidents of 
common importance are mentioned in the texts. The earliest Visigothic code of Euric includes 
as a time limitation or prescription the death of King Theoderic I. The king died in the Battle 
of Chalôns against Attila the Hun in 451, (Eur.277). The same battle is also mentioned in the 
Burgundian laws as a marker for limitation (LB.17.1).168 The Roman successor states were 
also entangled with each other through politics and warfare. The Frankish kingdom fought the 
Visigothic with help from the Burgundians in 500, as there was much enmity between the 
Burgundians and the Goths. In 534, the Franks conquered the whole of the Burgundian 
kingdom. In the eighth century, the Lombards and people in another part of the Visigothic 
territory were overrun and by the Franks and were added to the latter’s empire. 
 
The English legal sources 
 
Notions of the level of sophistication of the law have also marked the study of British legal 
history, where the Norman Conquest represents a watershed. Legal historians tend to 
categorise their research according to whether the legal sources date from before or after 
1066.169 It is generally accepted that the Norman Conquest brought substantial change in the 
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way laws were made and enforced, although there was some continuity between the Anglo-
Saxon system of law and the feudal legal culture of the Normans, a continuity that was first 
expressed by the Norman rulers themselves.170 Moreover, the earlier North Sea exchanges of 
ideas and ideologies, including legal ones, are assumed to have been interrupted. Another 
historiographical tendency was to downgrade the early English laws.171 This interpretation 
sees the early medieval legal system as favouring mediation between the parties to a conflict, 
while the system in Norman England was seen as authoritative and executive.172 However, 
others have emphasised the continuation between the Anglo-Saxon period and the period after 
the conquest.173 Moreover, early English law has become an object of research in its own 
right. As Patrick Wormald has argued and demonstrated, Anglo-Saxon legislation was an 
important development of the law, not a leftover from the past or a prelude to Norman law 
reforms.174 In the present study, I will concentrate on the laws originating in the period from 
602 to 1018, that is, on the Anglo-Saxon laws, while only looking at the continued 
development under Norman rule briefly, as a result of the feudal spirit of these later laws. 
 These sources for English laws can be divided roughly into three parts. The first part 
contains the laws of the kingdoms of the Heptarchy, a historical term for the kingdoms of 
what later became the territory of England in the seventh to the tenth centuries.175 The second 
part contains the laws from the period of unification of the kingdom that would be England, 
opposing the Danes. The third part is formed from the laws from the twilight of Danish rule in 
the times of Æthelred (r. 978-1016), Swein and Cnut (r. 1014-1035). Wormald sees the 
legislation from Alfred onwards as being particularly English, and treats the prior legislation 
from the seventh and eighth centuries as a foundation for it.176 Chris Wickham has pointed out 
the anachronistic views of the Heptarchs, where scholars give a teleological sketch of the 
making of one larger kingdom.177 Nonetheless, I will label the laws of the Kentish and West 
Saxon rulers as ‘early English law’, in the sense that these first laws were important parts of 
developing English law. They were contemporary with continental Germanic law, but in the 
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light of the preservation and transmission of the extant sources they have been put together 
with other English laws. 
 The earliest legislation is the Kentish laws, with King Æthelbert’s laws (Ath) of 602-
03 forming a code.178 Later kings, reigning many decades after him, added to his laws. 
Hlothere (r. 673-685) and his nephew Eadric (r. 685-686?) would hardly issue laws together, 
since Eadric fought and defeated his uncle.179 Still, their promulgations must have been seen 
as one entity by the Kentish people, or maybe Eadric built on earlier legislation and reinstated 
his enemy’s laws for legitimacy. The laws of Hlothere and Eadric has anyway survived as one 
source (Hl&E). Eadric was succeeded by his brother Wihtred (r. 690-691) (Wih), of whose 
laws we have a few more sections extant. The laws of Æthelbert reveal how the Church was 
organising itself again on the island; otherwise, the laws concern the privileges of royal 
authorities and attempts at peaceful regulations for subjects. The law seemingly had 
jurisdiction within the kingdom, and it does not appear to have a primarily ethnic quality, 
aspiring, as a territorial law, to go with the kingdom. The later supplements would address 
obligations between subjects. The laws of Wihtred primarily deal with church privileges, 
forbidden behaviour and marital behaviour, resembling more of a penitentiary than secular 
law.180 
 The contemporary West Saxon King Ine (r. 688-726) issued many laws (Ine), but 
these only survive because they were preserved in the laws of the later Alfred the Great (r. 
871-899), in a ninth century manuscript and several fragments (Alf).181 Therefore, it is 
uncertain which of these laws were originally Ine’s, and which were edited by Alfred’s 
learned men or through later transmissions. Alfred’s introduction, containing the Ten 
Commandments and much about his own expectations as king and judge, tells of the many 
earlier laws that he disapproved of and removed (Alf.Int.49.9). Thus, Alfred’s legislation is 
still a continuation and transmission of earlier legislation. Since the manuscripts have 
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different subdivisions,182 I will follow the rubricated classification of the law of Alfred, as 
used by Frederick L. Attenborough and Dorothy Whitelock, in the references.183 
 Groups of normative material constitute the second part of English law, with the 
unification of the Heptarchy into one kingdom of the English. The first source material here 
is, fittingly, the treaties with the Danes, first between King Alfred and the mysterious Danish 
lord Guthrum (A&G), and later by Edward (r. 899-924) and an even more mysterious 
Guthrum (E&G).184 Although these sources are contentious, they are rewarding for a 
discussion of transmission of law, due to contact between the Scandinavian and English 
administrations. The ruler of the larger territory probably faced challenges from powerful 
families, as well as the presence of ‘Danes’ or warriors and settlers from the Nordic regions. 
These documents are normative treaties, and as such comprise the very essence of the law that 
would have been emphasised by the English and Danish authorities. The English may have 
emphasised this more, being the victors in the war with the invading Scandinavians.185 Thus, 
our interest here lies in the information in the treaties about inheritance and wergild. 
 There are vernacular manuscripts that contain much of the original law from before the 
Norman Conquest. The most prominent of these is the Textus Roffensis, or H, which is the 
only one that contains the earliest Kentish laws.186 The laws of Æthelbert may have been 
issued in Latin, similarly to the continental laws, and then at some later point translated into 
the vernacular. Both Oliver and Wormald conclude nevertheless that it probably was 
originally written in the vernacular, even if they both note the traces of Latin syntax, spelling 
and word choice in the Old English MS.187 A Latin translation, the Quadripartitus, from the 
twelfth century comprises a further major source, and in some cases the only source, for early 
English law.188 It is believed to be a Latin translation of earlier vernacular documents, 
although it is uncertain how much has been changed in the process.189 
 The third groups of laws are those ascribed to the kings Æthelstan, Edgar, Æthelred, 
and Cnut. The three former can be said to have ruled a fairly consolidated state, compared to 
their predecessors and to England under Cnut. Still, their legislation makes for interesting 
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comparison, and enters the discussion when relevant. The traditional scholarly reference to 
the English laws uses a numerical listing of the laws in apparently chronological succession. 
However, the nineteenth-century discussion over dating has led to the notion that some laws 
with higher numbers were actually issued prior to laws with low numbers. Patrick Wormald 
has criticised the practice of using the established numbers because it hides other, and in his 
view separate, laws within the traditional classification.190 In particular, the substantial extant 
legislation of Æthelstan, numbered from I to VI, suffers from this. Scholars have agreed that 
V predates IV, and IV predates III, but the numbers remain fixed.191 Wormald also argues, 
conversely, that the classification separates entities that should be read as part of a continuous 
work. He complained that ‘[f]ew things better betray the enslavement of early English legal 
studies to traditional practice than continuing use of numeration for Æthelstan’s laws that 
everyone since at least 1858 has known to be wrong’.192 The enslavement to practice will, 
even so, be continued here for ease of reference. However, the dating of the law in question 
will be mentioned when relevant. 
 The third part of the early English laws covers the late-tenth and early eleventh 
centuries. It includes the laws of successive kings as they were revised in the eleventh century 
by the archbishop of York, Wulfstan (†1023), who is usually referred to simply as Wulfstan. 
He played a major role in English political and ecclesiastical life during his time as 
archbishop. Wulfstan cooperated closely with King Æthelred and made substantial 
contributions to the king’s administration through councils and texts. When the Danes gained 
control in England – first through Swein Forkbeard in 1013, and then through his son Cnut 
after conflicts in 1016 – Wulfstan was loyal to the cause and continued his cooperation with 
the authorities, though the head had changed.193 Liebermann holds that Wulfstan was more of 
an editor of legal texts than the actual author.194 Dorothy Whitelock and other scholars 
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working with the laws of Edgar, Æthelred and Cnut consider him more as the actual author, 
the lawmaker.195 
 From Æthelred we have a number of legal sources, which can be divided between 
those written before and those written after Wulfstan became an advisor.196 They are often 
numbered as I-VIII, and even up to I-X, Ætr.197 The origins and succession of these sources 
follow an unclear system, although II, III and V seem to originate before 1008 and are mainly 
secular. The later sources have more ecclesiastical features. Æthelred is also credited as the 
creator of the Treaty with the Danes of 991 (II Atr), although the treaty appears as a dictate 
from the Danes. 
  From Cnut’s reign we have two actual laws, and letters and documents that shed light 
on normative standings.198 The laws are categorised as ecclesiastical (I Cn) and secular (II 
Cn), where the latter, of course, include the most relevant legislation on inheritance and 
homicide.199 The laws have vague internal dating, but many clues exist from which scholars 
can determine a terminus ante quem and terminus post quem for the individual manuscripts, 
relying on the eventful political situation in the late-ninth and early tenth centuries. The dating 
of the laws of Cnut in particular has been important and an object of debate, not least due to 
his overthrowing of Æthelred and his later actions in England and in Denmark and Norway.200 
Most scholars agree that 1028 is the year of genesis for the secular law II Cn. Whitelock and 
others plausibly argue that Wulfstan, who died in 1023, is assumed to be the mind behind I Cn 
in particular, but also II Cn, promulgated after his death.201  
 The systematisation of canon law brought about a stronger self-awareness in the 
Church, as the rules of the local parish and the papacy sometimes came into conflict with 
secular law. Legal activities in the secular sphere were influenced by scholarly 
methodological legal studies, which resulted in legal reforms in some European states, 
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including twelfth-century England. However, the post-Conquest rulers in Britain apparently 
saw little need to issue royal laws for the English territory immediately.202  
 
Scandinavian legal sources 
 
In the following chapters, the legislation in the Scandinavian countries will be treated as one 
entity, in the same way as the Germanic and English legislation. There are plausible reasons 
for presenting the Scandinavian region as a whole as a common legal region. The cultural and 
linguistic, as well as political, fellowship locked together the societies in the areas that 
became the kingdoms of Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and extensions to the Icelandic 
republic and the Finnish areas can even be included here. As with the early medieval 
kingdoms on the Continent, the common culture led to intellectual, economic and dynastic 
collaboration, but also to violent conflicts and enmity between the realms, and internally 
within them. However, there are multiple reasons to argue that a scholarly treatment of the 
Nordic laws as coming from a common legal region would be a false construction.203 The 
individual societies in this corner of Europe would have had as much cultural communion and 
intellectual fellowship with their other neighbours as with each other: Denmark with the 
Continent, Sweden with the eastern powers and Byzantium, and Norway with England, 
Scotland and Ireland, where their economic and wider interests lay. I would argue that the 
vernacular legislation and obvious similarities in the mode of legislation and construction of 
the law make it natural to treat the Scandinavian laws as related. Differences in the legal 
sources will still be examined in the analysis, and the possible internal and external influences 
will certainly be a topic of concern. However, researchers do recognise a main divide in the 
Nordic laws regarding the structures and principles of inheritance. The laws classify into a 
western- and eastern-Nordic system, which will be examined further in later chapters.204 
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 A particular feature of the Scandinavian laws was the so-called provincial laws.205 The 
modern Scandinavian term for these laws is Landskapslov: law of the landscape. The 
landscape is a particular region with a shared legal culture.206 The written laws of these 
provinces date to periods after the Norwegian and Danish kingdoms emerged in the tenth 
century, and simultaneously with the origins of a Swedish kingdom in the thirteenth century. 
In the case of Norwegian laws, sources and the content of the laws themselves suggest the 
rules originated in the tenth century before the state-formation process. The provincial laws 
continued after the state emerged, each belonging to a particular landscape with a main 
provincial assembly, lǫgþing, and they continued to exist as provincial legal entities when the 
overarching Danish, Norwegian and Swedish kingdoms were established in the period 900 to 
1100. Later, the revision and formal approval of the laws became the task and right of royal 
authority. Scholars disagree about the power structure in this process. How involved was the 
king in shaping the law and in deciding the contents, and how much input did the provincial 
assembly have?207 The Swedish and Norwegian provincial laws were organised into thematic 
subsections, called bálkr, according to their juridical field, something not found in the other 
laws included in this study. 
 For the Nordic sources, several other factors need to be introduced into the debate. 
First of all, we need to consider the origin of the laws and whether the Nordic provincial laws 
were a result of works by learned jurists or were an oral transmission from the pre-Christian 
era.208 Second, there is the issue of whether the Nordic laws reflected European legal thinking 
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at the time of writing or whether they were a genuinely original product. As a result of these 
considerations, the nature of the scholarly debate about Scandinavian law has been different 
in many ways concerning source criticism and origins, with the only possible exception being 
the Visigothic code of Euric. I believe that these distinctions have led to separate treatment of 
the Nordic codes and of earlier medieval western law, at the expense of seeing them as part of 
a continuous development of European law. Later scholars have maintained that, to a large 
degree, the laws represented a novelty, although they may contain custom and traditional view 
on law.209 
 The regions that came to constitute the Norwegian kingdom seem to have already had 
a complex legal system by the 900s that was comparable to the continental civitas courts in 
the early and High Middle Ages. But since the first written sources only date from the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, the origins of the legal system, its design and its development 
are obscure to us. A region at this time would later become one of the provinces in the newly 
constituted Norwegian kingdom, and the lǫgþing would be the highest provincial assembly.210  
The extant provincial laws are the Gulathing Law (G), for the Gulaþingslǫg of the west of the 
country, and the Frostathing Law (F), for the Frostaþingslǫg in the northern and middle parts 
of the kingdom.211 The two other provincial laws for eastern Norway are known to have 
existed, but are lost apart from their Christian law sections.212 The first known written law of 
the Norwegian realm was the Gulathing Law, which survives in a late manuscripts, but 
contains elements from several periods. The law was possibly put into writing in the late-
eleventh century but survives in a version that probably found its form in the 1170s.213  
 The Frostathing Law survives in its thirteenth-century version, probably dating from 
after 1215, as is revealed by the implementation of decisions taken by the fourth Lateran 
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Council.214 However, Jan Ragnar Hagland and Jørn Sandnes believe some of the rules on 
inheritance and wergild to be from earlier versions due to their contents.215  
 From the mid-thirteenth century, major legal reforms began in Norway, and in 1274, 
King Magnus Haakonsson (r. 1263-80), nicknamed the Lawmender, issued the Code of the 
Realm (MLL), after which a process of the unification of the law in the Norwegian realm 
began.216 
 In the provincial laws, one of the points is that there are no certain originators like a 
royal legislator. Before the thirteenth century, the law, ideally, should have been created at the 
assembly and transmitted by a lawman (lǫgmaðr). Only after the civil war in Norway (1130-
1240) did the king become the unrivalled legislator, for secular law, and the supreme judge. 
From this period, the job of the lawman also changed from passing on the correct law to 
acting as a judge. The promulgation of the Code of the Realm in the thirteenth century, 
annulled the previous provincial laws.217  
 There were many Swedish provincial laws, from the southernmost in Scania – which 
will be treated as a Danish provincial law because of the shifting political landscapes – to the 
northernmost in Hälsingeland. They can be divided roughly into an eastern and a western 
legal culture, because of their content and form. This division coincides with the division into 
the svea and the göta districts, where the two major groups constituting the people of the 
Swedish kingdom lived. In the thirteenth century, the different Swedish areas were put under 
more direct royal rule than the loose union of regions controlled by the great men of the 
previous centuries.218 Compared to the other Nordic countries, and indeed the rest of Europe, 
it seems that written laws came later in the Swedish realm.219 Three periods of organised legal 
work are known to us. The first was in the first three decades of the thirteenth century, when 
the Västgöta Law (VgL) appeared and was also revised. Another period saw the immense 
legal work on the provincial laws for several provinces during the 1290s, when several of the 
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provincial laws were promulgated by royal decree.220 The third period of legislation occurred 
around the mid-fourteenth century, when, in about 1347, King Magnus Eiriksson (1319-1364) 
issued a Code of the Realm (MEL) for Sweden along the lines of the Norwegian Code, and 
afterwards, in 1357, he similarly issued a Town Law.  
 The actions of Swedish kings and regents in the thirteenth century show that they were 
interested in controlling the law, by royal interference with the provincial laws.221 Moreover, 
the law-making activity was done in collaboration with the establishment of the Church in the 
provinces.222 Doubtless, there existed laws before the first known provincial laws, but it is 
plausible to assume that the tradition of codifying legislation began in the thirteenth century 
with the consolidation of the state and the firmer establishment of the Church in the 
provinces.  
 The surviving manuscripts date back to the late-fourteenth and early fifteenth 
centuries, and editing already exists in those early copies.223 Therefore, some layers in the 
laws can also be detected in the Swedish material, although of course we must be cautious 
about pushing back the date of the regulations.  
 The Danish law-making process was different from the Norwegian and Swedish legal 
developments. It did not lead to a national code for the whole kingdom after a period of legal 
activity in juridical regions. Legal historians have discussed the extent of the jurisdiction of a 
later law, the Law of Jutland, and whether it actually covered other regions.224 Moreover, it is 
suggested by legal historians that the earliest law, the law of inheritance and non-
compensational deeds (Arvebog og orbodemål, A&O), or at least that part of it concerning 
non-compensational deeds, was meant to be a law for all Danes.225 The law was probably 
shaped from the 1170s and was complete from around 1200.226  
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Denmark consisted of three legal provinces: Jutland, which is the mainland including 
the isle of Funen; Zealand, consisting of the isle and surrounding islands; and Scania, 
southwestern part of modern day Sweden. The earliest extant copy of the Law of Scania is the 
Codex Runius, which is believed to date to the later thirteenth century or around 1300.227 The 
references to the Danish provincial laws will follow the numbering in the edited printed 
editions of the series Danmarks gamle Landskabslove (DgL), published between 1933 and 
1951, and the corresponding numbering in the translated publications will follow Danmarks 
gamle Love på Nutidsdansk from 1945 to 1948.228 For the law on inheritance and non-
compensational deeds (A&O), my references are to what has been labelled ‘Text 1’, unless 
otherwise specified.229 This is the oldest redaction of the law book, although the earliest 
manuscripts date from the early fifteenth century. Therefore, the possibility of later editing 
and of the erasing of rules that did not fit with the later legal norms is present, as with most of 
the sources used here. However, the A&O does contain several elements that were changed in 
later Danish legislation, and we can assume that the early version of the law was, to a large 
degree, copied without critical changes in the following centuries.230 
 We should avoid a teleological perspective that legal activity must result in a national 
law, even though the provinces formed part of the same legal culture. Helle Vogt describes 
the quest for a code of the realm as a straightjacket, pointing out that the existence of 
provincial laws does not exclude the existence of a common idea behind all the provincial 
laws that, taken as a whole, are almost identical.231 Dating the Danish provincial laws is a 
difficult task, since only the Law of Jutland has a known promulgation date; this is also why it 
has been proclaimed to be the national code of Denmark.232 The discussion of the origins will 
follow the survey of Helle Vogt. Legal historian Per Andersen has conducted a thorough 
examination of the status, age and contents of the many manuscripts of the provincial laws 
from Denmark, and should be consulted for further details.233 
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 The culmination of Nordic legal development into national laws, bringing several 
jurisdictions under a unified legal authority, is seen as the effect of strengthened state 
authority. Göran Dahlbäck suggests that the high medieval European standards on law 
demanded consistency and formality in legislation, and that the Swedish Code of the Realm 
and Town Law met the high standards of the legal ideology of their time.234 
 
2.3 Making the law: Legislators and real legislators – the legal elite 
Who made medieval law? Several of the secular authorities who succeeded the Romans 
produced secular law. With a few exceptions, these laws claim to have been instigated by the 
ruler, the king, and most of the others also carry the stamp of royal sanction. The specific 
lawmaker was not necessarily a king, given the descriptions in the legal sources themselves. 
As an example, the Visigothic law of 650 hints at the skills and morals of the one artifex 
legum, the maker of the law, who was not the king but was appointed by him (LV.1.2.2-9). 
The king would, of course, not attempt such an enterprise alone, but was always dependent on 
a literate and legally trained council. These were the people who are here termed the ‘legal 
elite’ of medieval Europe, a group consisting of notaries, clergy and educated people close to 
the secular authority or part of that authority. Patrick Wormald has provided the most radical 
view of early medieval legislation as being a tool of legitimation used by kings.235 In this 
interpretation, the law was not a tool for creating justice or a tool for deciding cases, but a 
symbol of power. Nevertheless, we must assume that the rulers who ordered a written law 
were also determined to approve the contents of that law. The authority as legislating king 
would come from the substance of the legislation. 
 
The king as legislator 
 
We name the law by the king from whom it is derived, and speak of the king as an active 
legislator. To a large degree, the laws were promulgated as products of royal enterprise. 
Romantic images of the introduction of laws depict the king standing amongst his best men 
and representatives of the Church, deciding what would be the optimum and most needed law. 
Historians do not necessarily buy this view, but, for pragmatic reasons, refer to the king as the 
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actor by knitting together the law-making process and him as a person. The making of 
medieval law would happen in many different ways, but most of these ways were more 
complex than through the sheer genius of the king. Rex Iustus ideologies would make kings 
want to have laws. As Patrick Wormald has argued, the law legitimised the rule of a king, not 
only as a provider of peace, but also as the regulator of society, and as the giver of the written 
word.236 We see successive rulers in most medieval kingdoms attempting to contribute to the 
collection of laws in the country. The king would, regardless of his role in the process, build 
his authority on these same laws. A king’s authority was protected by the laws, as the laws 
were protected by his authority. The power to lay down law was invested in the kings of the 
medieval kingdoms.237 Law-making was expected. In addition, through this action ‘he’ would 
be the ruling authority, whether that authority was constructed of advisors, family or nobody 
at any given moment. Helle Vogt argues that, at least in Denmark, the provincial assemblies 
tried maintain an illusion of autonomy but the idea grew that legislation was the king’s 
domain.238 
 Thus, examples of secular law that originate from somewhere other than the royal 
hand show interesting aspects of the participation of other interest groups, although the royal 
authority probably did have to agree to the law. In the northern Scandinavian realms, the 
lawman would be the ‘keeper of the law’, because he knew the law.239 There are indications 
that the office was hereditary in the Norwegian and Swedish provinces.240 The king in 
Scandinavia, as in the earlier European kingdoms with legal enterprises, was dependent on a 
legal elite. 
 
The legal elites of medieval Europe 
 
Legal transmission must come from knowledge of existing law, as original law-making 
probably requires some legal training too. I have asserted above that the process of legislation, 
whether royal law or not, were aided by legally trained scholars, termed a ‘legal elite’ by Alan 
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Watson.241 The legal elite involved in the source material presented here are a heterogenic 
group of notaries, clergy and high politicians.242 They exist mostly as an anonymous 
assumption, but we do know some of the actual characters involved in the process of writing 
law in the different regions during different centuries.  
 In European legal history, the Roman jurists of the classical age could serve as the 
foremost example of the legal elite, and the best example of a situation in which those who 
develop or make the law have no legal authority. Gaius, Papinian, Paulus and Marcian gave 
opinions on legal questions, and these opinions would not necessarily have been 
conclusive.243 Some of the more prominent jurists, however, had positions as imperial legal 
counsellors or even Praetorian Prefects.244 Moreover, almost all of them came from senatorial 
families. The discussions of family law and other topics could thus be seen as coming from an 
elitist point of view. Still, the inclusion of problems that were relevant to the poorer classes 
means that we can give the jurists credit for discussing actual juridical problems concerning 
normal people. The jurists were given authority by later emperors, and became, through 
transmission, our foremost providers of classical Roman law.  
 The European centres of learning were the primary places in which law was thought 
about and discussed. Young men from every part of Europe came to these centres to be 
educated by renowned masters; in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they also came to the 
universities of Bologna and Paris. This education meant that the group of learned men in the 
medieval realms had been trained in many of the same texts, thought about the same ideas and 
were given the same cultural heritage of the Roman past, so that even a Norwegian or an Irish 
student would be infused with a Roman background.245 These men were equipped with much 
the same logos, and taught in the same Latin. In the same way as Christianity worked as a 
cultural unifier for the western European regions, the schools gave the regions a coordinated 
administrative apparatus. Given the numbers of those who received this training, both before 
and after the revival of Roman law, the educated men would easily obtain influential positions 
as administrators, clergy, judges, lawyers, royal counsellors or other positions requiring men 
of letters. One factor that divides the source material is the rise of the universities and learned 
law. For the law material covered by this analysis, this means that the Nordic laws are a 
product of the time after Roman and canon law became objects of study, while the English 
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and continental laws originate from the time between the original making of Roman law and 
the medieval revival of Roman law. 
 The law that originated in the centuries before the universities was constructed with 
the help of learned scholars. The project of the Roman successor states of making written law, 
like the Roman authority, depended on the legal elite maybe even more strongly than did the 
Roman administration. The existing Roman elite in the regions affected by the disintegration 
of the Roman state and the genesis of a new kingdom continued their lives to a large degree. 
As Ralph Mathisen has demonstrated, the nobility exercised different strategies and 
willingness to adapt to the changes.246 Some offered their services to the new administration. 
Some representatives of the legal elite who drafted continental legislation in the early Middle 
Ages are known to us, and some of them have already been mentioned in the survey of the 
sources. One of the earliest attempts at non-Roman law-making, by the Visigothic king Euric, 
was guided, if not run, by the Roman notary Leo of Narbonne.247 Leo survived into the rule of 
Euric’s son Alaric II, who ruled during the Gothic adaptation of the Theodosian code.248 
Sidonius Apollinaris mentioned him in a poem and appraised him with knowledge of Roman 
law.249 Sidonius also reveals in his letters the attendance of a Roman learned man called 
Sygarius at the Burgundian court. Sidonius praises (or rather mocks) Syagrius for learning the 
Germanic language and calls him ‘a new Solon in the elucidation of Burgundian law’.250 Ian 
Wood assumes Syagrius to have assisted the legal work of the Burgundians.251 Lupoi also 
points to the legally trained Roman Laconius as part of king Gundobad’s counsel.252  
 In the short prologue of the Pactus Leges Salicae of the Salian Franks, it was claimed 
to have been written by a quartet of named men: Wisogast, Arogast, Salegast and Widogast. 
These were, according to the text, chosen to set the law of the Franks.253 Katherine Fisher 
Drew placed no significance on these four in drafting of the legislation or the collecting of the 
laws into one code.254 Ian Wood holds them as a reflection of the status of the Pactus as not 
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purely kingly law, but the law of the Franks, even if their existence was unknown.255 We can 
probably assume these men to be symbolic, if not mythical, figures in the origins of a 
Frankish written law. Nevertheless, the care taken to show that righteous men were chosen to 
carry out the task of deciding the law implies that there was a need to ensure that law-making 
was supervised with competence, not by the brutality of the king. Wormald holds the view 
that the law of the Salian Franks could not be linked to royal activity.256 As has already been 
mentioned, the attachment of the laws to the Merovingian king Clovis has defined the dating 
and the views on the origins of the code.  
 We see that the rulers finding necessity in producing written law make pragmatic use 
of men of letters in this work. So, too, in a time of colonisation. The way King Cnut (r. 1016-
1035) made use of his former opponent Æthelred’s right-hand man, Wulfstan, shows a 
political talent to exploit the newly conquered region’s establishment.257 Wulfstan was 
intellectual, highly educated and already politically trained. To allow him to continue his 
work did much to promote stability within the English kingdom. It is possible that Cnut had 
the same intention for Grimkjell, the trusted English bishop of his former opponent in 
Norway, King Olaf Haraldsson. The first Christian laws of Norway are ascribed to King Olaf 
and Grimkjell during Olaf’s conquest of the land. And, although the trustworthiness of the 
transmitted remnants of these laws are highly questionable, the two probably set some kinds 
of rules when arriving in Norway. After Olaf’s death, Grimkjell continued his work under 
Cnut’s son Svein. He might have been involved in Svein’s legal work.258  
 The scholastic environment that flourished before the universities came into being in 
the eleventh and tenth centuries was not built up through institutions, but revolved around 
individual masters. Mia Münster-Swendsen has shown in great detail how these places of 
learning were held together by the close relationships between the master and his students and 
between the students.259 The success and prominence of the ‘school’ depended completely on 
these relationships and on the constant re-creation of the group’s reputation. A prominent 
scholar would take in students who were bound to their master in loyalty and, ideally, in 
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love.260 They would exercise what Münster-Swendsen has labelled ‘ennobling qualities’ in 
their painstaking and time-consuming studies. They would aim to reach a higher spiritual 
level and liberate themselves from desiring material things. However, they would not exclude 
themselves from society like the religious orders, but rather be a tool of society by applying 
their skills for the greater good in politics, court life and administration.261 The diligent 
student would therefore strive for proper conduct and posture within himself, together with 
justice and temperance in his surroundings. Students brought these ideals back with them, 
together with scholarly knowledge of law.  
To the kings who were promulgating law, and to those under the jurisdiction of law, 
what was the ideal of a legal advisor? The lawman at the provincial assembly of 
Västgötaland, Eskil, was credited for producing the first Swedish written law. He was 
described in a list of lawmen as ‘wise’, ‘as learned as learned men’ and ‘supportive of the 
Västgötar and their chieftains’.262 From this we can picture an ideal legal advisor who was 
both book-smart and pragmatically loyal to the people affected by law. The Scandinavian 
provincial assemblies were characterised by their autonomy from the king; the legal elite in 
other regions would to a larger degree be loyal to the royal apparatus more than to the nobility 
and general population. Still, the ability to keep in with many interest groups would be a 
necessary virtue for the legal elite, together with knowledge of the law. 
 Pride in education and learning was enormous. Abbot Samson of Bury St Edmunds 
was a former Paris university student. He would chastise his monks with his scholarly 
intelligence and enjoy dignity as a judge and mediator because of his skills.263 Samson did not 
make law, but he showed signs of the legal knowledge of his class, as well as the pride such 
knowledge gave. The schools were generally attended by students from nearby regions, rather 
than being international forums of collective learning, as the universities would later become 
to some degree. But, the schools’ reputations sometimes transcended administrative 
boundaries, and attracted foreign students.264 We can assume that the legal elite of sixth- to 
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tenth-century northern Europe was not primarily taught at these schools. Instead, the clergy of 
Church centres and abbeys were competent in the law.  
 Learned clergy would give more than one meaning to the term ‘law’. Lawrence of 
Durham (d. 1154?), a Benedictine monk and a defender and prosecutor at court, argued in his 
Oratio pro juvenibus compeditis (Speech For the Young Men in Shackles) that the master’s 
responsibility for his servant is not found in ‘the law’, in which unspecified references are 
made to the Roman corpuses of Theodosius and Justinian together with those of Caesar and 
Pompey, but in ‘the law of this land’.265 Münster-Swendsen regards this comment as an 
establishment of learned authority.266 In other works, Lawrence refers to ‘both laws’, which 
Münster-Swendsen links to a passage in canon law where Urban II states that there are two 
laws, lex publica and lex privata, the former to be found in scriptum and the latter inscribed 
on the heart.267 A source contemporary with Lawrence, John of Salisbury, also refers to the 
dual legal concepts of the law in letters and the law of the mind;268 the second of these 
concepts could perhaps be linked to a Christian legal culture. The law of the heart or mind, 
which we can term a feeling of righteousness, was given higher dignity than the written law. 
Münster-Swendsen argues that this reveals the dialectic nature of the receipt of the law. The 
legal elite were conscious that the written law did not necessarily lead to justice from 
consciousness, but that a sensitive feeling of righteousness should be applied by the judge. 
According to Münster-Swendsen, this was used as a political argument for demanding that the 
lords who sat in judgment would consult men of letters, and that learning law would give the 
learner a greater sense of justice than the lord.  
 In the Nordic realms, the legal traditions were, to a larger extent, maintained by a legal 
class, as opposed to through royal sanction. This is because of the political situation; the early 
realms of Norway, Sweden and the free state of Iceland (although not Denmark) were not 
united kingdoms, but were still cultural and legal communities. In these three areas, ‘lawmen’, 
or people with specific legal knowledge, ‘spoke’ the law. This means that they recited the law 
to the assemblies and during cases presented at the assemblies (þing). Before any stable 
authority was established, the legal provinces had lawmen, and these lawmen continued to be 
legal consultants or ‘keepers of the law’ in the eleventh century and from then on. Studies of 
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lists of lawmen have revealed that particular families seem to have had the role of preserving 
legal knowledge.269 Without necessarily being legally trained at the universities, in procedural 
rhetoric or in reading the rules of Roman or canon law, these individuals had, or at least were 
supposed to have, through family training and constant repetition, a thorough knowledge of 
the prevailing law of the jurisdiction. However, it seems that the offspring of the 
Scandinavian elite were also sent to the European universities.270 Contact between the 
assemblies must also have led to an expanded legal basis from which to draw and to 
transmission of legal conceptions between them.  
 The Nordic elite appeared as students in learning centres on the Continent and in the 
British Isles. We see at once that the twelfth-century Norwegian clergy went to Paris, more 
precisely to the Abbey of St Victor. According to Sverre Bagge, Norwegian and Danish 
students were more represented in the prestigious centres than Swedish, which corresponds to 
the influence of Christianity in, and the Christianisation of, the Nordic region,271 and 
generally to the influence in ‘political, economic and cultural respects’ of the Anglo-Norman 
and northwest German areas of the east. We can further assume a transmission of the law in 
the same process. The natural development is that the level and spread of education increased 
with the increasing influence of the Church in Scandinavia. From 1285 into the fourteenth 
century, the number of educated men seems to have been much higher in Denmark than in 
Norway and Sweden.272 The historian Tore Iversen has suggests that the Norwegian 
archbishop Eysteinn’s Christian laws in the Frostathing Law were influenced by Eysteinn’s 
studies at St Victor, an important centre for theological discussion.273 In 1160-61, he possibly 
met or was taught the theology of Stephen of Tournai, author of Summa in Decretum Gratiani 
of 1159, and his ideas about causa efficiens and marriage.274 Eysteinn and other canon law 
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students would have been involved in these discussions, which took place at all learning 
centres and universities.  
 
Conclusion 
The sources selected for this thesis have distinct origins, but share some aspects in making 
and content. The legal transmission of rules and concepts related to inheritance systems and 
compensation for homicide would follow contact between people. The transmission of these 
concepts into the written law would follow contact between legal elites. In any matter, we 
rarely know who the individual members of the legal elite were. Therefore, an examination of 
the legal sources can say something about legal transmission where we lack knowledge of 
meetings between people. In the next chapter, I will turn to some theories of legal 




3. Approaching Transmission of Law: Theories and Methodologies 
 
To be able to discuss the possible evidence of legal transmission in medieval secular law, 
some terminology should be clarified and some careful guidelines should be established. In 
the humanities and the social sciences, the main term in this study – ‘transmission’ – 
resonates with terms like ‘spreading’, ‘diffusion’, ‘influences’.275 The terms and concepts will 
be treated in this chapter, but the clarifying begins with a discussion of the term ‘legal 
transplant’. 
 Some of the methodological challenges and limitations of the present project have 
already been addressed in the opening chapter, as have the necessary demarcations. As the 
principal method is comparison, some reflections on the use of variants of a comparative 
method will be outlined more specifically in the last part of this chapter.  
 
3.1 Theories of legal transmission 
The central aim of this thesis is to search for transmission of law in the Latinised spheres of 
early and high medieval Europe. In such a task, an applicable system of concepts will aid 
analysis. Theories of comparative law encourage the student to have a conscious awareness of 
what exactly is transmitted between laws, writings or ideas. Controversies over these factors 
have resulted in debates among comparative lawyers. In the following, I will go through a 
theoretical debate in comparative law regarding particular concepts connected with legal 
transmission, mainly using the ideas of two professors of law, Alan Watson and Pierre 
Legrand.276 The purpose of examining this discussion will be to isolate a set of terminology 
about legal transmission that will be useful throughout the following study of the sources. I 
will attempt to relate the legal theories to historical approaches, and discuss how these 
theories of jurisprudence can shed light on historical problems. 
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Transplants and filtration 
 
Alan Watson’s work Legal Transplants, published in 1974, has been a sound corrective to the 
rejection of comparative approaches on law.277 His theories have had implications for the 
study of comparative law.278 They are likewise much debated and much criticised, with 
arguments of exaggeration.279 His main argument is that laws in the shape of norms, 
principles and concepts spread just as easily as other intellectual commodities.280 According 
to Watson, laws are rarely devised for the society in which they now operate, and he held this 
to be unproblematic.281 His 1974 work was a comment on functionalism as an explanation for 
legal change in legal history.282 Watson’s aim with this work was primarily to point out the 
widespread use of borrowing in legal material, from the first known laws until the present 
day. His most central point was that legal development in history most commonly happens 
through legal transplants.283 In Legal Transplants, Watson gave many examples of law being 
directly borrowed from one legal region by another. His main arguments, though, relate to 
how Roman law has spread through transplants into the European legal systems from the 
Roman period onwards.284 The theory has also been called the ‘Roman theory’, and is 
understood to be applicable only to the history of western legal systems.285 
Although Watson’s theory that changes in law mainly happens through transplant calls 
for moderation, it contributes to the search of transmission of law. Another contribution of 
Watson’s work is that he questioned the long-established paradigm in comparative law and 
legal philosophy, a remnant from the founder of this field, Montesquieu, that law changes for 
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reasons outside the law but inside the jurisdiction.286 The work was also a comment on the 
theories of Montesquieu and later works of Otto Kahn-Freund that there are dangerous 
implications in direct transplants of modern law.287 The danger is due to the ‘risk of rejection’ 
by the new host (Kahn-Freund’s organic terminology is not accidental).288 Montesquieu’s 
points was that it would be ’un tres grand hasard’, a great coincidence, if the laws of one 
nation were suitable for another.289 Although Watson did not oppose coincidental legal 
transplants, he did oppose the idea that societies change the law because of elitist interests or 
political ideologies, and that law reflects the power structures of society. Rather, he shows 
how law can be autonomous from society. William Ewald pointed out that, in Legal 
Transplants, Watson confronted the prevailing mirror-theories, that in their extreme versions 
imply not only that law mirrors its society, but also that law is a complete entity, that every 
piece of it belongs together.290 My hypothesis is that medieval law is fragmented and 
coincidentally pieced together, and that the pieces often are transmissions from other law.  
 In Pierre Legrand’s critique of Watson, formulated in ‘The Impossibility of “Legal 
Transplants”’ (1997), Legrand claims that legal culture is an obstacle to the direct reception 
of law.291 ‘Legal culture’ in Legrand’s argument must be understood as the sum of practices, 
ideas and expectations of the law in a society’s subjects and legal organs. As legal historian 
Jørn Ø. Sunde asserts, legal culture changes by a gradual transformation of conceptions and 
expectations of law.292 Transmission of law will not change the legal culture, but legal culture 
will form the transmitted law.293 Legrand’s first objection to legal transplants derives from the 
manner in which he defines the term ‘transplant’. To Legrand, a transplant means a 
dislocation.294 He therefore asks what is actually being dislocated, and he understands 
Watson’s argument to be that rules can be dislocated freely, in anatomical terms like Kahn-
Freund. He also understands Watson as only referring to transplants of rules, as in positive 
law, and not to transplants of concepts, norms, jurisprudence and other elements that can fall 
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into the category of what is ‘legal’. Legrand consequently argues against Watson only on the 
basis of transplanting rules, and assert that rules are more than the words constituting them, 
and that their semantic meaning is what ‘partakes in the ruleness of the rule’.295 The meaning 
is locked into the cultural context in which the rule exists, and, since meanings are not 
transplantable, neither are rules.296 In addition, he emphasises that received law will pass 
through what could be termed a legal cultural filter297 and be altered when transmitted into 
another legal culture. Mere implants will be rejected in the new host legal culture. Legrand 
holds Watson’s definition of law to be wrong, by ascribing to him the view that rules, both in 
their exact wording and in their originally invested meanings, can be transplanted as a totality. 
What Legrand finds impossible is that a rule’s meaning in one culture could be transplanted 
into another culture. He claims that ‘the imported form of words is inevitably ascribed a 
different local meaning which makes it ipso facto a different rule. As the understanding of a 
rule changes, the meaning of the rule changes. And, as the meaning of the rule changes, the 
rule itself changes’.298 Since the rule is not the same, legal transplants cannot take place, 
according to Legrand. Further, he finds legal transmission to be an unimportant aspect of legal 
development, since it is the different culture’s perception of its laws that determines the legal 
process.299 This is based on his idea of legal culture and the assumption that each individual 
legal subject within a society is a bearer of the society’s legal culture.300 For Legrand, a study 
of the internal changing of laws is a constructive approach towards understanding legal 
development. An examination of external influences is not. 
 Legrand’s rejection of legal transplants is easy to challenge, mainly because he seems 
to have misrepresented Watson. First of all, Watson did not use the term ‘legal transplants’ to 
refer to rules being copied with their semantic meanings, but has, like Legrand, repeatedly 
emphasised that the different interpretations of borrowed rules are a key aspect of legal 
transplants.301 The theories given in Legal Transplants are not only about copying specific 
rules into foreign codes, but also, just as Legrand stresses, about how specific rules are 
interpreted and used differently when transplanted into other legal codes. Second, Watson did 
not refer solely to transplants of written rules, but also to transplants of norms, concepts, 
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jurisprudence and all things legal, and he said that these abstract forms of law also would be 
interpreted differently in the transplant process. Nevertheless, almost all of Watson’s 
examples of legal transplants concern specific written rules or rules copied from one corpus to 
another. Examples of transplants of ideas are presumably not very easy to identify, and 
therefore clear examples are not readily to hand, but must be explained in broader passages. It 
all boils down to the definition of what is meant by transplant, to what constitutes a rule of 
law, and to whether one considers legal concepts and elements of processes and punishments 
as a part of the law.  
 In a reply, Watson claims that Legrand has an outdated view of the law as the ‘spirit of 
the people’.302 Further, he finds it ‘banal to notice that the same rule operates differently in 
two countries: it operates to different effects even in one’.303 Watson then criticises Legrand’s 
dismissal of the focus of comparative legal theories on external influences. Watson agrees that 
changes within a legal system are important, but says that it is the comparison of different 
legal systems that reveals their historical relationship.304  
 Still, as Richard L. Abel has pointed out, it is difficult to grasp Watson’s treatment of 
law and society.305 He is more than vague on what he defines as laws, and on whether the 
laws he refers to are laws-in-books or laws-in-society. This distinction is crucial for the 
present study, which concentrates on laws as law-in-books, and the motives of the legislator. 
The link with society comes from his survey of law-making, when he says that the real 
lawmakers are neither the authorities nor the people, but the ‘legal elite’ in society.306 Watson 
does not explain the causes or effects of legal transplants, mainly because he finds the process 
so common that there is no need to explain its background. Laws are difficult to invent and 
easy to borrow, and there is no need to have a reason for this. As for the link to society, he 
states, ‘the truth of the matter seems to be that many legal rules make little impact on 
individuals, but what rule actually is adopted is of restricted significance for general human 
happiness’.307 His basic opinion seems to be that laws work indirectly within society, so that 
the ‘volkgeist’ does not determine legal change. 
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 One of Watson’s frequently used examples is the Turkish adoption of the civil codes 
of Switzerland in 1926. The authorities of the young republic of Turkey wanted to modernise 
society, and therefore also its legal system – the secular courts, which were ‘backward and 
primitive’, and the religious courts that were in use.308 In short, a commission shopped around 
for a law to replace the Ottoman legal system, and chose the Swiss civil codes in their 
entirety. In addition, Swiss jurisprudence, glossaries and precedents were brought along with 
the codes, together with Swiss legal professors to teach Turkish lawyers and judges.309 The 
commission also borrowed commercial law, maritime law and criminal procedure from 
Germany, criminal law from Italy and administrative law from France. This is an extreme 
example of legal transplants, but it illustrates essential points in both Watson and Legrand’s 
arguments: the borrowed laws were then mildly altered to fit with each other and with Turkish 
social problems, but were largely not tampered with. The result was that the law bore no 
resemblance to Turkish society. Therefore, fifty year later, one still found in the peripheral 
communities people living according to the old laws and not the Swiss law.310 This conclusion 
supports both Watson and Legrand: law can be transplanted, but it will need to be altered to 
be applicable in the new society. 
Finally, to Legrand’s argument about the impossibility of legal transplants, Watson 
replies with an allegory of a grafted tomato plant, and asks if the plant is the same when it 
gains strength in its new soil.311 Watson believes it is, but suspects that Legrand does not, 
since transplants are impossible. Legrand might perhaps think that rules and tomato plants 
cannot be compared. The discussion turning towards Heracletian epistemological philosophy 
is a less important issue for my focus here and will not be followed any further. The point is 
not whether the rule, because of the change in its environment, is a different rule because it is 
interpreted differently, or altered or adjusted. The point here is that the law from one society 
can be included in another. Depending on one’s legal and philosophical leaning, legal 
transplants are possible.  
  Although Legrand and Watson have different views on the relationship between law 
and society, they both agree that law is adjusted when it is included in another law. A fruitful 
part the argument is the theories concerning the process of alteration, and how received law is 
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altered by passing through the legal cultural filter in order to be accepted in its new society.312 
In addition, to the extent they touch upon it, they both argue that studies of the alterations that 
happen in this process will address why the foreign law was transmitted into the new legal 
system, and that the transmission will reveal developments in the legal system. Therefore, 
these theories may be useful for historians in determining the cause and effect of legal 
transmission. While comparative law can provide different angles on how to view the 
reception of the law, comparative law is rarely used in the context in which these 
transmissions happen.  
In the discussion of legal transmission, relevant issues relate to whom the written law applies, 
as well as to the boundaries of the law. A normal distinction would be between territorial law 
and ethnic law, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Roman law, for instance, was in 
principle valid for everyone within the territory of the Roman Empire, while the Lombard law 
and some of the Swedish provincial codes, as well as others, seems to have been valid only 
for those defined under a specific ethnic group.313 More interesting to the search for legal 
transmission is the unofficial boundaries of law, or the extent of the law. Patrick Wormald 
criticised the teleological historical approach to early medieval law as bearer of gens, or as an 
ethnic marker.314 Next, we should discuss what the extent of medieval law was, in both 
people’s mentality and the jurisdiction it claimed.  
The anthology Boundaries of the Law from 2005 raises important questions regarding 
what we imagine the law’s range of influence to be, which could be both its jurisdiction and 
range.315 The editor Anthony Musson addresses the geographical, personal, social and cultural 
legal boundaries.316 Modern historians understand law to be uniform and total, but he asserts 
this is not applicable to medieval societies. It is important to remain conscious of the 
multilayered ranges of medieval law when discussing transmission. Dirk Heirbraut points out 
that, in Flanders in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, several competing laws had effect in 
overlapping regions.317 Feudal law competed with the urban jurisdiction and local v. regional 
laws/jurisdictions. He gives examples of local and regional conflicts of law, where the parties 
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were from different communities or regions. Territorial boundaries usually solved the 
problems of conflicting jurisdictions, but Heirbraut explains that this did not happen in 
Flanders, where the overlapping remained even when the Low Countries were united under 
one ruler. At the local level, several competing laws still applied. 
Such overlapping can also be found in the specific institutions in the law. Although it 
should have been superfluous to legislate on vengeance due to the development of the state, it 
still existed in both European medieval society and in the laws. In much the same way, Trisha 
Olson has shown in a thorough study of the role of sanctuaries as part of medieval conflict 
resolution how, although giving peace to an offender for having hidden in a sanctuary seems 
an obsolete practice and ‘antithetical to civilised systems of justice’, this was unproblematic 
during the period the practice was used, because the layers, tools and processes were different 
then from our current understanding of right process.318 Sanctuaries were considered as an 
existing part of a possible legal process, and mentioned in several secular laws from eighth-
century Spain to eleventh-century Flanders to twelfth-century France.319 Heirbraut has also 
shown that the same law could be interpreted in many different ways in the different judicial 
systems of Flanders: for instance, the law giving the eldest son the larger part of the 
inheritance would bestow on the younger children different shares in different regions.320 
Taking into consideration Legrand’s theory of adaptation of transmitted law into a new legal 
culture, we must also acknowledge that legal subjects and the legal authorities recognised 
different laws being current in the same territory, or a group being under several different 
laws at the same time, and that this was unproblematic. 
 The discussion between Watson and Legrand forms a theoretical work, and it also 
provides us with usable terminology. These tools can provide ways to interpret somewhat 
impersonal legal texts, where we have no clue about the individuals behind the normative 
material who were in contact with those norms. Watson’s theories give the whole backdrop to 
legal transplants. This phrase is somewhat controversial and rigid. A more subtle version is 
the term that forms the basis of the present thesis, transmission. Legrand’s definition of the 
term legal culture gives us a sustainable framework for discussing the sum of norms and 
customs and understanding of legal concepts within an area, an area often corresponding with 
the jurisdiction of the laws. Legrand’s arguments of adaptation and alteration explain how 
                                                 
318 Trisha Olson, ‘Sanctuaries and Penitential Rebirth in the Central Middle Ages’, in Boundaries of the Law: 
Geography, Gender and Jurisdiction in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Musson (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2005), pp. 38-52 (p. 39)  
319 Olson, ’Sanctuaries’, pp. 40-42. 
320 Heirbraut, ‘Rules for Solving Conflicts’, pp. 49-50. 
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transmitted law can be introduced into other legal cultures, through legal cultural filters. 
Next, some possible ways of law can be transmitted will be depicted. 
 
Modes of transmission 
 
As the theories of Alan Watson, and the discussion that followed them, show, transmission of 
law can take many forms. We can distinguish three key factors concerning how legal 
transmission can ultimately take place. First, law can spread by transplants, a conscious 
copying of other societies’ laws. Secondly, law can spread by influence, intellectual 
tendencies affecting the makers of law, by reception or pressure, resulting in common 
concepts of justice in different legal cultures. Finally, law can spread by what we may call 
filtration, when external influences or transplants are altered according to domestic legal 
traditions. A fourth feature is relevant to this study; the question of the legislators’ motives for 
including contents in law. Influence is the most general and somewhat superficial way of 
explanation, and the most widely used description for legal transmission by scholars. 
‘“Influence” has become almost a dirty word in legal history’, Bernard S. Jackson noted in 
1968, in his article on influences on ancient law.321 It might be an obvious point, but it can be 
fruitful to give some reflections on the modes of transmission. There is, of course, a 
difference between, on the one hand, ideological impulses from one legal culture to another, 
and on the other, new laws thrust upon a society by a conquering force. Slow religious or 
cultural influences are different from the loan of a great bulk of law. The reactions – that 
Pierre Legrand claims must take place – to the transmitted law would also be different, 
ranging from acceptance to non-acceptance, and these would be visible in different types of 
amendments to the new law. A possible way to view both the types of transmission and the 
types of reaction will be as pairs of terms with positive and negative connotations. The 
following list is my suggestion to how we can articulate different (not ranked) types of 
transmission, according to the way it takes form with the legislators and in the legal culture.  
Type of transmission Positive connotation Negative connotation 
Transplant Loan Imposed law 
Filtration Adaption Adjustment 
Influence Reception Pressure 
Motives Inspiration Discouragement 
                                                 
321 Jackson, ‘Evolution’, p. 372. 
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While this vocabulary may be useful in describing transmission in the following chapters, 
what can the explanations of legal transmission be? Watson has put forward four aspects of 
‘legal transplants and of legal autonomy’ as an attempt to theorise on a large scale about 
borrowings of law that have been and are still conducted everywhere: 1. extreme utility; 2. 
chance; 3. difficulty of clear sight; and 4. need for authority.322 
 By utility, Watson means how easy it is to borrow law, and how difficult it is not to. 
Laws transmit easily, although not without friction. Watson explains this with an example 
from the Dutch reception of Roman law transplanted into Dutch law, by pointing out the 
vigorous effort to learn Roman law by Dutch law students. This effort, he asserts, is a 
testimony to the conscious attitude that an imposed law can be met with ‘the ability within a 
system to reject a potent and dominating foreign force.’323 Another obvious point is that 
transmission of law must happen through persons, individuals and groups, or with the works 
of persons as instruments. People from one legal culture must bring law to another or to 
someone from another legal culture; or someone must actively seek foreign law, visit it or 
send for it; or multiple meetings between people from different legal cultures must result in 
gradual influences of legal ideas and concepts of law; or someone must come across legal 
works by others or laws made for someone else. Alan Watson calls this particular aspect 
‘chance’, by which he means something unpredictable.324 The point is that legal transmissions 
happen through direct or indirect contacts between people. 
 The two aspects of difficulty of clear sight and need for authority are connected to the 
jurist interpretation of transmitted law in early modern Europe, where Watson uses examples 
from the understanding of Roman-Dutch and Romano-Scottish law. A point may still be 
relevant to a survey of medieval laws: Watson argues that difficulty of clear sight may cause 
the legal elite to give authority to foreign law while not completely understanding the nature 
of the transmission. The need to give authority will, according to Watson, also cause legal 
transplants in itself.325 This chapter has identified some tools of vocabulary, technical 
terminology and possible explanations for transmission of law. The next step is to provide 
some reflections on the comparative approach. 
 
                                                 
322 Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception’, pp. 335-51. 
323 Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception’, p. 339. 
324 Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception’, pp. 339-51. 
325 Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception’, pp. 350-51. 
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3.2 Methodological reflections  
A study of legal transmission will, by its very nature, demand a comparative approach to the 
sources. The aims and scope of the present project require a comparison of broad 
geographical areas over a wide time span. Moreover, the base of the survey is a systematic 
identification of origins, influences and directions of the transmission of law. The analysis 
will be an interpretation of the legal material as normative texts, in order to discuss possible 
motives behind the legislation or the incorporation of transmitted law. These methodological 
approaches will be outlined further in this chapter. Comparative approaches can still 
contribute to the missing links between the surviving materials, when mapping the larger 
image of medieval legal development. 
 
Large scale comparisons, macro-causal analysis 
 
The volume of the source material, and the problem of assessing the transmission of law, call 
for comparisons to be made according to stringent criteria. The theoretical categorising of 
comparative methods by Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers will be useful here. 326 Skocpol 
and Somers classify what they call ‘comparative history’ in three main ways. These ways are 
labelled ‘parallel demonstration of theories’, ‘the contrast of contexts’ and ‘macro-causal 
analysis’. The scope and problems of this thesis make it natural to apply the last method, since 
what are sought are causal connections on the broad level – a macro level – of medieval 
western legal development. To search for causal connections as explanation presupposes an 
idea of regularity in historical development, which would be impossible to argue. However, 
causal connections as explanation make it possible to study the variations in developments 
that are given value as general patterns. In this study, the general pattern is legislation in the 
process of the formation of a state, and the variations sought will be in legislation on wergild 
and inheritance. The method of macro-causal analysis can, according to Skocpol and Somers, 
be executed in two ways, by what John Stuart Mill termed The Method of Agreement and The 
Method of Difference.327 In using the Method of Agreement, one seeks to identify the crucial 
causal factor, a common component of studied objects that have a similar result, where those 
                                                 
326 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, ‘The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry’, in Social 
Revolutions in the Modern World, ed. by Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 
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327 Skocpol and Somers, ‘Uses of Comparative History’, p. 79; John Stuart Mill, ‘Two Methods of Comparison’, 
[selection from his A System of Logic, New York, Harper & Row, 1888] in Comparative Perspectives: Theories 
and Methods, ed. by Amitai Etzioni and Frederic L. Du Bow (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), pp. 205-10. 
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objects are otherwise different. The Method of Difference would, by contrast, mean finding 
the crucial variable that is different in the studied objects although they are otherwise similar. 
The third method of Mill’s is a combination of the two logics. In regards to assessing the 
transmission of law, a combination will certainly be used. Even so, the method of difference 
could be more fruitful to the study in consideration of the notion that one finds what one 
seeks: the hypothesis put forward in this thesis is that there are traces of transmission and 
influence between the laws in western medieval legal cultures. The assumption is that a 
certain agreement in the material exists, an agreement that is unrevealed: the objects agree on 
crucial points (because of transmission), which results in similar legislation on wergild and 
inheritance, even though the objects otherwise differ. This would suggest applying the method 
of agreement. However, if we instead treat the material from different times and regions as 
fairly similar objects (law codes), and by the method of difference approach the sources with 
a search for their differences on crucial points (the laws on wergild and inheritance), this 
approach would be better at falsifying the hypothesis. A combination of the two methods 
might thus be the favourable solution in a direct comparative analysis. 
 What, then, are the objects to be compared? To be able to discuss transmission, the 
comparison would necessarily happen at several levels: of the separate rules concerning 
inheritance and wergild, of the combined legislation in one law code, and of the legal cultures, 
and the separate regions within the western spheres. A full comparison at all levels would of 
course be an unrealistic task for a thesis, but reasonable juxtapositions will be attempted. 
 The first principle of comparison is that objects of equal sizes should be compared. 
This rule is the first to be disobeyed in a study of this kind. The reason lies in the unequal 
legal activity over the centuries and the inequality between the mass of Roman legislation on 
inheritance and the small number of rules on this subject in the Germanic codes or any other 
secular medieval written law. In any case, the volume of Roman law simply makes the objects 
far from equal in any sense. Selected Roman rules will have to be contrasted with a few 
possible relevant rules found, for instance, in the Edict of Rothair. Similarly, the 
professionalisation of the Roman legal system makes it unequal with the early medieval 
continental, English and Nordic systems. As we are aware of this concern, the aim of this 
study is not to assess sheer quantity or quality, but the ideology of the content. Here, the rules 
are comparable. We are not looking for equality in the legal systems or quantity of law, but 
for signs of transmissions.  
 Another problem regarding these objects is the predefined legal regions in which I 
operate. In the fundamental work on comparative law by Zweigert and Kötz, the discussion of 
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the grouping of – mainly modern – legal families is addressed.328 They point to the fact that a 
classification of the world’s legal systems into families would be ‘vulnerable to alteration by 
historical development and change’.329 As we are studying ancient legal systems, the 
viewpoint of the researcher would influence the grouping, as would a predisposed attitude 
towards legal and historical development. The division that has already been sketched out, 
into the legal regions of Roman law, Germanic or continental law, early English law and 
Nordic law – disregarding the temporal factor – arguably stems from a modern cultural 
classification of western culture. Zweigert and Kötz themselves divide the modern legal 
families of the western world into the Romanist, Germanic, Anglo-American (common law) 
and Nordic families.330 Yet, the modern classification arguably has a historical foundation, a 
factor that Zweigert and Kötz also regard as one of five factors being crucial for a division 
into legal families.331 These regions or cultures have a history as legal families. The criticism 
of a division into such entities has mainly been that the division into modern legal families 
does not necessarily correspond with the boundaries of legal cultures.332 Legal cultures 
overarching different legal families can be interpreted as signs of transmission of law. 
 
Comparison along diachronic and synchronic lines 
 
The aim and scope of this study calls for a comparison of legal sources from different 
geographical regions and from different periods, which involves comparing them 
synchronically and diachronically. The terms ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ are mainly used 
in the subject of linguistics.333 In the field of social anthropology, where the terms are also in 
use, diachronic and synchronic comparison denotes, respectively, comparison of occurrences 
at different points in time and occurrences compared regardless of time or without time being 
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a factor in the operation.334 Here, however, the term synchronic will be applied to legal 
developments taking place in different regions in mainly the same time span, and its opposite, 
diachronic, will denote legal developments taking place at different points in time, regardless 
of region. 
 When studying the transmission, influences and origins of law synchronically, the aim 
is to examine similarities and contrasts between legal regions. The classification of legal 
regions has already been discussed above, but some points on geography could be made here. 
The project has previously been limited to the Latin spheres of Europe, mostly western and 
south-central Europe, which creates a division between the Latin spheres and the Slavic and 
Greek spheres, and excludes the latter two. One could ask if this is a natural legal division, 
when thinking, for instance, of the developments in the Byzantine spheres and their 
interaction with the Lombard and later Norman regions of Italy mentioned earlier. Boundaries 
between the geographical jurisdictions may be blurred or overlapping. Within the Latin 
sphere, areas overlapping several states or jurisdictions appear as a natural legal family even 
although there are many differences between their laws.  
When trying to explain similarities in the sources, and to assess the possible direction 
of transmission, an obvious approach is to look at the geographical proximity of the relevant 
jurisdictions. However, this should not hinder us from looking at other possibilities, including 
that transmission could take place between more physically remote areas. For instance, Lisi 
Oliver and Jocelyn Hillgarth have shown correspondences between, respectively, the Frisian 
and the Kentish, and the Visigothic and the Irish, legal material that cannot be explained by a 
shared language or physical proximity, but that still have elements of shared culture due to 
contact by sea and through trade.335  
The comparison of the Nordic laws with early medieval continental and English 
legislation can provide fruitful rewards, despite methodological challenges. The early 
medieval laws from the European Continent and the high medieval Nordic laws have a similar 
genesis. They originated in a period of state consolidation, and they originated in the wake of 
Roman law although at different points in time – the Germanic laws as a response to Roman 
legal hegemony when successor states were established on or near earlier imperial territory, 
and the Nordic laws, in written form, from the impact on Europe of the revival of Roman laws 
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at the universities. Both the Nordic and the Germanic laws could be both a reaction to and an 
effect of Roman legal culture. We can therefore expect to find (and have found) Roman legal 
concepts in both continental and Nordic European legislation. Moreover, we can therefore 
also expect to find in the same sources norms that have been chiselled out and that oppose 
Roman legal concepts, since legislators or legal cultures as a whole found it necessary to 
construct legal concepts that were essential in the regional or national legal culture but that 
were opposed to or were not found in the civil law of the Romans. For this reason, the sources 
of law from the early medieval Continent and England can justifiably be compared with each 
other. 
 The obscure lines of transmission will fully emerge through a diachronic perspective 
between the legal cultures from different periods and regions. The early medieval legal 
development was born out of the Roman legal tradition, but found its own way in the 
following centuries. The establishment of universities in Europe, at which the study of law 
became professionalised, is a divide in the time span covered by this thesis. This is a 
significant watershed, and although historians point to continuity with, and the origins in, the 
learning centres and schools that pre-dated the universities, the unification of canon law and 
the systematic approach to both Roman and canon law were important developments.336 The 
establishment of the European universities made Roman law rise again for a second wave of 
influence on the ius of the developing European states in the 1100s to the 1300s. The division 
in time will therefore separate the Germanic and English laws as one synchronic legal 
development, and the Nordic laws as the second, later legal development.  
 A diachronic comparison of course risks the pitfall of teleological presumption, as for 
all studies of development over time. The presumption of an existing process of development 
itself leads the historian in a certain direction. The risk, therefore, when studying the 
development of laws in the process of the formation of a state is that all choices and selections 
made by the legislators are read as another step towards the consolidation of authority. A 
counterweight to this problem is the effect that a diachronic comparison of odd objects 
separated by centuries and long distances can liberate the analysis from such teleological 
presumptions. The aim is a comparison of contents regardless of time, not to find the causes 
and effects of a particular development.  
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A hierarchy of probability 
 
The primary goal of macro-causal analysis is, according to Skocpol and Somers, to develop 
explanations of the crucial similarity or differences in the cases being studied.337 To explain 
the outcome of legislation in the areas in relation to each other would, as such, be the primary 
goal of this study. A problem with this is mentioned in the introduction: that regulation of 
inheritance and homicide is essential in any society. Thus, it could be argued that inheritance 
and a system of compensation would always exist in legislation enacted in forming states, and 
would basically have common features in these laws for that reason. The obvious similarities 
in the topics makes it difficult to assess what is transmission of law and what is similar 
solutions to similar problems arising in different legal cultures. To be able to disentangle the 
types of similarities, and assess if similarities can be classified as coincidence or as 
transmission, the legislation will be analysed by grading the results of the comparison in a 
hierarchy of probability. 
How does one describe similarities in laws? When discussing what or where 
transmission took place, the search for possible influence would be at some level of 
correspondence linking two laws: a rule, a statement, a stipulated punishment, a procedural 
description or something else. For instance, Lisi Oliver has tried to pinpoint the relationships 
between some of the early medieval continental legislation by using the term ‘textual 
echoes’.338 The notion of correspondence can be so vague. A fitting quote from Wormald 
describing the historian’s approach to the legal material is that it ‘obstinately refuses to fall 
neatly into clearly distinguishable categories’.339 The quote can serve as an argument for the 
challenges of arranging these sources according to the aim of the study. The point is that the 
problem of explaining transmission lies in the systematic methods of the scholar, more than in 
the laws themselves. To have some possible guidelines in the study, a ranked model of aspects 
of the laws has been constructed. The model has been called the hierarchy of probability, 
which means that the factors are given certain levels.340  
 
My hierarchy of probability has the following levels: 
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1st level: The text of the law 
1.1 COPY 1.2 TRANSLATION 
| 
2nd level: The content of the rules 
2.1 COMPOSITION 2.2 MOTIVATION/ARGUMENT/BASIS 
| 
3rd level: The elements of the rules 
3.1. TERMINOLOGY 3.2 PROCEDURE/SOLUTION  3.3 OTHER CONTENTS 
 
The hierarchy will point to similarities, but will not in itself yield explanations for the 
similarities (or for transmission). Simple in style, it basically illustrates a key point of how to 
assess the probability of a transmission of law. The task can be questionable because, in many 
instances, what accounts for actual transmission, and what is merely a remote connection 
through common thoughts between the European learned elite seen in different law codes 
simultaneously or at different points in time, is open to discussion. Therefore, the 
‘probability’ denotes with what certainty legal texts can be assumed to be related, or to have 
had an influence on (or have been influenced by) another.  
 The factors ‘Copy’ and ‘Translation’ are at the top of the hierarchy for obvious 
reasons. Verbatim conformity would clearly indicate that the scribe of a later text had 
knowledge of an earlier, although both of course could be copies of an unknown source. This 
would fall within (but would not alone constitute) what Kahn-Freund and Watson refer to as 
legal transplants.341 A text that follows another nearly word for word, although in another 
language, could be assumed to be a translation. The early English (although these could have 
been translated later) and Nordic laws are in the vernacular, but possible international 
influences can be found in Latin.  
On the second level, I have set ‘Composition’ and ‘Motivation/argument/basis’ as 
equally probable indicators of transmission. Motivation, argument and all sorts of background 
to the issuing of a law can reveal whether one source relies on transmission from another 
source. Either the lawmaker gave the source of influence directly, or the formulas alone 
expose a relationship with other sources. The other factor on the second level of probable 
transmission is ‘Composition’. Here I am considering the structure of the text. Similar build-
ups of rules dealing with the same topic, composed with the same structure, with the same 
arguments and the same style, would indicate that the newer is based on the older.  
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The third level of the hierarchy of probability consists of the content and meaning of 
the rules, and is therefore focused on the semantics of the rules rather than on the technical 
similarities of the two first levels. Relationships between medieval legal texts can be sensed in 
the total meaning of the rules, in features like terminology or their prescribed solution to the 
topic in hand. Most of the early medieval legislation was written in Latin, and thus shares a 
legal language from the outset.342 However, scholars have found the irregular employment of 
vernacular terms useful in the discussion of the relationship between medieval law codes.343 
The similarities and, even more importantly, the dissimilarities in the terminology are 
valuable sources. In the same way, the usages of similar or different Latin terms in separate 
laws on the same subject are important clues.344 The descriptions of procedure or stipulated 
outcome of certain cases, such as the sequence and size of the compensation, would also be 
significant concerning the relationship between laws. Background and procedure are on the 
third level of probability, because neither of these types of general similarities can establish 
with certainty a transmission of law, or from which source or direction, if this is not stated 
explicitly. Most of the investigation in this thesis will relate to the two lower levels of 
probability. 
These methods, one could argue, involve a danger of over-generalising the material in 
question. Still, a systematic comparison of the content and motifs of the laws will reveal 
nuances concerning possible influences and transmission of law, and thereby shed light on the 
results of contact of legal intellectuals in medieval Europe, otherwise unknown to us. As a last 
element on the third level in the hierarchy, I have put ‘other contents’, in order not to miss 
clues of transmission omitted through the rigidness of a systematic approach. At this level, we 
can find how law has been adjusted and adapted to local societies, since the comparisons also 
reveal the differences, and thereby the changes made to the rules. It is at the second and third 
level that we compare the meaning of the law, to analyse the broader legal development in the 
Middle Ages, as transmission with adjustments through a 900-year time span could bring to 
light connections not found earlier. 
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In this survey, the objects are not of similar size (neither in physical nor in abstract form), 
time, or origins. The objects being compared are based on my choices, both their selection 
and the emphasis as an historian, together with what is ‘alike’ and ‘different’. Therefore, I 
have constructed the hierarchy of probability to systemise my own choices for the reader, and 
to clarify the variables compared, the criteria weighed, and the conclusions. In the following 
chapters, I will compare laws on inheritance and compensation for homicide according to the 
specified criteria of differences and similarities. The terminology for understanding legal 







4. Laws on Inheritance: Systems and Principles 
 
Laws on inheritance served three purposes. One purpose was to avoid conflicts within a kin 
group (as compensation was a tool to settle conflict between kin groups). Another purpose 
was that inheritance laws gave family members the right and duty to provide for relatives, 
thus strengthening the structures that took care of social needs in society. A third purpose was 
to determine the way in which property and privileges, and thereby power, was distributed in 
society.345 A tidy inheritance system would have a stabilising effect on society. It would also 
be the way in which resources were transferred between generations, and how families, 
communities, and eventually the whole of society reproduced itself from one generation to the 
next. The authorities’ interest in family transactions would be all but casual. The motives 
behind rules on inheritance can thus illuminate if legislating authority made conscious choices 
on the distribution of wealth among subjects when establishing and changing inheritance 
laws. Did they analyse the possible consequences as we do? Similarities in the law texts 
throughout the centuries present us with interesting evidence. They could stem from shared 
ideas of transferring wealth across the generations, and thus the continuation of society. 
Similarities possibly in the laws stemmed from coincidental transmission of existing secular 
law, or even careful and conscious loans from the existing laws of others. One topic to study 
when examining laws on inheritance systems is whether those families with interest in 
inheritance pressured legislators.  
 In the history of inheritance in western Europe, what is comprehended as a strong turn 
in the eleventh century towards a favouring of the male line and the firstborn male son might 
have existed.346 However, Georges Duby has pointed to the fact that although an emphasis on 
the male line began to be evident, the favouring of the eldest son, primogeniture, was only the 
custom of the upper seigniorial class in France towards the end of the eleventh century.347 
James Brundage believes that the flexibility of the canons, as regards distribution of 
inheritance at will, gradually influenced the European systems of inheritance from the 
eleventh century onwards.348 Even if there was a change to or peak of favouring the male line 
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through the firstborn son among European aristocracy at this point, early medieval law 
differed in their systems. And the same was true of secular law from twelfth-century 
Scandinavia.  
 The measures for dividing property by inheritance are often interpreted both in 
contemporary sources and in modern studies as a triangular struggle between king, Church 
and nobility: the somewhat caricatured presentation of nobility protecting family property at 
all costs, the different agents of the Church trying to get hold of it, and the king motivated by 
enriching the treasury. The stage is often set in eleventh- or twelfth-century France or 
England, when feudal structures in society must inevitably be taken into consideration.349 
Another interpretation regards the Church and normal people, where Christian intellectuals 
condemned lay people’s sinful mode of living. Regarding inheritance, that would manifest in 
letting, according to clergy, illegitimate relatives inherit. In the latter example, secular 
authority could act both under the influence of the Church or as a protector of custom, when 
siding with either party.  
 How did secular authority try to regulate inheritance by written law? What tendencies 
in terms of legislators’ view of kinship within the state structure can be seen in the laws? The 
following chapters on inheritance examine the apparent convictions of secular authority; in 
the secular legislation on inheritance it may be possible to detect the norms with which 
authority would be associated. Herein could be found the source of influence on the 
lawmaker, and the origins and transmission of law. The chapters on inheritance 
comprehensively assess the legal material’s portrayal of inheritance, together with a 
comparison of the systems that can be detected in it. The inheritance systems as they are 
portrayed in the legal source will be reconstructed in separate chapters with comparative 
approaches. The task here is to attempt to identify possible motives, influences and 
transmission. Yet, law derives from norms and practice alike, and I will discuss the influence 
from prevailing traditions where relevant. For studies on how the European population dealt 
with their inheritance according to, or in opposition to, the law at different times, several 
thorough works can be consulted.350 The question here is whether practical needs or customs 
                                                 
349 For instance, Duby, Love and Marriage. 
350 Examples: on Frankish kinship: Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure; on Frankish women: Suzanne Fonay 
Wemple, Women in Frankish Society: Marriage and the Cloister 500 to 900 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1981). On early Scandinavian evidence: Birgit Sawyer, The Viking-Age Rune-Stones: 
Custom and Commemoration in Early Medieval Scandinavia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Lars 
Ivar Hansen, Inheritance, Property and Marriage in Medieval Norway (New York: Boydell and Brewer, 2013). 
On the Icelandic: Agnes S. Arnórsdóttir, Property and Virginity, The Christanization of Marriage in Medieval 
Iceland 1200-1600 (Århus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2010). 
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manifested in written law or vice versa, and if changes in the law were a result of necessity or 
of transmission from other law. Principles of inheritance are often used as an explanation for 
certain medieval social structures, such as kin groups and marriage strategies, but is it 
possible that, conversely, such structures can explain the changes in principles of inheritance? 
Canon law and ideologies of the Church called for a cognatic family and inheritance system, 
and it is interesting to see whether secular legislators complied. Also, how kings as lawmakers 
would be interested in controlling systems of inheritance can reveal if they borrowed from 
other laws, or the laws were an image of a current (or outdated) custom.  
 To demonstrate the inheritance systems in the written laws, I will use genograms. 
Such a model cannot do justice to the variants of distribution or to the flexibility of a system, 
but a genogram will illustrate the nature of the default system and dominating aspects of each 
jurisdiction. Also a model of this kind can assist in explaining the many degrees of kin that 
appear in the rules, which would be excessive to mention. The prototype genogram with the 
list of kin related by degree is shown in Figure 1.
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Abbreviations in the genograms 
 
Figure 1: Genogram of Ego with bilateral relatives to the second canonical degree. Miriam Tveit  
The figure above represents a genogram in the form they will be modelled from the laws throughout the survey of the 
legal sources in this chapter. The person from whom the property is inherited will generally be termed ‘Ego’ in this 
thesis, as the centre of the inheritance system, alternately ‘the deceased’. 
BD Brother’s daughter 
BS Brother’s son 
DD Daughter’s daughter 
DS Daughter’s son 
FB Father’s brother 
FBD Father’s brother’s daughter 
FBS Father’s brother’s son 
FBSS Father’s brother’s son’s son 
FF Father’s father 
FFB Father’s father’s brother 
FFBS Father’s father’s brother’s son 
FFF Father’s father’s father 
FFM Father’s father’s mother 
FFS Father’s father’s sister 
FM Father’s mother 
FS Father’s sister 
MB Mother’s brother 
MBD Mother’s brother’s daughter 
MBS Mother’s brother’s son 
MF Mother’s father 
MM  Mother’s mother 
MS Mother’s sister 
SD Son’s daughter 
SiD Sister’s daughter 
SiS Sister’s son 
SS Son’s son 
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4.1 Two models of inheritance system 
In the first part of this chapter, I outline the intestate system of inheritance described in the 
legal sources. We could term this the default inheritance system, meaning the inheritance 
system in its ‘cleanest’ form, without provisions or restrictions. Generally speaking, the 
default system constitutes the intestate division of the property of a legally married person 
with legally married parents, and with legitimate children, and/or legitimate siblings and/or 
legitimate uncles/aunts, and so on. In some secular laws, the inheritance system was described 
in minute detail, in others, explicit information on the default method of distributing 
inheritance is lacking. In case of the latter, attempts will be made to recreate the default 
system using laws on wergild, incest legislation and other relevant regulations that shed light 
on the authoritative conception of how inheritance should be distributed. This is done to better 
understand the inheritance regulations that do exist. 
 Medieval inheritance law is thoroughly discriminatory regarding gender, and this 
examination of the system will, of necessity, follow this lead. The centre of the inheritance 
systems, the deceased, will be termed Ego in the tradition of kinship and genealogy research. 
In this thesis, Ego is always a male, if not otherwise stated. The reason for this is not, of 
course, that inheritance by females are uninteresting, but that the default inheritance system 
we are presented with in medieval laws is, with some important exceptions, that of a male. 
The most elaborate exception is Roman law, where both in classical law and the later imperial 
constitutions, there are discussions of and changes to the rights of inheriting both to and from 
women, mainly concerning mothers.351 The reason is of course connected with the attitude 
towards female ownership, and the passing of wealth through women. Although there are 
plenty of examples of rich landholding women and heiresses in the Germanic kingdoms, the 
laws nevertheless impart another image.352 
 After establishing the ideal system of inheritance and its principles stated in the legal 
texts, I will address specific inheritance rights that emerge from a specific source. These deal 
with multiple spouses, half-siblings, different sets of offspring, different classes of illegitimate 
children (of which there are several categories in Germanic, and also Scandinavian, laws). I 
will focus on women’s right of inheritance, because studies of inheritance are more often than 
                                                 
351 For a recapitulation of the main points and developments, see Buckland, Text-book of Roman Law, pp. 368-
71. 
352 An alternative reading of the sources with focus on the female Ego should provide many interesting findings. 
However, this is a different task not to be undertaken here. 
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not defined by the rights of women, in order to define the whole system. Unlike females as 
Ego, females as heirs were significant for the legislator and society’s concept of the 
inheritance system. The focus will equally be on the rights of sons to inherit and the systems 
that allow brothers to inherit together. 
 In Nordic scholarship, a scientific branch of study and a particular set of terminology 
have developed around principles of inheritance found in both the Nordic medieval legislation 
and in non-normative source material from the Nordic regions. The outlines of the inheritance 
systems and principles in the laws will be expounded using these terms and classifications, 
because they have proved useful in exposing particular elements of inheritance laws, and 
because an equal approach to the entire corpus of source material makes the legal materials 
comparable. Moreover, such an approach will make the presentation of similar topics in the 
different sources more coherent. The main terminology from Nordic research on inheritance 
distinguishes between two systems of inheritance, that is, in the eastern and western Nordic 
regions. These are called the gradual system and the parentela system. 353  
                                                 
353 Sjöholm, Sveriges medeltidslagar, p. 124; Hansen ‘Slektskap, eiendom og sosiale strategier’, p. 122; Sawyer, 
Viking-Age Rune-Stones, pp. 77-79. 





The parentela system (Figure 2) specifies the priority of descendants, whereby the line of 
descent precedes grade of kinship. The first parentela consists of the Ego and its offspring and 
their descendants; the second parentela is constituted of the Ego’s parents, siblings and their 
offspring downwards. Similarly, the third parentela consists of grandparents, aunts and uncles, 
cousins and their descendants, and so on. The inheritance would go to descendants of the first 
degree, i.e., children, and if there were none, then the next degree, grandchildren, had priority.  
In its cleanest form all descendants of the same degree would share the property equally, and 
one parentela had to be exhausted of all descendants, and descendants of both sexes, before 
the right of inheritance passed to a parentela of higher level. As Birgit Sawyer has pointed 
out, an important feature of the parentela system is the principle of representation.354 Children 
of a deceased or disinherited child would claim the inheritance in his/her place. The complete 
exhaustion of a lower parentela will herein be termed a ‘full parentela’. Perfect equality of the 
division between the sexes or lineages will be termed a ‘strict parentela’. 
Although female inheritors would be favoured alongside male peers in this system, a 
mode of division in some law was that women received inheritance by lot. The ratio in the 
Scandinavian laws was 1:2, i.e., female heirs received half as much as male heirs of the same 
degree.  
 The gradual system (Figure 3) gives priority according to degree of kinship with Ego. 
Individuals nearest to the deceased would have the right of inheritance before more distant 
relatives, which would, for instance, give parents priority over grandchildren. Applying the 
gradual system also meant calculating the grade of kinship according to specific criteria. Also, 
principles of priority would be combined with the gradual system, accommodating, for 
instance, a preference between descendants and ascendants of equal degree, and applying 
patrilineal principles so that male relatives would be favoured over female relatives of the 
same distance from Ego.355 
 
                                                 
354 Sawyer, Viking-Age Rune-Stones, p. 77. 




Figure 3: Example of the gradual system of inheritance, according to the Frostathing Law, which also emphasises 
patrilineal distribution. The different relatives inherit according to distance from the deceased. 
 
The two models of inheritance system form the basis for the following survey of the sources, 
where the rules will reveal principles that will be categorised into one or the other. The laws 
on inheritance do not correspond tidily with these models. However, the models serve as a 
way of understanding the fundamental principles of an inheritance system and the changes in 
it, which again serve to identify traces of legal transmission. 
 
4.2 Principles of inheritance 
A combination of different types of principles is typically found within both the gradual and 
the parentela system in the normative sources. The principles further determined the norms of 
property transfer within the default inheritance system. I will here sketch some of the most 
common and significant principles of inheritance before we meet them again in the legal 
material.  
Besides traces of patrilineal features and favouring of relatives upwards or 
downwards, what Lars Ivar Hansen classifies as lineage and kinship groups are some of the 
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principles included in the laws. Sociological studies of family have developed a range of 
terms for describing the concept of kinship, some of which are relevant when describing the 
inheritance systems as they emerge in the laws. Kinship can be counted through line of 
decent, as lineage. Lineage can be counted through one sex, unilinear, or through relatives of 
both sexes, as omnilinear. Another way to comprise kinship is in the group of descendants, 
ascendants and collaterals of one individual, as laterality. They could be formed of relatives 
counted through both male and female relatives, in bilateral kin groups, or just through one 
sex in unilateral kin groups.356 Then there are the terms agnatic and cognatic kin, which have 
various meanings in the sources and are understood differently by scholars. In Roman law, 
agnatic refers to the paternal kin group, while cognatic referred to the maternal and paternal 
kin (D.38.10.4). These definitions of agnatic and cognatic will be used here. Roman law also 
included emancipated children and adoptees, who held a different status. What principles that 
dominate inheritance practices affect the deconstruction of family property?357 Applying 
lineages with rights restricted to, for instance, the firstborn (primogeniture) would in theory 
hold the estate together. On the other hand, the concept of cognatic kindred groups together 
with equal distribution among collaterals would split up property from one generation to the 
next, rearranging the capital. Bilateral kin groups give the impression of being the more 
flexible and equal system, in terms of the rights of maternal and paternal relatives, and the 
status of male and female kin. As pointed out by Lorraine Lancaster the ‘Ego-centred bilateral 
kin groups cannot persist as continuing units (…) When the focal relative dies, the group loses 
its identity’.358 Of this reason, we could expect a combination with other strategies to secure 
the continuation of a kin group. These strategies possibly appear in written law as added 
principles to the default system. 
One related effect of a cognatic concept of kinship is that it includes by principle the 
mother of Ego, hence the default system also includes the mother of Ego’s children. If 
legitimacy comes from a legitimate marriage, then this person is a legitimate wife. The 
mother/wife constitutes a particularity in the inheritance system. When a mother survives her 
children, or a wife survives her husband with whom she has children, the property of the 
father’s ascendants can fall to her through the child. This constitutes backwards inheritance, 
also called reverse inheritance. Missing descendants return inheritance backwards into the 
                                                 
356 See Goody, Development of Family and Marriage, pp. 222-24 and Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og sosiale 
strategier’, pp. 108-09 for a comprehensive elaboration of the various principles. 
357 Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og sosiale strategier’, pp. 110-11. 
358 Lorraine Lancaster, ‘Kinship in Anglo-Saxon Society: II’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol 9, No. 4 
(1958), pp. 359-377. 
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parentele, with the risk it would fall, through women, into another kin group. Because the 
modern scholar has been occupied with the property of nobility, backwards inheritance is 
conceived of as a problem in medieval inheritance systems. Of course a woman’s family 
property could and did likewise enter into her husband’s family through the same 
mechanisms. We see medieval legislators approaching the challenges of a mother having 
inheritance rights to her offspring. What if parents survived their children, or if their only 
conceived child was stillborn? How would posthumous children inherit? The laws reveal 
similarities in the dealings with such questions. 
 To view a legislator’s idea of how many relatives constituted kin with claims to 
intestate inheritance, the mode of counting kinship is vital. The Romans used what has been 
termed the Roman mode of counting. This is opposed to the medieval mode of counting, 
called the canonical mode of counting, or sometimes the Germanic mode. This mode caused 
turmoil in medieval marriage cases, and modern research thereon, because the combination of 
this with a marriage prohibition within seven degrees highly reduced the pool of possible 
marriage partners.359 In the Roman mode of counting, degrees were calculated by starting 
with the Ego, then counting one degree by each step upwards and downwards. Thus, a first 
cousin would be a relative of fourth degree. 
 From the ninth century, the canonical decrees indicate that the mode of counting 
kinship had changed to the canonical mode. The change came with sharp restrictions in 
marriage legislation. What constituted an incestuous and thereby illegitimate marriage was 
extended from including cousins to include all descendants from the couples’ five times great 
grandparents. The regulation from the Church was in number of degrees, from four to seven 
degrees of kinship constituting incestuous marriage. But they also counted degrees differently, 
from counting each joint between two persons, to counting directly to a common ancestor. 
When counted this way, the cousins became related in second degree and not in the fourth 
degree, as they would have by the Roman method of counting.  
Scholars have discussed several motives behind the change, particularly relating to the 
relationship between the Church and the aristocracy. The most radical view is that of social 
anthropologist Jack Goody, who suggested the western Church tried to restrain legitimate 
                                                 
359 Constance Bouchard, ‘Consanguinity and Noble Marriages’, p. 270; Frances and Joseph Gies, Marriage and 
Family in the Middle Ages (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), pp. 83-84; Herlihy, ‘Women, Family and 
Society’, p. 102; Michael Gelting, ‘Marriage, Peace and the Canonical Incest Prohibitions: Making Sense of an 
Absurdity?’, in Nordic Perspectives on Medieval Canon Law, ed. by Mia Korpiola (Helsinki: Matthias Calonius 
Society, 1999), pp. 93-124 (p. 93). 
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marriages among the aristocratic families to prevent them from producing heirs.360 The mode 
of counting seems to have developed through the early Middle Ages in Western Europe, 
particular within the Church, but it can also be found in other sources.361 However, we do not 
see it in the Germanic laws from the eighth century. Whatever the motives behind, the 
canonical mode of counting persisted. The extreme incest regulations endured until the fourth 
Lateran Council in 1215, when the accepted degrees of kinship changed from seven to four, 
still of the canonical mode of counting.362 This relaxation can be seen clearly manifested in 
the Nordic laws, making 1215 a terminus post quem for revised provincial laws.363 Of course, 
how far kinship was counted had major importance for inheritance regulations, because it 
increased the number of kindred possibly entitled to inherit. Other measures would kick in to 
control distribution of wealth, particularly in the marriage legislation. A comparison of the 
laws on marriage and inheritance reveal both the legislators’ and nobility’s strategies in that 
respect. However, in the following, the rules on inheritance will be based on the relevant 
legitimate marriage.  
 Some principles come into effect as to the mode of dividing the estate of a deceased. 
An important principle is representation, where the heirs of a missing heir would take 
inheritance by representing the missing heir. The division was made according to numbers of 
heirs, calculated from other principles. In the strictest sense, the property would be shared 
equally among the grandchildren by sons and daughters alike, and with maternal or paternal 
relatives without consideration of how many there were on each side. Thus, if the mother had 
four living brothers and the father had two dead brothers, but one nephew, the property would 
be divided in five equal shares. This principle is called division per capita. Another mode of 
dividing is according to type of relatives they originate from, which branch of the close 
related. This is the mode often found in modern inheritance systems. The Romans named the 
principle to divide per stirpes. If the deceased had two children, and only one lived, then the 
property would still be divided in two and the dead child’s heir would get that share between 
them. Similarly, if Ego had a number of siblings, but some had died, then the heirs of the dead 
siblings would take their share by representation. According to this principle, four 
                                                 
360 Goody, Development of the Family and Marriage, pp. 34-37, 123-28. 
361 Goody, Development of the Family and Marriage, p. 56; Herlihy, ‘Women, Family and Society,’ p. 100. 
362 Bouchard, ‘Consanguinity and Noble Marriages’, p. 269; Goody, Development of the Family and Marriage, 
pp. 139-44. 
363 Vogt, Function of Kinship, p. 63; Lars Ivar Hansen, ‘The Concept of Kinship According to the West Nordic 
Medieval Laws’, in How Nordic are the Nordic Medieval Laws? , ed. by Per Andersen, Ditlev Tamm and Helle 
Vogt, Proceedings from the first Carlsberg Conference in Medieval Legal History (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2005, 
2nd edn 2011) ’, pp. 177-206. 
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grandchildren by one son and one grandchild by another son was irrelevant; the property was 
still divided in two. In the parentela system, all on the same collateral relatives are equally in 
line to the inheritance of Ego. According to the gradual system, specific relatives were given a 
specific position, or number, in the line of inheritance. Division into branches in the gradual 
system was specified according to determined principles, not automatically given. 
 
Conclusion 
Legal authorities possibly included such principles consciously, or they could have been an 
expression of family strategies influencing or pressuring law-making authorities. The 
following chapters will be structured according to the systems and principles stated above, to 
find the content of the laws and the meanings and motives behind the legislation on 
inheritance. The given default inheritance systems as they emerge in the laws and the main 
principles from which these systems are built are of interest to the continuous comparison of 





5. The Inheritance System and Principles in Roman Law 
 
Roman law was by all appearances the major source of influence for the early Germanic 
legislative initiatives. Regarding inheritance legislation, there was potentially much to borrow 
from Roman law. Regulations regarding family matters are extensive in the surviving corpus 
of almost a thousand years of Roman legislation. From the Twelve Tables of approximately 
mid-fifth century BC and through the active age of jurisprudence in the second century AD 
and up to the massive legal revision by Justinian in the 530s, numerous adjustments to 
inheritance laws exist. The quantity of regulations or rules regarding inheritance is substantial 
and detailed, both in describing the rights of succession and in elaborate discussions of the 
eventualities.364 Estimations are that roughly 40 percent of the largest bulk of the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, the Digesta, relate to succession and inheritance.365 The protection and possession of 
inheritance were included at length.366 Concerns for the preservation of the inheritance as 
dowry, dotal land and other property transferred within or between families received elaborate 
treatment. Topics related to inheritance were also substantial in other parts of the Roman legal 
corpus that was accessible to medieval legislators; separately Gaius’s Institutes and Paulus, 
and the Codex Theodisiani. Development within Roman legal tradition is relevant, both the 
motives and the shifting authorities' politics and, later, between state and Christianity. Several 
of the Novellae of Justinian signified radical change from earlier Roman legal traditions, for 
instance regarding inheritance.  
 The inheritance system in Roman law of course changed through the centuries. We see 
development in the default system, both in the basic principles, and in the kin considered 
heirs. In the vast material, minor or major contradictions frequently occur. Consequently, I 
attempt a basic map of the default inheritance system in the parts of Roman law that were 
accessible to a later legal elite. They would, in the same way as we are today, be presented 
with Roman law en bloc, and not as a chronological development of legal ideologies. Still, I 
will survey the default inheritance systems in Roman law in three different phases, to 
establish first the basic system, and then the continuous development of principles. A 
                                                 
364 See, for instance, the Digesta: D.5.3.13-15, D.23.5 on dotal land, D.37.1-11 on Bonorum Possessio 
concerning wills. See also Codex Iustiniani C.6.1-54 and C.3.28-30 for actions on void wills, gifts and dowries. 
365 Bruce W. Frier and Thomas A. Mac Ginn, A Casebook on Roman Family Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 204), p. 321. 
366 Basic principles of intestate inheritance in the Digesta can be deduced from parts of book 5.3, 37.7-9 and 
38.6-9, 11; books 27-34 give interpretations of fideicommissum, legacy and other ways of acquiring inheritance. 
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chronological survey will both explain the motives behind the changes and display the variety 
of principles from which later Germanic or Nordic legislators could borrow. 
 Within late Roman written law, the continuous fundamental concept of inheritance 
was based, more or less, on the parentela system and equality between the sexes (I.3.1). The 
default intestate inheritance system gave no prior position to the firstborn, or sons before 
daughters.367 We can detect the same equality of the sexes as the normative concept within 
society.368 The children of the deceased would inherit their parent’s portion per capita, that is 
'per head', i.e. per person, and a principle of representation was expressed through division per 
stirpes, i.e., through the branches of collaterals, a terminology used by Gaius (Gai.3.8, 
Gai.3.16). The division into branches also extended to the rest of the family and continued to 
be the mode of distribution, as seen in the rescripts of, for instance, Diocletian in 290 
(C.6.55.2) and Justinian in the 530s (C.6.58.15.3).  
 However, what both legal sources and other sources demonstrate is that in Roman 
society it was anticipated far more often that one would draft a last will than not. The intestate 
inheritance seems to be almost an abnormality, if we are to believe the classical texts, at least 
among the upper strata of society. Jane F. Gardner and Thomas Wiedemann argue that there 
are signs that Romans died intestate in the early republic, but that this changed.369 William W. 
Buckland understood the tradition of wills to be a rooted social sentiment deriving from the 
early republic.370 Traditions among the subjects, at least among those with wealth to pass on, 
probably influenced the legislation on inheritance.In the late republic and later, the norm was 
to draft a will of any possessions. In particular, we see this feature in the extant laws. The 
existence of the word for not having made a will – intestatus – being an expansion of the 
word for being with written will – testatus – alone suggests the importance of this practice in 
the Roman legal mindset.371 Therefore, Roman inheritance legislation mainly revolved around 
the will; vindication rights concerning the will, and rights of disclaiming wills, arguments 
                                                 
367 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Study of Roman Law, pp. 125-26.  
368 Jane F. Gardner and Thomas Wiedemann, The Roman Household: A Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 1991), 
pp. 117-18. 
369 Gardner and Wiedemann, Roman Household, p. 117. 
370 Buckland, Text-book of Roman Law, p. 361. One way to understand these traditions is as a remedy to the 
introduction of emancipation - which theoretically disinherited the offspring. Another explanation was that the 
plebeian gained rights of testament and thus cherished this privilege. Finally, Buckland points to the Roman 
ideal of each deciding one's successor. From Gaius’s Institutes (2.179-81), we see that the Romans had a 
tradition of naming substitute heirs in case an heir died before they themselves did. 
371 In medieval Latin, intestate also came to signify dying without leaving alms for one’s soul, Niermeyer Mediae 
Latinitatis Lexicon Minus 2001: intestatus. 
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about undutiful wills or interpretations of wills (see, for instance, D.5.2.1).372 In early 
medieval secular law, though, the written will did not have such a status, and hardly it appears 
in written law at all, although there are indications of an increased tradition for a written 
contract in the sixth- and seventh-century Germanic laws.373 What is important here are the 
principles of the intestate system, and whether they could have been the foundation for later 
lawmakers. It is not whether these rules had frequent consulting and usage in the Roman legal 
system. Rules about wills reveal information on the intestate system, too. The appointed heir 
could in fact reject a will, since not only the estate of the deceased would be passed on, by 
also debt, duties and unsettled business (D.29.2.1-2, 6). The right to refuse inheritance applied 
for intestate heirs, too. This means that if the appointed heir(s) did not accept, or the will was 
invalidated, then the system of intestacy applied after all. Furthermore, the anticipated 
recipient in the testament was the same as the heir in the intestate system; children had rights 
and an expectation of being favoured in the will, to the degree that children left out would 
have vindication to sue on the basis of an undutiful will (D.5.2.2).374 Thus, direct heirs of the 
family were protected from disinheritance on mere the disfavouring by parents, and wills that 
did not favour them were even invalid (D.28.2.30-32).375 In this way, we can find the Roman 
intestate inheritance system also in the rules on undutiful wills. 
 The order of succession in the default system in the subsequent stages of legislative 
work will be established here, within the parts of Roman law that was accessible to the later 
Germanic legal elite. 
 
5.1 The basis of the Roman inheritance system 
Roman law famously distinguished between sui iuris (heirs in their own right) and sui heredes 
(his heirs) those under the patria potestas, the power of the pater (father). The independent 
would still have been financially dependent on familiar support or on receiving an inheritance 
                                                 
372 Though Roman wills is a rewarding topic in legal history, I will not follow that trail here, but concentrate on 
portraying the intestate system. To read more on the will in Roman law, see Buckland, Text-book of Roman Law, 
pp. 331ff.; Jolowicz and Nicolas, Study of Roman Law, pp. 126-32; Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman 
Private Law, pp. 284ff. 
373 See, for instance, marriage gifts in Eur.307/LV.5.2.7, and of slaves in Rot.227. See also Hughes, ‘From 
Brideprice to Dowry’, pp. 269-75, on the contract among Germanic elite. Evidence of the will in eighth-century 
Lombard law can be found in Ais.12.III. 
374 Gardner and Wiedemann, Roman Household, p. 121.  
375 In the republican era, a further effect was the practice of giving legacies to people who were not heirs. It 
could both be a way around the requirement to provide for the heirs and also a way of favouring those who could 
not be heirs. 
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when the providers died off, as Antti Arjava has pointed out.376 Because of the absence of 
waged work among the upper classes, Roman heirs from these ranks would need an 
inheritance for their livelihood or to sustain a certain lifestyle. Both labourers and the children 
of elite families would have relied on support. Elite families would largely live off family 
estates, as peasants would live off their ancestral land. Sui iuris could then be the subject of a 
will, or given other forms of donations as inheritance inter vivos.377 
 The basic system from which Roman legal regulation of inheritance was built derives 
from the republican paraphrasing of the law of the Twelve tables (from c. 450 BC). If we 
extract the simplest form and cut short the possible alternatives, the first heirs of Ego were 
those in his power, the sui heredes, denoting mainly legitimate children (Tab.5.4). According 
to the much later Institutes of Justinian (I.2.13.5), the Twelve tables stated that both sons and 
daughters had equal rights to share in the inheritance. This principle would endure in the 
Roman concept of inheritance, although in this early phase it regarded only children that were 
sui heredes, but not more remote descendants or ascendants. Grandchildren by sons would 
inherit by representation if the son was deceased. They inherited per stirpes, so that plural 
grandchildren shared their dead fathers portion (Gai.3.8). Grandchildren through daughters 
were excluded; the equality did not extend beyond children.  
If there were no sui heredes, then the agnates were next in line. Agnates were defined 
by Roman jurists as the male blood-relatives from a common male ancestor (D.38.10.1). The 
order of succession to the inheritance would follow degree of kinship, with closer excluding 
the more distant (Gai.3.10-11). Parents were not designated in particular as heirs.378 However, 
the father would come to inheritance as agnate, of which he naturally was the first in line by 
proximity.379 It all relied on the status of the father and offspring, whether they were 
emancipated or not.380 Although the medieval legislators did not use these same terms for 
family structures, the distinction of independence was relevant to a person’s legal capacity. 
The institution of emancipating children meant that the age varied when a Roman son or 
                                                 
376 Arjava, Antti, Women and Roman Law in Late Antiquity (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1994), pp. 53-54. 
377 Buckland, Text-book of Roman Law, pp. 361-62. 
378 The father, if pater familias, would have rights to the return of the peculium, the child's given capital 
(D.15.1). The property that the son had earned himself, for instance in the military, the peculium castrense or in 
the civil service, the quasi castrense could have been seen in the same manner. Property otherwise appropriated, 
bona adventitia, would be distributed as inheritance, and was as such reserved for the descendants. Buckland, 
Text-book of Roman Law, p. 373.  
379 If the father himself was under the potestas of the grandfather, he still was the first agnate, although it is 
uncertain how and in what order grandfathers came into the equation. See Buckland, Text-book of Roman Law, 
pp. 372-75. 
380 See Jolowicz and Nicholas, Study of Roman Law, pp. 118-20. If the father was emancipated and the son not, 
and the father then readopted, then they were both sui heredes to the grandfather who was in potestas. 
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daughter was legally independent. He or she would be a minor, and as such reach sexual 
maturity at twelve years for girls and fourteen for boys (D.23.1.9, D.23.2.4). The age of 
personal independence was traditionally twenty-five years of age (D.4.4). This legal age 
might have reduced to twenty in the later period, as we encounter in the constitutions of 
Valentinian III from 452 (Nov.Val.35.10).381 We find the legal age of men and women set at 
twenty years in Visigothic laws from the same period (Eur.321). A possible reason for the 
similarity could be the change in Roman understanding of adulthood brought about in the 
decades where Roman politics and military were highly occupied with, and infiltrated by, men 
of Germanic descent.382 This could be a case were late Roman law was influenced by the 
Germanic law through pressure from Germanic presence. 
 On the other hand, the mother did not have rights to inherit from her child under the 
republic. This issue became a topic for later revisions. The mother could inherit a portion as 
wife of the father if she survived him. This presupposed that she was married to him cum 
manu, the form of marriage that made her part of the husband’s family. In contrast, one could 
also enter marriage sine manu, in which a woman kept her ties to her birth family.383 Of 
course, the wife of Ego would also be subject to these categories.384 These distinctions in 
marriage were obsolete in the late republican era. Possibly, they nevertheless resounded in the 
Germanic concept of marriage where the wife was legally subordinate the husband.385 
The brother and sister were next in line of succession after the father. Siblings came in 
second degree by the Roman mode of counting, as did grandparents and grandchildren. 
Grandchildren by deceased sons were favoured by representation, but both the brother and the 
sister of Ego originally excluded other grandchildren. In this system, the female agnates 
beyond sisters were excluded (D.38.16.2). The reasons for this could be a general idea that 
remote kinswomen were not the right successor to administer a man’s estate, or, as Felix 
Jolowicz have pointed to, an apprehension that great the wealth of women should be 
restricted.386 If the deceased had no accepting agnates alive, then the cognates, termed as the 
clan of the deceased, the gentiles, succeeded to the inheritance (Tab.5.5). Buckland and 
Jolowicz have posited the notion that refusal by the closest agnate excluded more distant even 
                                                 
381 Arjava, ‘Paternal Power’, p. 162.  
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384 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Study of Roman Law, p. 124. 
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386 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Study of Roman Law, p. 249. 
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if he rejected the inheritance.387 A better explanation is that closer agnates excluded the 
possibility of representation, as Gaius commented (Gai.3.15).388 At least that may have been 
the interpretation or the practice of the rule later on by the medieval legal elites. 
 A surviving wife of Ego would come next in line of succession after the cognates.389 
Reasons for this were possibly the general distrust displayed in the laws of married couples 
showering each other with the riches of the familia for love (D.24.1). A scepticism led to the 
prohibition of giving gifts to your spouse in Roman classical society, and this was not 
abolished before Emperor Justinian relaxed the prohibitions in the sixth century. He also lifted 
the restrictions on the dos (dowry) and the dos ante nuptias (prenuptial gifts) and called them 
instead dos propter nuptias, ‘gifts in connection with/concerning marriage’ (C.5.20, I.2.7).390 
Classical Roman law shows that intestate inheritance included landed property and movables, 
but also usufruct, entailed estates and legacies.391 In the categories of the Digesta, we find the 
collection of laws on legacies strangely detailed, being specified on, for instance, perfume and 
clothes (D.34.2) or furniture (D.33.10). The dowry – and the dos ante nuptias, which became 
a substantial part of the marriage settlement in the later empire – formed part of the couples’ 
inheritance inter vivos. The dowry was a security for the wife. As with inheritance through 
wills, the details of the dowry were settled in a marriage agreement, rather than by legal 
default. The restrictions on inheritance between spouses were, I believe, an expression of a 
desire to prevent backwards inheritance. If the marriage was childless, expectation was that 
the marriage gifts returned to the respective family. Therefore, the inheritance of daughters 
was important, as were the fate of her children. The Romans must be said to have a bilateral 
kinship structure in the classical age, although the all-powerful pater familias overshadowed 
this in sources and research.  
 The laws provide an increasing number of degrees for the default Roman inheritance 
system, laws gave in the. Agnatic claims included the tenth degree in the Institutes of 
Justinian, counted in Roman mode (I.3.5). In comparison, the acceptable degree of marriage 
was beyond four Roman degrees, excepting cousins (D.23.2.3, C.5.4.19). Ten degrees was 
thus an extension from the Digesta, where Gaius (D.38.10.1, D.38.10.3) and Paulus 
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388 See also Buckland, Text-book of Roman Law, p. 364. 
389 Gardner and Wiedemann, Roman Household, p. 140. 
390 It was possible to favour the spouse in the will or by legacy, and numerous examples, fictional or not, reveal a 
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or the usufruct of the late husband's estate. 




(D.38.10.10, LRV.Paul.Sent.4.10) defined relatives to the seventh degree, which was also the 
limit for inheritance before falling to the treasury. The thorough account in Paulus reveals an 
important concept of the Roman system: it is primarily focused on the line upwards and 
downwards. The last joint in his survey of kin ends with trinepos and trineptis 
(D.38.10.10.17), the great-great-great-great grandson and -daughter. It could be that the 
occupation with the tradition of the ancestors, mos maiorum, in the Roman political mindset 
led to collaterals being almost unmentioned in the descriptions. We see collaterals lacking in 
Justinian’s Institutes as well. With the inclusion of inheritance rights to seven degrees of 
agnates, and in the first centuries of imperial rule, the Principate, also including cognates, it 
would have been overwhelming to explain the complicated sidewise structures of genealogy 
too. Possibly the up- and downwards focus was merely scaffolding for others to continue 
from. The praetor’s edict ran only to seven degrees (I.3.5.5). In twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
Norwegian laws, we see description of the bilateral kin group as well, resulting in long, 
elaborate descriptions. The reason for not including the lateral kin in the Roman texts could 
be as pragmatic as not dedicating the space for obvious details. 
 Only legitimate children could be heirs according to Roman custom.392 The 
distinguishing of heirs according to the traditions of the patria potestas, meant that a child had 
to be accepted by its father. An illegitimate child was postponed in the order of succession 
(D.38.8.4). The unborn child would also constitute an object of dispute. It seems that children 
born posthumously would be equal heirs with their siblings. Within the more remote kindred, 
the relative would also have to be conceived before the death of Ego, to be a possible heritor 
(D.38.8.1.8). Regarding Ego’s own offspring, his widow or divorced wife could not remarry 
before one year had passed, to avoid confusion of paternity (D.3.2.10, C.5.9.2). Measures 
were taken to ensure that legitimate posthumous children could join as heirs, but even more to 
prevent the widow from secretly becoming pregnant shortly after to have other men’s children 
inheriting from the deceased (D.3.2.16). Special regulations existed as to how to examine 
pregnant women (D.25.4), revealing the importance of legitimacy. In some medieval law, we 
shall see that legitimacy was also an important factor. Christianity was possibly the source of 
influence to the medieval laws on legitimacy, although the concept could have be a 
transmission from secular Roman law as a reception. 
 The foundation of the default inheritance system of Roman law was thus that of 
parentela in the immediate family, but with gradual tendencies among distant relatives. 
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Backwards inheritance was prevented by restricting the rights of the wife and mother of Ego. 
The Roman inheritance system included principles of representations, although the children of 
sons were originally prioritised. Similarly, legitimacy and status of the descendant regulated 
the distribution of inheritance. The system was based on bilateral principles downwards, 
although we see a favouring of inheritance going through male agnates among more distant 
relatives.  
 
5.2 Developments through the praetor and imperial legislation 
Over time, the different praetors amended the rights of inheritance through edicts, and thus 
gave extended rights to different groups of relatives by way of claiming bonorum possessio, 
the rights to possession of goods (D.5.5). The rights would rectify the order of succession 
under the ius civile, and thus worked as a parallel system. Whether the old inheritance system 
had become archaic, or whether active changes to it were made, is uncertain, but the jurists’ 
comments on the praetor’s edict show a range of differences to the first established system. In 
fact, some of our knowledge of the republican system derives from it being contrasted to 
contemporary law in the first centuries AD.393 The most important developments from this 
would be the inclusion of all children, regardless of emancipation, the inclusion of female 
agnates and the inclusion of cognates. 
These groups were termed in three classes of possible claimants to the intestate 
inheritance by Ulpian (D.38.6.1).394 The first class was the children of the deceased, and the 
praetor by bonorum possessio now allowed children who were emancipated and sui iuris to 
inherit along with the sui heredes (D.37.8.1-3, D.38.6, Gai.3.1). In addition, adoptive children 
came into this category (D.37.8.1.2, D.37.8.6). Adoptees otherwise enjoyed equal status to 
blood relationship, and now the inheritance rights reflected this.395 
It seems that principles of prioritising descendants were emphasised in contrast to 
earlier law; rights of representation developed further. Earlier, a surviving child excluded the 
grandchildren by a deceased son. According to Gaius, they now had rights to claim a share of 
their parent’s portion along with the other children of Ego (Gai.3.2, Gai.3.15, D.37.8). This 
regarded only children of deceased sons, although the son’s children were not discriminated 
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against by gender. Prior to Gaius, the jurist Marcellus (late-second century) assumed that 
grandchildren by daughters also enjoyed this right, according to a rescript from emperor 
Antoninus (D.37.8.3). The commonplace contradictory opinions expose an inclination 
towards thinking in concepts of parentela, although the conception had not yet matured. 
Descendants now enjoyed priorities before ascendants, although the equality between male 
and female heirs did not extend to grandchildren.  
 The second class of heirs was the legitimi, which consisted of the male agnates, while 
the third class was the cognati, cognates, the remaining relatives on the maternal and paternal 
side.396 Tendencies towards also including female agnates in the group of agnates appear in 
imperial constitutions from the early second century: where only sisters and daughters of Ego 
would have rights earlier, now the other paternal female relatives gained equal rights after 
their male collaterals, and together with cognates (Gai.3.29-31, D.38.8). Ulpian (?170-228) 
argued that the rights of legitimi also extended to related women with reference to the Senatus 
consultum Tertullianum under Hadrian (r.117-138) (D.38.7.2.1-2). Although there is little 
evidence of extended inheritance rights of distant female relatives until the late-fourth 
century, we could view Ulpian’s opinion as an expression of the developing concepts of 
parentela principles in Roman legal ideology – that women were natural claimants to 
inheritance. Gender equalities were gradually extended to the distant relatives, together with 
an emphasis on descendants. 
The third class of cognates included all relatives to the sixth degree (D.38.8.1), on both 
the maternal and paternal side, and definitely including the female cognates.397 Those more 
closely related to Ego inherited before those more remote, and collaterals inherited together 
(D.38.8.1). In the final class of heirs, husband and wife were called to inherit from each other 
(D.38.11.1). Thus, only if all other relatives to the sixth degree were missing, spouses 
succeeded in the default system. If neither legal heirs nor spouse claimed the inheritance of 
Ego, then the public fisc claimed it (D.5.3.20.7). 
 We see that cognates inherited by proximity, but were descendants prioritised before 
ascendants? If several cognates were in the same degree to Ego, they should share the 
inheritance per capita (D. 38.8.1.10) and not per stirpes, as would become the distribution 
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model in later Roman law and in parts of medieval legislation. Probably the same division 
applied between ascendants, descendants and collaterals, since Gaius reminded his reader that 
those related in the same degree ‘do not always run together’ (D.38.10.1.2). Hence, we must 
believe that the cognates were intended to inherit together regardless if they were up- or 
downwards or sideways related. To calculate the grade of kinship after specified criteria is 
what we have defined as the gradual system. Roman law appear to have maintained parentela 
principles in the inner circles of kinship and among paternal male relatives, and gradual 
principles for the more remote maternal and female kindred.  
 
5.3 Towards a parentela system in late Roman law 
In the Principate and onwards, several imperial constitutions addressed and developed the 
inheritance system in favour of female relatives in all degrees. In particular, the mother of the 
deceased would gain a prior position in the sequence of succession. Buckland has argued that 
the reason for favouring the mother’s and female relatives’ position in the inheritance system 
was mere repair of injustice of the old law.398 Despite the total power of the pater familias and 
the social restrictions on the movement of women, Roman society was not discriminatory 
against women as owners or in terms of economy.399 Compared to contemporary, and at least 
the later, societies, the Roman woman officially had many rights of property equal to her male 
peers. To rectify archaic imbalances could well be the reason for amending the inheritance 
laws. According to Ulpian, a mother who survived her children would be elevated to the 
position of the legitimi, if she herself had given birth to three children (D.38.7.2.4). This 
criterion was lifted by Constantine (CTh.5.1), who removed what was labelled, in several 
ways in his constitutions, as the ‘burden’ of Augustus (CTh.8.16.1).400 A mother shared with 
other agnates up to one-third of the estate. The existence of a father or brothers still excluded 
the mother. Justinian further strengthened the right of a surviving mother to inherit together 
with other siblings of Ego (I.3.3.4, C.8.58.2). The legislators obviously saw it as natural that 
both parents surviving their offspring would inherit the parts of their estate reversed.  
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Roman law and society (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 32 and Judith Evans Grubbs, Law and Family in Late 
Antiquity, The Emperor Constantine’s Marriage Legislation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 132 
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The closest cognate did not inherit everything, but the closest in groups of collaterals 
would share. The motives for this could be the general equality among the descendants 
inspired the view of distribution among more remote relatives. Another explanation is the 
changes made to marriage legislation in the fifth and sixth centuries. The marriage gifts, dos 
and dos ante nuptias, were protected to such a degree for the families providing them, that to 
keep family estates in the family, it was necessary to ensure that women holding the marriage 
gifts were joint heirs mortis causa.401 If, in the process of producing Germanic law codes, 
contemporary legal elites had access to post-Theodosian law, then they might have had to 
make conscious choices concerning the inheritance rights of mother, daughter, sister and other 
female relatives in their own legal work. The gift from the bridegroom’s family to the bride’s 
was an important part of Germanic marriage, and thus the emphasis on the dos may have been 
a reception from Germanic law.402 The Visigothic and Lombard laws held the dowry to be a 
feature of Roman custom and Roman law, a tradition they did not adopt into their own written 
law (LV.3.1.6, Ais.1).403 Justinian’s disgust with the tradition of ‘buying’ the bride, as he 
understood the Armenian tradition to be, with marriage gifts from the husband’s family, 
speaks against this theory (Nov.21). 
 Late Roman legislators strengthened the rights of descendants by concentrating on the 
principle of representation. The right of representation had been ambiguous to both legislators 
and jurists, and the right of grandchildren only became uniform in later rescripts. For instance, 
a sister would exclude more remote agnates, but contradicting views still existed in the mid-
third century, as in the response of Emperor Decius to one Asclepiodota, to whether sisters 
also excluded the son of a brother (C.6.58.3). Two novels of Justinian, Novellae 118 and 
Novellae 127 from 543 and 548, respectively, are considered to have revolutionised the 
Roman inheritance system.404 In these, descendants gained full priority before ascendants in 
the inheritance system, and male and female collaterals became equal. However, tendencies 
towards a parentela system had already emerged in the fourth century. Emperors Valentinian 
II, Theodosius I and Arcadius in 389 gave grandchildren by a deceased daughter of Ego the 
right to inherit from him by representation, although only two-thirds of what the daughter 
would have had (C.6.55.9). The remaining third would go to the other children at the expense 
of the grandchildren. In 426, Theodosius II and Valentinian III instructed the senate of Rome 
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that grandchildren by a daughter undoubtedly (sine dubio) had rights of representation 
(C.6.55.11), removing any inequality of descendants. A constitution of Justinian from 528 
exhibits the idea of prioritising descendants of either branch before ascendants (C.6.55.12), 
which similarly found its way into the Institutes (I.3.4.1). Obviously, the topic of 
representation was under discussion throughout the third to the sixth centuries, where the 
legislators became ever more determined to enforce the rights of grandchildren, and all 
descendants. This direction may be connected to the change in how the head of family was 
viewed. The concept of kin through a bilateral kin group is more prominent later Roman 
legislation, and so the late Roman family has been seen to be less dominated by the pater 
familias figure.405 Antti Arjava maintains that the patria potestas did not lose its place in later 
Roman society, and particularly not in the legal aspect.406 Still, as Arjava must admit, new 
factors determined the late Roman family.407 A father with patria potestas experienced 
reduced rights in economic regards. Gifts the deceased had received were considered part of 
his peculium and were reversed to the donator or to the pater familias (late ex. C.6.61.1). In 
the late-fifth century, however, Emperor Leo and Anthemius decided instead that it would be 
given to the children of the deceased, a development already seen in former constitutions 
(C.6.61.4). Justinian later confirmed that parents had to leave their deceased children’s 
property to the children’s own offspring (C.6.61.6). We find in these later constitutions that 
the mother gained rights in late Roman law, but that the descendant’s rights were strengthened 
even more. 
 The admission of rights to female kin and to the children of a familia may seem like a 
relaxation of the power of the male heads of family and society. However, the changes were 
parallel to a tightening of morality and family values in imperial legislation.408 Later Roman 
legislation exhibited a different view of the family, with more dogmatic standards of family 
life.409 Hence, incest, adultery, divorce and illegitimate unions or offspring were elaborated on 
more, although not necessarily treated more harshly than in classical law. Emperor 
Constantine decreed in 331 an infamous prohibition on divorce, which became a turning point 
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of family law (CTh.3.16.1). The prohibition became the object of further legislation in the 
next two centuries, with both relaxations and renewed penalisation.410 Constantine also passed 
edicts on the status of children, and defined more precisely those considered illegitimate in all 
senses, namely the children born of infamous unions (CTh.4.6.2). The laws further divided 
between legitimate children born in a legitimate marriage, and those of a lawful union but not 
legitimate marriage. Children of the latter were termed naturales liberis. Constantine forbade 
all gifts to such offspring (CTh.4.6.1-2). Later emperors apparently disagreed in whether 
natural children could inherit a small amount of the property of their father (CTh.4.6.4-8). 
Justinian issued a list of reasons for legally disinheriting children (Nov.115.3). The reasons 
were violence, insults, accusations or attempted killing of parents, as well as impudent 
behaviour, associating with criminals, actors or circus artists, and not caring for insane parents 
or refusing to pay ransom if they were captives, a son having intercourse with his stepmother 
and a daughter living promiscuously or refusing marriage. A similar list of misbehaviour were 
acceptable reasons for disinheriting parents (Nov.115.4). The list in many ways corresponds 
with the ever-expanding list of accepted reasons for divorce (Nov.22.3-19 and Nov.117.10-
12).411 We find these topics again in the Germanic laws, being equally occupied with 
legitimacy and divorce. 
 Emperor Constantine’s change in style in family law has often been interpreted as due 
to Christian influence. Edoardo Volterra has, for instance, shown how the style and wording 
in late Roman law was very different from earlier, and has been interpreted as being the work 
of Christian clergy.412 However, Judith Evans Grubbs has disputed that the assertion of 
Constantine’s law-texts was different because of his Christian leaning.413 Rather, she asserts 
differences in late Roman law to be the result of the new authoritative language and late 
Roman norms. Nevertheless, there are differences in not only the style of the law language, 
but also in its contents. The early rule of a public Christian emperor could barely have caused 
a dramatic change in official terminology by then, into the style of the Church fathers we 
know from the following centuries. Possibly the stylistic influence went the other way around, 
from Roman administration to the clergy. Much of the same content, if not style, appears in 
the early medieval secular law. 
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Conclusion: Roman inheritance laws 
The mass of legislation on inheritance show signs of contradiction, as more often than not is 
the case of the collected Roman law. The contradiction between emperors’ written decisions, 
the responsum must be read as a contradiction in mindset. Nevertheless, findings show a 
steady development towards a concept of the parentela system, where descendants were 
prioritised before ascendants, including relative gender equality and including principles of 
representation. In late Roman imperial legislation, two groups were repeatedly addressed, the 
mother and grandchildren of Ego. Through motives of fairness and equity, imperial 
lawmakers were inspired to advance these relatives in the default inheritance system. The 
confusing bulk of law comprised the basis for Germanic legislation. Accordingly, we can 
compare the Germanic development with Roman inheritance legislation from different 





6. The inheritance Systems and Principles in Germanic laws 
 
With his work on Germanic Kinship Structure, Alexander Murray opposed the longstanding 
assumption that the Germanic groups stuck to unilineal, even patrilineal modes of counting 
kinship.414 The early Germanic legislators paid attention to the topic of inheritance, although 
to varying degrees. The laws described the ideal system and to how to deal with problematic 
instances.  
 Murray also modified the generally accepted interpretations of Germanic ideas of 
private property. Traditionally, there were three stages, where land was first considered 
communal, then clan based, and finally there was a move towards a more individualistic 
concept of absolute ownership due to ‘confrontation with Roman Law’.415 There was also a 
common notion of a particular Germanic concept of demanding the consent of relatives when 
alienating family property. Murray opposed these interpretations of the Germanic legislators 
themselves, but also justly corrects the view of ownership according Roman law. As he points 
out, Roman law exhibit a range of ownership types for land and movables, in laws from late 
antiquity.416 Co-ownership, usufruct, vindication, purpose- or licence-based ownership are 
some examples. Moreover, the earlier Roman legal material also exhibits the same 
differentiations. Ownership could be on many levels and take many forms, and as we 
remember from the survey of Roman inheritance laws, a testator could not bypass a rightful 
heir, and the relative’s consent in alienating property was part of Roman legal concepts.417 
 Germanic kinship structure did not favour female heirs, but the prevailing view is that 
women were gradually given improved economic privileges from the sixth to the eighth 
century when it comes to rights of possession and owning landed property.418 From the time 
of Clovis to the time of Charlemagne, Frankish women were given the right to own land, be 
sole heir, possess their dos and morning gift both in and after the marriage, be co-heirs with 
their sons, given extended rights to be supported after widowed. According to studies by 
Susanne F. Wemple, this should be interpreted both as a reflection of the Germanic 
authorities’ ‘desire to imitate Roman customs’ (which did not distinguish between the sexes 
                                                 
414 Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure, pp. 35-111. 
415 Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure, pp. 179-80, and see also n. 7. 
416 Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure. 
417 Buckland, Text-book of Roman Law, pp. 281-360. 
418 See, for instance, Wemple, Women in Frankish Society, pp. 44-50. 
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regarding inheritance), and a way for Germanic authorities to weaken the powerful kinship 
structures.419  
 The written laws include a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, but 
in slightly different ways. Defining legitimate heirs of course depends on the definition of a 
legitimate marriage. While in Roman law we find legitimate children and heirs as those born 
in a marriage, illegitimate children fall into two categories, those conceived in a possible 
lawful union between individuals who were not married and those of an infamous union. A 
typical example of the latter is a union between a senatorial relative and an actress (D.23.2.27, 
CTh. 4.6.2). Non-consistently, children born out of wedlock were termed natural children, 
naturales liberi, in Roman law (D.38.6.4, CTh.4.6.4) and in the Lombard law (Ex. Rot.154-
162). Natural children had inheritance rights, although some offspring of infamous unions 
were deprived of all opportunity to inherit. 
 The indebtedness of the Leges to Roman law is often mentioned, without clear 
reference to the nature of what the loan consisted of. Regarding inheritance laws, scholars 
have also argued for more independent legislation, since the Germanic and Roman customs 
largely diverged in this matter. According to Maurizio Lupoi, we rarely find adoption of rules 
between Roman and Germanic law, only traces of influence from ancient systems.420 Others, 
such as Hagith Sivan, have pointed out how Germanic law follows Roman law closely in 
marriage legislation, where we would assume strong Germanic custom influenced the content 
of written laws.421 This chapter will examine the Germanic laws’ presentation of the default 
inheritance system, one at the time. My survey will also focus on the selection of topics 
introduced in the previous chapters: type of system, prevailing mode of kinship, principles of 
representation, and women’s inheritance rights as wife, mother and sister or more remote 
relatives. Moreover, inheritance rights to ancestral lands will be introduced as a topic. The 
inheritance laws of each legal culture will undergo a comparison with the other Germanic 
laws and with Roman law. The survey begins with the laws of the Franks, since their 
inheritance system allegedly contrast the Roman system more than other Germanic law.422 
 
                                                 
419 Wemple, Women in Frankish Society, p. 44; Suzanne Fonay Wemple, ‘Women from the Fifth to the Tenth 
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6.1 The Frankish legislation on inheritance 
The Frankish kingdom established in the wake of withdrawal of Roman authority soon saw a 
generation of domestic jurisdiction and production of home-made law. The Pactus Legis 
Salicae, (PLS) mainly instigated by King Clovis (r. 466-511), shows more attention to private 
dispute settlements than to family law, or to constitutional care overall. This has led to 
Frankish society being represented by modern scholars as an aristocracy-dominated 
battleground between elite families’ interest and struggling authorities’ force.423 Restricted 
space was given to family law in the Pactus. The laws put into writing in the Pactus were 
directly copied, for the most part, into in the law code of Lex Salica Karolina (LSK), credited 
to Pepin (r. 752-768) and Charlemagne (r. 768-814). Nevertheless, the few revisions in 
inheritance laws are of significance. And, although most of the content was seemingly 
transmitted in the 300 years between the two codes, the late fifth-century addenda, the 
Capitularies, also provide important additions to the inheritance system as it is portrayed in 
them.  
 Murray points out the ambiguity in the inheritance laws of the Franks, where those 
closely related to Ego are listed in some detail, but the order of succession of more remote 
relatives is not described.424 After examining the evidence, I would suggest that Salic law 
implemented a default inheritance system that changed its principles according to the distance 
of the nearest relative. The close relatives inherited according to parentela principles, while 
the more remote inherited by designation, after gradual principles. In Frankish legislation, 
kinship was counted within six degrees (PLS.44.11-12/LSK.24.10-11). These degrees appear 
to have been counted in the Roman mode, and was the same number of degrees found in other 
continental laws, including the Visigothic. At the time of Clovis, six degrees corresponds with 
the concept of cognatic kinship and inheritance rights in Roman law. It was not until two 
centuries later that the infamous demand of the Church came into being, where seven degrees 
between spouses became a requirement for a valid marriage counted in the Germanic mode. 
We can assume the accuracy in degrees to be a direct borrowing from Roman laws. Other 
evidence is that early Salic law stated that he who wished to remove himself from his kin 
group could do so by losing all rights of inheritance together with the responsibility to provide 
compensation to his kin (PLS.60). This section uses the term parentilla of the kin with whom 
the Ego identified. This does not refer to the concept of parentela as it is used in this study, 
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but to the entire kin group within six degrees, of which a person was responsible to and could 
be supported by.425 Thus, we can assume that the limit of six degrees was already established 
in the fifth century, as a reception of Roman law and mode of counting. 
 The rules in Pactus Legis Salica and Lex Salica Karolina were mainly statements 
without explanations of the underlying motives. The inheritance system can be deduced from 
two central rules in the Pactus and the later Carolingian law, which also reveal the internal 
diachronic development. 
Primarily, children should inherit from Ego. If there were none, then the parents would 
inherit, and if no parents survived, then siblings inherited (PLS.59.1-2/LSK.34.1-2). The 
deceased’s maternal aunt was the next in line, then the paternal aunt (PLS.59.3-4). Apparently 
legislators favoured the matrilineal line, whereby female relatives were first in line to inherit 
after the close family. The A-family of manuscripts read that the mother would inherit if Ego 
had no offspring. This led to discussions of whether the Frankish kinship structure was 
matrilineal in its origins, with counter-arguments that it was patrilineal and the rule itself 
comprised movables or maternal dowry.426 The system also suggests that an equal division 
between the sexes was a priority. The first sequence forms the first parentela, with the 
exception that it did not mention grandchildren of Ego, nor the children of siblings. However, 
a later capitulary added grandchildren (PLS.Cap.6.1). This could be an indication that the 
concept of representation was not accepted in the earliest laws, although it is also possible that 
the rights of grandchildren were implied. If neither children nor grandchildren existed, the 
inheritance system of Clovis’s laws took the form of a bilateral gradual system instead (See 
Figure 4). Murray and Wemple have interpreted the Frankish family structure as bilateral.427  
The system was copied in the later Carolingian version, except that here, paternal 
aunts are favoured over maternal (LSK.34.3-4). If these maternal, female relatives were 
absent, the closest family members inherited (PLS.59.5/LSK.34.5). But the classes of 
manuscript diverge on which line: the oldest, A-family (where the section is numbered 59.4) 
states whoever is closest, ‘quicumque proximo’, would succeed, whereas C-family and H-
family specify whoever is closest from the father’s line.428 The fact that maternal kin came 
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before paternal had led scholars to the conclusion that this regarded only movable property. It 
possibly did, but later laws also regarded estates in general at some point. Brunner assumed 
that the paternal family gained precedence from the 560s.429 Wemple also assumed that the 
later changes in the C-family gave the paternal relatives priority, and that this is why the rule 
came to also include land in addition to movables.430 Another interpretation is that women 
held inheritance rights to land where there were no male collaterals. Murray interprets the 
order of succession to be a distinction of the Franks from the Roman inheritance system, as a 
‘statement of the peculiar “Frankishness” of the Frankish inheritance’.431 However, he here 
basis his statements on the inheritance system as it was after the Roman Praetor’s edict and 
before the changes in late antiquity towards favouring the mother and remote female kin. It is 
thus uncertain whether the Frankish legal elite, whether themselves of Roman or Germanic 
origin, were not acquainted with fifth-century Roman law or whether they were so much 




Figure 4: Genogram of the inheritance system in Salic law. Bracketed numbers are revisions from capitularies and LSK. 
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In other rules, we find signs that women were accepted as actors in the economic 
system. The inheritance system reflected the system of distribution of compensation. PLS.58 
follows a similar pattern to that of PLS.59: if a killer was unable to pay the full compensation, 
then his mother and father were responsible, followed by the maternal aunt and her children 
and then three of the nearest relatives on both the mother’s and the father’s side. We find here 
the same pattern of a parentela as in the rule on inheritance, maternal aunt followed by the 
bilateral kinship group.  
Likewise, the receiving end of the compensation mirrored the inheritance system 
(PLS.62/LSK.14). Compensation would be divided in two, half to any children and half to be 
shared between both the maternal and the paternal kin. The capitularies stipulate one quarter 
to the wife – if the mother of the children – of a killed man (PLS.Cap.1.68) and repeats the 
model of the three nearest maternal and paternal kin to receive the last quarter, or half if the 
wife was absent. The outlines of the distribution of compensation will be discussed later in 
this thesis.  
 The intestate system emerges as a somewhat inconsistent gradual system where female 
heirs are favoured first bilinearly, followed by paternal kin, at least in some manuscripts. 
Therefore, discussions have focused on what kind of property these sections applied to, 
whether this was movables or land, or types of landed property.432 The confusing element 
relates to particular land ownership, as PLS.59 ends with the famous enactment that has 
preoccupied studies on Salic law: PLS.59.6 concludes that terra salica could only go to the 
male sex.433 Such land would pass undivided to sons. The section has been taken, by Brunner 
and Wemple, as proof of the strong patrilineal fabric of the code, and suggestions have been 
made that section 59.1-4 only concerned movable property.434 But as Drew has pointed out, 
there was a difference between this terra salica (held as fief or tenure) and allodial land – 
alodis.435 Terra salica was given as tenure either in the lifetime of Ego or in the past to an 
ancestor. Allodial land, on the other hand, was land held in the family for a certain time, and 
could seemingly be inherited by female heirs. The A-manuscripts further use only terra, 
indicating a change in either the status of land or the law on landed property.436 Murray holds 
terra to be ‘land however acquired’, and he points to the view that salica refers to sala, that is, 
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house and not Salic.437 He argues that it denominated the family homestead, to be inherited by 
sons. The changes in time could stem from developing concepts of land over the course of 
time after conquest. As I will come back to below, the Lombards changed their concept of 
land in relation to the minimum number of years it needed to be held to bestow ownership in 
the years after their conquest of the northern Italian peninsula. 
Due to consideration of the scope of this thesis, where a rule’s content is significant as 
transmission from earlier laws or as a source for later interpretations, I will not attempt to 
discuss it further. Thus, I will leave to one side a discussion of the meaning terra salica had 
for the contemporary legal elite. In any case, the rubric of PLS.59 de alodis alludes to 
inheritance of different types of property. Murray argues that the basic principle in Frankish 
inheritance distribution was that each side secured their original part of the property, by 
reversion, ius recadentiae.438 Rudolf Huebner argued that ius recadentiae came as a reaction 
to the inclusion of maternal kin in the Germanic kinship structure and inheritance systems.439 
If we accept Murray’s contention that Germanic kinship structure not was patrilineal in an 
early phase, but bilateral, then ius recadentiae developed as a reaction to the development of 
ancestral property, and not as a reaction to the inheritance rights of maternal kin. After the 
being settled in new territory for a time, the developing landowning class wanted regulations 
to keep appropriated land. The concept, we can argue, was an original Germanic legal 
development, and originating due to requirements in the legal culture. 
 Even if each side held rights to reversion of property in case of backwards inheritance, 
it seems the legislators realised a need for keeping each of the properties undivided. Thus, the 
type of property is interesting again. The Herold MS hints at specific rules attached to allodial 
land. It was transferred undivided, which was usually the primary aim concerning property, 
until, ‘after a long time’, an unbearable situation of joint ownership among grandchildren or 
further down arose.440 Then it was divided per capita, and not after a branch of the original 
heirs: ‘non per stirpem sed per capita’. One possibility is that allodial land was assumed to be 
held in common by sons and daughters, who would live off the family property. The next 
generation caused problems of cooperation, and the estate was better divided equally between 
all grandchildren, rather than according to representation. In this case, we can imagine that 
other strategies would be applied by each family, with conveyance to a male heir after buying 
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off the rest, without such ideas surfacing in the extant laws. In the capitulary of what is 
thought to be King Childebert II (r. 575-595) of Austrasia, we find concrete provisions on 
representation (PLS.Cap.6.1). It states that nepotes would come to inherit in their parent’s 
place, and share their father’s or mother’s portion. The equality principle is used here as well, 
both in terms of a son or daughter of Ego being lost and division between grandchildren. The 
capitulary dates to 594, some few decades after Justinian in the 540s cemented the right of 
representation by grandchildren (Nov. 118 and Nov.127). If the Frankish legal elite knew 
Justinian’s and earlier emperors’ constitutions, the right of representation could have been a 
legal transmission from Roman law.  
However, one of the capitularies of Chilperic I of Neustria (r. 561-584) stated that 
daughters could inherit land if there were no sons (PLS.Cap.4.108).441 Drew has interpreted 
this to refer to terra Salica.442 If this is right, then it would thereby overrule earlier law, by 
allowing families to transfer beneficial land through daughters as well. 
 We can see that inheritance was to be divided in the sense that all heirs in the same 
collateral branch in the same degree would get equal parts of the property; sons and daughters 
shared and siblings of the departed shared. The allodial land, though, was not divided, but we 
are not told if equal parts of movables or other land would compensate for one person 
inheriting the land. If not dividing, it is tempting to assume that a son would get the land and a 
daughter got the movables as dowry or inheritance. However, this is a biased conclusion; the 
matrilineal lines were possibly favoured in the intestate system. A reason to give inheritance 
rights to maternal kin would be to avoid the potential for them to instigate a feud, just as the 
Lombard law favoured only those who could instigate a feud (see below). 
 Certainly, real life would have more complicated family structures than just one 
couple and their offspring. Second or more wives and husbands with their respective sets of 
offspring presented problems in the first part of the default system, challenges that were met 
by the lawmakers. The legal material reveals an expectation that property of a deceased 
spouse would be divided if the children were of age (PLS.Cap.3.101.1). If a wife died first, 
and the children were still minors, then the husband was required to protect her property or 
dos443 for her children, and keep it out of reach of his new wife and new children. Similarly, if 
there were no children of the first marriage, then the dead wife's relatives were entitled to 
two-thirds of her dos, but had to leave some of the furniture for the husband 
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(PLS.Cap.3.101.2). If it was the woman who remarried, the betrothal fine was due to the dead 
husband’s relatives. But the relatives in question changed from the law of Clovis to the later-
sixth century capitularies: in the early law, it was the maternal male relatives of the man 
(PLS.44.6-12), while the paternal male relatives gained this right in the later revision 
(PLS.Cap.100.1). Related to the discussion above, we can see both that originally maternal 
kin was prioritised, and that this right changed to the paternal kin of Ego. Similarly, it appears 
that the wife of Ego enjoyed the right to the dos, but she did not inherit from her husband. 
This prevented the dubious effects of backward inheritance. 
However, another capitulary of Chilperic (r. 561-584) established the half-and-half 
split between the relatives, as regards the dos in the case of the death of one spouse 
(PLS.Cap.4.110). We find a similar division in Burgundian laws (see below). That the 
legislator gave emphasis to the woman’s right to the dos is significant according to 
Wemple.444 She points out that this developing transfer in Germanic law of the ownership of 
the dos from the bride’s family to the bride herself empowered women economically, also 
unmarried women. The right to the dos extended to the morning gift, and to the dowry and 
eventually also to landed property. Wemple asserts that Roman custom influenced this change 
and that the underlying motive, as mentioned above, was an attempt to weaken the kin 
through permitting rights to the weakest family members.445 As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, we can, in the instance of the dos, also assume an influence from the Germanic 
practice on Roman law and practice.446 The legal cultural encounters in the fifth and sixth 
century obviously affected legal views on female ownership rights. 
 Frankish regulations on inheritance follow stages of development similar to what we 
saw in late Roman law. If transmission of law took place, there was, nevertheless, a Frankish 
alteration of the Roman laws. The Church may also have influenced Frankish law, and an 
introduction of the favouring of women as part of the introduction of Christianity from the 
late-fifth century. If so, Germanic law adapted to Christian concepts on marriage and women 
in general, where they gained a more prominent status within the Germanic culture. In 
Frankish law, a modified parentela system of inheritance is displayed, extending no further 
than to the first line of descendants. The laws consist of strange principles of prioritising 
maternal kin, but with ancestral land being secured for patrilineal descendants. The 
introduction of representation appears as a novelty. In the mid-sixth century, the Franks 
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annexed the Burgundian kingdom. Burgundian rules on inheritance were a different in several 
regards. 
 
6.2 The inheritance laws of the Burgundian kings 
Burgundian king Gundobad (452-516) issued his Liber Constitutionem around the same time 
as the Salic laws of Clovis were enacted. As Gregory of Tours vividly described, the Frankish 
and Burgundian authorities had dynastic and diplomatic relations with approaches that 
vacillated between friendly and hostile.447 Gundobad and his son Sigismund (r. 516-524) both 
revised the laws regarding inheritance. The code from the late-fifth century and amendments 
dating from the early sixth describe a strict patrilineal system of succession to property. New 
amendments regarded both the extension and limitation of women’s inheritance rights, as the 
result of encounters between legal cultures among the elite. The Lex Romana Burgundionum 
effected Roman inheritance law on Roman subjects and would have been a work of reference 
to the Burgundian legal elite. Still, the contemporary relationship with the Roman empire 
might have been a factor in the shaping of secular law, and not Roman law alone. The 
Burgundian kingdom was defined as foederati, allies, to the Romans. And, although they 
seem to have enjoyed an independent rule in the west, the Burgundian king Sigismund was 
presented, through the writings of Bishop Avitus, as a soldier of the Roman emperor and their 
land as ‘uestra orbis’,448 which translate into ‘your sphere’. Avitus claims further ‘the light of 
the East touches Gaul and Scythia, and the ray of light that is believed to rise there, shines 
here’.449 Barnwell argues the submissive wording reflects ‘what was perceived to be the 
relationship between the king and the emperor’ as characteristic of a distant dependent 
kingdom.450 The Burgundian elite have been described by scholars as maintaining their 
Burgundian traits, long after merging with the Roman empire.451 The Burgundian king and 
aristocracy have appeared more as warlords than as Romanised, possibly a conscious policy 
of the legislating kings. Did this also result in inheritance regulations being consciously non-
Roman? After being an Arian Christian, Sigismund converted to the Catholic faith, which 
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may have made him more credible for the Roman authorities and Romans within the 
Burgundian territory.452 The conversion established the Catholic Church in a dominant 
position within the Burgundian kingdom, although both Arian and Catholic clergy worked 
side-by-side within the Burgundian realm.453 It might have been important for the converted 
king to pay heed to canonical teachings on inheritance and family law – both Gundobad and 
Sigismund showed interest in theological questions – but inheritance regulations were not 
predominantly Christian.  
 King Gundobad presented the principles of inheritance as customary law (LB.51.1, 
LB.53.1). From the rules we can deduce the default inheritance system. A father had to 
distribute his property in equal shares among his sons (LB.1.2-3, LB.51.1). Some sections 
even indicated an expectation of division inter vivos to the sons, while the father kept one part 
for himself. With this part, the father had the right to do what he pleased. Sons were first in 
line of succession, followed by daughters (LB.14.1). Then the siblings of both sexes were 
next in line of succession, followed by what the legislator described as ‘near relatives’, 
‘proprinquos parentes’ (LB.14.2). From other rules on the family, it is reasonable to assume 
that the near relatives signified paternal relatives only, although we do not learn whom were 
considered to be closest, and nor the number of degrees included. Later sections from 
Sigismund imply that if the deceased had a surviving father, then he would share the 
inheritance with the deceased’s son (LB.51.2, LB.75.1, LB.78.1). If the father did not spend 
his own portion after dividing the estate with his sons, they would inherit an equal part in this 
mortis causa (LB.51.1). 
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Figure 5: The inheritance system as portrayed in the Burgundian laws. A gradual system where ascendants were 
favoured before descendants. 
 
The Burgundian written law employed principles of representation, in the way 
grandsons would enter into their deceased father’s share of inheritance in relation to the 
latter’s father or brother. Apparently, granddaughters did not hold this right. A father’s share 
in a dead son’s property would divided between the brothers when the father shared it with 
them or died, i.e., the brothers inherited a share of their dead brother’s property. However, this 
did not apply to daughters, because a father’s own portion or obtained portion was reserved 
for sons only (LB.78.1). The expectation of dividing inter vivos in the Burgundian code could 
also imply that legislators expected daughters to receive a share before their parents passed 
away, as dowry or addition to dowry.  
 Provisions were seemingly made by Gundobad for daughters to inherit from their 
father only if there were no sons (LB.14.1). It was expected that daughters would receive a 
portion of the paternal property to dispose of at will (LB.14.7). We do not learn the precise 
size of this, but a clue is the portion due to daughters who entered a monastery (LB.14.5): 
when a daughter took the veil, she was entitled to a part of her father’s allotted land, the sors, 
a type of land discussed below. If she had one or two brothers, then a third of the sors was due 
to her (LB.14.6). If she had four or five brothers, a non-specified, probably smaller, portion 
was hers. One conclusion from this could be that she received one lot from the property, equal 
to her brothers; if there were four siblings in total, she got one-fourth, and so on. However, the 
119 
 
restrictions on female relatives in the Burgundian code make this a generous guess. Also, this 
division only considered a sister that took the veil. We must keep in mind that the rules 
traditionally regarded nuns as having a higher status according to the legal elite.  
Sisters’ rights to a father’s portion have a correlation with the rules on division 
between a daughter and a grandson. If Ego died, leaving a father, a sister and a son, then 
apparently, the property of Ego and his father would be shared by his sister and his son, i.e., 
aunt and nephew, according to a distribution formula (LB.75.2-3). The rule leaves room for 
interpretation on the division between the daughter and grandson of Ego. The father of Ego 
would have half of his son’s property and his grandson the other half. Then at the death of the 
father, the father’s half would be divided again, between his grandson and daughter. Drew and 
Beyerle maintained that if the father had already divided his property with the son of Ego 
inter vivos, the daughter would end up with three-quarters of the father’s share according to 
LB.75.1, but not if the father lived with his property undivided.454 This would suggest that the 
parent’s decision to divide their property in life would have considerable legal implications 
for their descendants. The favouring of daughters over grandsons gives some clue as to the 
inheritance rights of women: they were given consideration, although this practice still 
complies with patrilineal principles in a gradual system since the father had priority over the 
son. If we compare this distribution formula to the division of the marriage price, wittimon, of 
an orphan girl (LB.66), a similar pattern appears. The distribution of the marriage portion for 
a girl left with uncles and sisters, gave the uncles one-third, and the sisters would receive one-
third.455 Here the collaterals were favoured before a male, paternal relative. However, 
daughters were exclusively entitled to appropriate their mother’s movable goods (LB.51.3). 
The Leges Burgundionum did not specify female ascendants in either line, but did specify 
female descendants or collaterals of Ego, the daughter and sister in LB.75.4. In this 
constitution of Sigismund, the sister nevertheless constitutes the paternal aunt of Ego’s 
daughter. The portion due to the sister of Ego constituted their paternal portion of the 
inheritance. This means that the agnatic women were part of the inheritance system. Possibly, 
by the same mechanisms, they would inherit among the ‘proprinquos parentes’ as well. The 
Burgundian law of Gundobad followed unilateral principles and had a unilateral gradual 
system whereby direct ascendants were favoured before distant descendants. As such, it 
                                                 
454 See Franz Beyerle, Gezetze der Burgunden, Germanenrechte, vol. 10 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1936), p. 103 n. 1; 
Drew, The Burgundian Code, p. 72 n. 1-2. 
455 Plus their mother’s third. Drew also suggests that the last third was due to the bride herself as a dos. For a 
discussion on the character of this type of payment in Germanic marriage, see Hughes, ‘From Brideprice to 
Dowry’, and Dübeck, Kvinder, familie og formue. 
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contrasted with the Roman and Frankish default system, although they work along similar 
lines regarding female agnates. 
 Patrilineage principles would also apply to the rearing of minor grandsons by the 
paternal grandfather, whereby the grandsons’ mother could keep them if she did not remarry 
(LB.59). A woman would rear her sons under the protection of her husband’s family. Property 
and ideas of lineage were modelled on patrimony and protecting the family property. 
Moreover, Gundobad forbade anyone from disinheriting their sons. The above-mentioned rule 
LB.51 refers to one Athila who tried to disinherit his son. Gundobad claimed that ‘what he has 
done contrary to law shall have no legal force’.456 He made it illegal to deny sons their due 
portion, either by intestacy or by testament, although as earlier enactments admit, he awarded 
men the right of distribution of their own property (LB.1.1, LB.43). The case of Athila, which 
could well be fictional given the peculiar name,457 suggests that the Book of Constitutions 
was well embedded in the legal system of the Burgundians during their short rule. We learn 
also that a Roman girl who voluntarily runs off with a Burgundian will be disinherited by her 
Roman parents (LB.12.5). This sentence indicate a reference to Roman law, where eloping 
daughters would lose their inheritance according to Constantine (CTh.9.24.2), although 
disinheritance was a normal punishment for disobedient women in Germanic laws, too.458 
 Women inherited their mother’s or unmarried sisters’ female movables, like fine 
clothes and adornments (LB.51.3). Still, women could make special provisions for their 
movable property without contradicting law, and without daughters or sisters being able to 
sue on grounds of invalidity. There are indications that a woman’s property returned to her 
line, if she had no children; the marriage gifts could not be demanded back by relatives of the 
husband, and neither could relatives of the wife demand back marriage gifts to him after her 
death (LB.14.3-4). However, other rules demanded the dos returned to the patrimony, or 
given to the son of the marriage, and to the respective son of each marriage if there were 
several (LB.24.1). But, if childless, the widow and the husband’s relatives would share the 
dos 50/50 (LB.24.2). A widow was required to preserve the property for minor heirs or later 
relatives, but she could do what she wanted with her own portion or gifts from her son or 
husband (LB.24.3-5) and keep her dos and morgengeba (LB.42.2).  
                                                 
456 ‘quod contra legem fecerat, ex lege iussimus non valere’. 
457 ‘Athila’ has an unquestionable resemblance to the name of the Hun leader, former foe of the Burgundian 
military forces. 
458 See, for instance, LV.3.4.7, Liu.5.V, Liu.114.XI. 
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The widow’s entitlements were scrutinised on several occasions in the legislation of 
Sigismund, after king Gundobad had first favoured the rights of widows in negotiations with 
the secular nobility. A widow whose son had died was given rights to use her son’s 
inheritance during her lifetime (LB.53.1). In 501, Kung Gundobad announced that, although 
he had earlier decreed the inheritance of a childless man should go to his siblings (LB.14.2), 
after consideration he had decided to amend the law, so that widows who had not remarried 
could live off part of their husband’s property (LB.42.1). Later, apparently by advice of his 
aristocracy, the ‘obtimates populi nostri’, Gundobad had been counselled against this, because 
the husband’s relatives would have to wait too long for their share (LB.53.1). But, instead of 
depriving the widow of usufruct, he called for an immediate shift of the man’s property: the 
widow would surrender half of the total property to the in-laws, and have total ownership of 
the other half (LB.53.2). This was a generous share to the widow, and in 517 King Sigismund 
reduced it to one-third (LB.62.1). Apparently, after more legal advice or complaints from 
noblemen, King Sigismund placed further restrictions (LB.74). He set conditions that said she 
could only obtain the third if she had not received any property from her parents or by gift 
from her husband. She had to remain unmarried and would only have usufruct. This aspect of 
the Burgundian legal development is anomalous, if we view the women’s enhanced 
inheritance rights in the early medieval laws as a result of influence from canon law. Widows 
were granted large parts of the property, in line with Wemple’s theory of the contemporary 
development of enhancing women’s property rights, inspired by Roman law. Secondly, these 
rights were restricted again due to pressure on the legislator from the aristocracy. Obviously, 
Burgundian secular law was made with conscious knowledge of Roman and other secular 
law, and, from the fact that changes happened through internal development, we can argue 
that transmission from external sources probably happened through conscious choice more 
than by chance. 
 The prohibition on disinheriting might have been taken with regard to sors as it was 
sometimes called, or Terra sortis. Sors referred to the land the Burgundians acquired from 
Roman landholders when establishing foederati on Roman territory in 443.459 The original 
Romans were required by these agreements to hand over part of their land to a Germanic 
family, officially as a loan or, as Drew describes it, as ‘that land which a barbarian “guest” 
had assigned from his Roman “host”’.460 By virtue of these agreements the Germanic groups 
                                                 
459 A foederati agreement was established in the early fifth century but was abolished and reinstated in the 430s. 
460 Drew, The Burgundian Code, p. 22 n. 1. 
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could seize two-thirds of the land, sortis, and the original Roman population could hold a 
third, tertia. Whether this meant dividing the actual estates, as was the earlier understanding, 
or if it was the total land available, of which two-thirds was given to the newcomers, is 
debated.461 In the Extravagantes, additional laws by the Burgundian king Codomar, the 
portion is described as one-half.462 The land was possibly acquired without the need for royal 
approval, it seems, as royal grants of land were under different regulation and legislation. 
However, these properties were most likely granted directly by the king as a reward for 
services rendered.463 It is probable that landed property was given to a certain part of the 
group in question, which established a Germanic landowning class. As Chris Wickham 
argues, the terminology implied taxation, because Germanic landholding usually meant 
military services and exemption from taxes.464 We would still assume that the Roman and the 
Burgundian had some overlapping ground, or indeed that a concept of commons existed, 
because we learn that if either Roman or Burgundian made a clearing on the communi, then 
the other should receive an equivalent piece of ground (LB.13).465 The division of Roman 
land between Germanic groups and the original owners would also be treated legally in a 
more direct manner in other states; for instance, in Leges Visigothorum (LV.10.1.8-16). 
Zeumer implied that the Visigothic king Euric had similar constitutions from his father, 
Theoderic I.466 Time limitations of 30 and 50 years applied to these holdings, as to other land 
in the earliest Germanic law, a feature probably adopted from Roman concepts of 
ownership.467 If land was held for a certain length of time, normally stated in written law as 
50 years, it could not be contested.468 Burgundians also held two-thirds of the territory in their 
area. Terra sortis contrasted with the Frankish terra salica, and also with the allodial land 
mentioned in the Frankish laws. It was different, too, both in origin and in meaning, from the 
treatment of the same land division in Visigothic law (see below). The first section of the code 
stated that a man could do what he wished with his property, except for terra sortis (also 
                                                 
461 See Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages, 84-85; Goffart, Barbarian Tides, pp. 139-44. 
462 Leges Burgundionem Extravagantes 21.12: ‘medietas’. 
463 Drew, The Burgundian Code, p. 23 points to G. A. Davoud-Oglou, Histoire de la législation des anciens 
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466 Zeumer Leges Visigothorum, p. 5. See also Wormald, ‘Leges Barbarorum’, p. 26. 
467 See Eur.277 and LV.10.2.1-7. 
468 Goffart, Barbarian Tides, p. 142. 
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termed adquisita (LB.1.1). The particular instruction also suggests that sors had a higher 
status in the inheritance regulation. We further learn that minor wrongdoers would not lose 
their right to retrieve the sors from their parents (LB.47.3). Sigismund forbade the sale of 
sors, and the selling of land to foreigners (extraneus) (LB.84). In this way, sors probably was 
under similar protection as terra salica. 
 We see that Burgundian secular law displayed a unilateral gradual system with 
emphasis on patrilineal principles. Thus, they diverged from the Roman inheritance system in 
that women could inherit to a limited extent. Special regulations were nevertheless carefully 
implemented to ensure the economic safety of daughters and widows of Ego. In the short code 
of the Burgundian kings, we also see an example of the elite, as opposed to the legal elite, 
pressuring the legislating king to make changes in law, because the favouring of women 
affected the nobility’s accumulation of wealth. In their neighbouring kingdom to the west, the 
Visigoths maintained the opposite principles. 
 
6.3 The inheritance system in Visigothic law 
The laws of the Visigoths in Spain have been labelled by some the law, of all the Germanic 
laws, that was closest to Roman law.469 At the same time, Visigothic laws on inheritance are 
characterised by providing equal division between male and female heirs. Roman influence on 
the Visigothic laws is thought to be stronger in the seventh-century code Leges Visigothorum 
written by kings Chindasvint (r. 641-653) and Reccesvint (r. 649-672).470 Euric made a point 
of opposing the Roman emperors, but he still had Roman help in shaping the code, Leo of 
Narbonne being a significant figure.471 Enmity towards the Roman state and culture might 
suggests that the equality between the sexes was a result of Gothic tradition rather than Leo of 
Narbonne’s influence, but a more plausible explanation is that there had already been an 
extensive appropriation of Roman laws in the first stage. Later kings were obliged to issue 
                                                 
469 For instance, Roger Collins, Visigothic Spain, 409-711 (Cornwall: Wiley-Blackwell), p. 227; Roger Collins, 
‘Law and Ethnic Identity in the Western Kingdoms in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries’, in Medieval Europeans: 
Studies in Ethnic and National Perspectives in Medieval Europe, ed. by Alfred Smyth (Ipswich: Palgrave, 1998), 
pp. 1-23 (p. 14); Claude, ‘Remarks’. 
470 Francisco Martínez Marina, Ensayo histórico-crítico sobre la antigua legislación y principales cuerpos 
legales de los reynos de Leon y Castilla, especialmente sobre el código de D. Alonso el Sabio conocido con el 
nombre de las Siete Partidas (Madrid: En la imprenta de la hija de D. J. Ibarra., 1808), pp. 22, 162 n.3; 
Wormald, Lex Scripta, p. 107, King, Law and Society, pp. 23-51; Hughes, ‘From Brideprice to Dowry’, pp. 267-
76; Harries, ‘Not the Theodosian Code’. 
471 Harries, ‘Not the Theodosian Code’, pp. 40-48. 
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laws for the approval of the both higher clergy and the higher Gothic nobility.472 Still, these 
later laws also bear a heavy resemblance to the Codex Theodosiani. Others have seen more 
Gothic traits in both of the legal texts.473 How were the inheritance laws influenced by this?  
The Visigothic code of 650 reveals a consistent attitude towards shared inheritance by 
male and female heirs of the same collateral degree (LV.4.2.1-10). These principles were 
incorporated from the late fifth-century code of King Euric (r. 466-484) (Eur.320, 328, 331, 
336). The image of kinship portrayed by legislators was consistently founded on the idea of a 
cognatic kinship group. Evidently, from the earliest extant laws of Euric, an inheritance 
system along both strict- and full parentela principles was legally maintained (Eur.320, 328-
331, 336). Descendants were prioritised and collaterals in each parentela had equal rights to 
the inheritance regardless of sex or side of the family. The order of succession decreed by 
Euric was that of children and grandchildren, followed by parents, then siblings and their 
offspring, then grandparents and then uncles and aunts (Eur.331, 336). All the ancient laws 
specify that the collaterals, both male and female, were to divide the property of the deceased 
equally. The complete equality between the sexes and lines in every aspect is one of the 
features that distinguishes the Visigothic from other Germanic legal works.  
 Visigothic legislators followed Roman legal texts in the way they assessed degree of 
kinship and the relevant number of degrees. The Visigothic legislation on degrees, LV.4.1.1-
7, was copied verbatim from Leges Romana Visigothorum, the Breviary of Alaric, in the 
section from the jurist Paulus, 4.10.1-8, even including the interpretationes.474 The Leges 
Visigothorum lists six degrees (LV.4.1.1-6). The last section cites the reason for ending at six 
as the lack of names for any extensions of kin beyond that (LV.4.1.7). The last ancestor was 
termed trivius and trivia, trinepos and trineptis.475 The seventh-century rules on degrees in the 
Leges Visigothorum thus had roots in the sixth-century Gothic adoption of Roman law. 
Because of the direct transmission from Roman law, it is plausible to assume that the 
Visigoths counted according to the Roman method. However, because the rules count straight 
up- and downward, we cannot say for sure. The incest prohibition, the forbidden degrees of 
marriage, mirrored the number of degrees by excluding relatives within six degrees to marry 
                                                 
472 Marina, Ensayo histórico-crítico, pp. 21-22; Wickham, Inheritance of Rome, pp. 136-37. 
473 John F. Matthews, ‘Roman Law and Barbarian Identity in the Late Roman West’, in Ethnicity and Culture in 
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(LV.3.5.1), while the incest prohibition in Roman law excluded relatives to the fourth 
degree.476 This Visigothic marriage prohibition was credited King Chindasvint and could have 
constituted a part of Gothic legislation that was more distinctively Gothic than the counting of 
degrees itself. The extensive marriage prohibition was adopted into the western Church in the 
ninth century.477 The Visigothic regulation of forbidden degrees in marriage thus superseded 
that of Roman tradition and the Church in the seventh century, and predated canonical 
intervention.478 Possibly the Goths or the dominance of the Gothic church through pressure 
influenced the Christian scholastic in Western Europe.  
 
 
Figure 6: Visigothic laws according to Chindasvint appear as a parentela system, similar to Roman law. Still, gradual 
features can be detected in the legislation from the 650s. 
 
The parentela system was inserted into Leges Visigothorum, the mid-seventh century 
compilation. In his later additions, Chindasvint may have introduced tendencies of gradual 
principles; he asserted that the estate of parents inheriting from their dead children was 
                                                 
476 Herlihy, ‘Women, Family and Society’, pp. 97-98. See also chapter 5 of this thesis. 
477 Bouchard, ‘Consanguinity and Noble Marriages’, p. 270; Gies, Marriage and Family, pp. 83-84; Herlihy, 
‘Women, Family and Society’, p. 102. See chapter 4 in this thesis. 
478 At the Councils in Rome in 721 and 743, the prohibition was extended to four degrees, still moderate 
compared to the Visigothic. 
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distributed among particular relatives in equal parts after their own passing, and he prioritised 
their siblings over their parents (LV.4.2.17,18). The absence of grandparents, with aunts and 
uncles being first in line, could suggest an inclination towards gradual elements. It could also 
imply the obvious, that the inheritance went through grandparents, too. The rules retained 
equal shares for males and females.  
 In what appears as new law in the Visigothic code, the kings restricted the possibility 
of bequeathing via a testament all of one’s property to certain family members, or to 
strangers, on the grounds that too many wasted their property or dowry and deprived their 
descendants of the ‘naturalis pietas’ owed to them (LV.4.5.1). The amount that could be 
willed away freely was reduced from an unknown sum to one-third. As in the case of Athila 
in the Burgundian laws, the authorities desired to take inheritance rights out of the intestate 
system, because they were concerned about leaving the apportioning of inheritance to the 
whim of the individual, as in the case of disinheritance by will. This could be an attempt to 
disassociate from the Roman tradition of wills. Naturally, since Romans from the late-sixth 
century were also subject to Visigothic law, the tradition of wills needed to be treated in this 
law. Romans made up an overwhelmingly large part of the population and would influence 
the legislation of Visigothic rulers.479 Although the legislators made sure family property 
would largely be kept within the family, Chindasvint set provisions that limited the 
inheritance to the first parentela, and gave the couple from which the parentela would 
originate the right to make each other heir by testament (LV.4.2.19, 20). However, in the 
eighth century, King Erwig had small but significant additions made to the old rules. The 
revisions focused more on what happened if the deceased died intestate (LV.4.2.3, 7).480 The 
additions were abundant, and identical reservations were formulated by Euric’s legislators 
(Eur.320), but the interesting point is the repetition of dying intestate. It may have been 
included to underline a point. The Gothic notion of succession may have moved towards the 
Roman model for bequeathing possessions by testament, whereas other continental laws gave 
more prominence to intestate heirs. Although centuries had passed since the region was freed 
from Roman authority, it seems that Visigothic inheritance laws were revised in line with 
Roman principles of inheritance. Antti Arjava has argued that the Visigoths might have 
adopted the model of emancipating children, although the Gothic view of full age influence 
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Roman tradition.481 Children became independent at twenty years of age, according to the law 
of Euric (Eur.321, LV.4.2.13). 
 The gradual system seems more intricate and open to domination and conflict within 
the kin group, but the parentela system had its own problems, as the Visigothic legislation 
reveals. Similar to the concerns of letting the spouse inherit was the possibility that parents 
would inherit from their offspring. Parents inheriting would have a great effect on where the 
ancestral property ended up, and the legislator apparently knew about conflicts concerning 
backwards inheritance (LV.4.2.17). Backwards inheritance could lead to property being split 
up backwards and allotted to another line. Did a child who died in infancy gain inheritance 
rights? If yes, then the parents or their family could inherit from each other through the dead 
descendant. That is why determining the limits of a child’s inheritance privileges is important. 
At what point did the child become an heir? Chindasvint argued that a child who had hardly 
seen the light of day could not own property, and set the critical limit of death for an infant 
after ten days and baptism. A child surviving longer would confer inheritance rights to its 
ancestors, but one who lived shorter would not be taken into account. Conversely, a 
posthumous child would share in the inheritance with other heirs if it survived (LV.4.2.21). 
Children from each marriage inherited before half-siblings of another union (LV.4.5.4). A 
parent that survived both the spouse and the children was a risk, because he or she could 
further distribute inherited property to collaterals, or children by another wife or husband. 
Letting spouses inherit posed similar challenges, because when the respective husband or wife 
died, then their relatives would end up with the property of the other family. However, 
ancestral land was protected in Visigothic law by stricter regulations, so that it would only 
reverse along the line from which it derived (LV.4.2.6). Murray argues the rule to express the 
ius recadentiae, law of reversion, which he believes developed among the Germanic 
people.482 He further agrees with Alvaro d’Ors that it was a novelty in the Leges 
Visigothorum, arguing ex silentio, since this topic is absent from the law of Euric.483 d’Ors 
suggested that the concept of reversion was an influence from Frankish laws, something 
Murray supports.484  
Husband and wife could not inherit from each other if there were relatives within 
seven degrees (LV.4.2.11), which reflects the earlier tradition in Roman law. However, since 
                                                 
481 Arjava, ‘Paternal Power’, pp. 163-64. See also chapter 5 of this thesis. 
482 Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure, p. 215.  
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Gothic legislation apparently followed the late Roman example, the restriction on the spouse 
may have been motivated by a requirement of the parentela system. But the legislators 
enacted constitutions similar to those of Burgundian and Salic law concerning gradual 
principles, i.e., that a wife could only receive her portion (one-third) of the children’s 
inheritance if they died and the rest would return to the father’s relatives (LV.4.2.18). Euric 
had decreed that a widow with surviving children would divide their father’s property with 
them equally, similarly to the Burgundian father (LV.4.2.14). During her lifetime she was 
allowed to do what she wanted with the surplus of such property, as long as the value of the 
property itself was kept for the heirs.485 The squandering of property is a topic treated in some 
depth in Leges Visigothorum from the 650s but especially in the Codex Euricianus. In the 
earliest Visigothic legislation, provisions to secure and preserve family property for 
subsequent generations were detailed so minutely that they were only surpassed by Roman 
law.486 
 Regarding landed property, the Visigoths had also annexed from the Romans part of 
their land when colonising southern Gaul and the Hiberian peninsula. Like the Burgundians, 
the Goths claimed two-thirds of the land. The division from the fifth century was addressed in 
seventh-century law, apparently as a continuation of Euric’s old enactment of the sors 
(Eur.277).487 The rule warned Romans against taking more land than the two-thirds given to 
the Goths, while the Goths should leave the last third for the Romans (LV.10.1.8). Surely, this 
must have affected inheritance distribution, where all property was to be split equally. Still, 
the written laws do not explain how to divide the sors between heirs although a general 
opinion is that principles of male priority or primogeniture applied.488  
 Visigothic law contains the cleanest form of a parentela system found in the laws, with 
principles of utter equality in all joints. The inheritance system resembled what the Roman 
system would later become, and there may be a trace of transmission from Codex Theodosiani 
or Codex Iustiniani. We saw how the counting of kinship was directly copied into the Leges 
Visigothorum, and can assume that the legal elite that made the Visigothic secular law also 
found other late Roman inheritance legislation sensible. Still, the Visigothic parentela system 
displayed in secular law was strict and more coherent than we find even in the later sixth-
century Roman legislation. Original, possibly Germanic, measures were introduced to secure 
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family land. Furthermore, the rules protected the parentela system by regulating the rights of 
parents to inherit from children or from each other. Their Italian neighbours, the Lombards, 
issued law enacting other principles altogether.  
 
6.4 The inheritance laws of the Lombard kings 
Lombard legislation lacked the specific terminology and regulations on ancestral land that 
Salic and Visigothic laws contained. We could explain the absence of such laws as being due 
to the short period of time between the Lombard occupation of northern Italy (568) and the 
promulgation of the first written laws (643), which was a mere seventy-five years. However, 
in the later part of the legal work, issued in the first half of the eighth century, Lombards had 
held the earlier Roman land for generations. Regulations on landownership according to 
prescription formed. In the first written Edict of King Rothair (r. 636-652), disputes over land 
held for five years only are addressed (Rot.228). The successors of King Rothair, Grimwald 
(r. 662-671) and Liutprand (r. 712-744), developed increasingly complex regulations 
concerning the time land was held, whereby only land possessed for thirty years bestowed 
ownership (Gri.1, Gri.4, Liu.54.I). In 726, Liutprand further doubled the stipulated period, to 
sixty years (liu.70.I), and also introduced the concept of possessing what had been royal land 
(Liu.78.iX), i.e., what the Lombards appropriated in the conquest.489 This type of land would 
be equivalent to the sors we read of in the other Germanic laws, as John Allen and Friedrich 
Savigny interpreted it to be.490 A law from Liutprand’s later reign also ruled on disputing 
possession of movable and landed property after thirty years, where suspicion of falsification 
existed (Liu.115.XII), and unsurprisingly suggests that the time land was to be held prior to 
ownership was increased in line with the Lombard presence in Italy. Disputes over property 
were settled by oath or combat (Rot.228). Landed property was a serious matter to the 
Lombard legislators, as was inheritance. 
 The Lombard inheritance system was, similar to that of Burgundian law, a patrilineal 
gradual system. The simplified version was that property passed to male offspring, and sons 
inherited from their father. There was no priority given to a particular son or number of the 
sons, for instance by primogeniture. To disinherit one’s son was, as we saw in the Burgundian 
and Visigothic law, illegal (Rot.168), unless for very serious reasons, like adultery with a 
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stepmother or attempted murder of relatives (Rot.169). These reasons are also evident in the 
late Roman laws concerning disinheritance.  
The written laws do not reveal the order of succession in the default inheritance 
system, or the mode of counting degrees. From regulations of inheritance to illegitimate sons 
(see below), the suspicion is that the legislators worked from the assumption of a patrilineal 
system. According to Rothair’s Edict, Lombards counted relatives to the seventh degree, and 
probably distributed inheritance up to and including the sixth degree, similar to Visigothic and 
Frankish laws (Rot.153). Rothair further demanded any Lombard who claimed inheritance to 
name all relatives between himself and Ego. This may suggest that Lombards counted in the 
Roman fashion, since in the seven canonical degrees one person had an overwhelming 
number of relatives.491 The system fits well with the otherwise paternalistic culture, equally 
mirrored in the early laws from the mid-seventh century. Sons were entitled to the inheritance, 
but they were also left with the responsibility or right to guard sisters, aunts and brothers who 
were still minors. Lombard society was driven by the ideology of a male head of the family, 
who had power over spouse, children, servants and others (Rot.184, Rot.385). The man could 
not maltreat or kill his wards or wife without cause (Rot.166, Rot.182, Rot.195, Rot.200), but 
he alone decided about their actions and property. As such, a free man held full power within 
his household and boundaries, according to the law. Neither king nor neighbour could disturb 
him there, if he lived according to the law. Breach of a free man’s peace in his home was a 
grave offence to him (Ex. Rot.32-34). The system did not reflect the patria potestas culture of 
the Romans, though, where offspring, including sons, were dependent on the oldest male 
ancestor, and the head of family was responsible for his whole parentela. Lombard boys were 
legally considered minors until they were twelve (Rot.154), and became fully independent at 
the age of eighteen (Liu.19.I). They then had the right to establish their own household and be 
the head of their own family.  
 Women were, by law, incapacitated (Rot.204, Rot.385).492 They could not be legally 
independent, but their care, called mundium, was entrusted to a man, who became her 
guardian, called mundwald, in the last resort to the king himself. The mundium of daughters 
and sisters of Ego would pass to male heirs, even natural sons or relatives of a deceased 
husband (Rot.161, Rot.182). The mundium would normally be possessed by the father or 
brothers of a woman (Rot.199), and passed to her husband through formal engagement (Ex. 
                                                 
491 This could also be one reason for encouraging drawing of heraldic maps by the synod of Ingelheim in 948, 
Bouchard, ‘Consanguinity and Noble Marriages’, p. 272. 
492 Wickham on women in Lombard law and society: Wickham, Inheritance of Rome, pp. 199, 213. 
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Rot.186). The privilege could be sold to and owned by men outside the kin group as well, and 
gave the holder access to the woman’s property (Rot.195-196). A husband could inherit from 
his wife, but the wife was not the heir of the husband, and a widow could not possess her 
husband’s property undivided. This was probably because she could not legally act without 
her mundwald. However, the husband’s relatives inherited the widow’s mundium as well as 
the rest of his property, and would be party to any remarriage of the widow (Rot.182). A 
mother could not inherit from her son. This meant that backwards inheritance into a woman's 
family was avoided: the husband continued to keep possession of a wife’s property after her 
death for her children and, if the wife survived him, she, or more correctly her new 
mundwald, would not possess the husband’s property. It is not clear what was supposed to 
happen to the property of the wife if the marriage was childless, except we are told that her 
relatives would inherit it if her husband had killed her without cause (Rot.200). If the tables 
were turned, and the wife had killed the husband, then his relatives got his property (Rot.203). 
A possible way for a woman to achieve some independence was for a Lombard woman to 
marry a Roman man. According to a law issued in 731, this would place her under Roman law 
and, if she survived him, give her the right to choose her next husband (Liu.127.XI). Romans 
and Lombards were treated differently under the law, but Lombard attitude towards Romans 
also appears hostile or at least reserved in real cases.493 The laws of Ratchis (r. 744-749)were 
probably edited because the king fell into disgrace due to his flirtation with Roman culture 
and his marriage to a Roman woman, Tassia.494 Apparently, a major problem was that Ratchis 
made charters of land after the manner of Roman law, and accepted a dowry from his wife in 
the Roman style, instead of providing the traditional Germanic dos. The first law of Aistulf 
revoked all of Ratchis’s gifts and favours (Ais.1).495 As the reaction to King Ratchis’s 
behaviour shows, the hostility did not seem to ease over time. The reason for the Lombards’ 
cold feelings towards Romans may be due to their relationship with the Roman empire.496 
Walter Pohl has suggested that the disintegrating force of politics under Justinian was an 
obstacle to state consolidation for the Lombard rulers.497 
 
                                                 
493 Pohl-Resl, ‘Legal Practice and Ethnic Identity’, p. 209.  
494Hughes, ‘From Brideprice to Dowry’, p. 273. See also Pohl, ‘Frontiers in Lombard Italy’, for an account of the 
attitude of Ratchis towards Roman culture. 
495 Bluhme, ‘Edictus’, p. 196 n. 2.  
496 For a brief picture of the diplomacy and conflicts between the Lombard and Roman elites on the Italian 
peninsula, see Wickham, Inheritance of Rome, pp. 143-46, 267. 




Figure 7: The gradual system of Lombard law 
 
Although Lombard laws appear to be fully patrilineal, it seems kinship was also 
reckoned in terms of bilateral kin groups. Sons would inherit their mother’s marriage portion 
bestowed on her by her own relatives (Rot.200). Lombards were allowed to use in-laws as 
oath-helpers in the absence of close relatives (Rot.362), which further supports the belief that 
Lombard family structure was regarded by legislating authorities as a kin group containing 
both maternal and paternal kin. Sons possibly also inherited from their mothers, and thus also 
excluded daughters from inheriting this way, as Liutprand later gave daughters the same 
rights to a mother’s property as sons if there were no sons (Liu.1.I). 
 The legislation of King Rothair (r. 636-652) was concerned with the alternatives when 
there was no legitimate son as heir. First of all, there are many regulations on the rights of an 
illegitimate son, the naturalis, which Katherine Fisher Drew translated as ‘natural son’498 
These were children born out of wedlock but in lawful unions like concubinage, serfdom and 
similar. Natural sons also had rights to a share of the inheritance, although it was much less 
than that of their half-brothers born in wedlock. Children born in infamous circumstances, 
including incestuous unions of every sort, had no rights at all (Liu.32.III-34.V).499 If Ego had 
one legitimate son, then that son was entitled to two-thirds of his property, and the natural son 
or sons would have one-third. If there were two legitimate sons, then the illegitimate sons 
                                                 
498 Drew, The Lombard Laws, p. 77. 




would share a fifth, if three legitimate, the natural sons were left with a seventh part 
(Rot.154). The rule continues the progression along the same lines: 
1
(𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠∗2)+1
 . The 
formula, in the ratio of 2:1 in favour of the legitimate sons, reveals that the family property 
followed the legitimate male line, but, nonetheless, the illegitimate sons were not left empty-
handed. As a comparison, the eighth-century increase in daughters’ inheritance rights 
(Liu.102.VI) gave the daughters with legitimate brothers even less than Rothair allowed 
illegitimate sons with legitimate brothers: 
1
(𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠∗3)+1
, which gives a ratio of 3:1 in 
favour of the sons. If there were no legitimate sons, then legitimate still daughters had a claim 
to the inheritance. 
 According to Rothair’s Edict, a female only child was entitled to just a share 
(Rot.158); the property would be divided into three between the daughter, natural sons and 
other relatives of Ego. This ratio is also found in the Scandinavian written records from the 
twelfth century. However, if there was more than one close female heir, and no legitimate 
sons, the women would receive half of the property jointly (Rot.159, Rot.160). Both 
daughters and fatherless sisters of Ego counted in this division. The natural sons of Ego still 
got a third and other relatives a sixth. Overall, the seventh-century Edict of King Rothair gave 
unrivalled favour to legitimate sons, followed by legitimate daughters and finally illegitimate 
male descendants. Daughters were also entitled to a faderfio, a gift from their father on their 
marriage (Rot.199).    
 The rights of grandsons were not addressed in the Edict but by King Rothair’s 
successor Grimwald (Gri.5). King Grimwald complained that grandsons would be left with 
nothing if their father was already dead, and evidently introduced the principle of 
representation. Further, granddaughters and grandsons with natural status had the same rights 
as daughters and natural sons, proportionally according to number of heirs. The earlier Edict 
did not mention representatives of grandchildren other than the son of a legitimate son, thus 
following the pre-Theodosian Roman principles on the same topic. It is likely that the default 
system did not count further female descendants, considering the limited rights of daughters 
themselves. Sons of naturales had, as mentioned above, no rights of inheritance except by 
will (Rot.157). Only the legitimate grandson by a legitimate son was eligible to receive a 
representative portion of the inheritance.  
 Moreover, there are indications that, in the absence of male descendants, property was 
transferred to the relatives of the Ego’s father. The extant laws provide few details regarding 
the possible order of these relatives in terms of entitlement to inheritance. Some clues can be 
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found though, suggesting a traditional sequence following patrilineal principles, as found later 
in the western Nordic laws. Fatherless brothers would receive compensation for each other in 
the case of killings, which suggests they were also each other’s heirs in the absence of sons or 
father (Rot.162). The law of Rothair mentions the brother, uncle and cousin in that order in 
connection with plotting the death of a relative, and we may reasonably assume that to be the 
expected order of inheritance, too. Uncles accusing their nephews of being born out of 
wedlock (Rot.164) similarly suggests that the uncle was likely to be at the top of the list of 
relatives with a claim to the above-mentioned third of the inheritance, if the offspring of Ego 
were illegitimate.  
 According to written law, a woman’s claim to inheritance depended on male support. 
Unlike developments in other Germanic successor states in the sixth and seventh centuries, 
Lombard women were not given extended economic rights and were not given the right of 
inheritance, other than a third part if they were the only legitimate offspring. If we follow 
Wemple’s argument as to why Frankish women and others gained such rights, it would mean 
that the Lombards did not desire to imitate Roman customs and that the king was not in 
position to or interested in weakening the kinship structure. But then, in the early eighth 
century, Lombard royal legislation changes. The Lombard king Liutprand (r. 712-744) 
provided the most extensive supplement to the Lombard law after Rothair. In his first year as 
king and in his first act as legislator, the first law he made concerned the succession of 
daughters. And in the first year, he issued six sections concerning inheritance, five of them 
relating to female heirs. 
 The first law states that in the case of there being no sons, daughters would inherit as if 
were they legitimate sons, i.e., the whole property (Liu.1.I). The second one continues that 
both married and unmarried daughters would share, while the third excluded married sisters 
of Ego and the fourth included unmarried sisters to share equally with daughters (Liu.2.II, 
Liu.3.III, Liu.4.). Then we are presented with the reservations: the fifth states that female 
heirs who act against their father’s or brother’s wishes could be disinherited (Liu.5), which 
resounds of Justinian's Novella on disinheriting children, although disobedience would be an 
reason for being disinherited even without inspiration from Roman law (Nov.115.3). And 
finally the last of Liutprand’s six laws makes it possible to overrule all the five previous by 
saying that a sick and dying man could make decisions on behalf of his soul, and dispose of 
his property in whatever manner and to whatever extent he wished (Liu.6). This means that a 
man with no son could give the whole property to the Church, or to male relatives instead of 
to his daughters. In effect, the Lombard king made it possible for sonless Lombards to 
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distribute their possessions however they pleased. It is not clarified explicitly whether 
daughters would surpass illegitimate sons completely, but the text of Liu.1.I reads ‘If a 
Lombard dies without legitimate sons’ (my italics).500 Maybe the old formula of 
1
(𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠∗2)+1
 would apply, in favour of the main heir, here being legitimate daughters. 
In 725, Liutprand nevertheless repeated that a father could not dispose of more than two-
thirds of his property if he had daughters, securing a third for them by law (Liu.65.I). This 
could indicate that fathers were disposing of more than 2/3 of their property to the detriment 
of their daughters and that the repetition was a result of Liutprand’s earlier regulations not 
being followed, or, it could be a general repetition, emphasising his sentiment in the matter of 
daughters’ right to inheritance. Either way reveals that women’s legal status was improving. 
 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of inheritance according to the regulations of Grimwald (r. 662-671) and Liutprand (r. 712-
744). Grandsons and daughters gained rights of inheritance not seen in the earlier laws of Rothair. 
 
A more difficult principle to establish is whether daughters came before sons of sons. 
The extant text is silent on this. If the law of Grimwald giving sons and daughters of sons 
representative inheritance rights is followed, it is tempting to argue that sons of sons would be 
prioritised before daughters of Ego, or that they shared by an unknown allocative formula. 
 What was the point of letting daughters inherit? There are several plausible 
explanations. First, they could bestow continuity within the family, when male descendants 
                                                 
500 Drew, Lombard Laws, p. 145. 
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were exhausted. Secondly, daughters could gain advantageous marriages as heiresses and 
thereby transfer their family’s property to an even larger unit. This perhaps presupposes a 
cognatic kinship structure, which the Lombards, according to their laws, can only be said to 
have to a minor degree. And thirdly, it was perhaps believed reasonable to distribute 
inheritance to daughters as well as sons, a topic which several Frankish fathers expressed an 
opinion on in their wills.501 Brigitte Pohl-Resl interprets the improvement of daughters’ 
inheritance rights as the influence of Roman law.502 She also illustrates that the practice 
among Lombards might have been more favourable towards female relatives than the law 
texts indicate. The last argument is interesting seen in light of three provisions Liutprand 
issued fifteen years after his first laws, which all are intended to restrict women’s possessions 
over property (Liu.101.VI-103.VIII). Liutprand stated that a woman who took the veil should 
give two-thirds of her property to her mundwald. She thus kept a third, similar to the 
Burgundian rules. Lombard women who entered monasteries fell under Roman law, and 
Liutprand in this way secured her property for the Lombard society.503 The second rule 
continued that a man with legitimate sons could only give a maximum of one-quarter of his 
property to daughters and sisters combined, that is in the ratio of 3:1, and the third law 
forbade a husband from bestowing more upon his wife than he did on the day of their 
marriage. The latter has the feel of Roman law, which denied gifts between spouses right up 
to Justinian. The inheritance privileges Liutprand gave daughters only favoured them when 
they had no brothers. Anyway, these three rules indicate that, to a larger extent, Lombard 
women became property owners in the eighth century. The motives behind the making of 
these laws could be the effect that Liutprand’s first laws had when they gave daughters the 
right to inherit. Still, a Lombard was not allowed to control or sell her property in any way, at 
least not legally, not even when unmarried, childless or widowed, because, according to 
Lombard law, she would never be emancipated. Hence, men controlled property through 
women under their guardianship. The earlier marriage laws of Rothair indicate that daughters 
could nevertheless potentially gain a substantial share of their father’s property, but still 
maximum one-quarter, with a ratio of 3:1. The woman kept her morning gift and the gift she 
received from her husband in connection with the marriage, called metfio (similar to the dos), 
                                                 
501 Paul Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1920), p. 
288. 
502 Pohl-Resl, ‘Legal Practice and Ethnic Identity’, p. 214. 
503 On secular society and relatives in monasteries, see Alexander Kazhdan, ‘Byzantine Hagiography and Sex in 
the Fifth to Twelfth Centuries’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 44 (1990), pp. 131-43. 
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but the aforementioned faderfio was to be divided with her sisters if widowed, although it 
remained the woman’s during her marriage (Rot.199).504 A transfer of this kind was voluntary 
for the woman’s family, and not a required part of the legitimising nuptial transfers (Rot.181). 
The gift was only mentioned in the seventh-century laws from Rothair. Diane Hughes has 
argued that Liutprand’s establishment of inheritance being given to daughters by testament 
actually alludes to the faderfio.505 She believes this transfer would be of substantial size and 
sought by men, suggesting families equipped their daughters with large dowries.506 Since the 
Lombards viewed the dowry as a Roman institution, the legislator saw faderfio not as dowry, 
but bound to revert to the giver. Liutprand probably replaced this transfer with the opportunity 
for daughters to inherit according to the circumstances of the respective family.  
 The secular laws of the Lombards revealed an interesting combination of both the 
bilateral kin group and strong patrilineal principles. These were combined in a gradual 
system, but without specifying the order of succession. In the Germanic laws, we primarily 
find the principle that all legitimate heirs should inherit. In Lombard law, all sons shared at 
the expense of daughters and illegitimate sons. A particular feature in Lombard regulation on 
inheritance is the focus on the status of both Ego and possible successors. Legitimacy was 
sought for both, and, by and large, determined the division of property. Landed property held 
high status, and it was apparently important to transfer it to the proper successors. As with 
Salic and Burgundian law, we do not find the principle of representation a natural concept of 
distributing inheritance. Representation seems to have been a novelty, possibly introduced by 
Lombard legislators after influence from eastern Roman law in the seventh century. By and 
large, in the distinctive Lombard law, it is possible to see evidence from transmission of law 
in the concrete changes of inheritance principles. This evidence of transmission can be traced 
back mainly to Roman influence, and not to other Germanic laws. The bi-legal system of law 
obviously caused contamination to the law in development, the Leges Langobardorum. 
 
Conclusion: Germanic inheritance laws 
When juxtaposed, the examples of Germanic secular legislation on inheritance each appear 
distinctively domestic, not least because they all originate within different systems. Each of 
the laws are centred on particular aspects of inheritance that they seek to prevent. When the 
                                                 
504 Tveit, ‘Non enim coitus matrimonium facit’, pp. 97-99. 
505 Hughes, ‘From Brideprice to Dowry,’ p. 273. 
506 Ibid.  
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models of inheritance systems are applied, we find that of the four examples of secular legal 
culture, two fell into a moderated parentela system and two into a form of gradual system. 
Although the Lombard and Burgundian laws relate to patrilineal principles in the inheritance 
system, all of the four legal cultures reveal a concept of kinship that includes a connection 
with both maternal and paternal relatives.  
 The rules themselves reveal little direct copying between the codes. Nevertheless, 
there are several concurrences in certain numbers that can only be understood as direct 
transmission of law. The usage of six degrees is one such concurrence. In Visigothic law, the 
wording is copied verbatim from Roman law to Gothic law. In Frankish laws, the number of 
degrees were also indicate a shared notion with Roman law, but not a transmission of the 
sentence of Paulus as a whole. This can certainly indicate that the limit of six degrees 
prevailed in the late Roman and early medieval legal understanding of inheritance and 
kinship. As expected, the probability of transmission between Roman and Germanic law is 
high. 
 When comparing the elements of the second level in the hierarchy of probability, some 
correlations emerge that indicate transmission of motivations and basis. All laws address the 
disinheriting of sons, which did not fit with the legislators’ idea of correct distribution of 
inheritance. Arguments for not accepting disinheritance comprised the injustice and 
complications such an act would cause, while Visigothic law emphasised the problem of 
parents favouring ‘strangers’ instead of their own children. To regulate inheritance included 
making sure future generations were not deprived of livelihood, but also ensuring that estates 
were not fragmented by inheritance through plural descendants. The interest of families were 
combined with the interest of the individual. 
 The concept of representation emerged in seventh-century Germanic legislation. We 
find somewhat uneven inclusions of all descendants in later layers of law. In practice, 
grandchildren might inherit, but in the legal sources the rights of taking a deceased parent’s 
share is presented as a novelty. The late Roman revisions of regulation of reversion and 
representation possibly influenced the legal elite of the western kingdoms when Justinian’s 
compilation came to be known. By comparison, we find regulations on backwards inheritance 
in the laws with bilateral systems, but it was not considered necessary for regulations of either 
reversion or backwards inheritance in Lombard and Burgundian patrilateral systems. 
 When compared, the two parentela systems of Frankish and Visigothic law are 
differently presented in the texts. In the fragments of the Visigothic king Euric from the late-
fifth century, distribution of inheritance was described as a remarkably neat system of 
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equality. The Roman system was the model for this feature, but the Visigothic parentela was 
more complete than Roman law shows at this point. Decades later, the writing of a Frankish 
code included the principles that the nearest related (to Ego) would be first in line, according 
to the order seen in the parentela system, but presented thereafter a range of particular 
relatives to follow next. Still, the gradual principles were not directed towards the paternal 
line or male relatives only, as we find in Lombard and Burgundian law.  
The latter two gradual systems are not identical either, but focus primarily on a 
distribution formula in case there are several heirs of different sex or status. However, while 
they follow patrilineal principles, we do not learn, in either Burgundian or Lombard law, the 
preferred order of succession of relatives more remote than uncles. Their principles appear 
founded on the notion of the autonomy of the (male) head of family. We can say that an 
inheritance system in written law was adjusted to internal interests of the respective society, 
but with no less involvement from legislating authority. 
A discussion of inheritance rights often brings with it a survey of the rights of females 
to inherit, because daughters’ rights as compared with sons’ define much in the inheritance 
system as gradual, parentela, patrilineal and so on. There are mainly three ways in which a 
daughter would inherit. Either she inherited if she had no brothers, or a sister or sisters 
received a portion consisting of half of her brother(s) portion, or, sisters and brothers inherited 
equally from their fathers’ and/or mothers’ possessions. A diachronic survey of the Leges, 
display the tendency that women obtained more rights in a region’s later laws than were seen 
in the earliest written laws from each legal culture. Such development could be the result of 
an overall strengthening of women’s economic legal position, or it might have been that the 
legal system of inheritance or the combination of private property with an omnilateral 
understanding of kinship resulted in other regulations written into the law. Indications are that 
these changes were the result of influence from Roman law, or more likely, the Roman legal 







7. The Inheritance Systems and Principles in English Laws 
 
In the introduction, I argued that all societies’ laws must include regulation of inheritance to a 
certain degree. The English laws, included in this survey, do this to a very limited degree. 
Compared with the extant continental legal material, the early English laws are found wanting 
in terms of rules of inheritance. Moreover, the surviving legal material from the kingdoms of 
Kent, Wessex and – from the late-ninth century – the king of the English507, are much less 
equipped with regulations concerning family and marriage.508 In addition, the typical 
prohibitions on incest and stipulations of betrothal transfers are fewer than those found in the 
Germanic legislation.  
We could argue ex silentio, in relation to the legal sources, that a search for 
transmission from other laws would be futile, but that would be a premature conclusion. As 
will be clearer in chapter 11, on compensation for homicide, the early English laws and other 
non-English contemporary legal sources have a lot in common concerning their contents 
outside inheritance legislation. What is more, congruence of other kinds may emerge from the 
material. The sparse content of the English laws further provides an ideal opportunity to 
contrast the legal sources to better see the crucial factors behind the similarities. The earliest 
extant laws were dominated by the rights of the king and privileges of the Church. The 
content of the laws also seems to have affected modern research on pre-Norman English 
legislation, as opposed to both research on the source material and scholarly interest in 
English family and marriage from the twelfth century onward.509 Scholars’ focus has chiefly 
been on the power structures of early English society rather than on marriage strategies, 
concepts of family and distribution of wealth through inheritance systems, which have pre-
occupied historians of, for instance, Frankish and Nordic societies. It is nonetheless possible 
to deduce an image of the lawmakers’ view of Anglo-Saxon society from the laws, which is 
easier than deducing the same lawmaker’s concept of the default inheritance system. Other 
sources on family and inheritance between the Roman withdrawal in the fifth century and 
King Alfred’s reign (r. 871-899) are chronicles, wills and poems. From Bede to Beowulf, the 
                                                 
507 If we regard Alfred as ‘king of the English’, and Æthelstan as the first king of a (more unified) English 
kingdom. See Wormald, Making of English Law, p. 286. 
508 Lorraine Lancaster, ‘Kinship in Anglo-Saxon Society: II’, The British Journal of Sociology, 9, 4 (Dec 1958), 
359-77, (p. 360). 
509 Some examples of significance are James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); James A Brundage, Sex, Law and Marriage in the Middle Ages 
(Aldershot: Variorum, 1993); Frederik Pedersen, Marriage Disputes in Medieval England (London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2000). 
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‘Anglo-Saxon family’ can be pieced together.510 However, the task here is not to arrive at the 
most plausible inheritance system applied by members of the societies in the Heptarchy or 
England, but to survey the legislators’ ideas of existing or idealistic inheritance systems and 
possible transmissions of legal concepts of inheritance.511 Therefore, the scarcity of 
regulations concerning inheritance is more relevant than suggestions of the system that can be 
deduced from the surviving laws. The legislators’ ideas on kinship structures form an 
important basis for the further discussion of transmission of legal concepts between the legal 
families. The position of the authorities in society is also needed for analysis of the laws on 
compensation for homicide in the early English laws (of which there are plenty). A sketch 
will therefore be made of the kinship structure with an attempt to map out the inheritance 
situation.  
 
7.1 Inheritance in the earliest English legislation 
From the earliest phase of English legislation, the surviving Kentish laws make up most of 
our knowledge from the Heptarchs.512 The early medieval English legislation does not 
generally address inheritance or make any attempt to describe the inheritance system, unlike 
the lengthy explanations we saw in Frankish law. Maurizio Lupoi has asserted that, although 
there seems to have been a large degree of influence from the Continent, and particularly the 
Frankish legislation, in the Kentish laws, the structure and contents of it is much different.513 
It is different not only because of the use of the vernacular in the extant version, but also 
because of the focus on criminal law and the influences by the Church. The Church did not 
have a separate judicial system before the Norman Conquest in 1066, and higher clergy would 
have participated in the secular system, which makes it difficult to call it secular.514 As Lupoi 
admits, Bede stated that the laws of Æthelbert were created ‘iuxta exempla Romanorum’, 
‘inspired by the examples of the Romans’, although Lupoi interprets the phrase to refer to 
ecclesiastical influence in writing of the law.515 As the two spheres of ‘ecclesiastical’ and 
‘Roman’ became inseparable in the early Middle Ages, this conclusion is probably correct, 
                                                 
510 For instance, see Gies, Marriage and Family. 
511 Barbara Yorke, Kings and Kingdoms of Early Anglo-Saxon England, (London: Routledge, 2002). 
512 Apparently, Alfred based his laws on laws from the other Heptarchs. 
513 Lupoi, Origins, pp. 66-67. 
514 Lupoi, Origins, pp. 65-66. 
515 Bede, Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum, ed. by Charles Plummer, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: E 
typographeo Clarendoniano, 1896), no. ii.5; Bede, A History of the English Church and People 
(Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983 [1955]), p. 108; Lupoi, Origins, pp. 66. 
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although the men of the Church were vessels of the transmitted Roman-ness from earlier. 
Roman law in the shape of Leges Romanorum Visigothorum, for instance, was studied at 
Canterbury in the late-seventh century by later Abbot Aldhelm.516  
 There are hints that the system legislators assumed was in place is that of the 
parentela, with descendants inheriting, male and female collaterals together. Clues to this are 
found in the Kentish laws from 602-03, ascribed to King Æthelbert, which assume that 
children shared their father’s property between them (Ath.80). In the later Kentish laws of 
Hlothere and Eadric, a dead father’s relatives together with the mother were responsible for 
safeguarding a child’s inheritance until he came of age (Hl&E.6):  
  
Gif ceorl acwyle be libbendum wife 7 bearne, riht is Þæt hit, Þæt bearn, medder folgige ; 7 him 
mon an his fæderingmagum wilsumne berigean geselle, his feoh to heldenne, oÞ Þær he x 
wintra sie. 
 
If a man dies leaving a wife and child, it is right, that the child should accompany the mother, 
and one of his father’s relatives who is willing to act, shall be given him as his guardian to take 
care of his property, until he is ten years old.517 
 
In his translation, Attenbourough consistently interpreted the pronouns for the child as 
meaning a male child. We find a similar wording in a rule from the laws of the West Saxon 
king, Ine (688-694). In these laws, a condition was added with specified sums to rear the child 
(Ine.38). The sum would probably be taken out of the father’s property (Ine.38):  
 
Gif ceorl 7 his wif bearn hæbben gemæne, 7 fere se ceorl forð, hæbbe sio modor hire bearn 7 
fede : agife hire mon vi schill. to fostre, cu on sumera, oxan on wintra ; healden ða mægas one 
frumstol, oð ðæt hit gewintred sie.518  
 
If a ceorl has a child by his wife and the ceorl dies, the mother shall have her child and rear it, and six 
shillings shall be given for its maintenance – a cow in summer and an ox in winter. The relatives shall 
keep the high seat until the child is grown up.519 
                                                 
516 M.R. James, ‘Two Ancient English Scholars: St Aldhelm and William of Malmesbury’, David Murray 
Lecture (Glasgow, 1931), 14; Lupoi, Origins, pp.63 n. 104. 
517 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 18-19. Hlothere & Eadric §26 also specified the sum 
that should be provided for the rearing of a foundling. Attenborough’s translation.  
518 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 48. 
519 Translation is based on both Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 49, and Julie Mumby, 
‘Anglo-Saxon Inheritance’, http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/reference/essays/anglo-saxon-inheritance/ 




The expectation of the mother’s involvement fits descriptions found in other early medieval 
sources.520 Thomas Charles-Edwards reads primogeniture into the rule of Ine, and asserts that 
the eldest son would inherit his father’s land.521 It is understandable why Charles-Edwards 
makes this case, since the gender used in these sections was masculine: him, his, hit. 
However, the pronoun hit could signify neuter as well, and it is plausible that the scribes used 
neuter as a common denominator for both sons and daughters, or the masculine form as 
unmarked gender.522 Julie Mumby also warns against interpreting a male child in this rule 
based on the neutral bearn, and also points to the, admittedly much later, Custumal of Kent, 
giving the family farm to the youngest, by ultimogeniture.523 Quite possibly, there are 
differences between the Kentish legislation on inheritance, portrayed in the rule of Hlotere 
and Eadric, and the West Saxon legislation from Ine. Nevertheless, we should not exclude the 
possibility of legislators emphasising inheritance rights for male offspring, as the former rule 
did. The will of King Alfred includes bequests to his three daughters of landed property.524 
This could be used to prove the existence of female inheritance rights in Anglo-Saxon society, 
but the disproportionate larger bequests to his sons indicates only a favour to his daughters 
and certainly not equality between children. Lorraine Lancaster has demonstrated how 
daughters and their offspring appear as recipients in wills from the tenth and eleventh 
century.525 Wills could indicate that they did not inherit automatically, although the 
distribution in the wills might have been as much about which estate or valuable object was to 
be transferred to which child, as about the overturning of the default system. The inclusion of 
grandchildren by both sons and daughters in the wills is further evidence of principles of 
representation, and a tradition of thinking of kinship in bilateral terms and of inheritance as a 
parentela system. 
 Other information we can deduce from the sections above is that a mother did not 
inherit from her children if acknowledged by the father and paternal relatives existed. 
However, the wife of Ego would inherit from Ego directly, sharing a portion together with the 
children. According to the laws of King Æthelbert of Kent, the wife was given inheritance 
                                                 
520 Gies, Marriage and Family, p. 103. 
521 Thomas Charles-Edwards, ‘Kinship, Status and the Origins of the Hide’, Past & Present, 56, (1972), 3–33. 
522 For use of marked and unmarked gender in Old English, see Anne Curzan, Gender Shifts in the History of 
English (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 13-14, 70-73. 
523 Mumby, ‘Anglo-Saxon Inheritance’. 
524 EHD, no. 96. 
525 Lancaster, 'Kinship in Anglo-Saxon Society', pp. 363-65.  
145 
 
rights to as much as half of her husband’s property if offspring were produced (Ath.78). 
Compared with other western legislation, this is the greatest share a wife was entitled to 
according to secular law-making. But what can be read about the position of the relatives of 
Ego when the spouse was favoured in death? The Kentish laws show that a kind of brideprice 
was expected in a lawful marriage agreement (Ath.77).526 The woman would be guarded with 
mund, similar to the Lombard mundium and the term mundr found in the Nordic laws 
(Ath.75-76).527 Her own dotal property seems to remain with her, and would be transferred to 
her own father’s side accompanied with the morning gift in case of her dying childless 
(Ath.81). According to theories on family strategy, these traditions suggest that the father of 
the woman had expectations in their daughter’s offspring as their own heir.528 This is again 
evidence that legislators anticipated that daughters inherited together with sons. Moreover, the 
rights of the wife in terms of the husband’s property would follow the children also in 
divorce, in the way that she would have half his property if leaving with the children (Ath.79), 
and a children’s share if leaving without (Ath.80). This half would surely fall to descendants 
after her own death, although the laws do not address her remarrying and having other 
children.  
Much can be inferred from these sections. First of all, the wife had inheritance right 
together with the children, similar to Burgundian and Visigothic law. Second, the inheritance 
system as it was understood by legislators in Kent and later Wessex followed cognatic lineage 
rather than cognatic kinship groups, and patrilineal tendencies can be seen in inheritance 
rights. A woman’s inheritance would pass down her father’s line primarily. Thirdly, the 
passing to the nonspecific magas – relatives – and unspecified degrees of relations could 
again suggest that the parentela system was perceived by legislators to be a common norm, 
but with the wife – as the children’s mother – included. If this interpretation is right, we have 
an inheritance system with parentela principles in the first parentela including the wife, and 
with patrilineal principles further out. The laws do not give any specific indications of 
principles of primogeniture, ultimogeniture, or other priorities among the heirs of the body. 
 
                                                 
526 See further the discussions on brideprice in Goody, Development of Family and Marriage, pp. 241-42; 
Hughes, ‘From Brideprice to Dowry’, p. 267; and Dübeck, Kvinder, familie og formue, p. 67. 
527 See, for instance, Rothair’s Edict Rot 160-161 and 182, and the Gulathing Law, G.25 and G.51, NgL I, pp. 17 
and 27. See the etymology of mund in the meaning of ‘protection’ in Pons-Sanz, Norse-derived Vocabulary, pp. 
148-49, 243 n.‡. 
528 Jack Goody, ‘Inheritance, Property and Women: Some Comparative Considerations’, in, Family and 
Inheritance: Rural Society in Western Europe, 1200 1800, ed. by Jack Goody, Joan Thirsk and E. P. Thompson 




Figure 9: A possible interpretation of the inheritance system in early English law 
 
The laws on compensation indicate that the legislators described a kinship structure 
based on bilateral principles. I will return to these laws in a later chapter, but some points can 
be made regarding transmission of inheritance laws. In the laws of eighth- and ninth-century 
Wessex, we find that the lawmakers distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate heirs, 
suggesting reception of the Christian concept of legitimacy, or the Roman concept of 
legitimacy, possibly an influence through the medium of Christian ideology. According to 
Bede and other Christian scribes, the sanctity of marriage was tied to the provision of 
legitimate offspring.529 The laws from Wessex introduced the concept of the illegitimate 
child. According to Ine, the father who disowned such a child should not have its wergild if it 
were killed (Ine.27). A later rule of Alfred deprived instead the mother’s side of rights, 
although this specific rule, Alf.8.3, makes reference to the illegitimate child of a fallen nun. 
The same rule deprived the mother’s side of compensation and inheritance from the father of 
the child. Given the specific circumstances of a nun bearing an illegitimate child, we should 
assume that this was an exception to the norm, the norm being that the mother’s side shared in 
inheritance as in the compensation. Conversely, the division of compensation following the 
death of legitimate children might have followed bilateral principles, with both the matrilineal 
and patrilineal line sharing in it. The same ideas probably applied to the inheritance system.  
                                                 
529 Gies, Marriage and Family, pp. 104-05. 
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 To return to the question of the inheritance right of the spouse versus relatives, the 
marriage laws of Æthelbert give further clues as to the position of the wife. Adultery by the 
wife would be settled with the intruding man gaining a new wife for the husband with ‘his 
own money’, possibly meaning that he provided the dos, in addition to paying wergild to the 
husband (Ath.31). Only the compensation from the wife’s lover was specified, and what 
happened to the adulterous wife was not mentioned. Frances and Joseph Gies have interpreted 
this as a generally pragmatic view on marriage, adultery and divorce in English societies. 
They believe that the attitude towards divorce could be compared with that of the Romans and 
Merovingians, and that adultery ‘was treated in the same non-judgmental spirit’.530 It seems 
reasonable to assume that the legislators had no problem with the dissolution of marriage, 
regardless of the Church’s teachings. However, in my view, it is difficult to interpret the laws 
of Æthelbert in any way as ‘non-judgmental’ towards the adultery of the wife. Although a 
wife could leave her husband, taking the children and half his property, adultery was graver 
than divorce. A more plausible interpretation is that in the eyes of the legislator, the husband 
could be violent with her, and possibly kill her, unpunished, in much the same manner as in 
both Roman and Merovingian legislation together with most normative material from the old 
testament to laws from the eighteenth century .531 Her lover still had to pay the compensation 
and find a new wife, and this settlement in itself was the same as for the grave crimes, like 
homicide.532 We do not learn whether the wife also lost the property she brought to the 
marriage, but an interesting point is that neither she nor her family was held responsible 
according to the law, only her lover. This could suggest that the wife’s family had no 
responsibility and thus no rights to her property by inheritance, or one could argue that 
adultery were non-compensational for her, and looked upon as very grave by secular 
legislators. This particular rule can be placed together with regulations from the later West 
Saxon king Alfred (r. 871-899) concerning how a man was permitted to fight another man he 
found with his four closest-related women: wife, daughter, sister and mother (Alf-42.7, see 
chapter 7.3). He could do this without fear of vengeance, or rather, it was his full right. 
Neither did Alfred reveal what should become of the adulterous women, but fighting her lover 
would suggest that adultery was considered a serious breach of domestic peace and violation 
                                                 
530 Gies, Marriage and Family, pp. 108-09. 
531 Deut. 22:20-23. In the Digesta, adultery was one of the few accepted grounds for immediate vengeance: 
D.48.5.21-22, D.48.5.25-26, D.48.8.3.5. See for instance Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde, Speculum legale – rettsspegeln, 
(Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2005), p. 62. 
532 See chapter 11. 
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of the rights of a husband. The evidence still indicate that the wife was one of the heirs of 
Ego. 
 
Legislation from Alfred to Cnut 
 
After the subjugation of the south in the 870s, Alfred’s laws were applicable to societies of 
the other kingdoms and implemented by later rulers.533 There seems to be a change of 
structure in the legislation of the English kings from the tenth century onwards. A common 
legal system was established, and King Edward’s laws I&II are what Attenborough has 
described as ‘more coherent and logical in form’ than the previous centuries’ legislation.534 
Neither of these contains particular family law, but they do contain peace regulations. In the 
laws of Edward, we are given several references to Domboc, which Libermann regards as the 
laws of Ine and Alfred, a view that is accepted by Attenborough and Wormald.535 In the 
preamble to I Edward, the reeves are commanded to judge justly and ‘hit on ðære dombec 
stande’, ‘based on the lawbook’ (I Edw.preamble). Hence, Edward relies on earlier legislation 
and, if Liebermann is right, on the West Saxon law codes.  
 The laws of Cnut are also found wanting in family law. Incest would be punished by 
compensation according to degree of kinship, with wergild or a fine or with all owned 
property (II Cn.51).536 They do not specify to whom but it is presumably the king. The 
husband might have claim to the wife’s property if she died first, as he would be entitled to 
her whole property because of her adultery, whereas the wife would lose her ears and nose (II 
Cn.53). The crackdown on women’s conduct might possibly result from an ideological 
change towards patrilineal principles in Europe.537 
 The Anglo-Saxon laws do not reveal the legislators’ ideas on topics we found 
specified in the continental legislation, such as representation, number of degrees or mode of 
counting. The few rules describing kinship structures take the organisation for granted, or 
possibly the organisation varied from family to family. We can assume that the approach to 
inheritance via kinship structure was flexible. Mumby argues that flexible practices made it 
                                                 
533 Wormald, Making of English Law, pp. 480-81. 
534 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 112. 
535 Liebermann III, p. 92; Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 204 n. preamble, 205 n. 5.2; 
Wormald, Making of English Law, pp. 479-81. 
536 The vernacular uses versions of ‘ealre æhte’, whereas Quadripartitus uses ‘omni pecunia’, and Constitus 
Canuti prescribe ‘totam substanciam’. 
537 Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom and sosiale strategier’. 
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possible to pass landed property over the generations through sons.538 If we follow her 
interpretation, each family would make strategic decisions regarding their property according 
to a desired outcome. If this were the case, the strategies would not leave a dominant trace in 
the legislation from AD 600 to AD 1000.  
 In the continental laws, the legislators assume, for the most part, that heirs, or at least 
the male heirs, shared the property equally. In the early English laws, we only find 
descriptions of cases with one child, which have led to discussion of prioritisation of children. 
Ultimogeniture is found in the much later period, known from thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century sources, as was the case in the Custumal of Kent: several boroughs claimed the 
system of inheritance rights of the last-born son.539 There is reason to believe that the 
postponement of daughters in inheritance was a post-Conquest principle, connected to feudal 
ownership strategies. The principles of ultimogeniture from the borough customs only applied 
to the English part of the population. It is made clear in the case of Nottingham that the 
French, who mainly constituted the nobility, the administration and other authorities, would 
pass their inheritance to the oldest son, by primogeniture.540 Now, to make the last-born son 
the sole heir has several advantages: the elder sons must find profession, get married and 
move out. When the father dies, the mother would probably run the household for a while, 
since the youngest son quite possibly would be a minor. His sisters would also be married off 
before his succession. And neatly, the estate is sorted and ready when it is time for the heir to 
take the place of his father. On the other hand, agnatic seniority, with succession of the oldest 
brother instead of the deceased’s own children, would unite the property in fewer hands again 
and avoid partitioning of land and valuables. 
 
7.2 Bookland and folkland 
Having outlined the general system of inheritance and principles in the English sources, a 
particular principle relevant in the case of inheritance should be discussed regarding 
transmission of law: land ownership and the legal terms of bookland and folkland. As with 
terra salica, the debate on the nature of these concepts has been extensive. Baxter and Blair 
argued ‘bookland has assumed a disproportional significance in the literature’ on 
                                                 
538 Mumby, ‘Anglo-Saxon Inheritance’. 
539 See Mary Bateson, Borough Customs. vols 1-2 (London: B. Quaritch, 1904-1906). Records of Nottingham 
i.175-iii.406, Waterford enpartira (Dublin version), Godmanchester (?), Shrewsbury: Court Roll, No 755, 
Bateson, vol 1, pp. 130-32. 
540 Records of Nottingham i.189, Bateson, vol 1, pp. 130-32. 
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landownership.541 There were distinctions between the two, the basic interpretation being that 
bookland was land that had been granted by royal permission in writing (in a book), and 
folkland was all other land.542 More complex are the distinctions between privileges of 
ownership in each type at a given time, and the discussions thereon. Although many charters 
deal with folkland and bookland, the terms rarely emerge in the laws. When they do, however, 
it is with an obviousness that suggests the concepts were familiar to both legislator and 
subjects. As with terra salica, terra sortis and allodial land, these two types of land ownership 
resulted in differential treatment with regard to the inheritance rights of such land. 
Alfred’s provision stated that those in possession of bocland, handed over from 
kinsmen, were not permitted to alienate the land unless it was approved by those relatives 
who first had required the land or those who had left it to them (Alf.41). In other words, 
bookland inherited from kin could not be alienated without permission from the relevant 
kinsmen. In Edward’s law, we find references to boclande and folclande as two distinct types 
of landholding and the different rights connected with them. The section I Edw.2 concerns 
those who withheld another’s rights in bookland or in folkland. Infringement of rights in 
either type of landholding demanded public reparation, with fines of thirty shillings payable to 
the king for each lost opportunity to do right (I Edw.2.1). In Æthelstan’s laws of London, the 
holder of bookland would be entitled to a cut of a thief’s confiscated property if the thief was 
a tenant on his land – ‘Gif hit bocland sy’ (VI.As.1.1). The thief himself should be executed, 
his property would compensate the stolen goods, and the landowner would acquire one-sixth 
of the remainer of his property, shared with his widow (one-third), the king (one-third) and 
the associates of the vicim (one-sixth).543 Associates here could mean the victim’s 
community, guild or companions in the town of London. In the ecclesiastical laws of Edgard 
from around 960, the owner of bookland is assumed to be a thegn. The owner – a thegn – 
would pay a third of the tithes to a church on his land if it had a graveyard (II Edg.2). The 
mode of landholding was apparently linked to the king’s administrative apparatus, although 
the nature of it was permanent and not tenure. As Stephen Baxter and John Blair put it, all 
                                                 
541 Steven Baxter and John Blair, ‘A Model of Land Tenure and Royal Patronage in Late Anglo-Saxon England’, 
Anglo-Norman Studies: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2005, 28 (2006), 19-29 (pp. 20-21). 
542 Baxter and Blair, ‘A Model of Land Tenure’ p. 19. 
543 Liebermann came to this conclusion, Liebermann III, p. 117 n.10. The rule does not reveal the percentage of 
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with the associates’, translation by Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, 157. See also Hudson, 
Laws of England, p. 192. 
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bookland originally given as royal grants, but all royal grants were not bookland.544 The 
distinctions in landownership relating to royal grants of course bring elements of feudal tenure 
into the discussion, and a third term used in the sources on land holding is lænland. However, 
the term does not define the nature of the two concepts because it seems that both bookland 
and folkland could be lænland.545 Therefore, some have suggested that bookland was 
perpetual tenure. 
In the laws of Æthelred, the king had a claim to fines imposed on those possessing 
bookland (I.Atr.1.14). Cnut had deserters sentenced to death and their property forfeited (II 
Cn.77); they also had to surrender bookland, if owned, to the king (II.Cn.77.1). Liebermann 
used the term ‘Grundeigen besitzen’, property owner, in Atr.1.14, and ‘urkundlich 
Grundbesitz’, documented property owner, in Alf.41.546 His interpretation relates only to land 
ownership recorded in writing. In 1893, Vinogradoff opposed the prevailing view that 
folkland represented common land, and instead proposed that it was land held within kinship 
groups and held by custom within the family as ‘folk-right’.547 Maitland shared this opinion, 
and asserted that ‘[i]n all probability, the folk-law of this early period knows no such thing as 
testamentary power. Testamentary power can only be created by the words of a book, by an 
anathema’.548 Folkland relied on folk-law, which, according to Maitland, was the opposite of 
privileges given ‘in books’. According to this interpretation, folkland was held in the family 
by custom and right, protected from royal interference, whereas bookland was given by 
privileges and therefore subject to obligations. Leo Wiener, who asserted that a lot of English 
terminology were borrowings that are hard to identify because of translations into the 
vernacular (and therefrom into Latin in the later Quadripartitus) held bocland to be a direct 
Anglo-Saxon translation of ‘hereditas allegata’, ‘property recorded in a book’.549 This 
interpretation defines bookland instead as land held within the kin group, and protected from 
sale or confiscation by the king. This view was also shared by Eric John, who argued even 
more strongly that folkland was controlled by authorities in such a manner that it could be 
                                                 
544 Baxter and Blair, ‘A Model of Land Tenure’, p. 27. 
545 Baxter and Blair, ‘A Model of Land Tenure’, p. 20. 
546 Liebermann I, p. 75. See also Liebermann II, 1, p. 26.  
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withdrawn from the holder, like tenure, whereas, on the other hand, bookland would be 
handed down as inheritance to kin as ‘permanent tenure’.550 In the legislation on desertion, 
Cnut inserted a specific section on forfeiting even bookland, which implies it would in all 
other aspects be protected for the heirs, i.e., it should be passed on in the family no matter 
what the circumstances of the possessor. Bookland would be kept within the family as 
patrimony. This view has been expressed by Patrick Wormald, who claims bookland was 
given by charter but with permanent ownership that included rights of disposal by will.551 
This explanation is supported by Baxter and Blair, who claim that folkland and bookland were 
distinguished by two vital facts: bookland was given by royal diploma in perpetuity and could 
be alienated at will, and folkland was simply unrecorded land, which royals could lay claim to 
and possessors held in normal ownership but with normal obligations and inheritance 
principles.552  
The relevant question, then, is how these types of landownership fitted into the 
legislator’s idea of inheritance principles. If folkland would automatically be passed on as 
inheritance, a kinsmen’s claim to it was indisputable. The crucial thing about bookland, then, 
was that it could be sold or given away from the family without royal sanction. If bookland 
was held independently and without obligations, it was much more desirable. Although it 
seems the right of alienation was continuous, this advantageous type of landholding would 
more often be given to heirs. By custom it became part of the anticipated inheritance, as 
evidenced in the laws of Alfred (above). The division has many of the same features as that of 
Lombard and Burgundian royal land. It rather shows a need for defining the status of land and 
the importance of securing land both as inheritance and for the state. 
 As Wiener pointed out, the possible transmission of the concept of registration of 
landownership could be transmission from the continental practices of ‘hereditas allegata’. 
The translation in Quadripartitus is ‘terra testimentalis’ in Æthelstan (As.1.1), ‘Liberas terras’ 
in Æthelred, and ‘terra hereditas’ in Alfred and II Cnut, and ‘feode’ in II Edgar (IIEdg.2). The 
different translations, by apparently the same hand, have been explained by Wormald as 
‘embarrassing inconsistency’.553 He suggests that the conflicting translations of bocland into 
Latin are reflected in the contradictory scholarly discussion of the term.  
                                                 
550 Eric John, Land Tenure in Early England, (Leicester: University Press, 1960), p. 39. 
551 Patrick Wormald, ‘On þa wæpnedhealfe: Kingship and Royal Property from Æthelwulf to Edward the Elder’, 
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552 Baxter and Blair, ‘A Model of Land Tenure’, pp. 19-29. For instance, tax, maintenance of commons, road-
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553 Wormald, Making of English Law, pp. 99-100. 
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If we look at the legislation in the light of inheritance systems, and of continental 
solutions to land tenure and patrimony, the heir would probably be in the patrilineal line. The 
legislators of Alfred’s and of Edward’s law thus seem to be of the view that land should be 
passed on through the male line, although we cannot know for certain if this was the case if 
the closest heir was female, for instance if the deceased only had daughters.  
 
Conclusion: English inheritance laws 
The lack of inheritance regulation in the laws of early English kings implies that customary 
laws were sufficient for legislators when creating written law. However, this was not the case 
for Germanic legislators, who also tried the novelty of law-making. Nevertheless, the little 
information we have about the early English laws and law-making provides a patchy image of 
an inheritance system based on combined principles of both patrilineage and bilaterality. As 
in Frankish laws, the inheritance system appears to be a modified parentela system with 
descendants sharing equally. In the more remote degrees of kinship, the paternal kin group 
apparently had primacy when inheriting from a man. Simultaneously, a woman’s relatives 
would have claims to her property if she had no children. A wife’s inheritance appears as the 
vital feature to control in the early laws. A wife was entitled to inherit a share of her 
husband’s estate, like in the continental codes. Another aspect of the English laws that relates 
to the Frankish laws fairly accurately is the division of status of landownership. The separate 
rights connected to bookland and folkland could relate to the salic land and the allodial land 
in Frankish law, respectively. The concept of such a divide may have transferred from the 
Continent together with the Latin terminology for landed property. Although we can detect 
these features in both Salic laws and Anglo-Saxon laws, it is not evidence of transmission 
from the Continent, or vice versa. Rather, we should view them as common concepts of 
inheritance distribution, where the inheritance principles reflect reception of concepts and 
values rather than transmission of written law. For this reason, there are only a few traces of 
transmission from non-English written laws, as Roman or Germanic laws, even if we knew 
these were known in the Anglo-Saxon courts.  
 If we assess these conclusions with regard to the hierarchy of probability, the probable 
transmission still appears on the second level, with similarity in content, concepts and 
motivation. The content of the early English laws synchronise on a few topics, such as lacking 
detailed descriptions of distribution of inheritance to more remote relatives, but rather, as the 
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Burgundian and Lombard laws, leaving the distribution open to follow a prevailing kinship 
structure. English laws also follow Germanic laws in content by including a division of status 
in landed property, although neither the denomination nor the division is exactly the same. In 
concepts, the English laws include the use of the concept and terminology of mund for caring 
for women and children. Regarding motivation, English laws, both Kentish and West Saxon, 
show traces of transmission from Roman and canon ideology through influenced, and 
influencing, high-ranking clergy, who were learned in Roman law and involved in the process 
of legislation. Internally, the picture is clearer. The successive legislators outspokenly reissue 
their predecessors’ law, and in both Kent and Wessex the legislators reveal a dependence on 
earlier laws. Later legislators also refer to earlier legislation, and thus the little we find on 
family legislation was copied or revised. A question emerges as to why the legislating kings 
did not find it necessary to regulate inheritance, incest or marriage in more detail, as other 
secular legislators did. Probably, the kinship structure and inheritance system was flexible, 






8. The Inheritance Systems and Principles in the Scandinavian 
Laws 
 
The direction of development in the Nordic laws – from which system towards what – has 
been the subject of discussion among modern scholars.554 The longstanding view was that the 
prevailing principles before the laws were put into writing were those with a strong patrilineal 
element, and that the earliest laws reveal a legal culture in transition towards a bilateral 
system of inheritance. In the debates in the 1980s and 1990s, this view was contested. Some 
scholars suggested that the provincial laws were sources indicating or suggesting an opposite 
development, from cognatic kinship principles towards domination of patrilineal principles in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries.555 This would follow the European development, albeit 
delayed. The change to cognatic inheritance principles seen in the later Nordic laws would be 
another turnaround, in line with European legal standards.556  
 The particularities of the Nordic inheritance principles have been thoroughly covered 
by Helle Vogt’s studies of kinship models in Scandinavia.557 Vogt has shown, above all, the 
relative speed with which the Nordic laws became up to date on the regulations of the Fourth 
Lateran Council, where the limitations on incest prohibitions were reduced from seven 
canonical degrees to four.558 Her outlines of the course of inheritance distribution and 
comparisons of the provincial codes in this respect give a clear and sufficient picture of the 
Nordic legislation on inheritance. I will nevertheless map out the main principles of the 
inheritance systems in the following. The reasons for doing so are that, to a large degree, Vogt 
seeks to enlighten what lies in her title; the function of kinship, and how it manifests itself 
through canon law society. Further, she understands the development to a large degree as 
influences from the contemporary canonical teachings. Here, the focal point is to assess also 
possible secular influences and to discuss the motives of the legislators in the process of 
developing written inheritance laws. Therefore, the inheritance principles will be reviewed. 
                                                 
554 See Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og sosiale strategier’, pp. 118-45 for a summary of the main debate among 
Nordic scholars. 
555 Christer Winberg, Grenverket: Studier rörande jord, släktskapssystem och ståndsprivilegier (Stockholm: 
Institutet for rättshistorisk forskning, 1985), p. 27; Sawyer, Kvinner och familj, pp. 59; Hansen, ‘Slektskap, 
eiendom og sosiale strategier’, pp. 112-15.  
556 Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og sosiale strategier’, p. 137; Knut Helle, Gulatinget og Gulatingslova 
(Leikanger: Skald, 2001), p. 137. 
557 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon; Vogt, Function of Kinship. 
558 Vogt, ‘Slægtens funksjon’, p. 205.  
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 In chapter 1, I mentioned what has been called a division in the Nordic inheritance 
laws into roughly eastern- and western parts. The division into east and west represent more 
areas of legal reasoning than actual compass points. East covers the laws of Denmark and 
eastern Sweden; west is constituted by laws of Norway, Iceland, and the western Swedish 
provinces, but also the province of eastern Gothland and the isle of Gotland.559 Historians 
Elsa Sjöholm, Birgit Sawyer and Lars Ivar Hansen has have pointed to this break in the 
otherwise corresponding provincial laws.560 The division is found in distribution of 
inheritance by the parentela system in the eastern Nordic laws, and the gradual system in the 
western Nordic laws. The parentela system, which first followed one stock of descendants 
until the line was exhausted before moving on to the next, was found in the Danish and 
eastern Swedish laws. The gradual system, which graded inheritors according to distance to 
the deceased, agnatic or cognatic lineage and gender, dominated the western Swedish, the 
Norwegian and the Icelandic laws.  
 Further, the Norwegian principles of inheritance have been studied somewhat in 
isolation because they stand out in some respects compared with other Nordic (and European) 
legal sources. The very detailed inheritance prescriptions and attention to the kin group in 
both the provincial laws and later Code of the Realm seem reactionary in the vigorous law-
making in the latter half of the twelfth century and from 1260 to 1320. Earlier scholarship has 
perceived the Norwegian laws as inbred and out of line with European contemporary 
standards, a view that has been rejected in the last decades.561 The disorderly differences in 
the Swedish provinces also cry out for particular attention. So does the – in a European 
context – very late emergence of written law in Sweden. The Swedish provincial laws 
emerged in writing between the late-thirteenth century and a point a little past occurrence of 
the Black Death in Sweden. It would be anachronistic to assume a unified state administration 
in the kingdom of Sweden at this point, but since many of the provincial laws had royal 
sanction and show high congruence in content and form, it is peculiar that the two different 
inheritance systems coexisted between the landscapes. The coexistence is evidence that it was 
the þing, the provincial assembly, rather than the king who formed the law in the Swedish 
provinces. Subsequently the influences on the thingmen would result in transmission of law, 
and it would be through filtration in the provincial assembly that secular law was adapted to 
                                                 
559 Sjöholm, Sveriges medeltidslagar, pp. 124-25. 
560 Sjöholm, Sveriges medeltidslagar, pp. 120-25; Sawyer, Kvinner och familj; Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og 
sosiale strategier’, pp. 119-27. 
561 Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og sosiale strategier’; Sunde, ’Internasjonaliseringa av retten’, pp. 54-71. 
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local legal culture. Even so, the king had an opportunity to put a rubber stamp on the 
provincial laws through royal sanction. The written Danish laws, although hard to date 
precisely, possibly originate from the late twelfth century.562 The close Danish contact with 
continental Europe and the tidiness of the inheritance system gives them a civil flare lacking 
in the northern Scandinavian laws. Scholars have suggested that changes in the Swedish and 
Norwegian laws, particularly with regard to a daughter’s inheritance portion, were 
transmissions due to Danish influences.563 Though it is justifiable to view the Nordic region 
as a single legal culture with congruent norms, it is of interest to examine these differences in 
the written normative sources. 
 Another difference between the law books is the connection made between marriage 
laws and inheritance laws. The Swedish provincial laws in particular have inserted marriage 
legislation in the section on inheritance. In the introduction of the law of Uppland and the 
Vestmanna Law, the matter was explained:  
 
The inheritance section starts with marriage, for always one comes from two, man from man, one after 
the other. Never came two together that should not be separated eventually; one passes and the other 
lives on. With the offspring of man and wife, all inheritance begins.564  
 
It presents poetic reasoning, but also a powerful indication that lawful marriage now had 
become a premise for inheritance rights of children. As we shall see, the Nordic countries that 
were Christianised as some of the last regions in Europe would emphasise the legitimacy of 
the heir more strongly than other legal cultures. Helle Vogt has also pointed to the stressing of 
legitimacy in the Norwegian material and questions why, on the other hand, the Norwegian 
provincial laws do not knit law on dowry to the inheritance sections.565 Norway was 
Christianised in the early eleventh century. Christianity had had a footing in the region prior 
to this, but not a structural organisation. Christianity was widely introduced by the anglicised 
war kings Olav Tryggvasson and Olav Haraldsson (later St Olav). Priests, church ornaments, 
the Bible and canon law were brought to Norway from England.566 The provincial Gulathing 
                                                 
562 Fenger, Gammeldansk ret, p. 94; Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 64-65. 
563 Taranger, Magnus Lagabøters Landslov, p. 82; Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 164-65. 
564 UL.Ä.1, V.Ä.opening. My translation from the modern Swedish in Holmbäck and Wessén, Svenska 
Landskapslagar I, p. 63. 
565 Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 172-74. 
566 Absalon Taranger, Den angelsaksiske kirkes indflytelse paa den norske (Kristiania: Den norske historiske 
forening, 1890), pp. 203-216, 296-335, 372-395; Torgeir Landro have modified the view that Norwegian 
Christian laws were influenced by Anglo-Saxon laws: Torgeir Landro, ‘Kristenrett og kyrkjerett, 
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Law refers to a law given by St Olav himself early in his reign.567 Although this may be a 
myth, later legislators or revisers of the law would respect the laws of the saint.  
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the reality of family life often involved 
more complex family situations than a merely legally married couple and its legitimate 
offspring. Second or more marriages, several broods and children born out of wedlock would 
play a role in the distribution of property in inheritance. The Scandinavian laws deal with 
these problems more than the other sources. While the Norwegian laws have detailed 
descriptions of how illegitimate children or other family members could come into inheritance 
(or rather not come into inheritance), the Swedish legislation on inheritance can be said to 
contain a certain focus on the different offspring of separate wives.568  
 While we know that from the thirteenth century the Scandinavian kings tried to control 
the legislation process, the genesis of Scandinavian provincial laws is obscure when it comes 
to agent and legislator. Thus, the origins of law could be both from local customs and later 
royal policy, from the formative phase of royal power, and onward. This point is important 
when it comes to inheritance legislation, because it gives rise to the question of what or who 
created the norms. Was it the tradition of the kin groups or transmission from secular 
authority? Was the development caused by change in concepts of kin or due to the 
transmission of European legal cultures and/or canonical teachings? 
 
8.1 Danish provincial laws 
As Helle Vogt has stated, the principle of prioritising descendants prevailed in all the Danish 
provincial laws.569 The laws listed the order of inheritance rights in what we have termed the 
parentela system. In the assumed oldest written law, formed around 1200, The Book of 
Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes (A&O), terminology was inserted prescribing 
that inheritance should, first of all, go forward, meaning down through the parentela to the 
descendants (A&O.1.13, SL.34). The provisions for controlling backwards inheritance were 
immediately put into law. 
 The provincial laws show a large degree of internal dependence, where the later ones, 
the Law of Jutland (JL) and Eirik’s Law of Zealand (EsL) from the 1240s, closely follow the 
                                                 
borgartingskristenretten i eit komparativt perspektiv’, unpublished doctoral thesis University of Bergen, 2010. 
For comments on general influence from English culture, see also Sawyer, ‘English influence’, p. 225.  
567 Knut Helle, Gulatinget og Gulatingslova (Leikanger: Skald, 2001), pp. 18, 177. 
568 For instance, see HL.Ä.12 and UL.Ä.13. 
569 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, p. 204. 
159 
 
contents, structure and to some degree wording of the Law of Scania (SL) and The Book of 
Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes, stemming from the late-twelfth century.570 
There are still numerous differences in their separate rules on inheritance, revealing a legal 
work conscious of the shifting legal ideals of the time, both those of the Church and of secular 
society.571 The impact on the making of the Danish laws by known men of the Church is 
acknowledged: the work of Bishop Anders Sunesen and Bishop Absalon on the Law of 
Scania, at least.572 Generally though, a substantial transmission of law took place between the 
Danish landscapes, and within the Danish legal culture.573 Rules regarding inheritance are 
found in book I of Eirik’s Law of Zealand and The Law of Jutland, and they share the same 
contents and much of the same structure. The assumed earliest law, The Book of Inheritance 
and Non-Compensational Crimes, also contains many of the same rules and contents in book 
I, albeit with slightly more detectable differences. The Law of Jutland follows the Law of 
Scania almost verbatim, but with several important variations in the rules. These differences 
are of course of major interest when studying the development in inheritance regulation in the 
Danish legal culture. However, regarding transmission of law, it is sufficient to point out that 
there was a major interdependence between the law texts.  
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Figure 10: The parentela system after the Danish provincial laws. Notice that the sisters of Ego would also receive half 
the portion of the brother. In the Law of Jutland, this principle applied to all female relatives. 
 
 Outside the default system, Danish law operated with a system called fællig (A&O.1.7 
and 15), which was joint ownership within a defined group of usually the closest family.574 
The default inheritance system, however, operated with a straight parentela system, dividing 
the property of Ego between collaterals, descendants before ascendants. The property of the 
deceased was divided in shares or lots (loth) according to the number and nature of the heirs, 
which can be seen as similar to the Roman division per capita. However, the inheritance 
among children would be divided in lots according to a method other than the Roman 
principle of total equality. There was an important principle in the system of division whereby 
the inheritance was divided into lots between sons and daughters: daughters would get half 
the lot of a son (A&O.1.1, VmSk.1.1, SL.22 JL.1.4). The fraction was in the ratio 2:1, son to 
daughter. When there was one son and one daughter, the son would get two-thirds and the 
daughter one-third. If there were several children, then the estate was supposed to be divided 
accordingly, so that sons would get one full lot each and the daughters one-half. 
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Children of Ego were nevertheless first in line, and the principle of representation 
made certain that eventual grandchildren or great-grandchildren were next in line to inherit, 
before those of the second parentela, parents or siblings and their children (A&O.12, SL.33-
35). The succession in the Law of Scania was also true to the parentela system, with 
grandparents on both sides, followed by cognatic aunts and uncles (SL.36).  
 Inheritance was counted to the seventh degree according to the earliest laws, The Book 
of Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes (A&O). In later editions of provincial laws, 
the law of Scania and the Law of Zealand (VsL.1.20), inheritance was limited to four degrees 
of kinship. This reveals an adaptation of the current legal ideology of the time, stemming from 
the Fourth Lateran council. However, the law of Jutland operated with seven degrees from its 
1241 version (JL.1.23). Similar to the Norwegian Gulathing law, the legal elite seem to have 
kept the original number of degrees in the revisions made after the Fourth Lateran council. 
This could be due to an idea of the sanctity of the law, which is unlikely given the willingness 
among the Danish legal elite to absorb changes in international trends, or due to lack of 
knowledge or a lack of concentration by those copying earlier law into the Law of Jutland. 
The Book of Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes and Valdemar’s Law of 
Zealand gave slight priority to the patrilineal kin by giving the father’s relatives a priority in 
the third parentela. It is significant that these two are the earliest Danish provincial laws. But 
what does this tell us? Probably that patrilineal principles were prevailing in the twelfth 
century, and that this later turned to equal rights of both maternal and paternal lines, and that 
the Danish laws changed towards more balanced parentela principles in the formative phase. 
Michael Gelting finds it likely that Danish provinces followed an inheritance system of 
gradual principles before the laws were set down in writing.575 He also points to what he 
believes is the exact time when female inheritance was introduced to the Danes, the 1170s 
with the legislation of Valdemar I. Vogt asserts that, ‘[t]he laws give the distinct impression 
that the inheritance law was under discussion when the provincial laws were being 
recorded’.576 The Danish provincial laws nevertheless all include the feature of lots and half-
lots. The rules describing the system of lots still do not appear as direct copies of each other, 
which suggests that the institution of dividing inheritance into full- and half-lots was an 
integrated part of the legal culture and written down independently. Even if the views of how 
far back in time to stretch the segregation of the sexes were debated, the system was 
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apparently accepted. The institution may initially have been a transmission from other laws, 
but it was a non-controversial part of the inheritance system at the time it was put into writing 
for the different landscapes.  
Vogt argues that the ideology of letting both sexes inherit was established through the 
influence of canonical teaching.577 She has nevertheless pointed to possible earlier sources of 
secular influence on the particular distribution of half-lots to daughters578: Novella 118, where 
descendants were given preference and the equality between sons and daughters was 
emphasised, or, more certainly known in Denmark, the Insitutiones of Justinian (I.3.1), and 
include the above-mentioned Lombard king Rothair’s Edict 159, which stipulated the ratio 
between legitimate daughters and illegitimate sons. We could also point to Lombard laws 
stipulated ratio between legitimate and illegitimate son’s, which was also 2:1 (Rot.154) and 
Liutprand’s ratio between sons and daughters which was 3:1 (Liu.102.VI), together with the 
general wrestling with similar problems in Burgundian and Salic laws, as discussed earlier. 
The continental admission of rights to daughters may well have been the source of influence 
on Danish legal culture. Moreover, the shift towards bilateral principles within Norwegian 
legislation, explained below, represents a change in the same direction. Where the earlier laws 
displayed a view of society and kin as patrilineal, later legislators introduced rights for women 
to inherit. The change happened through influence and pressure from current European legal 
thought. We can argue for a transmission of legal ideas, more than transmission of law. My 
point is that the Danish model of giving a daughter half the lot of a man compares with the 
earlier European model of giving daughters a share of the inheritance. Burgundian law 
permitted a daughter a share of one-third of her father’s property if she took the veil; Lombard 
law permitted a daughter a third of her brother’s share. The half-lot means that if there was 
one daughter and one son sharing the inheritance, then she received one-third by law, and he 
received two-thirds, not very different from the division found in early medieval secular law. 
There is still a problem with this conclusion: the Danish inheritance laws otherwise follow a 
strict parentela system, which cannot be said of Burgundian or Lombard law. Other 
contemporary secular law, such as the Visigothic and Frankish law, follow a parentela system 
to a large degree, at least within the closest family within the first parentela. These inheritance 
regulations were based on an equal division between children, regardless of gender. 
Nevertheless, we remember that the laws of the Visigoths and the Franks also included other 
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kinds of regulations mildly favouring male heirs or the paternal side. The Danish laws 
probably reached their form of distribution with less to a daughter for similar reasons: a need 
to concentrate the main family property in one heir, a man. Thus, the similarities in the 
legislation on the daughters’ portion may be a result of developing solutions to the same 
problem, and these were drawn in written law. We could still argue that indirect legal 
transmission took place from the sixth to the thirteenth century, due to the legal elite’s 
knowledge of such modes of discrimination between sons and daughters in secular law. If we 
argue that the same legal elite had knowledge of Roman law at this point, then the diversion 
from Roman law must have been a conscious choice among those putting the local laws into 
writing.  
 The division into full and half-lots applied to sisters. One interesting difference 
between the Danish laws was that, while the earlier law thoroughly gave all female relatives 
half the share of their male collaterals, the later laws gave the more remote female relatives an 
equal share. The Law of Scania distinguished between the ratio of the property inherited 
between sisters and brothers, where the sisters should get a half-lot of brothers like the 
daughters (SL.34, SL.36), while The Book of Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes 
asserts that men should always have twice that of a woman (A&O.1.12). So did the Law of 
Jutland (JL.1.4-5), which sets it apart from the contemporary provincial laws. The reason for 
the Law of Jutland to contain the apparently older regulation giving all female relatives half 
that of a male could stem from its transmission from the A&O and the early law of Zealand, 
as a case where the translator kept the discriminating provisions for some reason.  
 The representation system mentioned above, functioned with the grandchildren getting 
their parents due share according to the sex of the parent (SL.33). But the Danish laws only 
divided per capita within the prior heirs, so that children would receive per capita, but 
grandchildren would share the lot due to their parent. They would, as described in old Danish 
in King Valdemar’s Law of Zealand (VsL.1.7), inherit ‘the same lot as their father or mother 
would have taken, if they had lived’.579 We find the same wording in the Law of Jutland, to 
inherit.580 Although the Jutish, which was the youngest, and obviously the copy, only mention 
the father, while also being the law retaining the women’s half-portion among remote 
relatives. The legislators thus found it necessary to explain that if a dead son had one daughter 
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also DgL VII, p. 7 and 137.  
580 ‘sicut pater eorum deberet, si uiueret’, DgL IV, pp. 14-15. 
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and a dead daughter had many sons, the daughter of the son would inherit a full lot and the 
many sons of the daughter would share the half-lot. Hence, we can say that the Danish system 
divided per stirpes, according to the first line of heirs. This meant the children of Ego, but 
also siblings. The brothers and sisters of Ego would inherit from him when the parents had 
died, and would then form branches of the second parentela.  
 The wife would acquire one lot of the inheritance intestate if the couple had children 
(SL.6, SL.22, JL.6). She could not acquire her husband’s ancestral land, though, only movable 
property, ‘bought land’ and otherwise acquired property. In the Law of Jutland, even the 
wife’s part would be sized according to the sex of the child. She would have a full lot if she 
had born a son, and a half-lot if the offspring was female (JL.6). The remaining spouse could 
live undivided in the property if the children were minors. Several of the provincial laws 
opened with rules on what to do if the surviving wife was pregnant (SL.1, JL.3, EsL.2). 
Measures would be taken to assure a child was underway, and that it was in fact the late 
husband’s offspring. If it survived, it should be heir. The principle of giving females a half-lot 
came through in every aspect of the Danish inheritance regulations, revealing the effort given 
to securing major family property for the male heirs, even in the parentela system 
 The question of the widow being pregnant leads to another principle in the Danish 
laws. If we remember the constitution of the Visigothic kings that a child would have to 
survive ten days to be counted as heir, having implications for the division of inheritance to 
the child’s mother, another criterion comes forth in the Danish material. The child would have 
to be born sound, but also baptised to be the rightful heir (SL.1-3,JL.1-2, EsL.2). In these 
sections, too, the Law of Jutland and Eric’s Law of Zealand follow the content of the earlier 
Law of Scania closely, revealing their interdependence and transmission. As will be revealed 
further down, the Swedish laws gave the mother the right to inherit from the husband if she 
was pregnant at the time of his passing. The child did not have to be born to make its mother 
an heir of Ego. The Danish inheritance laws portray a system where, compared to 
contemporary European legislation, principles of equal rights to be heir persisted among the 
sexes and the generations, even if the distribution discriminated against females. Joint 
inheritance rights and the emphasis of baptism calls to mind the concepts we found in the 
Visigothic system. Nevertheless, without evidence of direct transmission from the Visigothic 
texts, Roman law and the Church are the obvious explanation for the source of influence, as 
they also were for the Visigothic legal elite. The Danish inheritance system was probably a 
result of transmission from the contemporary concept within European legal ideology in the 
form of Roman law and canon law, most possibly by the works of influential bishops, like 
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Anders Sunesen or Absalon. The Danish laws included measures that could be activated to 
ensure the property to be inherited would fall to those desired as heirs, but were in European 
context equal to heirs. The contemporary laws among the Danes’ northern neighbours in 
Norway followed quite the opposite model.  
 
8.2 Norwegian laws 
The two surviving provincial laws in Norway show a continuous development in the 
authoritative inheritance legislation in the Norwegian kingdom. The Gulathing Law (G) from 
around the 1160s581 followed a neat gradual system, favouring patrilineal, male relatives.582 
The extant version of the law originating in the province of Frostathing (F) is assumed to date 
from the 1260s, although it contains older material, some of which from just after 1215, due 
to its limitation of inheritance to four canonical degrees.583 The gradual system prevailed in 
this one, too, only with a heightened emphasis on the legitimacy of the heirs according to 
Christian canons.584 Thus, the influence of canon law appear to be evident in the inheritance 
laws, and the Christian laws in Norway may have been transmitted law as well.585 The 
Gulathing Law also contained rules on distribution of compensation that went beyond seven 
degrees in the responsibility of kin, and incest prohibition that only went to six degrees by 
dispensation from the pope.586 The provincial laws were revised in the mid-thirteenth century, 
but later revisions in the Gulathing Law did not lead to a harmonising of the number of 
degrees from seven to four, as they should if they followed the canonical decision from 1215.  
 The early laws called for the son of Ego to inherit first, then the father (G.103). 
However, it is difficult to establish if the father would inherit if the son of Ego had no heir, 
i.e., if Ego had no grandson, since the next in line is the grandson sharing with Ego’s 
                                                 
581 Regarding the dating, see Robberstad, Gulatingslovi, p. 9, and Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 37-40. 
582 Torben Anders Vestergaard, ‘The System of Kinship in Early Norwegian Law’, Medieval Scandinavia 12 
(1988), pp. 160-193; Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og strategier’, pp. 129-33; Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, p. 
203.  
583 Hagland and Sandnes, Frostatingslova, p. xxx-xxxiii. Although rules on compensation involved relatives 
from the fourth to the sixth degree, see ch. 12 and also Hansen ‘Concept of Kinship’, p. 194. 
584 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, p. 214. 
585 Philologist Eyvind Halvorsen has suggested that Norwegian priests would have had the opportunity to make 
new laws soon after ordination, but we have little evidence that laws were either introduced or adjusted to local 
customs or features. Eyvind Fjeld Halvorsen, ‘De gamle østlandske kristenrettene’, in Nordiske 
middelalderlover: tekst og kontekst: rapport fra seminar ved Senter for middelalderstudier, 29-30 Nov. 1996, ed. 
by Audun Dybdahl and Jørn Sandnes (Sandnes: Tapir, 1997), 59-68, (p. 68). 
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daughter. Rules on representations are implemented in the Frostathing Law, although the 
specified representation concerned the son of a son only (F.8.1), not to the whole stirpes and 
not grandchildren by a daughter. That means only a son’s son would be heir before 
ascendants, even if a daughter and a son’s son shared mutually (G.103 F.8.2). This feature is a 
trait of the gradual system.  
In the Gulathing Law, if Ego had no children or father, then the siblings were heirs, 
possibly both sisters and brothers, since the text specifies ‘brother inherits from brother, and 
every sibling with shared father [inherits as well]’ (G.103). Sisters were definitely behind 
brothers in the later Frostathing Law (F.8.4). After the sister, followed the mother of the 
deceased. Next in line to inherit were the father’s brother and the brother’s son, according to 
the Gulathing Law, indicates patrilineal tendencies. The Frostathing Law had the father’s 
father sharing with them (F.8.5). Close patrilineal female relatives sharing with Ego’s mother 
followed them.587 The mother was thus put back in line to number six, compared to the 
Gulathing Law, where mother was the fifth heir to her son. Then, the Gulathing Law specified 
three classes of illegitimate sons – illegitimate daughters were not in the picture – and 
continued with paternal male cousins (G.104).  
There are several theories concerning why the patrilineal element was particularly 
strong in the Norwegian laws. Torben Vestergaard has revealed that the laws contain a core of 
three directly related males; father, son and grandson.588 He calls this the ‘minimal kin’. Lars 
Ivar Hansen argues that the concretising of the minimal kin was an innovation within the 
Norwegian legislation in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.589 Both Hansen and Vogt suggest 
that the tendencies were a result of the battle between the forming state and the established 
land-based elite.590 The partiality for patrilineality was thus an attempt to keep estates 
undivided in response to increased pressure from royal power and the Church as accumulators 
of land, together with the ideology of cognatic calculation of kin and distribution. Based on 
these theories, we can assert that these rules originated as a reaction to influence from other 
legal cultures. The Norwegian legal elite, which at this point grew out of the assemblies, 
shaped the law in relation to pressure from landowning subjects, who themselves were 
reacting to canon law. It might also be argued that the landowners were reacting to increasing 
royal control, which sought to weaken opposition from the landowners by dividing their 
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estates. What both Hansen and Vogt demonstrate is that the inheritance laws were flexible, 
and were written down at a time where these principles were under discussion. 
 After the domination of the paternal side came the maternal kin and also heirs through 
female relatives. The listing still consisted of male children of female relatives, and male 
maternal relatives (G.105, F.8.10-13). Robberstad interpreted these inheritance regulations as 
the younger part of the law.591 Compared with other secular law, it is unlikely that the women 
would be completely excluded from inheriting in the earliest inheritance regulations, and we 
could assume that women inherited when all male relatives were lacking, as in the 
Burgundian and Lombard laws. The favouring of males over females to inherit was present in 
all joints and degrees, and demonstrates the legislators’ idea of patrilaterality. The Gulathing 
Law sums up the listings with a clarification: if there were relatives of the same distance to 
Ego, those on the male side (the paternal kin) would precede those on the female side (the 
maternal kin) (G.105). Further explanation was given on how to proceed the counting of heirs, 
and of those women not mentioned in the listing, the son’s daughter comes before the others. 
The fact that this needed clarification suggests the patrilineal emphasis in the provincial 
codes, and that the calculation of degrees and closeness of kin were negotiable in the legal 
culture in the two Norwegian provinces. 
 As described above, the principles of representation were restricted to male patrilineal 
descendants. A particular feature of the Gulathing Law that separates the provincial law from 
other European codes is that the unborn child did not have inheritance rights with the other 
legitimate children (G.104). The unborn would only share in the dos of the marriage, and have 
the mother’s dowry, and came only as the thirteenth heir of its father, after the illegitimate 
children. Roman law had an arsenal of rules regulating the rights of an unborn child, and 
similarly precautions to ensure that widows were bearing the deceased’s child without doubt, 
which insisted on the widow refraining from remarriage for twelve months after the husband’s 
death or in cases of divorce.592 Post-mortem heirs are not mentioned in the Frostathing Law, 
but prescriptions similar to the decisions of Reccesvint and Chindasvint in Leges 
Visigothorum were added in the later Code of the Realm, where unborn children, if they came 
alive into the world and were baptised, would inherit from their father ‘and others’ 
(MLL.5.7.5). Baptism was not expressed as a criterion in the Gulathing and Frostathing Laws, 
as it was in the Danish and also in the Swedish provincial legislation, but the laws elsewhere 
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592 For instance, see D.3.2.10, C.5.9.1. 
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emphasise the importance of baptism (G.21-22, F.2.2-3), revealing that it was a developing 
principle due to influences from the Church. 
The requirement that heirs were legitimate in a default system of intestate inheritance 
applies even more to the Norwegian provincial laws than to other laws. In the first section on 
inheritance distribution in the Frostathing Law (F.8.2-8), and in the Gulathing Law (G.103), 
legitimacy was one of the factors that determined where in line a potential heir was. Hence 
illegitimates were also given access to inheritance, as they were in Roman, Burgundian, 
Lombard and Scandinavian laws. These, too, inserted illegitimate children into the standard 
description of the inheritance system, but postponed or with a reduced portion. The Gulathing 
Law first established how legitimate and illegitimate children inherit (G.104), before 
concentrating on other more remote relatives. Illegitimacy pushed these sons back in line after 
the legitimate children of both sexes, and parents and siblings. Similar to the Danish material, 
there were three categories of illegitimate children: born in concubinage (hornunge), born in 
secrecy (risunge), and born to a slave woman (tyboren). Categories that correspond to natural 
children, infamous children and slaves, as other European secular law refers to them. As 
mentioned above, no illegitimate daughters were mentioned in the Gulathing Law, but in the 
Frostathing Law, they were counted next in line after illegitimate sons (F.8.8), which speaks 
of a growing consideration for women. This was possibly a result of Christian influence or the 
knowledge of canon and Roman law. However, these laws are not particularly concerned with 
illegitimate daughters, and rather we could argue that allowing them to inherit falls within the 
general pattern in secular European legislation, where legislators in each legal culture 
included ever more groups within the inheritance systems. It would then be a similar solution 
to a similar problem, and not necessarily transmission of law. Vogt argues that the attention to 
illegitimate-born relatives in the Frostathing Law suggests that the finalisation of these 
inheritance laws happened at a point when the marriage ideal of the Church was fully 
established in the European ideology, i.e., the late-twelfth century, by Pope Alexander.593 
That is plausible viewed also in light of the establishment of royal succession in the same 
period, by King Magnus Erlingsson from 1163, which was inserted into the Gulathing Law 
(G.2).594 The law of succession decreed that heirs to the throne had to be born within 
marriage. State development may also have influenced the legislation on inheritance. Church 
                                                 
593 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, pp. 215-16. 
594 See further Regesta Norvegica I nr. 111. Attention to illegitimate offspring can be seen as a stage in the civil 
war that engulfed the Norwegian realm between the 1130s and the early thirteenth century. 
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policy was that illegitimate children should not inherit from parents, although this was not 
part of canon law’s sphere.  
 
Figure 11: The gradual system from the Frostathing Law. 
The medieval inheritance laws from Norway are characterised by the extreme catalogue of 
degrees according to the gradual system. The listing in the Frostathing Law ends with the 
maternal uncle’s daughter’s son (F.8.12), having counted a wide spectrum of the relatives 
included in the bilateral kin group. Vestergaard has suggested that the multitude of relatives 
was a repetitive pattern, easy to remember because it originated from an oral transmission of 
the law.595 The complex pattern is only mirrored, and even surpassed, by that in the Icelandic 
law of Grágás, which is thought to have been transmitted from Norwegian law.596 Helle Vogt 
has dismissed the similar system of transactions of various amounts of compensation for 
homicide in the Frostathing Law as absurd and hardly applicable, and asserts that the level of 
detail in naming relatives is a result of the need to instruct Norwegian subjects in canonical 
kinship structure.597 However, the equally minute descriptions in Visigothic legislation were 
the result a transmission from the listings in Roman law. That is a tempting conclusion 
regarding these rules on inheritance, too, because the texts enlist numerous heirs in succession 
                                                 
595 Vestergaard, ‘System of Kinship’, pp. 160-93. 
596 Vestergaard, ‘System of Kinship’, p. 181; Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, pp. 195-201. 
597 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, pp. 186-88; Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 145, 160. For distribution of 
compensation in the Frostathing Law, see F.6.1-45. 
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as the Visigothic and Roman rules did. However, the Norwegian rules mostly contain 
descriptions of the kin group sideways, whilst the list of the jurist Paulus copied into the 
Leges Visigothorum listed mainly ascendants and descendants.598 Nevertheless, the listing of 
heirs extends to six degrees, which is the same as the forbidden number of degrees in Norway 
after dispensation given by the pope, but also the same number of degrees that we find in the 
Visigothic laws of 650 (see above). It is the implementation in the gradual system that made 
the pattern complex. Vogt argues that the system was introduced through canon law and the 
kinship structures found there. Based on the equally minute descriptions of relatives, it seems 
plausible that the Norwegian legal elite that shaped the inheritance system had been 
influenced by the concepts found there through transmission of canon law, but also by Roman 
law, and possibly through other secular law. Nevertheless, the level of detail could possibly 
speak more of a domestic tradition of keeping track of relatives.  
 The western Nordic laws seem odd in a European context, with the consistent and 
complex gradual system. The Code of the Realm of King Magnus the Lawmender would 
revolutionise the inheritance system in the Norwegian legal culture, but the complexity of the 
sequences was continued. In the Code, a greater emphasis was put on the rights of female 
relatives to inherit, and the gradual principles were modified in the direction of parentela. 
However, it is difficult to establish whether these were slow changes already taking place, or 
if the shift from the patrilineal preference was an ideology influencing the administration of 
King Magnus (r. 1263-1280). Vogt concludes that the modification of the patrilineal tendency 
was a reaction to influence from Roman and canon law in the same period.599 It is 
nevertheless significant that the legislator strengthened the emphasis on legitimate heirs 
(MLL.5.7.1). Legitimate sons of legitimate parents would first in line for inheritance. Hence, 
whether Ego was born in wedlock himself mattered and continued to be a presumption for the 
default system. 
 The major break from the provincial laws was the Code of the Realm giving admission 
of inheritance to daughters by right. According to the laws of King Magnus daughters would 
share with their brothers, although only half of their brother’s portion, i.e., in the ratio 2:1 
(MLL.5.7.2). The Norwegian law now was in line with the principles established in Danish 
law before 1200. If the deceased had no sons, then surviving son of sons inherited by 
representation. However, the ratio would not follow a division per stirpes as the earlier 
                                                 
598 Leges Visigothorum, MGH, LL nat Germ, 1, pp. 171-173, LV.4.1.1-6. 
599 Vogt, Function of Kinship, p. 178. 
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European legislation, but the son’s son would share equally with a daughter. In this instance, a 
daughter would receive a full portion, and the grandson would thus get less than his father 
would have if he were alive, different from the abovementioned Danish principle of 
grandchildren receiving what their parents ‘would have taken, if they had lived’. This 
principle reveals both a favouring of children over grandchildren, and a continued patrilineal 
emphasis with son’s son coming before other grandchildren (see figure 12). If there were no 
surviving children, then the father would have the property of the deceased before 
grandchildren (MLL.5.7.4), a principle that continued the prioritisation of ascendants over 
descendants. Equality of the sexes did not reach beyond daughters. The principles of 
representation were not even applied to the first parentela, the exhausting of a parentela before 
moving to the next. Also allodial land, óðal (odel, see below), would follow the principles of 
representation through only one stirpes (MLL.6.1.1), and would not be divided equally within 
the parentela. The default inheritance system in the Code of the Realm still comprised mainly 
gradual principles. 
 
Figure 12: The inheritance system presented in the Code of the Realm from 1274, here presented with only a fraction 
of the listed heirs in the law. The half siblings in each level and illegitimate offspring are omitted from the genogram.  
Sisters were followed by the mother of Ego, thus becoming the seventh in line, pushed 
back from the provincial codes. One explanation for this shift could be to ensure that the 
descendants of Ego’s father would inherit before a possible backwards inheritance into the 
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mother’s line and other children. The same applied to a woman’s inheritance: her offspring 
would have her property before her husband (MLL.5.7.6). Then the prescribed sequence of 
heirs broke up into a gradual system favouring paternal heirs over maternal, and men over 
women, similar to the provincial laws. Male heirs should come before female relatives of the 
same degree, but women more closely related came before more distant men in the order of 
succession outside the closest kin group. The rules continued with the criteria of sharing the 
lots by branches (stirpes) in the more distant relations, as described in the division among 
grandchildren. In the division between the twelfth heirs, father’s brother and brother’s son 
(MLL.5.7.10) provide some insight. If there were several of either category of relatives, then 
the inheritance was divided by lot between the branches, here the two sons of Ego’s 
grandfather: one branch being Ego’s father (represented by the brother’s sons) and the other 
branch being Ego’s father’s brother. Each branch would receive an equal part, and this should 
be divided among the designated heirs within the branch. The principle of division into stirpes 
points in the direction of influence from Roman law, although the principles could of course 
be transmitted through canon law as Vogt suggests. The dividing between branches also 
resembles thinking of kinship in parentele. The Code of the Realm appears as an intricate mix 
between the two systems prevailing in the Nordic region, suggesting that the late-thirteenth 
century was a time of transformation regarding regulation of inheritance. 
 The compilers of the law dedicated space, and not least parchment, to sections of the 
continuing list of heirs, which appear as a web of relatives from the paternal and maternal side 
sharing the lots. The order of succession was complicated further with including in the default 
system all relatives who were born in wedlock, but only sharing one parent.600 Thus, the 
legally born half-sister of Ego’s mother who shared the same mother would be the thirtieth 
heir. This possibility of multiple spouses and children born in concubinage, serfdom or under 
other conditions were specified in detail and allocated a position around Ego. As we saw in 
Salic law, the legislators would naturally be aware of such family constellations, but the 
minute description of each is unique in medieval law.  
Finally, the illegitimate daughter was the rightful heir, if all known relatives within the 
second canonical degree were absent.601 After her, all illegitimate offspring of the previous 
and all relatives to the fourth degree would be entitled the inheritance, and in last resort, the 
property of the deceased fell to the king.  
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 Apart from the admission of female inheritance and prioritising descendants, little 
novelty was added to family law by King Magnus. One notable exception was a finger 
pointed towards the wake, which was called an erfis: an inheritance banquet. These wakes, 
according to the text, appeared to the king more as commotion than penitence, hinting that the 
wakes turned into drunken riots (MLL.5.25). The legislator wished to fine both the host and 
the participating guests if funerary feasts got out of hand. Although interesting in terms of 
social behaviour, the significance concerning inheritance is perhaps limited, but it does 
suggest that the legislator assumed the kin would, shortly after a member’s passing, gather 
either at the residence of the already appointed heir, or to decide the heirs who would share 
the property. The latter alternative could be reason enough to cause brawls.  
 We can view the legislation in Scandinavia on landed property and allodial land in 
light of the legislation of ancestral land versus bequeathed land; terra sortis, terra salica and 
bocland/folcland. Though the Scandinavian definitions of these categories of land did not 
presumably derive from the earlier European concepts, they share some basic principles 
regarding inheritance and compare as ways to differentiate status of land and landownership. 
In Nordic laws, the restrictions on alienation of allodial land were taken further than earlier 
European regulations, with the Norwegian Code of the Realm being the extreme in favouring 
the kin group, especially the patrilineal side, in retaining land with particular status of odel 
(ON: óðal). In the thirtheenth century the right of odel had developed into a right for relatives 
of pre-emption of land with the status of óðal. Land required the status of odel, after being 
held within the family for a specified length of time. In this way, it was the opposite of the 
principle of ius recadentiae, seen in the Frankish laws, where the family’s rights of redeeming 
land was immediate after the death of the holder.602 Similar rights to pre-emption and 
redemption of land developed in the Danish landscapes, called lovbydelse, and Swedish 
landscapes, called bördsrett.603 The Norwegian odel, however, developed into the system with 
the longest time prescription and, as stated by Vogt, ‘the strongest expression of the rights of 
first refusal of the kin.’604 Therefore, a short outline of the Norwegian odel will be made as a 
case to be contrasted with systems of allodial land in earlier secular legislation. The 
geography of the Norwegian area of the Scandinavian peninsula is mountainous and sparse in 
arable land. The scarcity of accessible and fertile soil would have caused pressure on land 
during the increase in population during high medieval period and as a result led to strict 
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regulations within society. Helle Vogt has suggested the same, and she contemplates whether 
landowning was more prestigious in Norway, as opposed to Sweden and Denmark.605 The 
latter two kingdoms consist of larger areas of cultivatable land, greater possible acres and a 
better climate for agriculture. Interestingly, the republic of Iceland did not introduce the odel 
land. Climatically, Iceland had even harsher conditions for both cultivation and animal 
husbandry than Norway.606 However, the institution did not occur in the Free State laws in 
Grágás, and attempts to introduce such rights with Jarnsiða were rejected.607 Compared to 
legislation on allodial land in the Germanic kingdoms, it is a point that their regulation 
derived from an appropriation of originally Roman land. In the forming Norwegian state, 
power over arable land could easily become part of the general power struggle. The motives 
for regulating were nevertheless based in the need to define land, both to distinguish between 
ancestral land and bought land, and between ancestral land and royally given land. Even if the 
concepts may have their roots in continental ideas, the common features of the laws probably 
came from similar solutions to similar problems, and not transmission of law. As Michael 
Gelting has credibly suggested, the Nordic regulations on ancestral land should be seen as 
being influenced by canonical and secular regulations from the late-twelfth century 
concerning the kindred’s right to pre-emption of family land, like the French institution of 
retrait lignanger.608 
The regulations on odel land were incorporated into written law, although they 
probably existed in some form from at least the tenth century. The restrictions of the 
legislating authority expanded and refined the institution in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. Few sources from before the late-twelfth century are extant, and those that survive 
reveal few reasons to believe that óðal rights had the elaborate design that they had in the 
thirteenth century. Vogt and Gelting asserts the odel rights of pre-emption by family with time 
prescriptions to have first been cemented in the thirteenth century.609 It is plausible that the 
institution of odel rights became connected with landownership and rights to purchase within 
the kin group only at that point. Vogt points to the small number of references in sources 
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covering the centuries up to 1200. The sagas have very few examples, and were anyway only 
committed to writing in the thirteenth century when the concept possibly formed. The saga by 
Snorri Sturluson of King Haakon (918?-961) aðalsteinsfóstri, ‘reared by Æthelstan’, the 
English king, provide some reference to the concept being in use earlier. Snorri has Haakon 
give back the privileges of óðal (odel rights) to the landowners as thanks for being accepted 
as king at the assembly at Frosta.610 Snorri could have anachronistically backdated the 
important issues of landowners in the thirteenth century to the tenth. Or, it could have been a 
myth passed on, indicating that the concept had developed at some point before the thirteenth 
century, although the meaning of the term might have been different. King Haakon is 
assumed to be the establisher of the laws at Gulathing, and he could also be used as an 
appropriate mythical establisher of the institution for the landowners in the 1200s. King 
Magnus Erlingsson’s (r. 1161-1184) amendment demanded that outlaws forfeited all their 
property, and specified that this included odel land (F.5.44).611 The rule is easily compared 
with the above-mentioned rule of Cnut, demanding that even bookland would be forfeited by 
deserters. It is also worth mentioning that G.24, on intercourse with closely related women, 
states that a man should forfeit ‘every penny of his estate, both land and movables’, but does 
not add an emphasis on odel land like the section in the Frostathing’s Law. However, in 
another rule it was stressed that odel land, not bought land, could be part of the compensation 
(G.223).612 Surely, odel land or rights was an established concept with a dynamic content in 
the tenth to thirteenth centuries, similar to the institutions of sors, terra salica and bookland, 
even if there need not have been a transmission of the concept, but rather a similar solution to 
a similar topic of giving land a particular status. 
 Regulations in Gulathing’s Law reveal the decisive favouring of male owners of land 
with odel rights in instances of sole female heirs to odel land (G.275). A specified group of 
female paternal relatives would have the right of odel if none of the male members of the 
paternal kin group existed.613 Still, the prior claim of pre-emption would fall to the first son 
any of the women in this group. And if a male relative bought out a female, and he had a 
daughter while she had a son, the son would again have prior claim to redeem the odel. In this 
                                                 
610 Snorra Sturlusonar, ‘Saga Hákonar góða’, in Heimskringla, ed. by N. Linder og H. A. Haggson, vol. 1 
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611 ‘iamvel oðalsiörðum sem öðrum’. Vogt suggests the privilege found its form with Magnus Erlingsson’s legal 
reforms in the 1160s. Slægtens funksjon, p. 257. 
612 Thanks to Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde for pointing out this rule. 
613 They were the daughter, sister, paternal aunt, brother’s daughter and son’s daughter, i.e., all daughters of 
paternal relatives and heirs. 
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manner, the lawmakers saw the privilege of odel protected within the patrilineal group, 
always falling back into the pool, following the same family-tree, albeit changing between 
branches of the family.614 The institution of óðal in Norwegian laws used the same intervals 
as the marriage regulations. The incest prohibitions were seven degrees by the canonical 
mode of counting, while the Norwegian archdiocese had obtained a dispensation of six 
degrees from the pope (G.24).615 It could also be interpreted as a reference to the Fourth 
Lateran Council’s downscaling of the incest prohibitions to four degrees. Michael Gelting 
takes this specific rule as a reference to the fourth degree, and subsequently asserts the rule to 
be from shortly after 1215.616 
 Of the five women with potential right to odel, the daughter and the sister of a man 
would be his representative recipients of or contributors to compensation in the absence of 
closer male paternal relatives. They were thus part of the unilateral kin group, called 
bauggilde (baugilldis).617 The paternal female relatives of the bauggilde were therefore 
termed baugryge. In the Code of the Realm, King Magnus, although allowing some 
preference to females in relation to certain inheritance rights, specified that in the division of 
property containing odel land among several children, similar to Danish rules, the sons would 
have odel land and the daughters the other land plus movables (MLL.5.7.3). 
 The Norwegian legislation on odel land tells the story of a strengthening of the rights 
of kin from the thirteenth century, when the institution reached such a form in the laws, and 
on to the time of the Black Death, when this no longer mattered.618 Subsequent kings 
strengthened the rights of kin to odel land throughout the thirteenth century and decreed the 
most extreme favouring of heirs within the kin to the detriment of outside buyers in the 
fourteenth century. To gain odel rights, a family must have held the land for sixty years, and 
                                                 
614 Moreover, the branch that did not hold the property did not entirely loose the rights of odel. If the other 
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when having odel rights to land, the right of redemption lasted sixty years after selling it to 
outsiders (MLL.6.2-4). Gelting argues that from the transmission of these kinds of institutions 
protecting particular family land, the strengthening of odel was not a reaction from ‘a kin-
based society on the defensive against the influence of royal ecclesiastical power and learned 
law’, but to secure the land for the kin group.619 The time limitation appears extreme in 
Scandinavian circumstances, but it can be compared with time limitations found in Visigothic 
and Lombard law, which increased with geographical distance in relation to independence 
from the Roman empire. Although a transmission of the rights to odel is far-fetched, it is 
conceivable that the legal elite dealing with odel in the Code of the Realm knew of similar 
examples from early medieval secular law and were influenced by regulation of land in the 
earlier laws. 
 
8.3 Swedish provincial laws  
The Swedish provincial laws were, with exception of the early Västgöta Law, issued in a 
fairly concentrated time period, from the last decades of the 1200s and through the first half of 
the 1300s. The Older Västgöta Law originated sometime in the early 1200s, contemporary 
with the Danish and Norwegian legal enterprise. The other Swedish provincial laws that are 
extant are contemporary with the Norwegian Code of the Realm from 1274. The tradition of 
written laws thus originates later than in the rest of Scandinavia. However, this was also the 
most active period of secular legal enterprise in medieval Europe, which probably was the 
very reason for writing down law in the Swedish landscapes.  
The different landscapes seem to have produced these laws by local legal activity. 
Still, the extant copies received royal sanction, if we are to believe the surviving 
documents.620 In the consolidation process of the kingdom in late-thirteenth century, the 
Swedish provincial laws were promulgated by royal decree: the regency of minor King Birger 
(r. 1290-1317) saw the promulgation of the Law of Uppland and revision of the Östgöta Law. 
In the reign of his successor, Magnus, the Hälsinge Law and the Södermanna Law were 
promulgated. Through these actions, we can imagine that the king decided the contents and 
the differentiation in their contents. Or, that the provincial assembly, together with the 
thingmen did and that it was given a royal stamp of approval afterwards. However, we must 
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assume that the laws were formed and accepted in the province, and thereof not rejected by 
the local legal culture. Hence many of the same individuals from among the legal elite must 
have been involved in the design of the provincial law, and the continuous work would have 
made these legal advisors transfer and accumulate legal concepts to successors. The shape, 
form and contents of the provincial laws are also very congruent, and the relationship between 
them undisputable.  
Therefore, the question emerges as to why there are such important differences 
between the Swedish provincial laws when it comes to both the principle of female 
inheritance and to the inheritance system as a whole. The problem arises from treating the 
Swedish provinces as a congruent political unity, which they were not.621 Consolidation of the 
Swedish state in the thirteenth century was lacking. The landscapes that formed the Swedish 
kingdom comprised of regions with separate identities.622 The eastern laws presented the 
parentela principle with female rights and the western a gradual system where women only 
inherited if their male collaterals were absent. Moreover, we find in the Swedish Code of the 
Realm from around the 1340s,623 a merging of the two systems, and regulations allowing 
women to inherit with their male relatives (MEL.Ä.1-11). Most of the Swedish laws were 
arranged in sections by subject, and we find the inheritance and marriage sections closely 
connected.  
Neither version of the Västgota Law has this royal stamp. Based on the content, 
historian Thomas Lindkvist argues that the older Västgöta Law stands out from the other 
provincial laws.624 He also finds the lack of royal promulgation of this law as a sign that royal 
power was weaker within the province than in the rest of the realm, and that the regional elite, 
influenced by international law, were involved in forming the contents of the law.625 The 
lawmen had a strong position in the law-making, and the lawman Eskil was involved in 
formation of the written law for Västgötaland in the early decades of the 1200s.626 
                                                 
621 See, for instance, Lindkvist, Plundring, skatter och den feodala statens framväxt; Line, Kingship and State 
Formation, pp. 69-149. 
622 Götaland and Svealand. See, for instance, Line, Kingship and State Formation, p.35. 
623 The date of issue is uncertain, see Åke Holmbäck, ‘Innledning’, in Magnus Erikssons Landslag i nusvensk 
tolkning, ed. by Åke Holmbäck and Elias Wessén, (Stockholm: Awe/Gebers, 1962), pp. xiii-lxix (pp. xxx-xxxi). 
624 Thomas Lindkvist, ‘The Land, Men, and Law of Västergötland’, New Approaches to Early Law in 
Scandinavia, ed. by Stefan Brink and Lisa Collinson, Acta Scandinavia, 3 (Turnhout: Brepols 2014), pp. 89-97. 
Lindkvist actually only uses the term provincial law for the older Västgötalaw, because the others were royally 
sanctioned. 
625 Lindkvist, ‘Land, Men and Law’, pp. 91, 96.  
626 Åke Holmbäck and Elias Wessén, Svenska Landskapslagar V: Äldre Västgötalagen, Yngre Västgötalagen, 
Smålandslagens kyrkobalk, Bjärköarätten (Stockholm: Awe/Gebers, 1946), p. xix. 
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 Following the divide of the Nordic laws into an eastern and western legal culture, the 
eastern Swedish laws applied inheritance by the system of parentela. Thus, the laws of 
Uppland, the Hälsinge Law and Södermanna Law exhibit the principles we recognise from 
the Danish provincial laws (UL.Ä.11, HL.Ä.11, SmL.Ä.1). One parentela should be 
exhausted before moving on to the next parentela, so that even great-grandchildren inherited 
before siblings of Ego. As in the other Scandinavian laws, the Swedish inheritance system 
was not of a strict parentela; relatives of same degree but different sex inherited unequally. 
Like the Danish laws and the principles introduced in the Norwegian Code of the Realm, 
females would take a half-lot of the male collaterals. However, the favouring of descendants 
implied that closer female inheritors would inherit the whole lot before more distant male 
relatives, as the parentela system presupposes. The principle of a half-lot also extended to 
sisters of Ego who would take a half-lot of a brother (UL.Ä.12, HL.Ä.12, SmL.Ä.1.1). Also, 
the division of property when representation occurred was conducted in a similar fashion to 
the Danish. The laws exhibited a consistent use of the parentela system, by representation and 
by collaterals in each joint, who came into inheritance equally. Still, the unequal division of 
full lot and half-lot would follow the branches of descendants according to the gender of the 
first heir (UL.Ä.11, HL.Ä.11). Thus, the children and grandchildren of the sister of Ego would 
inherit a half-lot to those of Ego’s brother, even if they were male. These restrictions to the 
branch of female heirs reveal a patrilineal tendency in the parentela system. The principles 
may have been included for the same reasons that were suggested regarding the Danish laws, 
to secure the transfer of the family property to future male generations. Although the 
influence for the shape of the inheritance principles came from outside sources, the patrilineal 




Figure 13: The inheritance system found in the eastern Swedish provincial laws of Uppland, Hälsingeland and 
Södermannaland. Daughters received a half-lot of the sons, similar to the Danish mode of division.  
 The Law of Uppland states that inheritance could not go to the fifth degree (UL.Ä.11). 
This is of course unsurprising, since the Swedish provincial laws were issued several decades 
after the Fourth Lateran council. The need to point this out even at this point could be an 
argument for the view that canonical teaching was perhaps not at the front of people’s 
consciousness. Still, it may merely be a remnant from earlier and a demonstration of the 
conservativeness of law. As Alan Watson argued, it would be easier to copy earlier law, than 
to reformulate the passages.627 
 The western Swedish laws followed a gradual system, although to our eyes, neater 
than the strange division in the Norwegian laws, in that fewer relatives were listed, and that 
the order of heirs seem to follow the close family group according to bilateral principles, 
before more distant relatives. In the older Västgöta Law, daughters were excluded from 
inheritance if Ego had sons, or children of sons, a trait that was continued in the later Dala 
Law and Västmanna Law (DL.G.11, VL.Ä.11, VgL.Ä.1). The same three laws excluded 
sisters if there were brothers. The system in the late thirtheenth century laws follows 
principles of a cognatic kinship group, where relations were counted through both the male 
and female line. Descendants were prioritised before ascendants, which can be interpreted as 
an influence of the parentela principles, as we saw in the Norwegian Code of the Realm. The 
                                                 
627 Watson, Legal Transplant, An Approach, passim. 
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Västgöta Law has been compared with the Norwegian laws in content and terminology, 
although Lindkvist argues that direct loans have not been identified.628 Holmbäck and Wessén 
have pointed to the Norwegian connection of the lawman Eskil, who met with King Haakon 
Haakonsson (r. 1217-1263) on several occasions.629 King Haakon revised the Norwegian 
provincial laws. The main principle in the western Swedish laws was an emphasis on the 
patrilineal side. The basic order of inheritance was that sons inherited together with daughters, 
but daughters took half of what their brothers received, and both inherited before the father of 
Ego in the Östgöta Law and the younger version of the Västgöta Law, both originating in the 
late-thirteenth century (ÖgL.Ä.2.1, VgLY.Ä.1). Thus, the principle of a half-lot for women 
also entered the gradual system, again similar to its introduction in the contemporary Code of 
the Realm from Norway. The mother came next, followed by the brother of Ego and then the 
sister.  
We see in the late-thirteenth century laws the remains of tensions in society between 
allowing women to inherit, or not, together with their collaterals. That daughters inherited a 
half-lot with sons was perceived as a novelty among both the legislators and the subjects to 
which the change had to be explained. A specific framing of the new regulations in 
inheritance legislation and their perception can be found in the Östgöta Law. The text includes 
a specific reference to daughters being joint heirs as ‘new law’ (ÖgL.Ä.2).630 The disregard 
for the principle in the case of sisters, aunts and nieces in the same rule, and a return to the 
principle in the following rule (ÖgL.Ä.3), suggest a conscious introduction of female 
inheritance in the Swedish realm, somewhat reluctantly in the areas where sons and male 
relatives had traditionally been the obvious first heir. The ÖgL.Ä.2 describes how sisters 
claimed their share of the property according to the new law, while their brother got the whole 
inheritance earlier ‘under the old law’. The possible disputes in this period of change might 
have called for legislation on the matter. 
Introducing rights for women to inherit together with men must have been a change 
due to transmission of legal ideas. We learn several points from the legal text itself. First, the 
change came in the late-thirteenth century, similar to Norway. Second, the legislators felt the 
need to explain the change in the text, which reveals the challenges of introducing it to the 
Swedish landscapes. Third, the legislators’ explanation of old law and new law reveals an 
anticipation of change in practice as well as in written law. Following the theory of Alan 
                                                 
628 Lindkvist, ‘Land, Men and Law’, pp. 94-95. 
629 Holmbäck and Wessén, Svenska Landskapslagar V, pp. xx-xxi. 
630 See also Holmbäck and Wessén Svenska Landskapslagar I, p. 136 n. 8. 
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Watson and Pierre Legrand of how law changes, the adjustments to the transmission of law 
were commented on in the text itself. Elsa Sjöholm believes that the merger of parentela 
principles into the gradual system in the younger Västgöta Law and the Code of the Realm to 
be a compromise, implying that there was a tug of war between interested parties within the 
community.631 Lars Ivar Hansen has pointed to the effects of the gradual system and the 
patrilineal principle of keeping property together, and that patrilineage was a reaction to the 
increasingly centralised power of the kings.632 Helle Vogt asserts that the differences in the 
Swedish laws are a reflection of an ongoing discussion in society coinciding with the legal 
work, or as a result of it.633 We must assume that the legal subjects’ interests put pressure on 
what principles became part of written law in this respect. The change in the inheritance laws 
to accord more with the gradual system probably came through a transmission of law, but 
from where? The most obvious explanation is that the legislators shaping the western 
Scandinavian laws were influenced by the prevailing principles in the eastern laws of Sweden 
and Denmark. If the Västgöta province had already been influenced by Norwegian laws, the 
change in the Norwegian Code of the Realm would be another example to be copied. 
Regarding the inheritance of daughters in the Danish laws, arguments were that the right came 
from canon law teachings, and that the restriction to a half-lot could be due to influence from 
secular Germanic law. Swedish inheritance laws were possibly subject to similar influences, if 
not Danish law directly. At least we can say that the legal elite participating in shaping the 
provincial laws of Sweden were updated. In the obscure Swedish provincial Law of Gotland, 
a distinction between the Gotlanders on the island of Gotland and the non-Gotlanders 
elsewhere was inserted into the text (GL.24.5), who Holmbäck and Wessén holds to be the 
Swedes.634 The point of the differentiation was that Gotlanders followed local rules on family 
property and not necessarily the mainland norms. The section following obliged Gotlandic 
brothers to provide for the wedding of their sisters, probably if fatherless, or give a sister only 
an eighth part of his property (GL.24.4). We could assume that the medieval laws of Gotland 
kept more in line with the conservative western Nordic legal culture, although the age of the 
manuscript of the Law of Gotland calls for caution. The women possibly did not receive 
inheritance rights with their brothers, as in the eastern provinces.  
                                                 
631 Sjöholm, Sveriges medeltidslagar, p. 124. 
632 Hansen, ‘Slektskap, eiendom og strategier’, pp. 122-38. 
633 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, p. 214. 




Figure 14: The inheritance system of the Östgöta Law, showing some unmentioned male relatives (with question 
mark), which leaves us guessing. The gradual system includes some parentela principles, such as prioritising 
descendants and equality between collaterals. 
 
The order of sequence in the Östgöta Law juxtaposed the female relatives on the 
patrilineal side with the male relatives on the matrilineal side upwards, and sons of female 
relatives with daughters of male relatives downwards, exactly the same as what we see in the 
Norwegian laws (ÖgL.Ä.2-3). Daughter’s daughters or great-grandchildren are absent in the 
texts. Like in the Norwegian Code of the Realm, grandchildren were ranked, favouring male 
descendants. Moreover, the children of siblings are listed omitting the brother’s son. 
However, the Östgöta Law includes the principles of representation and a division according 
to stirpes. Nephews of Ego were therefore probably meant to take their father’s share. We 
could ask, though, if that implied that daughter’s sons would have a half-lot, and son’s 
daughters a full lot. The text stipulates that each branch should take half (if two heirs are of 
different branches), and does not elaborate on a calculation between the branches like we saw 
in the eastern Swedish laws, and in the Burgundian and Danish legislation. Another question 
that arises is how far down the branch of Ego’s siblings a share would be passed on before 
moving upwards again. The Östgöta Law maintained a prioritising of descendants over 
ascendants. It was explicitly worded that if descendants existed, then the ascendants would 
step back (Ögl.3.2). However, this only applied if ascendants and descendants of equal degree 
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were both male. Female would be favoured as the closest relative, but step back if equally 
related with a male. The Dala Law gave the half-siblings’, including daughters’, offspring 
priority before more distant relatives (D.G.11), something that can suggest that the legal norm 
was that descendants should be exhausted before ascendants came into inheritance. The total 
picture reveals the same tendencies as we saw coming through in the Norwegian Code of the 
Realm above: the law follows a gradual system, but with a slight leaning towards parentela 
principles, which was a prevailing ideology in European legal thinking in the late-thirteenth 
century and thereafter. 
 We find provisions for the complicating factors of family life. The older version of the 
Västgöta Law addressed the problem of several marriages for both man and woman. If a man 
had a different set of children with three successive wives, then the property would be divided 
into three equal parts, but the oldest set of children divided inheritance first, and then the next 
(VgL.Ä.5). If the woman had three successive husbands, the children from the last marriage 
would inherit from her (VgL.Ä.6, VgLY.Ä.8). Holmbäck and Wessén interpret this as the 
woman having separated from the children from the prior marriages.635 In the Östgöta Law, 
separate broods of Ego’s children would inherit by capita and not by stirpes as long as they 
were legitimate; all sons received an equal share and all daughters half as much (ÖgL.Ä.3.3).  
 Most of the Swedish provincial laws did not allow the husband and wife to inherit 
from each other, with exception of the man getting the best horse, weapons and his ‘church 
clothes’ from their common property (UL.Ä.10, HL.Ä.10). It is worth mentioning here that 
the Danish Law of Scania, the province bordering on the Swedish landscapes, did allow 
spouses to inherit. The wife was even given the right to a division with the man’s relatives, if 
the couple had no children (SL.1). If they had children, she would acquire one lot along the 
same lines as the children did. When spouses did not inherit from each other, the chance of 
losing family property into another family by marriage or backwards inheritance was 
weakened. However, if the parents were first in line to inherit from their children, then the 
chance of such happening would be increased by backwards inheritance. As pointed out 
earlier in this chapter, concerns over these questions related mainly to the mother inheriting 
from a couple’s children. Both in the eastern and western provincial laws, the Swedish 
regulations have the mother inheriting before siblings or more distant paternal kin. In 
comparison with how backwards inheritance was addressed in the Visigothic law, the topic 
was afforded far greater discussion and extreme provisions in the Uppland Law and Östgöta 
                                                 
635 Holmbäck and Wessén, Svenska Landskapslagar V, p. 85 n. 19. 
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Law. Parents would inherit from their childless offspring, father first, then the mother 
(UL.Ä.14). In the Östgöta Law, a whole scenario of possible scenarios were elaborated. If a 
man died and the widow gave his heirs the property, but afterwards found out she was 
pregnant, the child would inherit from the man. If then the relative who already had received 
the inheritance would prevent losing it by killing the widow, and then after her burial, 
suspicion arose that she was murdered and pregnant, then the community would be obliged to 
dig up the dead woman and cut her guts in search of a foetus (Ögl.Ä.7). Those who killed 
their kindred would of course be deprived of inheriting from them (ÖgL.Dr.20). The 
hypothetical cases of serious accidents were also addressed, in poetic forms (ÖgL.Ä.6): ‘Um 
kull suarf ok kiolsuarf ok kulsuarf’ – ‘On childbed inheritance and keel inheritance and coal 
inheritance’.636 The names played on alliteration, but they concern the death of a whole family 
at once, in child bed, at sea or by fire. A problem in these cases was to determine who died 
first, the children or the parents, mother or father. The order of death had implications for the 
order of succession. The Östgöta Law would have witnesses or oathgivers on the case, 
deciding whether the father died before the child and the child before the mother, in this case 
making the mother’s kin rightful heirs to the father’s property.  
Burning or drowning together were the examples used in other western Scandinavian 
laws. It is natural to include such laws, because these were quite likely incidents in medieval 
society. However, such detailed focus was not found in inheritance laws from the earlier 
European legal cultures treated in this thesis. According to the older version of the Law of 
Västgötaland, two mutual heirs dying at the same time neutralised each other’s claim to 
inheritance (VgL.Ä.13). The rule refers to two men only, keeping in line with the male-
dominated language of the older Law of Västgötaland. If the men died in separate locations or 
together in the same house, if they burned or drowned simultaneously, then the law instructed 
that ‘nobody is the other’s heir’, suggesting each side should keep their property. The 
contemporary Norwegian Law of Frostathing concluded simply that if ‘everybody drowned or 
everybody burned’, the kindred should count as if they died at the same time (F.9.2). We find 
this again in the eastern laws, the Law of Uppland having somewhat less dramatic wordings 
on both pregnant buried widows and calamities than found in the Östgöta Law; if it was 
impossible to decide order of death, the families inherited their respective portions, the 
woman’s kin hers, the man’s kin his (UL.Ä.17), similar to the principles of ius recadentiae 
                                                 
636 Axel Olof Freudenthal, Östgötalagen med förklaringar. No. 29 , (Helsinki: Tidnings & tryckeri-aktiebolagets 
tryckeri, 1895), p. 139. 
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although applied in a specific context. The Hälsinge Law, too, decreed this solution in 
accordance with the Law of Uppland (HL.Ä.13). A child would have to be born alive, and in 
sound condition, to be an automatic heir, as we saw was the criterion in the Leges 
Visigothorum and also in the Danish material, on which it quite certainly was modelled.  
 The Swedish laws regarding inheritance clearly originated by transmission from the 
contemporary Scandinavian legal family. We can sense a forced introduction of inheritance 
rights to daughters, and as scholars have pointed out, a discussion of these principles within 
the landscapes, at the provincial assemblies, and among the families. The most probable 
direction of influence was Danish law, but it may also have come from acknowledging similar 
changes in Norwegian law. In the inheritance sections, the Swedish medieval provincial laws 
follow the systems and principles of neighbouring written law. The late origins of the sources 
makes it easy to point to Danish and Norwegian influences, outside the evident adjustments in 
accordance with canon law, on the process of putting Swedish law into writing. Eastern and 
southern Swedish landscapes have laws resembling the already existing Danish provincial 
laws. The western provinces together with Gotland have the same gradual system and 
patrilineal principles as we find in Norwegian laws. As we have seen, the same principles of 
giving equal inheritance rights to women and to representative grandchildren and so on are 
evident, and the reception may also have come from other European secular and canon legal 
sources, or from the contemporary scholarly ideology. 
 
Conclusion: Scandinavian inheritance laws  
Compared with the written laws treated earlier in this thesis, what stands out in the 
Scandinavian laws is the quantity of regulation stipulating a shared inheritance. The level of 
detail also surpasses European medieval law. So what signs of legal transmission appear in 
the inheritance sections of the Scandinavian laws? The similarities within each legal culture, 
and within the Scandinavian legal landscape, between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish legal 
cultures, is already well known and attested, when it comes to inheritance legislation. 
However, this examination of the laws proves that the respective laws should not be assumed 
the same, as Ole Fenger assumed. On the contrary, it has revealed distinct particularities 
together with close familiarity.  
Regarding the continuity of the work of the lawmen, one would assume a higher level 
of direct transmission between the three kingdoms’ laws. The members of the intellectual elite 
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had the same background, were educated in the same ideologies and should have constructed 
the same laws. That was not the case, and Vogt asserts that local and personal interests would 
influence the work of writing a legal corpus.637 The legal elite would not act as a unanimous 
group, but intellectual currents would reach many of them and influence their work, including 
that of advising a ruling king in his legislation. The contemporary legal influence from 
learned law may have interrupted any local harmonising of the provincial laws, and opened 
the way for individual adaptation to European influences. However, the common legal 
framework of European legal thought would in itself have had a harmonising effect on the 
provincial laws as outside influence. 
If we view the comparative likenesses in light of the hierarchy of probability, we still 
find evidence of transmission outside the obvious interdependence of the provincial codes in 
each kingdom. There was clear copying of inheritance laws within each legal culture, for 
instance from the Law of Scania to the Law of Jutland, and from the Law of Uppland to 
Hälsingeland. The two extant Norwegian provincial laws mirror each other both in contents 
and in construction, and were obviously written from the same design. Here the Law of 
Frostathing is younger, and thus in its surviving form appears as the copy of Gulathing. 
Although there are numerous diversities in the provincial laws, there are obvious similarities 
on a second level: composition, motivation, argument or basis; and on a third level: 
comprising of procedure or sentencing assessment and other contents. The similarities to each 
legal culture’s respective neighbour are mainly in principle and content, while the form and 
order of sequence were different, together with the motivations behind the rules. It is obvious 
that in the case of inheritance regulation in secular laws, the Scandinavian legislators had to 
respond to canonical teaching of particularly the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. Legislators 
also commented consciously on the ‘new’ inheritance laws in the thirteenth century, giving 
increased rights to women to share with men. The most important findings of transmission 
regarding legal concepts are on the level of motivation and basis, with the inheritance rights 
of daughters with sons. First of all, the daughter’s half-lot in the Danish laws can be compared 
with similar partitions in other secular law; both the Germanic and the early English laws 
treated above included regulations that either restricted or favoured daughters in relation to 
inheriting a portion of the property, regardless of whether brothers existed. This partitioned 
inheritance in several instances amounted to a third of the property. My argument is that the 
Scandinavian secular laws were influenced by the opportunity to maintain the family property 
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by simultaneously giving women inheritance rights. The principle of allowing women rights 
was probably an influence from canon law, although we also saw in the Lombard laws 
arguments based on justice and reason for why women should inherit. The principle of giving 
women a half-lot was introduced as a novelty to the late-thirteenth century laws in Sweden 
and Norway. These may have been a transmission from similar sources, although it is more 
likely that a borrowing of the Danish principle caused the change, which itself was a 
continutation of older European legal principles. 
Of the particularities in the content, we see that the level of detail in the Norwegian 
material cannot be retrieved in the Swedish. Such detail corresponded with Roman law texts, 
and transmission of Roman law into Visigothic law. It is possible that these descriptions of 
kin were a model for Norwegian provincial laws. The consistent application of half-lots 
throughout the inheritance system in Danish laws stands out from the two other kingdoms. 
Further, the Swedes had other content which stands out from the rest of the Scandinavian 
material. However, there were several instances of similar wording within the rules of 
different provincial laws, as in the discussion of order of death. The interest in problems such 
as determining the order of deaths, and the dramatic solutions posed to disputes suggested in 
some of the material, can be said to have local origins. It is also possible that the 
particularities of the Swedish law derived from influences from other sources outside the 
scope of this thesis. Other researchers have pointed to potential influences on Scandinavian 
laws and culture from Russian or eastern law.638 
There was clear reception of Norwegian law in the provincial laws from Västgötaland, 
as others already have identified. The proximity of the region to Norwegian landscapes and 
the weakness of the Swedish state makes such contact only natural, as the province could 
equally identify with their western neighbours as with the Swedes. What is more interesting is 
the fact that the other western provincial laws, the Östgöta Law and the Law of Gotland, do 
not share the same familiarity with the Norwegian laws, although they include the same 
content. Rather, the Östgöta Law distinguish itself as containing the most peculiar original 
legislation of inheritance when it comes to elaboration and examples, although the topics 
within inheritance legislation were the same.  
The Scandinavian laws also reveal that they contain both original material and 
influences from European legal culture. We can find influences of canon and Roman law in 
                                                 
638 Helena Bodin, Bruken av Bysans: studier i svenskspråkig litteratur och kultur 1948-71, (Skellefteå, 2011).; 
Landro, ‘Kristenrett og kyrkjerett’, pp. 50-51, 62 on the Norwegian rules for rites of baptism compared with the 
Russian and Armenian rules in the Middle Ages. 
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the legislators’ motives to control inheritance. Even so, we see that the legal elite in 
Scandinavia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries also produced law in response to European 
legal influences. Inheritance laws in the western Nordic region contained strong patrilineal 
elements to frustrate the forces of equal distribution represented by canon law and Roman 
law. This is an example supporting Legrand’s theory on how legal transmission only happens 
with adaptation to the new legal culture, while still not being able to avoid influence from 








9. Compensation for Homicide and Secular Law  
 
The present chapter will primarily discuss the concept of compensation in general and what 
the institution of compensation was in medieval law. The theories discussed will form the 
basis for my survey of the sources in the following chapter. Additionally, it is necessary to 
place the crime of homicide and the legislation thereon into context, by discussing the motives 
behind secular legislation on private violence. 
 Compensation appeared as a solution to homicide, and many other wrongdoings, in 
most of the medieval secular laws. We can view the institution of compensation in many 
ways. First of all, it is a question of whether compensation should be regarded as punishment 
or compensation in the view of the legislator. Was the required sum a punishment of the 
killer, or compensation to the victim for the loss? The most obvious answer would be to see 
the required compensation as an equivalent loss for the offence done, although this is only an 
equivalent translated into worldly values and without consideration for the human loss. We 
should view the institution of compensation in light of Lex talionis and the formulated 
principles of ‘a life for a life, an eye for an eye’ from Exodus.639 The law of talion is also 
found in the Code of Hammurabi (§196-197), and has been interpreted as its underlying 
principle.640 The point of the principles in the law of talion was to curb excessive punishment 
and to give proportionate punishment.641 In our material on compensation for homicide, the 
proportional measure was between the deed and the restoration. The notion of taking a life for 
a life, and executing the killer, might be more in line with compensating the human loss. 
Compensation as equivalent loss must then satisfy the experience of injustice felt by the 
injured party, and be in proportion to the loss. Herein lies the concept of compensation as 
pacifying tool, which is another way of interpreting compensation: as a tool for avoiding 
vengeance. It is also the aspect of settlement by compensation that legal historians have 
emphasised as important: compensation for offences to prevent further violence.642 The sum 
would stop the injured party seeking vengeance for the misdeed. A disproportionate revenge 
would similarly throw the settlement out of balance. The continued acts of vengeance would 
                                                 
639 Exodus 21:23–27, and similar in Leviticus 24:19 and Deuteronomy 19:21. 
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641 Fenger, Fejde og Mandebod, pp.186-87; Tikva Frymer-Kensky, ‘Tit for Tat: The Principle of Equal 
Retribution in Near Eastern and Biblical Law’, The Biblical Archaeologist (Autumn, 1980), pp. 230-34.  
642 Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings; Drew, Lombard Laws, pp. 25-27.  
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be the feud, which we know from medieval literature and in particular associate with Frankish 
society and the Norse societies of the Middle Ages. Stefan Esders is sceptical about such an 
interpretation, arguing that it disregards the complexities of the legal thought behind the 
regulation, and also portrays a horrible, violence-ridden society.643 However, scholarly 
research does prove that, more often than not, vengeance or feud was an option not easily 
achieved.644 To ‘take back’, to use the terms of Irish legislation, is in its simplest form about 
obtaining justice.645 More complex vengeance would include restoring the honour of the dead 
and/or its family, and would furthermore have many kinds of messages incorporated into it.646 
The early continental legislation, as well as the early law of the Nordic regions, which was not 
produced by kings, treated compensation as conflict resolution. Compensation would be a 
solution to conflict between parties, and in the end, a tool to keep the peace. That could 
explain why compensation was prominent in laws that also contained much legislation on 
vengeance and responsibility of kinship. Roman authority would, at least in theory, be 
powerful enough to decree punishment instead of resolutions. Likewise, the Roman legal 
system would, again in theory, be sophisticated enough to execute justice without negotiating 
peace between the parties. As elaborated on in chapter 2, the legal systems of the successor 
states, the early English and Nordic kingdoms, were not. 
Yet a different angle is to view the compensation as restoration of the potential 
productivity through work of the dead or injured, as an economic compensation. This theory 
is more in line with the contested institution of brideprice, where the family of the bride 
received a price for the loss of her potential productivity when she left the family.647 Although 
this is a materialistic approach to the legal system, we should not overlook the economic 
impact of the death of a family member. It is also possible that the legal elite would be able to 
reckon the value of a life more easily in economic terms than in terms of honour or 
punishment. A better approach when considering the motives behind legislation is to be 
receptive to considering a combination of these theories of what the compensation for 
homicide represented to the legislator. 
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 An extension of the materialistic view is to interpret the system of paying 
compensation as the mark of lacking central authority.648 The responsibility of kin to 
contribute to the payment was a means of stalling violence through internal justice. The 
sharing of the compensation by the victim’s family would then be means of avoiding further 
enmity, pacifying the relatives’ responsibility to take vengeance. Thus, compensation has 
been interpreted as the legal system that emerges in a kin-based society with little legal 
authority. It is nevertheless an important point that the existence of feud does not mean the 
absence of the state, even if the absence of the state often resulted in the existence of feud. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the regulations on wergild that we find in secular law were 
a utilisation of the feud, to institutionalise modes of conflict into the legal system and thereby 
control it.649 More than any other, the secular sources reveal that state authority acknowledged 
the existence of vengeance and even made it a part of the legal system. Likewise, 
compensation as a legal solution was an integrated part of the legal system and written law, 
possibly incorporated to the benefit of legislating secular authority. 
 
9.1 The European concept of wergild 
In several sources, compensation was given in terms of wergild, directly or indirectly. The 
definition of the term wergeld or wergild is the worth of a man’s life in the Germanic 
languages. The etymology stems from wer=man, and geld=payment/money, (et. Vir:Lat, 
wer:Germ, Gield:AS, gyld:AS, giolld:ON). However, wergild was not the only term used to 
define the worth of a life in the legal sources. Burgundian law applied the Latin pretium with 
signification of ‘payment’, ‘recompense’ and ‘punishment’. However, the worth of a man’s 
life would frequently be used to stipulate an appropriate fine for an offence, or as a 
resolution.650 For instance, Lisi Oliver has shown how compensation for physical injuries 
would also be stipulated in relation to the wergild.651 In this thesis, the term 'wergild' will be 
used for where the legal sources stipulate the worth of a man. 
 We usually distinguish between the fines in the laws paid to the treasury for crimes, 
and the compensation for death or injury to people or livestock paid to the kin or to associates, 
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and therefore ‘personal’.652 To pay compensation was in many ways a private settlement 
between the parties, but secular authority wanted to regulate matters of homicide, violence 
and injury. This was a part of the consolidation of power, to have power over violence and 
justice and to control conflict settlement. The treatment of compensation and wergild in 
written secular law, and attempts to define the process in cases of private violence, reveal that 
authorities wanted to take part in conflict settlement. Furthermore, direct compensation to the 
insulted side does not exclude that the deed may have been an insult to the population as a 
whole, and that authority would need to build a self-image of control of violence and unrest, 
to have legitimacy.653 Even so, there were strong economic motivations for introducing or 
continuing monetary settlement in law, and for putting this into writing. 
 Moreover, we must see the use of wergild as being founded in the belief of the value 
of human life in and of itself. The high sums had preventive effect, but they were based on the 
wergild (regardless of terminology). With this basis on the wergild, the compensation could 
be half wergild or double wergild or other fractions and multiplications. As the sources will 
reveal, we also find in the rules a highly differentiated system of prices according to status, 
gender and age. Nevertheless, all compensation stipulated was costly. It is possible that it was 
considered unrealistic for those other than the nobility to pay it.654 
 Where did the concept of wergild and the institution of compensation come from? 
There are usually three explanations both in written law and in modern scholarship: as 
originally Germanic, a necessity of weak central power, or a product of the Church. 
Compensation in the laws appears as the original Germanic contribution to law, as Oliver and 
Stefan Esders have argued.655 Usually, this theory is argued based on the lack of evidence of a 
concept of wergild and compensation as a solution in Roman law. The concept of setting 
compensation for different deeds was firmly present in the Germanic laws by the time they 
were put into writing. It was an institution of medieval secular law, and a method of 
settlement in the continental, English and Nordic legislation from the fifth to the fourteenth 
century. In particular, it was the solution most applied for conflict resolution and punishment 
in the laws treating violence and offences against other people within the community. To set 
compensation for offences might have been a developing institution at this point.  
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We should also remember that the early attempts to ‘mend the law’ were responses to, 
or in some cases, inspired by Roman law. However, Roman legislation, to a large extent, 
lacks compensatory conflict resolutions. The absence of such is normally interpreted as a 
reflection of the powerful legal system of Roman provincial authority.656 On the other hand, 
compensation is often interpreted as an expression of kin-based societies and of weak or less 
‘cultivated’ ruling systems.657 The existence of what seems to be compensation for homicide 
in Tacitus’s Germania underpins such arguments.658 He mentioned a certain satisfactio that 
was the redress of wrongdoings. In recent years, scholars have begun to see the legal system 
and the system of feud as interconnected instead. For instance, Paul Hyams has criticised the 
theory that compensation is a sign of a weak state, and opt scholars to ‘discern the 
legitimating norms through which feuds were waged’.659 These more refined approaches to 
studying law and violence foster more complex understanding of both the legislation and 
medieval society. Violence, vengeance and feuding existed within the legal territories, as it 
did in the law, and so did compensation as an alternative to further violence. 
 Another theory – which is not mutually exclusive – is that the payment of 
compensation was encouraged by Christian authority in the unstable period from the fifth to 
the seventh century, all while the first Germanic legislation developed. Ole Fenger maintained 
that the compensatory system seen in early English legislation originated in the teachings of 
guilt by the Church and the emphasis on guilt (culpa) in canon law.660 He saw the minor 
participation of the kinsmen as a sign of assigning guilt to the active individual, away from 
kinship responsibility. This would be the wish of the Church and of royal authority, not a sign 
of deteriorating kinship structures. Fenger points to the similar development in Scandinavia 
several centuries after Æthelbert’s legislation.661 Nordic kings made the law in the same 
environment of a developing church organisation. While the Church in England was at a 
different stage of its development in 602 than it was around the reign of, for instance, 
Æthelred, it was nevertheless regaining an earlier position, not starting on virgin land. The 
Roman imperial presence had introduced Christianity to the island before its withdrawal in 
410, and it seems that, to some degree, the religion had some continuity among the inhabitants 
of the British island after the disappearance of the Roman legions. In terms of Christian 
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authority, the restoration was prompted and urged by Christian writers, like Augustine.662 It is 
worth noting that Christianity was not unknown in the Nordic countries either before 
Christianity was accepted or imposed. Cultural contact by trade, warfare and migration 
exposed the northerners to the teachings of the cross in the centuries before the religion 
gained domination in the region.663 These regions apparently knew both Christianity and 
wergild before the law was written down, but it is not possible to determine whether 
Christianity fostered ideas of compensation as a potential solution. Rather, it makes sense to 
assert that compensation was a legal solution which evolved because it was a reasonable 
solution to conflict. 
Connections between compensation in secular legislation and the provisions of the 
Church can be established in later English legislation, too; in the lengthy introduction to his 
compilation of laws, King Alfred of Wessex (r. 871-899) explains that after Christianity 
spread, synods were assembled throughout the world by bishops and wise men. Here ‘they 
then established, for that mercy which Christ taught, that secular lords might with their 
permission receive without sin compensation in money for almost every misdeed at the first 
offence (…); only for treachery to a lord they dared not declare any mercy’ (Alf.int.49.7).664 
The section tells of treachery as the only non-compensational offence, and of compensation 
being a solution that was too merciful. The intent of the author of the introduction could just 
as well be both to wash the king’s his hands of prosecution of enemies and to prosper through 
fines from the legal system.665 Still, the statement that clergy could give absolution to secular 
authority for extracting fines is interesting, and suggests a connection, or the notion that there 
might have been a connection, between Church teachings and compensation in secular law. 
However, whether it would be considered merciful at all times, as the law of Alfred gives the 
impression it was, is doubtful. The sizes of the sums demanded for homicide were indeed 
large. The Church was obviously connected with developing the institution of compensation, 
also in secular law. The institution of compensation is synchronous with the ideology of early 
medieval Christianity on humanity and responsibility.666 The origin and aspect of punishment 
in the institution of compensation will be further discussed in the following chapters in the 
context of the legal sources. 
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 We must see compensation as a combination of punishment and restoration, but 
maybe most of all as prevention for offences together with implementation of the notion of 
the value of life. A life should not be cheap. We can also view compensation as a practical 
solution to conflict resolution, where other alternatives were impossible or less functional, for 
instance, imprisonment.  
Presumably, compensation was a tradition in the separate legal cultures. For that 
reason, it was what Koselleck called the horizon of expectation with both the legal elite and 
subjects within the legal culture that compensatory settlements should become part of written 
law.667 The legislators may have had the opportunity to omit compensation from the leges, but 
they chose not to.  
 
9.2 Authority and private violence  
How can law on compensation express how medieval authorities dealt with private violence? 
The regions included in this survey coincide to a large degree with forming states, and were 
chosen specifically for this reason. Whether the consolidation process was successful or not, 
or the unities lasted, the laws can be seen in light of the authorities’ power to regulate 
interaction between its subjects during consolidation, of which the laws were a part of the 
authorities’ attempts to demonstrate their power. These were kingdoms in the Latin sphere, 
but it is arguable whether they deserved the label ‘state’ at all times. In chapter 1, I applied the 
medievalist equivalent of the Weberian definition of state to define the constitution of 
medieval territorial units.668 According to this theory, the authority would claim common 
territorial boundaries of a region, and would claim monopoly on taxation of the citizens and, 
most important here, would have a monopoly on the use of violence within the state. The 
medieval authorities promulgating the laws discussed in this thesis had different opportunities 
and approaches to controlling violence within their borders. In some of the regions presented, 
we can discuss whether any central authority existed behind the law. For instance, this is 
debatable in Scandinavia, particularly in Norway and Sweden, where the establishment of 
kingship was a protracted process.669 There were also varying ideas of boundaries and access 
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to taxation, but the claims were nevertheless present. We could as such treat these kingdoms 
as forming states, even if their executive power was uneven or non-existant.  
 Most of the legal sources treated here include compensation as the solution in cases of 
violence, before public corporal punishment. We can interpret compensation as a tool for 
avoiding vengeance used by secular authority, but vengeance need not have been the 
anticipated alternative. The ideal of restoring equilibrium is perhaps closer to the motives 
behind the institution of compensation. Moreover, monetary punishments could produce an 
income for the ruling government. Fines in excess of the wergild were prescribed in some 
laws; in others, the full compensation was shared between the king and victim according to a 
specified ratio. We rarely see substantial additional fines in the law in legal cultures without 
royal authority. In the early phases of formation of the Norwegian and Swedish states, the 
assembly (þing) acted independently from the king. The same is found in the age of the 
Icelandic republic, when there was no king, where the assembly acted as the government. A 
fine in addition to compensation was not part of the written law. In the Swedish laws, the 
province received the public fine. It would nevertheless be in the interest of centralised power 
to keep this type of settlement, as it would be more profitable than costly public displays of 
punishment. 
 When discussing transmission of law and influences on the legal elite, we see that the 
concept of talionis and the discussion of accepting violent or peaceful means was part of the 
intellectual trends of early and high medieval Europe. Augustine accepted reprisals against 
killers, although he encouraged people to await patiently for the vengeance of God.670 Thus, 
vengeance was just, but degraded. He even had his interlocutor Evodius say: ‘The law of the 
people merely institutes penalties sufficient for keeping the peace among ignorant human 
beings, and only to the extent that their actions can be regulated by human government’.671 To 
what degree did these trends permeate the legislative work? 
 Roman law did not interfere in conflicts between individuals or families, as a 
mediator. Crimes like homicide were a public matter, and the law did not acknowledge 
private actions, like settlements or vengeance, in any such matters.672 On the other hand, 
Germanic law revolved around the possibility of re-establishing peace between the parties 
through arrangements for the settlement between parties.673 Thus, it focused on re-establishing 
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peace within the community. The institution of paying compensation has thereby often been 
viewed by modern scholars as the result of a ‘less developed’ central power, a less 
consolidated power, less able to enforce ‘proper’ punishment.674 However, some see other 
features in the system of solving conflicts through payments: for instance, Jolowicz maintains 
that the development of composition was a development of liability, and ‘the germ of 
contract’.675 In his critique of legal historians’ teleological view on state and feud, Wallace-
Hadrill asserted that compensation existed before the powerful state, and continued to exist 
after the state emerged.676 He also recognised that the feud existed as well. In studies of feud 
and vengeance in the last half-century, historians have seen compensation as a peace-keeping 
tool, not necessarily equivalent with a weak legal authority.677 The so-called ‘peace project’ 
and the crime of breaking the peace are central to the authorities’ take on regulating violence, 
including homicide. The opportunity to take part in these regulations could itself indicate a 
certain degree of state consolidation.678 
 From the late-tenth century, an active church movement originating in southern France 
sought to advance ideologies of peace in society, the Peace of God.679 The Church evolved in 
Western Europe as a state in a world of feudal anarchy, but even so, it would be in the 
Church’s interest to keep the peace in society. 680 A stable society was in the interest of the 
Church not at least because of its dependence on landed property.681 As keeper of the peace, 
the clergy were equipped with tools of imposing penance, fines and excommunication. Late 
Roman legal authority accepted the division of a separate legal system for the clergy.682 
However, the inclusion of secular cases before the canonical court developed in the early 
Middle Ages, both materialistically and ideologically. Gregory of Tours portrayed a violent 
Frankish society and leadership, but still warned agitators of civil war that ‘without peace you 
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have not the grace of God’.683 The Church had the opportunity to condemn, but it had few 
tools at its disposal to execute earthly punishments, other than opposing violence and 
demanding fines.684 Secular authority represented the power to uphold the interests of the 
Church, as Augustine admits. 
 The ideology of King’s Peace follows the same ideology, making the king protector of 
the peace and the authority to demand peace. Thus, a breach of the peace would be a breach 
against the king’s law, and in itself a serious crime. The ideology evolved into the concept of 
the rex iustus, the king as embodiment of justice and protector of good law. According to 
these ideas of a peace, homicide constituted a crime against the king’s peace. Important in the 
role as rex iustus was the ability to enforce law, but so was the capability to give just law. The 
royal legislator would mirror his honour in the laws of his kingdom. As such, we must read 
the inclusion of compensation for homicide in law as an expression of an acknowledgement 
that this was a just solution, even if the motives may have been more pragmatic or 
materialistic. In this way, secular laws were influenced by the peace movement. 
 To have legitimate power, secular authority had to check violence, particularly in the 
form of homicide.685 The extreme version of homicide, premeditated murder, was non-
compensational in many secular laws and was punished with exile, execution or other 
measures. The fact that this criminal action was considered unable to be compensated for can 
be explained with premeditated murder being considered a crime against the people among 
whom the murderer lived, and against their lord: i.e., it was a public offence. To make amends 
was not enough to create equilibrium in the affected community; the murderer had to leave 
society. Following, the feature of compensating for homicide, both intentional (but not 
premeditated) and accidental, implies that legislators considered homicide not uncommon, 
and an act that could be solved with relative peaceful measures. The compensational penalty 
would be a tool for avoiding further violence, by paying back for the loss of life at its material 
value. Hence, it was in this management tool of the secular state authority that we find – at 
least in high medieval law – a peacekeeping measure. This raises further questions about how 
we interpret the legal rules on the satisfaction of the family of a homicide victim; do the 
legislators portray the family as victims of a crime or possible avengers? As poor wronged 
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relatives or raging feuders? The presentation in law of the recipients of compensation will be 
discussed in the following survey of the sources. 
 Let us return to the question introduced at the start of this chapter, on how to interpret 
compensation given in written law, as punishment or compensation in light of the state 
authority as legislator. An aspect of the historiography is the tendency to view conflict 
resolution in early medieval law, for instance compensation, as agreement, while the laws of 
the more organised states of the twelfth century brought in the notions of crime and 
punishment. Traditionally, compensation in early medieval law has been interpreted as 
agreement, as in works by Pollock and Maitland in their conception of Norman legal authority 
in England after the Conquest, among others. 686 They categorised Anglo-Saxon and Norman 
law in line with this distinction, that is, of the concept of punishing a criminal replacing the 
idea of settling a conflict with restoration of equilibrium. In this interpretation lies a reading 
of the early medieval legal system as mediator of the parties in a conflict, while that of 
Norman England was authoritative and executive.687 Historians who do not subscribe to this 
distinction have countered such a view since.688 The anthology edited by Wendy Davies and 
Paul Fouracre, The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe, do not use this 
distinction for the early medieval period. Rather, the authors point out the ‘absence of any real 
distinction between civil and criminal cases’.689 Patrick Wormald asserted that the concept 
was a misinterpretation of early English Law, and dismissed the idea that crime had its origin 
in Norman legal dominance, while early law consisted of the concept of torts.690 We should 
understand the methods of conflict resolution in medieval law within its context, as a possible 
form of punishment. The legislator’s concept of the violence that brought about the need for 
compensation was that the action was a crime; it was a violation against society and tried 
tackled by written law. The presence of violence and homicide did not exclude condemnation 
of it, or the desire to live peacefully. 
 Does the legislation on private violence express a dialectic dialogue between the legal 
elite and the subjects of law? The lack of sources to settlements of this kind makes it difficult 
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to clearly establish statistical knowledge on whether settlements usually involved amounts of 
compensation much higher than those we find stipulated in the laws, or whether they were 
lower. The prescribed tariffs are quite steep, but then again, the topic of regulation was 
killing. It is possible that the conflict settlement most used in a region would be making peace 
by public display of remorse or doing penance in a religious context, as Burchard of Worms 
was an agent for.691 Vengeance may still have been preferred, sought or expected by the 
offended party though, or anticipated by the community.  
 
9.3 Principles of compensation in secular laws 
Would the use of compensation in written law signify that the legislators expected local 
settlements of cases, or that official courts, or in the last resort the king himself, took on the 
task of passing judgment on whether compensation was the correct solution? If so, what 
determined the size of the sum to be paid in secular laws, and to whom? The institution of 
compensation as a tool of conflict resolution is complex and diverse, although the main points 
are common regardless of period or geographic location: someone had killed another and the 
relatives or associates of the victim would receive compensation valued according to a certain 
system of stipulation. Afterwards, those compensated should theoretically bear no further 
resentment towards the killer, and the killer should not be the object of retaliation of any sort. 
Some vital details concerning compensation are usually included in written laws. Some 
indicate the anticipated giver and recipient of the compensation, the amount of compensation 
and the time frame in which the transfer should be carried out. The sums found in the 
normative material were of substantial sizes, at least for the average family. The prescribed 
sums were also given in gold and silver, which most people did not possess. 
 In this survey of transmission of law on compensation for homicide, I shall primarily 
consider four specific features in the laws: The given value, the distribution, the conditions 
and the designated nature of the compensation. The first is the stipulation of the 
compensation, i.e., the legally prescribed value recompensed for a life. This involves how the 
legislator assessed the value of a life, and what criteria were used in law to differentiate 
between the subjects. Interesting factors here include the gender and age of the person killed, 
together with social standing, all of which was reflected in the price of the victim’s life. 
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Moreover, in light of transmission of law, the concurrence or differences of the wergild 
between the laws sheds light on their interdependence. 
It lies within the scope of this thesis to examine how compensation was paid and 
received, which relates to the second feature. Was the killer alone obliged to produce the sum, 
or did the relatives also share responsibility? To what degree of kinship did this responsibility 
extend in such regulations? On the other hand, it is interesting to see which relatives in the 
victim’s circle, according to the law, were to be compensated. It might aid further research on 
the topic to see how descriptions of the involved parties on both sides reflect the inheritance 
system found in the same laws. Were only closely related family the natural recipients, or 
were more distant relatives and associates also included? The level of detail in describing the 
people involved on both sides is also interesting regarding legal transmission. Were particular 
relatives of the killer obliged to contribute to the compensation, and why these and not others? 
Some laws are silent on the matter, and others designate recipients of the compensation. 
Comparing the results from the separate laws will reveal whether these descriptions reflect 
other secular law.  
Thirdly, as with the conditions of the victim, the conditions of the homicide affected 
some legislators’ stipulation of the compensation. As with the distinction between murder and 
homicide, the time, place and course of events are suggested in some rules as a possible 
indicator of the motivations behind the crime. To the legislator, the killer was assumed to be a 
male. As in the previous chapters on inheritance systems, secular legal sources usually 
describe the main character in the masculine form. Most laws include specific rules in cases 
where the homicide was committed by a woman, with consequences different to those for a 
man. The punishment for a female killer could be either harsher and more lenient than for a 
male, depending on the situation.  
 Lastly, the legislator's motivations, if stated, behind the rules on homicide may shed 
light on the question of how the legislator viewed compensation as a solution – whether the 
payment should primarily be seen as punishment or compensation. Do the separate laws 
concur on this matter? Other crimes considered as severe as homicide will be examined when 
relevant. These comprise a group treated similarly in many laws: adultery, theft and treason. 
Moreover, a brief look at these types of crime, which also gave rise to compensation, can 
provide further enlightenment on compensation for homicide. 
 The size of the compensation would, in any instance, be difficult to convert into 
graspable figures today, even more so in terms of converting the currencies used by each 
jurisdiction and comparing them. Likewise, it is problematic to compare amounts in similar 
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currencies at different points of time. Inflation, shortages and the value of gold and silver 
would all influence the standard value of any price. Furthermore, prices would be influenced 
by – and might even reflect – the milieu in which they were stipulated. Troublesome times, 
unrest and war would influence the value of a life and the power of the claimant. We can 
imagine that the structure of society, whether under a stable, powerful authority or more kin-
based, would play a role in anticipated and legislated compensation. In regions in which the 
king or lord had the legal power to demand part of the compensation or a fine, we could look 
at whether the size of the share to the wounded party might be reduced. We can find such a 
correlation in the stated duties of kin to contribute to compensation and the right to receive 
compensation.692 In contrast to a kin-based society in which internal justice ruled, the threat of 
vengeance or outlawry might push expectations of the size of compensation higher. But 
would this leave its trace in the normative material? It is challenging to see if the 
compensation stipulated for homicide reflects the price demanded, or whether conflict 
resolution through the transmission of wealth was as widespread as the law would lead us to 
believe. We can also question whether the parties, relatives or individuals involved were able 
to produce the sometimes immensely high sums demanded, and whether these sums were 
realistic pointers to real settlements or whether they have only a symbolic value. In light of 
legal transmission, a comparison of the value of these sums can reveal similarities both in 
case of symbolic or realistic compensation. A comparison of the wergild and fines in the 
separate laws should provide an idea of what these sums represent in writing. A method of 
solving the problem is through comparison of what the sums symbolised for the lawmakers 
and what the sum's proportion was within each jurisdiction compared with those in other 
jurisdictions. Similarities and differences in the sums can in themselves point to the existence 
and direction of legal transmission in medieval secular law.  
 
Conclusion 
The following chapters are an analysis of how the legal sources present compensation for 
homicide, and to what degree we can see traces of legal transmission in the laws on homicide. 
The questions raised above will be foci in the survey: was compensation considered a 
punishment or a tool of conflict resolution, restitution for loss of life or a pacifier? Who were 
                                                 
692 Karl Wührer, ‘Mansbot – Danmark’, in KLNM 11, p. 332. Wührer also mentions the attempts of Danish kings 
and the Church to minimise the common duties of the kin, which probably did not result in substantial change, 
since complaints about the burden of paying compensation for relatives were still extant in the sixteenth century. 
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the recipients of compensation, and how were they represented? What can we draw from the 
anticipated size of the compensation for homicide? First, it is important to establish to what 
degree homicide was to be settled with compensation according to secular law, and the next 
chapter begins chronologically with Roman law, which reputedly did not contain 






10. Compensation and homicide in Roman and Germanic Laws 
 
When studying legal transmission, signs of transmission in the Germanic laws from Roman 
law is anticipated. However, Roman law principally did not have compensation as an 
institution, while in the Germanic laws compensation was a main principle. Because of this 
contrast, an initial comparison of the two legal cultures is interesting even beyond the 
chronological structure of this thesis. Juxtaposing the known Roman law, which lacks 
compensation for homicide, with the Germanic laws modelled on Roman law can, shed light 
on those aspects of the law that were original in the Germanic legislation, while also 
providing some answers as to the degree that the legislation on compensation was originally 
Germanic, and the degree to which Roman law was devoid of this type of solution to 
violence. 
 
10.1 The crime of homicide in Roman law 
In Roman legal history, the principle of homicide as a crime against the state apparently 
became part of Roman legal culture at a very early stage under the republic.693 This crime 
would be subject to public trial and punishment and was not to be resolved by private 
settlement. In this case, homicide meant an intended and unlawful act, if not premeditated. 
Accidents causing death were a different matter and were apparently treated much more 
leniently. However, in the initial years of the Roman Republic, before homicide was seen as a 
crime against the state, early republican legislation on homicide was formed along the same 
lines as it later was in the medieval law. In this respect, William Smith pointed out that the 
term parricidium could refer to homicide in the meaning of intentionally killing in general, 
not necessarily killing family members or a head of state.694 In the early republic, according to 
George Mousourakis, the victim’s kin was left to punish the perpetrator by vengeance and 
apparently was expected to do so.695 Mousourakis believes this custom to have been so rooted 
in the legal culture that it resulted in the initiation of prosecution lying in the hands of the 
family of the person killed, even after the state court acknowledged the crime as grievous. 
Nevertheless, in the extant law from the second century BC onwards, it was a crime against 
                                                 
693 William Smith, A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (London: John Murray, 1875), p. 687, entry: 
De sicariis et veneficis. 
694 Ibid. 
695 Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, p. 208 n. 37. 
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the state. The law neither encouraged vengeance directly nor mentioned vengeance as a 
possible outcome, except in the case of an adulterous daughter or wife (D.48.5.21–22, 
D.48.5.25–26). The terms ultio – revenge – and inultio – not revenged, or not punished – 
appear in the laws on hereditary rights in relation to claims to succeed those killed 
(C.6.35.1,6,7,9, 9.9.27). Similar verbs are ulsiscor, punire and vindicare.696 However, the 
meanings of these are to seek vengeance by law or through the court. These imperial 
constitutions date mainly from the third century and appear part of the contemporary 
discourse, rather than touching upon anything latent in the legal system. To kill someone in 
self-defence or if enraged by a sexual assault would, however, constitute extenuating 
circumstances (D.48.8.1.3–5). 
 Because of the difference between the later laws of Latinised medieval Europe and 
Roman law regarding compensation as conflict resolution, it is of interest to search for any 
notions of compensation in Roman law. As it happens, the ideology of retribution existed. 
Indeed, compensation was introduced in early Roman legal culture. We find in lex Aquilia, 
from 286 BC, legislation on compensation for damage to property and the killing of beasts or 
slaves belonging to another person (D.9.2.2.2, D.9.2.27.5).697 Still, this refers to wrongful 
damage and not to compensation for causing death. Nonetheless, it implies that the principle 
of restoration after injury was part of Roman legal thinking. Roman jurist Gaius (c. AD 130–
180) asserts that the lex Aquilia is the origin of the Damni iniuriae actio (Gai.3.210, 
Gai.3.217), the right of compensation for the killing of these ‘properties’ done with dolus – 
intent - or culpa - neglect. This compensation was included in Justinian’s Institutiones in the 
sixth century (I.4.3). Similarly, Gaius points out that The Twelve Tables stipulated fixed 
compensation for injury, and that this was quite low due to the ‘extensive poverty of the time’ 
(Gai.3.223). Again, these were included in Justinian’s Institutiones, with the follow-up that 
this small penalty had become obsolete, replaced by a penalty introduced by the praetors, 
where the injured could demand a chosen sum, which the judge decided on according to status 
of the complainant (I.4.4.7). Apparently compensation for damage, loss and injury had been a 
part of the Roman legal system, or had become a more prominent solution in the late Roman 
                                                 
696 Examples of these verbs used in the meaning of avenging, although through the public court not through 
private violence, include C.1.19.1, C.2.40.1, C.6.6.7, C.6.35.9, C.6.40.2. 
697 Robinson, Sources of Roman Law, p. 30; Mousourakis Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, p. 58. See also 
Pauli sententiae 1.15, in Ulpiani liber singularis regularum, Pauli libri quinqué sententiarum, fragmenta minora 




legal culture, as argued by Lehman.698 Justinian also awarded compensation to victims of rape 
from the property of the rapist (Nov.150). Rape had earlier – at least in law – been equally 
judgmental of the victim as of the perpetrator (CTh.9.24.1). Constantine’s notorious rule of 
disinheriting raped daughters and executing assistants to rape was severe, but should possibly 
be seen as part of his programme to ensure family morality.699 Justinian’s revision and 
condemnation of other resolutions to rape (such as marriage, disinheritance and honour 
killings) must be seen as a legal improvement to the ruling of state (Nov.143).  
 Roman legal culture was originally founded on the principle of talionis, retaliation, as 
we see in the examples from the Twelve Tables on injury, explained by Gaius (G.3.223). In 
the examples of acts leading to compensation above, we also notice that compensation is 
considered punishment (poena) and not merely compensation.700 Interesting, too, is that the 
commentators from the third century and the sixth century considered the old punishments 
cheap. The version included in the Institutiones explains that the injured would estimate his or 
her own value, and that it would be considerably higher.  
Furthermore, the concept of ‘condemnatio semper pecuniaria’ existed, which 
stipulated that the sentence would be given in money and not the actual restoration of the 
subject of dispute.701 This is a concept of compensation, but for damaged property rather then 
for violence. The concept was based on the principle that the one suing would be awarded a 
sum corresponding to the value of the lost or damaged property. The sum would be imposed 
on the person convicted, who could pay it voluntarily or through the confiscation of property. 
Jurist Paulus in the early third century explained that capital offences would be punished with 
death or exile, whereas other criminal acts would be punished with a fine or corporal 
punishment (D.48.1.2). The fine would not be proper compensation for the victim of a crime, 
but a punishment providing income for the public. The fines to be levied for the benefit of the 
Roman treasury were stipulated as high sums, such as we see in, for instance, the Codex, with 
ceilings from a sixth-pound of gold to fifty pounds of gold for serious crimes (C.1.54). The 
fines would go directly to the treasury, according to a constitution given in 384 (C1.54.5). 
                                                 
698 Esders, ‘“Eliten” und “Strafrecht”’, p. 262; further references to Walter Lehmann, Über die Vermögensstrafen 
des römischen Rechts. Eine rechtshistorische Studie (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter Incorporated, 1904). Not 
available. 
699 Grubbs, ‘Constantine and Imperial Legislation’, pp. 130, 138-40. 
700 Gai institutions, or Institutes of Roman Law by Gaius, ed. by Edward Poste, Edward Arthur Whittuck and 
Abel Hendy Jones Greenidge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), p. 427. 
701 Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, Erster Abschnitt: Das altrömische, das vorklassische und das 
klassische Recht, in Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Rechtsgeschichte des Altertums, vol. 10, 3.3.1 
(Munich: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1955), pp. 408-10. 
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 Nevertheless, these laws tell only of injury and not homicide. Homicide was an 
offence against the public, together with treason, adultery, embezzlement from authority, the 
forgery of wills, tampering with the corn supply, extortion and election fraud, as summed up 
by the third-century jurist Marcian (D.48.1.1). So what punishment did Roman law require for 
killers? Classical Roman law stated that malicious killing and also intentions to commit 
homicide would be punished as homicide (D48.8.1.3, D.48.8.15). Conversely, unintentional 
homicide, for example through accidents or self-defence, would not be punished at all 
(D.48.8.1.3, D.48.8.14). A convicted killer was to be punished according to the severity of the 
action and not the status of the person killed (D.48.8.1.2). For homicide, the penalty could be 
either death or banishment from society. Exile in capital cases was supposed to be permanent, 
denying the offender ‘aqua et ignis’, water and fire, the necessities of life, a basic sign of 
belonging in Roman culture. Mousourakis compares this harsher exile to outlawry 
enactments.702 It is possible to see similarities with the institution of outlawry that we find in 
early medieval European law. The third-century jurist Marcian explained that the penalty for 
murderers and poisoners was deportation and confiscation, but that ‘nowadays’ the death 
penalty had become the norm (D.48.8.5). Higher-ranking nobles would traditionally be exiled 
for a short period when convicted. In the early fourth century, Constantine at least attempted 
to ensure that high-ranking officials would be tried and convicted for crimes without their 
elevated status protecting them (CTh.9.1.1). It is possible that the tradition of permanent exile 
for outlaws and more temporary solutions, for instance for elite members, still prevailed in the 
third and fourth centuries: Constantine found it necessary to send a decree to the African 
proconsul that killers should receive the death penalty and not be allowed to appeal and be 
exonerated (CTh.9.10.1). Since Marcian saw how exile was replaced with the death penalty in 
the third century, it seems the practice become law by the early reign of Constantine. The 
death penalty for intentional homicide appears to have been current law in Roman legislation 
until Justinian.  
 Examples can illustrate the severity of homicide to Roman legislators. When emperor 
Constantine (r. 306–337) himself was to pardon criminals in honour of his newborn 
grandchild, homicides were excluded (CTh.9.38.1), and early in his reign, he reiterated that 
homicide was one of the capital crimes (CTh.9.40.1). Following Constantine, his son 
Constantius upheld that those convicted of homicide lost the right to appeal (C.7.65.2.). This 
perception of homicide continued into later Roman legislation. An early fifth-century decree 
                                                 
702 Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, p. 38. 
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urged that those taken for grave crimes, among them homicide, be presented at court 
immediately (CTh.9.2.5), suggesting that the authorities wanted to give judgment in cases of 
violent crimes, and also that the authorities were reluctant to have serious criminals in prison. 
Both the examples from late Roman law tell us that the public legal system was expected to 
deal with killers, an expectation that became incorporated into the legislation. 
 Some homicides were graver than others. Sulla left his mark in the laws by 
establishing separate courts for poisoning and assassination in the Lex Cornelia de sicariis et 
veneficis.703 The killing of one’s own family members was worse than killing others 
according to republican law and the jurists’ discussion of these killings (D. 48.9). Such cases 
were therefore not a family matter. The only instance not covered by parricidium was the 
previously mentioned case of a father killing his daughter. Fathers had extraordinary 
permission to do so if the filia committed adultery (D.48.5.21–22, D.48.5.25–26, D.48.8.3.5). 
The killer of a family member was to be punished as other killers, except for those who 
committed parricide in the sense of killing one’s own father. Here, the notorious punishment 
of culleus applied, being sewn up in a sack and drowned (D.48.9.9). The only instance where 
a woman could bring a case herself without representation through her patria potestas or 
curator was in the investigation of the deaths of her parents or children or a patron’s family 
(D.48.2.1–2).704 
 A decree signed by Gratian, Valentinian (II) and Theodosius from 383 called for 
thorough hearings before execution and the absence of hasty judgments in charges of murder 
(CTh.9.1.14). However, Valentinian III and Theodosius II urged in a joint constitution from 
the year 445 that judges should not be lenient (NVal.19). Here, the division between 
premeditated murder and accidents leading to death was addressed. The emperors’ words 
claimed too many played the ‘accident’ card. Investigation in each case was demanded, with 
swift and merciless punishment for those not having killed by accident. 
 Roman law, even if the most elaborate and sophisticated example of civil law, was to a 
large extent procedural.705 In the periods of the Principate and the late empire, an official 
move in procedure developed, called cognitio, where the state took the role of accuser.706 The 
classic procedure in Roman society was that the pursuer of justice would have to play an 
active role in the accusing and summoning process.707 With cognitio, the Roman empire 
                                                 
703 Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, p. 78. 
704 A sentiment that was continued by Constantine in 322, CTh.9.1.3. 
705 Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, p. ix. 
706 Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, pp. 32, 126-27. 
707 Robinson, Sources of Roman Law, pp. 85-88. 
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apparently became more of a constitutional state with a rule of law, as we think of it today and 
as many imagine the Roman legal system to have been. However, there is far less on criminal 
procedure in Roman legal sources than on civil procedure.708 Robinson explains this by 
pointing out that in the Roman legal system all injury was a violation of law and homicide 
would be one of the graver crimes. Cognitio made appeal possible, but if found guilty of 
homicide, appeal was not possible (CTh.11.36.1, CTh.11.36.4) and as such would not be a 
debatable topic for jurists. This was also a clear case to legislating emperors: if the accused 
was found guilty, he or she should be convicted. 
 After Justinian, legislative work found a new direction. In the seventh-century law 
code Ecloga, things changed considerably with regard to compensation as a means of conflict 
resolution. The idea behind the Ecloga was, according to Edwin H. Freshfield, to have a more 
humanistic law, compatible with the Christian ideology of the time.709 One result, among 
others, was an extensive use of compensatory fines that followed the development of western 
legal ideology. Another difference was the replacement of the death penalty with mutilation in 
many cases. This was thought to be a more humane punishment, giving the culprit time to 
save his soul. The code was intended as a tariff list of punishment for various crimes, which 
makes it an entirely different type of source compared to the jurists’ discussions in the 
Digesta and the late Roman imperial legislation. In the Ecloga, several violent crimes were 
punishable by fines, possibly as compensation, or partly as restoration to the victim’s party. 
The listed form of the text does not reveal its purpose, as it comprised more a short manual for 
judges than a normative discussion.710 Murderers would still be executed, but violence that 
could apparently be paid for (Ek.5, Ek.17.5, Ek.45-48). This raises the question of whether 
there was a precedent regarding compensation in the late Roman court prior to Leo III's 
Ecloga.711 Still, as background to the early medieval concepts of compensatory punishments 
which were developing and also to this concept in the high medieval Nordic laws, it is 
essential to note that most of the Roman written law passed down only contained the notion of 
compensation to a minor degree. It is important to stress this point, given that the concept of 
compensation would be such a prominent institution in the secular medieval laws. 
 
                                                 
708 Robinson, Sources of Roman Law, pp. 98-99. 
709 Edwin Hanson Freshfield, A Manual of Later Roman Law, The Ecloga, ad Procheiron Mutata (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1927), p. x; Edwin Hanson Freshfield, ‘The Official Manuals of Roman Law of the Eighth 
and Ninth Centuries’, The Cambrigde Law Journal, 4, 1 (1930), pp. 34-50.  
710 Freshfield, Manual of Roman Law, pp. 1-2. 
711 See, for instance, Freshfield, Manual of Later Roman Law, p. 211, n. 1. 
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10.2 Wergild and vengeance in continental legislation 
Whereas Roman legislation on homicide works as a backdrop in this chapter, the Germanic 
laws serve as its fulcrum. Compensatory punishments were institutionalised and became more 
sophisticated in the legislation of the successor states, to the extent that they determined the 
whole law in some of them. Simultaneously, we find the meeting of the old legal culture of 
the Romans in the Germanic laws, although changed and changing, and the development of 
national legal cultures among groups in the forming of states. Wormald has suggested the size 
of the tariffs themselves constitute an ethnic marker of the law.712 To Lisi Oliver, 
compensation is what separates the Germanic laws from Roman ancestry.713 She asserts that 
the idea of compensation was an original Germanic part of law, which Roman legal tradition 
could not influence, as it had not existed. While that may be so, it is worth noting that the 
Germanic legal tradition started before the waning of Roman law in the West. Thus, the late 
Roman adaptations of compensation for different crimes may well be influences, as reception 
from Germanic law, or more likely Germanic custom. Also, the tariff lists in the Byzantine 
law of Ecloga can be viewed as adapted transmission from Germanic legal culture in the East. 
 The institution of wergild is thus a determinant of early medieval law, but was it a 
long-standing tradition? The law texts themselves are constructed to give us this impression. 
Compensatory punishments were also stipulated in the legislation on homicide. In the laws 
ascribed to the Burgundian king Gundobad, and the Frankish king Clovis in late-fifth and 
early sixth century, compensation was already a major part of the legal system. However, the 
level of making use of it in the legal texts vary; while the appearance of corporal, moral and 
monetary punishments are balanced in the Burgundian code, compensation permeates the 
Salic laws of Clovis entirely. Although the Germanic legislators of the early Middle Ages 
claim their law to be ancient and/or prevailing law, much of the written norms in Germanic 
law codes could well have been an invention.714 This question must be considered as part of 
the discussion about whether the Church promoted the idea of resolving conflict through 
peaceful means. The big question is whether the notion of compensation evolved from 
Germanic norms of conflict resolution or through the influence of or interaction with the 
Church. We do not have the privilege of observing a mainly non-Christian law from 
                                                 
712 Wormald, ‘Leges Barbarorum’, pp. 41-42. 
713 Oliver, Body Legal, pp. 8-11. 
714 Edictum Rothari Prologue.1, Leges Langobardorum, MGH, LL, 4, p. 1; Lex Burgundionum prologue; Leges 
Burgundionum, MGH, LL nat Germ, 2.1, p. 29. The attribution of the prologue in the Lex Gundobada is dubious, 
and it has been suggested that it is a product of successor Sigismund’s reign. Nevertheless, the act of ascribing 
the deed to a previous king is an act of creating a traditional bond through the laws. 
214 
 
Germanic groups in the Latin spheres. The very outset for most of the extant laws was the 
preceding Christianising of the gens. A feature of several of the medieval laws was to divide 
between premeditated murder and impulsive killings. Legal authority attempted to suppressed 
the extreme violence of killing another, but the extenuating circumstances of rage or 
retaliation was almost embedded into the act in these laws. Vengeance, or the urge to 
reciprocate, stands out as the driving force in the rules on homicide. However, the atrocity of 
planned and deliberate killing was the worst crime against society and against the rule of law, 
and thus against the king as well as the victim. In Germanic laws, then, compensation 
included an acknowledgement of the existence of vengeance. 
 That the legal elite in some of the Germanic kingdoms of Europe knew Roman civil 
law and inserted compensatory punishments anyway constitutes an interesting problem in 
legal history; did the late Roman law adapt to the legal cultures of inhabitants coming in from 
the north and east of the empire? The peoples of the Roman empire kept their group indicators 
and ethnic characteristics to a large degree.715 The all-embracing release of Roman citizenship 
in AD 212 by Caracalla changed the meaning of what was essentially Roman and instead 
divided the population into a group with high status and one with low status, i.e., honestiores 
and humiliores. As A. H. M. Jones has pointed out, differentiation in society was from then on 
‘no longer regional between Italians and provincials, but social’.716 The universal issue of 
citizenship would probably still not erase the differences of the gentes and groups within the 
Roman border. ‘Otherness’, as opposed to the Roma-Roman, was always present in the 
Roman empire from the time it extended beyond the Italian peninsula. Legal cultural 
differences could have influenced the law-making process of the empire in its entirety and 
possibly had a great affect in practice. However, the late use of restoration through 
compensation by Justinian can perhaps be seen as an effect of Germanic influence. 
 
The Burgundian laws 
 
The Burgundian code, one of the earliest Germanic laws, was contemporaneous to the law of 
the Merovingian king Clovis from the beginning of the sixth century. The rules of the 
Burgundian king Gundobad from around the year 500, and the additions and revisions of his 
successor Sigismund (from 523), apparently originated in the intersection between aspects 
                                                 
715 Tveit, ‘Non enim coitus matrimonium facit’, pp. 88-93. 
716 Jones, Decline of the Ancient World, p. 23. 
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lacking in Roman models and essential requirements in the Burgundian legal system. The 
Burgundian laws in general contain little on violent death compared to the other Germanic 
codes, but the three or four notes are clear enough. Murder should be punished with death 
(LB.2.1). In Gundobad’s legislation, we find a provision stating that the aggrieved party 
should be careful to concentrate vengeance on the guilty person alone and not harm innocent 
associates: ‘ita nihil molestia sustinere patimur innocentem’ (B.2.7), in other words, he should 
avoid a feud. Such constrictions, although implied in many of the medieval laws, are found 
explicitly only in the laws of the English king Edmund (r. 939–946) from the 940s (II Edm.1). 
The sentence suggests that Gundobad tried to gain a firmer grip on the regulation of private 
violence through the law than can be found in the contemporary continental codes. This could 
be a reception of Roman juridical ideologies of assigning culpa to the culprit. Instead, it may 
have been an expression of the legal system desired by the legal elite of the Burgundian 
authority, an attempt to avoid conflict in society given the political turmoil with its 
neighbours. 
 Written Roman law must be taken into consideration when examining the topic of 
compensation for homicide in Burgundian legislation. The Lex Burgundionum would 
naturally be highly influenced by and modelled on the adaptation of the Theodosian Code, the 
Lex Burgundionum Romana (LRB). The table of contents alone reveal that the codification of 
Roman law was the design for the Germanic code, with the first three chapters being identical 
and the second chapter treating the act of homicide. The LBR.2 would have paraphrased the 
aforementioned Novel of Theodosius II and Valentinian III from 445 (NVal.19.1–2), as the 
LBR.2 itself suggests. The LBR.2 and the LB.2 were both titled De homicidiis, and the first 
clause of both of these codes refers to the aggravating circumstances of murder and the next 
to the extenuating circumstances of accidental homicide, which stated that if ‘homicide has 
been committed, either by accident or because of the necessity of avoiding death, pardon shall 
be granted.717. The contents and legal ideology became part of the Burgundian adaption of 
Roman law.718  
Whether Gundobad actually had the power to control the legal system to such an 
extent we cannot tell, but his regulation of grave crimes suggests such control was considered 
necessary, or desirable. The Gundobadian rule emphasised the aspect of retaliation more than 
these two and, when including the following statement in a possible borrowing, was first 
                                                 
717 Translation from Pharr, Theodosian Code, p. 532. NVal.19.2: ‘si homicidium vel casu vel vitandae mortis 
necessitate constiterit admissum’. 
718 LBR.2.2: ‘Si vero homicidium casu vel vitande mortis causa forte dicatur admissum’. 
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adapted to the legal culture of the Germanic tradition: ‘if he pursues his persecutor and 
overcome by grief and indignation kills him’, then he should pay half wergild (LB.2.2).719 In 
this version it is not only self-defence and accidents that make for extenuating circumstances, 
but impulsive anger caused by the person who was killed, similar to Roman law allowing 
vengeance to be taken on adulterous daughters and wives.  
Murder was a non-compensational crime and should be punished with death (B.2.1). 
In the laws of Gundobad, murder is equal to treason in severity. Burgundian law did not, 
however, indicate that the death penalty could be employed as vengeance; the wording rather 
hints that one should expect official punishment. How to interpret what should happen in the 
case of intentional homicide that was neither provoked, nor premeditated, is unclear. 
Nevertheless, compensation was an option.  
Paradoxically, Gundobad’s laws set the compensation for taking a life at half the value 
of that life, i.e., half the wergild of the person (B.2.2). However, this particular rule does list 
actions of retaliation or self-defence leading to death, and this could be the reason for the 
reduced compensation. There is little else on compensation for homicide in terms of the way 
it was classified in other secular law, such as that for manslaughter, regardless of conditions. 
It would be wrong to force the source into predefined categories, and it is possible that the 
Burgundian division of homicide is between murder – as in killing with intent – and death as a 
result of unintentional actions. The former resulted in the death penalty and the latter in 
payment of half the wergild. In this way, it is in line with Roman law on homicide. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to ask the question: do the two degrees of killing disguise a 
middle level, i.e., of manslaughter, with the full wergild being paid? Presumably, Gundobad’s 
legislation would reckon on such a middle level with full wergild being paid. The solution to a 
real case would most likely be negotiated between the parties, ensuring revenge or agreed 
compensation. The laws are silent on how the process of resolving the conflict was supposed 
to happen. Neither do they reveal how to decide the severity and nature of a killing in a public 
setting or as a private settlement. Finally, the written laws are silent on the mode of 
distribution of the compensation, and they do not reveal whether the legislators anticipated the 
killer would pay the compensation alone, or whether his family would contribute, which is 
strange given the high sum of between 150 and 300 solidi, depending on the status of the 
victim. 
                                                 
719 Translation by Drew, The Burgundian Code, p.23. ‘dum sequitur percutientem dolore aut indignation 
conpulsus occiderit’, Leges Burgundionum, MGH, LL nat Germ, 2.1, p. 42.  
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The wergild of men was itself stipulated based on the status of the victim of the crime. 
In the Burgundian code, the worth of a person is termed in the Latin pretium. The 
differentiation of status is according to three classes, with 300 solidi for those in the optimas 
nobilis class, 200 for those in the mediocris class and 150 for those in the minor persona class 
(B.2.2). Oliver assumes that minor persona designated the category of the unfree.720 More 
likely, those in this group were among the free, although low-status, as concluded by Edgar 
Holmes McNeal and Katherine Fisher Drew.721 The inferior class was subject to regulation in 
the case of violent injury, which no unfree person would be (LB.26.3). King Sigismund also 
treated this group in his marriage legislation, together with the middle and higher classes 
(LB.101.2). The fact that minores were mentioned together with the mediocris and the 
optimates supports the view that they were freeborn. The minor persona status had more in 
common with the rank of ceorl than with the unfree, which we find in the early laws from 
Kent and Wessex, and the minima persona in the laws of Lombard King Liutprand, within 
which category people were certainly considered to be free. Homicide against the king’s 
slaves or agents would of course be punished harshly but, even if intentional, the law 
prescribed compensation commensurate with the deed (B.10, B.50). The stipulated amounts 
of compensation in these cases were ranked according to the craft or skill of the dead; for 
instance, a goldsmith was worth 200 solidi, but a carpenter only forty solidi. The sums were 
based mainly on the wergild of free men and show only the importance of the craftsmen or the 
status of the slave of the king. The transaction would also be allotted to the royal treasury and 
resembled a fine rather than the wergild. 
 Women probably held a wergild corresponding to a male relative, similar to what we 
find in the Lombard laws. Lex Gundobadorum provides little direct regulation of what should 
become of a female killer. We can only assume that the sterner penalties imposed on women 
with regard to other grave offences, such as adultery and desertion of the family, would also 
apply in the case of homicide, and if so, she would face the death penalty imposed by a public 
judge. We do not learn of differentiation between the Burgundian and Roman, if the Roman 
was the victim of homicide. We know that Romans were subject to Roman law, and conflicts 
between Romans and Burgundians should be taken before a Burgundian judge (LB.22).722 
Ralph Mathisen asks whether there was segregation of the Roman and Germanic population 
                                                 
720 Oliver, Body Legal, p. 213 places minora persona in the table of slaves’ worth. 
721 Edgar Holmes McNeal, Minores and Mediocres in the Germanic Tribal Laws (Colombus, OH: Press of FJ 
Heer, 1905), p. 40; Drew, The Burgundian Code, p. 85 n. 1. 
722 See also Leges Burgundionum Extravagantes 20, from 516, which repeats the provision. 
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within the administration.723 However, punching Roman nobility in the face rendered a 
compensation of fifteen solidi, the same as for the Burgundians optimates (LB.26). Regarding 
violence, they were apparently on equal footing, although as Drew points out, the Leges do 
not reveal the full relationship between the Romans and Burgundians within the kingdom.724 
  Burgundian domestic legislation thus gives a brief picture of the demarcation between 
Roman legislation and the anticipation of the Burgundian legal culture and sense of justice. 
Killings acted out deliberately – and thus particularly grave – would, as in Roman law, call 
for capital punishment in accordance with the keeping of order in Burgundian society. As the 
kingdom of Gundobad and his successor Sigismund was fairly stable during a turbulent period 
in the central European regions, we could expect harsh measures in law-making by the kings. 
Then again, it is not clear what to expect as Burgundian authority, similarly to that in other 
continental states, was possibly testing a new tool of government: written law. The short 
Burgundian code nevertheless appears as a crossover between Roman public law and the 
expectation of local solutions through compensation, as we see in other continental codes of 
the early Middle Ages. Compensation for homicide could be an expression of tradition or an 
solution invented for the task of creating a functioning society.  
 
The Visigothic laws 
 
The law codes of King Chindasvint and King Reccesvint from 650, known as the Leges 
Visigothorum (LV), have been labelled a fusion of earlier Visigothic enactments and Roman 
law adapted from the Theodosian code.725 To a large degree, this is also valid for the 
regulation of homicide. Instead of compensatory punishments and a focus on vengeance, we 
find heavy use of corporal punishment in the procedural legislation of the Visigoths. 
Compensatory punishments in the code are few, but a number of offences or incidents would 
result in fines to the treasury. Compared to the other extant Germanic laws, the Leges 
Visigothorum do not resort to compensation to the same extent in the case of homicide. 
However, the few references to compensation are so detailed that they constitute a problem of 
interpretation.  
                                                 
723 Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats, pp. 128-29. 
724 Drew, The Burgundian Code, p. 41 n. 1. 
725 P. D. King, Law and Society in the Visigothic Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 
23-51; Heather, ‘The Barbarian in Late Antiquity’, pp. 251-53; Harries, ‘Not the Theodosian Code’, pp. 40-48. 
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 In the seventh-century Leges Visigothorum, punishment for intentional killing was the 
death penalty, similar to Roman and Burgundian laws (LV.6.5.9). The following of Roman 
laws started even earlier: Gothic adjustments to the corpus of Theodosius in the Lex Romana 
Visigothorum are important. There was a small, but essential change in terminology in the 
interpretatio of the decree of Gratian, Valentinian II and Theodosius concerning capital 
punishment for those who forged wills and killed the testator (CTh.9.1.14). The amenders 
changed ‘internecivi’ in the original decree to ‘homicidii’ in the Visigothic interpretation. The 
change reveals that the Gothic legal system in its nascence applied the death penalty in an 
official sense from the time of Alaric II (r. 484-507). Even if the Roman constitution specified 
the particular kind of murder, the legal elite of the Visigothic king would have it cover all 
kinds of homicide. However, we must assume that they meant homicide with intent, as 
‘homicidum’ indicates killing with the intention to kill. The interpretation of the 
aforementioned Valentinian Novellae from the mid-fifth century emphasises the distinction 
between premeditated and accidental killings (NVal.19. interpretatio). The original Visigothic 
legislation included the same distinction. There was a differentiation in terms of the intent: as 
in Roman law, deadly accidents should not be punished according to Visigothic law 
(LV.6.5.1–2); also, the specified punishment for homicide was execution (LV.6.5.7, 
LV.6.5.12). As with Roman law, killing family members was a particularly grave act and was 
accorded the death penalty, together with special regulations governing the property of both 
the offender and the victim to ensure that no one benefitted from parricide by inheritance 
(LV.6.5.15, 17–19). Homicide, as in killing with intent, would then receive the same 
punishment as murder, i.e., as premeditated killing (LV.6.5.11). Thus, the death penalty 
pertained to killing someone deliberately, compensation was awarded in the case of killing a 
third party in violent action and no punishment for accidental deaths. However, collaborators 
with homicide and murder would be whipped and scalped and would moreover be required to 
pay compensation to the victim’s family to the amount of fifty solidi (LV.6.5.12).  
 Violence, damage and insults were actions that could incur both physical punishments 
or, in some cases, compensation. The result depended on the damage done or the wishes of 
the victim (LV.4.1.2). In some instances, the outcome would also depend on the status of the 
offender, as explained below. The punishment stated for killing someone was ambiguous, and 
the Leges Visigothorum’s chapter on homicide does not include compensation tariffs as we 
find in other written laws, although these exist elsewhere. There is one strange section in the 
eighth book concerning violence and injuries, in the fourth chapter, concerning damage done 
by and to animals and damage to property; the sixteenth rule relates to animals that kill or 
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disable people (LV.8.4.16). The rule prescribed the compensation due from the owner of the 
animal. The compensation, we learn, was supposedly equivalent to that in the case of 
homicide: 
 
…iuxta leges conponere non moretur, sicut est de homicidis, id est viris ac mulieribus, infantibus, 
servis vel ancillis conpositio constituta.726  
…as required by law shall without delay compensate just as in case of homicide, that is the agreed 
compensation for men, women, children, slaves and female slaves. 
 
Brunner interpreted the rule as regarding compensation for unintended offences.727 It 
obviously was, but it also refers to an equivalent compensation for homicide. As we know, 
unintentional homicide was treated as in Roman law elsewhere in Visigothic law, without 
punishment. Contradictions in written law are quite normal, and these tariffs could be the 
punishment for unintended homicide. They still reveal the wergild of persons, and more 
probably there was a list of compensation for manslaughter. Such an equivalent list might be 
lost, or never written down.  
The rule is labelled Antiqua, ‘ancient’, the mark of those rules ascribed to Euric from 
his law of 475. However, fragments show that, in the 580s, King Leovigild added more details 
to the text.728 The section continues with listing all the specified compensation. According to 
this section, a set of tariffs existed which enumerated the current levels of compensation 
according to the law. The oddly placed account of the tariffs has a high level of detail in the 
differentiation of value; it is more explicit in this respect than we find in other laws, either 
from the Continent or the English or Scandinavian regions, as will be discussed later. 
LV.8.4.16 consists of several specified sums, taking into account the nature of the person 
killed. There were twenty-one different levels of compensation depending on the age, sex and 
status of the victim.729 Whereas some of the high medieval Nordic laws give detailed 
descriptions of the distribution of the sum among the relatives, the paragraph on 
compensation in the Visigothic law rather records the details through differentiating between 
those killed (see Figure 15).  
                                                 
726 Leges Visigothorum 8.4.16, MGH, LL nat Germ. I, pp. 336-37. 
727 Heinrich Brunner, Über absichtslose Missethat im altdeutschen Strafrechte, vol. 35 (Reichsdruckerei, 1890), 
p. 818. 
728 Leges Visigothorum, MGH, LL nat. Germ. I, pp. 487-8. Zeumer does not list Chindasvint or Reccesvint as 
contributors to this rule, only Leovigild, Zeumer, Leges Visigothorum, p. 487. 





Figure 15: Amounts of compensation in the Leges Visigothorum 8.4.16  
Figure 15 shows that treatment of men and women was less equal than what we saw in the 
inheritance legislation. Furthermore, according to this particular rule, children were valued 
considerably lower than grown men and women, or those above fifteen years. An original 
feature here is the differentiation between children of different ages. The older the child, the 
higher the value if killed. This would certainly be based on the experience of child mortality 
in the period. For each year a child survived, the greater the chance of the child growing up 
and reaching maturity. Maturity was attained when a person turned fifteen years of age 
(LV.4.3.1), which explains the difference before and after fifteen years. Even so, both men 
and women became emancipated first at the age of twenty (LV.4.2.12).730 A more interesting 
discrimination in the tariffs is the rating between girls and boys, where girls under fifteen 
years of age had half the value of a boy of the same age. Although discrimination against 
female subjects is not surprising in itself, the Visigothic laws, both from Euric and those from 
the middle of the seventh century, were in many respects very gender equal. In terms of 
inheritance, equality in status was expressed in written law, both in relation to property in 
marriage and the age of majority.731 Grown women of what we must assume was considered 
fertile age were otherwise of slightly lower value than men. Bearing in mind these estimations 
of women in terms of future work capacity, marriage options and the potential for producing 
                                                 
730 The differentiation between emancipation and age of majority is explained in King, Law and Society, p. 244. 
The same separation between full age and minority can be found among the Lombards (Rot.154), but only for 
men of eighteen years or older. 






















children, it is puzzling that older women, categorised as aged forty to sixty and older than 
sixty years, both enjoyed equal worth to the equivalent male categories aged fifty to seventy-
five and over seventy-five years. Possibly this is the wrong way to look at the numbers and 
the answer is not that a low value was placed on young women, but that a particularly high 
value was placed on boys and grown men. Thus, older women did not enjoy a value equal to 
their male peers, but rather older men suffered a particular loss in value after the age of fifty 
according to Visigothic law. These differentiations are comparable to the Frankish laws’ 
differentiation in the same categories, treated below. However, the lines of differentiation are 
different. The categorisation and value given to each category must therefore have a basis in 
the norms of Gothic legislators, not necessarily from transmission of outside law, even if the 
concept of distinguishing between age, gender and status can be found in all of these written 
laws. Compensation due for forcing a woman to abort is comparable, valued at 200 solidi 
(LV.6.3.2). This sum is higher than for the death of a live boy, which may include an element 
of punishment for the damage of the woman’s fertility and honour, in addition to 
compensation for the loss. 
 It is not stated in the legal texts that the sums represent the wergild. The Latin term 
used was merely ‘conponantur’, which could be translated as ‘to be settled with’. In other 
sections of the Leges Visigothorum, terms such as ‘conpositionem accipiat’, ‘accepting 
compensation (LV. 6.4.3) and ‘satisfacere’, ‘compensate’ (LV.8.3.3) appear.732 If we assume 
that this list of tariffs was supposed to include manslaughter in addition to unintentional 
homicide given its obscure placing among the damage by animals, then the list is in line with 
the Burgundian distinction between intentional homicide and those done in self defence or as 
revenge. It is only comparable in this distinction, not in the actual categories it contains.  
 In some of the existing manuscripts, the listing of compensation in LV.8.4.16 opens 
with a differentiation on the basis of status, where an ingenuus – a noble or possibly freeborn 
– had a compensation value of 500 solidi.733 In contrast, a libertus – a freed person – had a 
value half of that, at 250 solidi. This was an amendment from King Ervig (r. 680-687), and 
these two categories appear to have replaced the age-differentiator in the version of 
Reccesvint and Chindasvint. This was possibly a later invention, but the distinction 
corresponds to the emphasis on status in several other parts of the law, also labelled ‘ancient’. 
If ingenui meant Gothic nobility, or native born, in contrast to Romans, this could be due to 
earlier attempts to make Goths and Romans equal in the law (LV.3.1.1). Naturally, Euric’s 
                                                 
732 Leges Visigothorum, MGH, LL nat Germ 1, pp. 265, 322. 
733 Leges Visigothorum, MGH, LL nat Germ. 1, pp. 336-37, 489. 
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laws would consider their gens, which was no longer necessary. The seventh-century version 
still contained many references to differences in class and status, and it is unlikely that the 
new law aimed to erase that difference in the amounts of compensation.  
In contrast to other legislation in the secular sphere, Visigothic law made a distinction 
in the status of the offender in relation to various offences of injury, damage and violence 
other than homicide. The law distinguished between lesser and higher status using a variety of 
terms, such as maior persona and inferior persona (LV.8.3.10), honestiore and minor persona 
(LV.7.5.1), potentior and humilior (LV.7.5.2). The division in many of these distinctions lies 
in a fine alone being imposed on the maior class, but corporal punishment, and perhaps a 
lower fine, being imposed on those in the minor class.734 A striking aspect of the terminology 
is the suspicious correspondence in the division into honestiores and humiliores in Roman 
juridical status, although the meaning of this is obscure. Caracalla’s division into two classes 
in AD 212 might have been adopted as a strategy and as terminology by the successor states. 
The corporal punishments were substantial in the graver cases, including, for instance, being 
forced into slavery, the loss of a hand or 100 lashes. However, monetary punishments were 
also sizeable, in line with wergilds listed in other continental laws. Nevertheless, nobility 
evaded the cruellest punishments, for instance investigation by torture (LV.4.1.2). According 
to the Leges Visigothorum, false testimony would deprive the honestior persona of the right 
to give witness in court, plus a double fine, but the inferior persona would receive 100 lashes 
in addition to losing the right to testify (LV.2.4.3). We can assume that the legislators held the 
same to apply in case of homicide, i.e., that those without the means to pay very high amounts 
of compensation were condemned to death while the rich were able to buy off their lives. 
 However, it is still problematic to make sense of the list of amounts of compensation. 
Two other rules in the Leges Visigothorum confirm that the normal compensation, possibly 
the wergild, for a man of low status was 300 solidi (LV.6.5.14, LV.7.3.3).735 Otherwise, there 
are few signs of the institution in the law, and only in a few sections of this elaborate corpus 
did the legislators insert compensatory punishments, and only in a very few sections do we 
find vengeance being addressed in particular. Two explanations can be suggested: either 
compensation as a means of conflict resolution was of declining importance or the legislating 
authority attempted to suppress it, or alternatively compensation for violence or homicide was 
so embedded in the conception of justice among the sixth- and seventh-century Visigoths that 
it was a system outside the system. Ideals from Roman standards in other parts of the written 
                                                 
734 McNeal, Minores and Mediocres, p. 107. 
735 For differences in surviving manuscripts, see McNeal, Minores and Mediocres, p. 101 n. 4. 
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code, and the outspoken fusion with Roman ideas stated in the code, could result in these 
more ‘barbaric’ forms of solutions being downplayed. Maybe it did not fit well with the 
Roman proclivity of the code, or with the legal elite identifying themselves as Romans or with 
what were considered Roman ideals. Nevertheless, the obvious reliance on compensation 
among neighbouring societies and expressed in other sources makes it unlikely that the 
Visigothic law did not include compensation as a means of settlement. The use of 
compensation in the case of damage by animals, as well as in the case of damage to property, 
reveals that it was a well-known concept. If so, the private nature of compensation for 
homicide did nothing to ensure its prominence in the code, but its obvious existence would 
also make it unnecessary. It was possible to list the contemporary wergild of people, the 
amounts of which may have changed over time. 
 The Visigoths ensured that murderers would not later hold significant roles in court, 
even if they were not executed for the homicide; in addition to exile, the murderer was 
prohibited from acting as an attorney. The relevant rule listed the types of actions making a 
person unsuitable to testify in court: ‘homicide, malefici, fures, criminosi sive venefici, et qui 
raptum fecerint vel falsum testimonium dixerint, seu qui ad sortilegos’ (LV.2.4.1) . 
Thus, murderers, wrongdoers, thieves, criminals or poisoners and those who abducted or give 
false witness were excluded. A similar list can be found in late Roman law. In Constantine’s 
above-mentioned legislation on divorce, similar, although not identical, actions were listed as 
a just cause for divorce if instigated by the wife (CTh.3.16.1): ‘si homicidam vel 
medicamentarium vel sepulchrorum dissolutorem maritum suum esse probaverit’. This list 
was continued and extended in divorce law in the following centuries by, among others, 
Theodosius II (CTh.3.16.2, CI.5.17.8) and Justinian (CI.5.17.10–11, Nov.22.3–19, 
Nov.117.8–10).736 The listing of serious offences apparently was a standard verse, and the 
Visigothic equivalent must be a transmission from Roman legal culture. 
 Visigothic kings are considered to have been powerful rulers, but this view is to a 
large extent based on the nature of their laws rather than other sources.737 As Wickham 
argues, the legal sources do not reveal much of what happened outside the royal court.738 
After the Visigoths’ conversion from Arianism, the Catholic Church had an influential 
                                                 
736 Tveit, ‘Skilsmisserett’, pp. 26, 29-32. See also Theodosius II’s revocation of the restriction of female-
instigated divorce in the eastern Roman empire (Nov.Th.12.1). 
737 See King, Law and Society, p. 222; Heather, ‘The Barbarian in Late Antiquity’, p. 251; Roger Collins, ‘Law 
and Ethnic Identity in the Western Kingdoms in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries’, in Medieval Europeans: Studies 
in Ethnic and National Perspectives in Medieval Europe, ed. by Alfred Smyth (Ipswich: Macmillian, 1998), pp. 
4-5.  
738 Wickham, Inheritance of Rome, p. 137. 
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position in the Visigothic kingdom and played an important role in the law-making process. 
Could we explain the few references to vengeance in the laws by moderation from the clergy? 
As a paradox, the single unmistakeable reference to vengeance mentions the sanctuary of the 
church: if a killer sought refuge in a church, the law states that the ones chasing him had to 
consult the priest before dragging him out (LV.6.5.16). Afterwards, he should not receive 
capital punishment, but either be blinded or given up to the family of the victim to be killed 
by them. Otherwise, we learn that one could kill a rapist (LV.3.3.6). Visigothic laws adapted 
Roman legal concepts, but still acknowledged that vengeance was a part of the system, and in 
these sections we see that private vengeance was an accepted right of the kin group. An 
adulterous wife or daughter could be killed, and her lover, without incurring sanctioned 
punishment (LV.3.4.4), similar to the right awarded to the head of family in Roman law.  
The sparse dealings with vengeance raise the question of whether it was such a natural 
course of action that it would have been superfluous to address vengeance in the laws, or 
whether such a topic did not fit well with the Roman and Christian spirit of the code. P. D. 
King asserted that strong royal power undermined the authority of the head of the family in 
the Gothic household, and that even if the kinship system predominated among the Visigoths 
it was the law and not a sense of honour that decided right and wrong in Visigothic society.739 
The Visigothic elite may have engaged in fierce feuding, without it being a matter of concern 
for legislators. Chindasvint himself erased many aristocratic families to secure his own 
power.740 We must keep in mind that the written law was probably constructed as an image of 
the legislator. To the Visigothic legislators, neat public procedures were given a prominent 
position over private settlements. It could be argued that this is a sign of a consolidated and 
strong Gothic state, but more probably it is the transmission from Roman law that rather gives 
this impression. As has been demonstrated above, the Gothic law nevertheless included 
distinctly Gothic legislation. As a result, we must assume that the transmission was 
consciously accepted, and was not merely uninformed receptions. 
 
The Frankish laws 
 
The above point concerning vengeance is suggestive compared to the legal sources of the 
Goths’ northern neighbours and later conquerors, the Salian Franks. In the Salic laws, we find 
                                                 
739 King, Law and Society, p. 222. 
740 Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages, p. 39. 
226 
 
no direct mention of vengeance, but the threat of violence may be the reason for their fully 
compensation-based enactments. Salic law has thus been used frequently by scholars to 
explain or prove the instability of the Frankish authorities. Wallace-Hadrill was of the view 
that Frankish law reflected the extreme feud-ridden rule of the Merovingian kings and that 
feuding was not only legally accepted but encouraged to keep the threatening aristocracy 
preoccupied with fighting each other and thereby pacify them.741 The Frankish legislators 
clearly built on an already existing concept of vengeance. However, there were probably other 
motives behind the legislation than simply manipulation of the elite as a peacekeeping 
resolution for general society. 
The Salic laws originated in the early sixth century under the Merovingian king 
Clovis, a contemporary of Gundobad. In its extant form, the text of Pactus Legis Salicae 
(PLS) appears more as a manual, with tariffs for compensation, than a legal code, not unlike 
the later, east-Roman Ecloga. Salic law contains descriptions of many types of offence and 
the corresponding sum to rectify the deed. Compensation was the prescribed solution for 
almost every kind of offence committed by free men and women.742 This includes the grave 
acts of murder, homicide, rape, molestation, torture, abduction, stealing and adultery.743 
Unlike the Burgundian and Visigothic laws, there was apparently no crime too grave for 
compensation under the legislating authority in the Merovingian kingdom.  
The successors of Clovis added important revisions to the law over the years through 
the so-called Capitularies. These new laws had a completely different conception of the 
punishments for grave offences and in some instances also addressed the shortcomings of the 
original law. Concerning private violence, the Capitularies constitute a break with both earlier 
and later legal texts. For instance, King Chilperic (r. 561–584) of the western parts of the 
Frankish realm prescribed the death penalty for procurers (PLS. 99) and rapists (PLS.130.3), 
while Childebert II (r. 575–595) of the northeastern parts did so for murder (PLS.Cap.6.2.2,3) 
and theft (PLS.Cap.6.2.5). He also used the same wording as in the Burgundian Roman law 
(LBR.2) concerning homicides caused by accidents and self-defence, which was derived from 
the adaptation of the Theodosian Code (PLS.Cap.6.2.3).744 Furthermore, the penalty for 
abduction and adultery was adjusted to outlawry or death (PLS.Cap.6.2.2). The revisions 
                                                 
741 Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings, pp. 125-26. 
742 Except in the case that a free man or woman had intercourse with or ran off with a slave; this would reduce 
them to slave status: PLS.13.8-9, LSK.23.7 and LSK.23.11. The Capitularies (PLS.98) prescribed the 
confiscation of property plus outlawry for a woman marrying a slave and gave her relatives the right to kill her. 
743 Murder and homicide: PLS.41, PLS.42, PLS.43, PLS.62, PLS.65e; molestation, wounding and torture: 
PLS.29; abduction and rape: PLS.13, PLS.15, PLS.133. 
744 Eckhardt, Pactus Legis Salicae, p. 268. NVal 19.2. 
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might have been current practice in Frankish society that ignored the law of Clovis, rather 
than a sharp shift in legislation. The interesting factor here is that these heirs of Clovis, who 
were ruling divided and destabilised kingdoms, legislated to an even larger extent for public 
settlement. Simultaneously, the Capitularies also contain encouragement of private initiative 
and duty in weeding out criminals and keeping the peace in local communities.745 Their 
turbulent periods of ruling may have necessitated the implementation of stricter laws, 
imagining a strong legal system. If this interpretation is correct, then state consolidation 
cannot always be measured by the quality of its laws. 
Compensation for homicide was stipulated on the basis of the wergild, with the 
victim’s gender and age as crucial factors. The normal wergild for a freeborn, grown man was 
200 solidi and this was also the compensation stipulated for killing a man (PLS.15, 
PLS.41.1).746 A young boy (PLS.24.1, 4, PLS.41.18) and a fertile woman (PLS.24.8, 
PLS.41.16) were valued at the highest worth, at 600 solidi. Girls of minor age (PLS.41.15) 
and older women (PLS.24.9, PLS.41.17) were accorded the same compensation as a man, i.e., 
200 solidi. The legislators stipulated amounts of compensation following principles similar to 
those in the Visigothic sources, although with some important differences. Women were here 
compensated by a much higher sum than men. There are the same distinctions in the Salic 
laws between grown women, and older women or girls of minor age. The latter two groups 
were to be compensated for in amounts equal to the sum for a grown man. Again, this must be 
interpreted as we have above in relation to the Visigothic differentiation of gender, although 
without the minute classification as seen there. The Salic law, too, reveals a high estimation of 
a boy as the potential man and heir, and of a woman, probably as producers of heirs. Lisi 
Oliver has interpreted the triple amount accorded for the fertile woman as the wergild for the 
woman’s life, the unborn child and the horror of the act.747 Carol Hough, although also 
regarding this wergild as the tripling of that for others, has criticised this conclusion and 
suggests that the price is for the life of the woman and her potential future children.748 This is 
more likely, given that the Pactus also includes several references to the killing of a pregnant 
woman and the unborn child, which was to be compensated by 700 solidi, 600 for the woman 
and 100 for the child (PLS24.5–6, PLS.41.19–20). This corresponds to the compensation for 
killing of a foetus in the womb but not its mother, which was 100 solidi. The destruction of 
                                                 
745 Clothar: PLS.Cap.II.92, 93; Chilperic: PLS.115; Childebert: PLS.Cap.6.2.2. 
746 Wormald ‘Leges Barbarorum’, pp. 21-54. 
747 Oliver, Body Legal, p. 241. 
748 Carole Hough, ‘Review: The Body Legal in Barbarian Law by Lisi Oliver’, Law and History Review, 30, 2 
(May 2012),  641-42. 
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the ability to produce future offspring and heirs could well be the reason for the wergild of a 
grown woman being set at threefold that of an ordinary man. If so, then the compensation in 
the laws was based on principles of restoration of the loss of a person’s work potential to the 
victim’s family, rather a solution than a punishment. The Merovingian kingdom is notorious 
among historians as the society most known, next to Iceland, for its culture of feuding, 
especially since Wallace-Hadrill’s 1962 publication, The Long-Haired Kings: And Other 
Studies in Frankish History.749 Nonetheless, the Salic laws essentially reveal little direct 
evidence of how acts of vengeance were perceived or what procedures were to be taken in the 
case of retaliation. Compensation is not directly linked to vengeance, either. Instead, we see 
that the sums correspond to a person’s worth or value, which signifies that compensation 
should propitiate and substitute the actual loss and not necessarily pacify. 
 Having been added to and corrected over a period of approximately 300 years, the law 
of Clovis was moderately revised and thoroughly restructured under Pepin and Charlemagne 
in the Lex Salica Karolina (LSK) from the early ninth century. It seemingly ignored the 
sterner capitularies and concentrated on systemising the rules of the Pactus Legis Salicae. All 
the rules treating offensive acts, such as violence, killings, theft and adultery, present various 
sums that would be satisfactory in providing restoration for the damage done.750 However, 
other rules mention that there were crimes for which the death penalty was given, without 
revealing what those crimes were (LSK.5.2). These were possibly the traditional crimes of a 
grave nature, such as murder, arson and treason, which carried the death penalty according to 
the Capitularies. If so, the Carolingian version had similar ideas of differentiation of 
premeditated homicide and manslaughter and unintentional deaths as the Visigothic laws, but 
such motives are not stated in writing.  
Even if compensation was stipulated for all kinds of deeds in the Pactus, which would 
elsewhere be non-compensational, a distinction was made between homicide and secret 
killings, or murder. If the killer tried to hide the body, the compensation extracted amounted 
to 600 solidi and the highest sum was 1800 solidi (PLS.41.4-7). In the later capitularies, these 
higher sums were reintroduced as compensation for the murder or homicide of noblemen, 
high clergy and men in the king’s administration.751 These are linked to high-ranking status. 
Little is revealed concerning status within the freeborn Franks, distinguishing between the 
                                                 
749 Wallace-Hadrill, The Long-Haired Kings. 
750 The rules referenced mostly correspond to those in the PLS stated above: murder and homicide: LSK.11, 
LSK.12-14; molestation, wounding and torture: LSK.XVI; abduction and rape: LSK.22; theft: LSK.39-43. 
751 PLS.8.1-7, ‘Seven types of cases’. 
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higher and lower classes, such as we find in the other Germanic law codes. The Capitularies 
make reference to the familiar distinction between a higher class of meliores and a lower 
class, the minoflidis, in a situation in which a body was found between two communities 
(PLS.102).752 There was a further distinction regarding ethnicity, or perhaps more correctly, 
identity. Frankish law distinguished between the Franks and the Romans, where the latter 
were accorded half the value of the former (PLS.41.8–10) In the Pactus, a Roman victim was 
even compared with the half-free and servants (PLS.42.4). Thus, killing a person identified as 
Roman and not of Frankish etnicity was only penalised at half the amount of a Frankish man. 
The same applied in the case of robbery (PLS.14.2–3). Thus, the Frankish laws do not observe 
a mutual standing for the Franks and the Romans within their jurisdiction as the Visigoths did. 
In the late-fifth century, this issue was current. We can imagine that the relatively new rulers 
in the relatively new Merovingian kingdom would need to distinguish themselves from the 
old structures of the Romans in Gaul. Possibly, it strengthened legal authority to also raise the 
status of Franks in law above that of the Romans. With all the upheaval in the region before 
the genesis of a Frankish kingdom, the Romans did not have a particular hold in the region 
that needed to be suppressed. The distinction was continued in the Capitularies of the later 
part of the sixth century (PLS117.2), in which Roman women were also valued at half the 
sum of Frankish women (PLS.104.9). What is more puzzling is the continuation of this 
distinction in Carolingian law on killing a Roman as opposed to a Frank (LSK.11.6-8, 
LSK.12.4) or robbing a Roman (LSK.18.1-2). It is reasonable to believe that the distinction 
between the Romans and Franks was likely to have been blurred by the eight century. In other 
sources, Roman disappear as an ethnic marker. Ralph Mathisen argues that the Romans in the 
Germanic kingdoms adapted to Germanic culture and became indistinguishable.753 Legal 
discrimination might have motivated such an adaptation, which would nevertheless have 
happen over the centuries. Mathisen also emphasises that the Franks became equally 
Romanised, which was also the case for the Visigoths according to Dietrich Claude.754 
Moreover, Charlemagne showed a neo-Roman streak and tried to establish an empire along 
the lines of the Roman model.755 Nevertheless, there were disturbances between the Franks 
                                                 
752 McNeal, Minores and Mediocris, pp. 56-57, asserts that a minoflidus was a smallholding, ordinary peasant, 
not a tenant. See also Drew, Laws of the Salian Franks, p. 45. 
753 Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats, pp. 145-46. 
754 Dietrich Claude, ‘Remarks About Relations Between Visigoths and Hispano-Romans in the Seventh 
Century’, in Strategies of Distinction, The Constructions of Ethnic Communities 300-800, ed. by Walter Pohl and 
Helmut Reimitz, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 117-22, 127, 130. 
755 Wickham, Inheritance of Rome: 375-404. 
230 
 
and Roman Byzantines in the Balkans and elsewhere.756 The distinction between Franks and 
Romans in the later revision only confirms that the legal system needed to differentiate within 
the population, and that not all legislation necessarily had realistic prospects. Relating to 
transmission of law, one possibility is that the distinctions were merely copied without any 
reflection of what these differentiations meant. This may simply have been the utility of using 
the earlier laws, where the Carolingian legal elite had enough to do reorganising the law and 
little time to assess the contents. This hypothesis is supported by Alan Watson’s theory of 
how easy it is to borrow law, and how difficult it is not to when laws are available.757 
In the Carolingian revision, the delineation of compensation from the Pactus was 
continued (LSK.11, LSK.33). The same amounts of 200 solidi and 600 solidi were given as 
the proper compensation for killing respectively a man, a girl or a barren woman, or a boy or 
a fertile woman. Pregnant women, too, were held to be worth compensation of 700 solidi, 
whereas the death only of the foetus was valued at 100 solidi. Given that Pepin initiated a 
major reform of the old monetary system of the solidi, it is peculiar that the old amounts are 
replicated. The reforms gave systematic value to the lesser currency units that developed 
during the Middle Ages, most importantly the tremissis.758 However, as Drew has pointed out, 
the old denominations and the ‘meaningless Malberg glosses’ were omitted, so some 
consideration must have been taken in the revision.759 It is possible that the actual amounts 
were more symbolic than real, given that no development had taken place in the course of 300 
years. If written law was, as Wormald suggests, rather a showcase for royal power, then the 
amounts themselves meant little in real court cases.760 In any case, the mechanism of the early 
medieval economy did not cause the same type of inflation as later and the amounts might 
have corresponded to the expectations of parties in a conflict. Again, we find that law was 
transmitted with very little attention to the contents, or possibly with considerable respect for 
the authority of earlier royal legislation. Still, there are some minor changes that suggest 
practical usage of Carolingian law. In the reissued rule on compensation for homicides of 
women and children, we find the differentiation of status rearranged putting the killing of a 
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young boy before a pregnant woman (LSK.33.4-9). Into this list of wergild and status, was 
also inserted the killing of a young girl (LSK.33.6) from the section on circumstances of the 
homicide (PLS.41/LSK.11).  
 Unlike the other Germanic codes studied here, Salic law included details of how the 
legislator anticipated the giving and receiving of the compensation. It was anticipated that the 
killer would provide the compensation out of his own property. If a killer was unable to pay 
the full compensation, then his mother and father (in some manuscripts his mother and 
brother) should contribute as much as possible, followed by the maternal aunt and her 
children (not the brother’s children?) (PLS.58).761 If they were unable to do so, then the 
remaining sum would be divided among three of the nearest relatives on the mother’s and on 
the father’s side. The responsibility of the compensation mirrored the pattern of inheritance 
(PLS.59). However, the sister of the killer was not mentioned. The sister might be assumed to 
be married, unable to use her husband’s property to pay compensation. The killer’s wife could 
not contribute either. 
Both the original and the revised law also contain descriptions of how the 
compensation, when paid, would be distributed. The compensation was to be divided with 
half going to any children and a quarter each to the paternal and maternal relatives 
(PLS.62/LSK.14). If the deceased lacked any of these relatives, the treasury received their 
part of the compensation. Alexander Murray has argued, based on the rights of the authority, 
that the two lesser parts were considered completely independent compensations.762 The 
paternal and maternal relatives were only connected through joint rights, but they did not 
receive the compensation as a joint clan. According to this theory, we should look at the 
compensation given in written law as three compensations, not one. 
The Capitularies, possibly of Childebert I, included the stipulation that the mother of 
the children of Ego received one-fourth, so that the heir received one-half and the wife of the 
killed man received half of the remaining half of the compensation (PLS. 68, Cap.I.).763 What 
is interesting in this text is what happens with the last portion. The rule diversifies to a greater 
extent in terms of which relatives would receive compensation, giving the closest three 
relatives from the maternal and paternal side the last share. If there was no wife, the relatives 
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would share her portion, i.e., half the compensation, in the manner that the two closer of each 
side would share two-thirds of the portion and the two more remote relatives would split the 
last third according to the same principle, where the closer received two-thirds. Murray, who 
discusses the rules on compensation as a realistic and not merely a written system among the 
Franks, has pointed out that the portion of the relatives was divided into parts with the ratio 
6:2:1.764 Hence, compensation was distributed in such a manner that those who were closer 
would receive larger parts of the compensation, but other close relatives would also be 
entitled to a share. Even if this study is based on the hypothesis that the legislation represented 
motives and not necessarily the reality of the legal system, the motives behind such a 
distribution could have been a way of satisfying those relatives who were potential initiators 
of feuds, so as to avoid vengeance for a homicide and prevent private violence. Similar 
distribution systems can be found in the English and Scandinavian material, and will be 
discussed later.  
So why did compensation permeate Salic law? Wallace-Hadrill argued that as weak 
rulers, the Merovingian authorities were themselves caught in the dynastic conflicts of the 
Frankish elite.765 They used feuds and institutionalised the form of settlement. Wallace-
Hadrill believed Merovingian kings could not abolish vengeance because they depended on it 
for the system of compensation to work. If there was no threat of vengeance, people would 
not pay the fines. We could further argue that this was the situation for all these societies and 
all levels of society – that the offender or the kinsmen paid money to escape violent reprisals 
– and that it was not a particularly Frankish mindset. Conversely, if there was no threat of 
expensive compensation, it would be difficult to stop people from feuding. We must assume 
that the legislators, both Clovis, and Charlemagne 300 years later, wanted to replace 
vengeance with peaceful settlements. Compensation was the most practical way to achieve 
this, and was set down in written law. Nevertheless, the consistent copying of earlier rules 
suggests, as stated above, that the Carolingian version was adapted, to a limited extent, to the 
current legal culture, and was only systemised according to a new order.766  
In seeking to determine whether compensation was regarded as a punishment or a 
solution, the Frankish laws indicate that the royal treasury might gain from making private 
conflict resolution authoritative law. The Pactus Legis Salicae invites court settlements 
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through its descriptions of procedure, or at least through threats to those not appearing in 
court when summoned (PLS.1/LSK.1, PLS.56/LSK.2). The earliest law code expected 
subjects to co-operate in peacekeeping, which included capturing and possibly harming 
criminals.767 To a greater extent than expressed in the Capitularies, legal authorities relied on 
the efforts of its communities to ensure justice. Possibly, the later legislators saw the necessity 
of controlling the court systems, or perhaps they had the means to do so. In the Lex Salica 
Karolina, there is little change from sixth-century law on possible income for the royal 
authorities in cases involving private violence. The focus on procedure that is demonstrated 
through Frankish law and even more so in legal records nevertheless suggests a desire for 
official settlements. Paul Fouracre has argued that the importance of the ‘procedural 
framework of Frankish dispute settlement can be overemphasised’.768 Fouracre suggests that 
the focus of procedural steps could instead be an emphasis on public settlement contra private 
and also ensuring that settlements did not take place outside court.769 The same appears in the 
chapter on proceedings in the Leges Visigothorum, which emphasised that agreements 
between the parties were unacceptable when the case was brought to court (LV.2.2.5). 
Settlements between the parties before the conflict was subjected to the public legal system 
appear to have been a concern to both Frankish and Visigothic legislators, which is connected 
to the state’s interest in controlling the legal system and sharing money transfers, as Murray 
also pointed out.770 
The overall image given in the Frankish laws is that of a legal process that could settle 
every case with compensation, but asserted this should be done in court. The Capitularies 
have lean somewhat more towards Roman principles than the codes. The motives behind the 
rules were rarely provided, although we find quite a detailed system of tariffs and distribution 
of the compensation for homicide. The Carolingian copies of outdated material from the 
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The Lombard laws 
 
The Franks’ and Visigoths’ neighbours in northern Italy, the Lombards, had written laws 
comprised of deeds and tariffs, similar to the Frankish laws. Lombard law contained 
compensatory solutions to most misdeeds, and added a fine to the royal treasury in most 
cases. In this respect, the Lombard laws appear to be modelled on the earlier Frankish laws, 
but with certain major differences in relation to the use of violence. The Lombard king 
Rothair, who enacted the first Lex Scriptum in the 640s, devoted much of the edict to 
problems regarding private violence. Faida, feuding, was addressed in several of the laws. 
The legal text gives the cessation of feuding as motivation for the enactments. For instance, in 
Rothair’s edict we read in case of injury that ‘(…), composition is to be paid according to the 
procedure provided below and the blood-feud shall cease’ (Rot.45) and:  
 
…we have set a higher composition than did our predecessors in order that the faida, that is, the blood 
feud, may be averted after the receipt of the above-mentioned composition, and in order that more shall 
not be demanded and a grudge shall not be held. (Rot.74)
772 
 
Patrick Wormald demonstrated how elements coincide in the Frankish laws, both the Salian 
and Ripurian, with the Edict, and with the seventh-century laws by Æthelred of Kent, which 
will be dealt with below.773 He follows the trail of Brunner’s argument that these laws had a 
common source of a lost law code from Merovingian king Dagobert.774 And, although 
Wormald does not support an original lex, he demonstrates the interdependence between the 
Frankish laws and the Lombard and Kentish, regarding several topics, and particularly 
compensation. However, where the Alaman and Ripurian laws correspond to the Frankish 
laws in structure and contents, Lombard law show a higher degree of deviation. Lisi Oliver 
pointed out the same familiarity, regarding compensation for injury.775 From this, we can 
assume, from the outset of the process of legislation, transmission of law from the sixth-
century Frankish laws to the seventh-century Lombard Edict, and simultaneously assume a 
                                                 
772 Translations by Drew, Lombard Laws, pp. 61 and 64-65; Leges Langobardorum, MGH, LL, 4, p. 20. Rot.75: 
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certain degree of original legislation and even a conscious attitude towards the loans from 
other legal sources.  
 Later Lombard kings supplemented Rothair’s edict. King Liutprand (r. 712–744) too, 
was more forthcoming in stating the motives behind the laws. His legislation continues the 
emphasis on avoiding violence. For instance, in resolving the conflict resulting from a broken 
engagement, he was credited with the reasoning that ‘[w]e do this in order that enmity may 
cease and there may be no feud’ (Liu.119). Thus, from the Lombard legislators we have the 
most outspoken acknowledgement of feuding in society and, among the sources included in 
this study, the only declared attempt to eliminate the custom. In the process of state 
consolidation, addressing violence would be a sensible way to ensure loyalty to the king. It is 
not possible to read from these sections that Lombard society was more violent than others 
were, or that the state apparatus actually curbed private violence within or outside the legal 
system. The set phrases in Lombard laws were, nevertheless, strong statements on the subject 
of feuding, contrasted with contemporary law. Traditions could be difficult to overcome in a 
forming state, illustrated by the Lombard king Liutprand’s attempt to abolish judgment by 
duel (Liu.118.II). A duel was not necessarily a fight to the death, but it was believed to reveal 
God’s verdict on the matter. The first blow would determine the guilt and from there 
compensation should be exchanged. Liutprand expressed the very core of the predicament in 
proclaiming ‘Quia incerti sumus de iudicio Dei’ (‘We are uncertain of God’s judgment’), 
referring to the fact that the wrong person might lose the combat. Resigned, he continued that 
‘on account of the customs of the Lombards, we are unable to abolish this law’.776 The 
rational thoughts of a legislating king could not alone enable him do away with a traditional 
proceeding. He was caught in what Katherine F. Drew has called the ‘clash between custom 
and the needs of the time’.777 Applied to the legality of wergild and the threat of feud, this 
raises the question of whether compensation was retained in the laws because it was too 
embedded in people’s sense of justice. The system of oath giving had the same purpose, to 
determine guilt with signs rather than evidence. However, oath giving declined in the 
Lombard legal system during the eight century, although it continued as a formality of written 
law.778 Hence, in some cases practice changed while law remained conservative. The same 
could be the case with the compensatory solutions in the laws. 
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Unlike other contemporaneous or later laws, Lombard legislators also explicitly admit 
by discouragement that compensation should be paid to avoid enmity and feuding: ’propter 
faida’.779 Furthermore, people seeking vengeance by killing an associate of the offender after 
receiving compensation should pay the compensation back twofold, but suffer no further 
reprisals from the official authority (Rot.143). The rule of the Lombard kings was troubled by 
conflicts with regional lords fighting for power and autonomy, many examples of which are 
provided by Paul the Deacon.780 Royal authority was conferred by election among these lords 
and was not hereditary. Besides unstable rule, the influence of the clergy on both legislation 
and the authorities was also limited, perhaps because both the Arian and Catholic churches 
operated within the boundaries until the beginning of the eight century, and thereby 
neutralised each other.781 We can thus assume a limited pressure on legislation from the 
Church. 
Monetary settlements were stipulated in cases of homicide, as well as in cases of 
injuries, insults and abduction.782 Compensation for grave offences should be stipulated based 
on the victim’s wergild and – in most cases – the king’s treasury would also receive a share. 
The compensatory system also constituted an income for the authorities. The prescribed 
procedure was set in an official framework and the written laws encouraged public settlement 
by institutionalising compensation. This ideally made the king a participant in the execution 
of justice and the law, although the king’s authority was limited.  
The compensation stipulated for homicide and rape was set at several times the 
wergild. The size of the wergild was not revealed in the edict of Rothair, but Liutprand’s laws 
include a list (Liu.62). According to this, wergild was differentiated according to status in two 
classes: those in the primus class were valued at 300 solidi, a minima persona at 150 solidi, 
and then there were the members of a third class, the royal gasindii, or servants of the king, 
which were valued at 200 solidi. This last class was an unfree but privileged group. The 
divide between higher and lower status is similar to the Roman divide. With the third group, 
the classification also resembles those seen in the Burgundian and Visigothic laws and in the 
Frankish Capitularies, and the sums correspond. 
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The sums may represent the wergild during Rothair’s seventh-century rule as well. As 
we saw in the compensation in Frankish law, changes were not made in the actual sums over 
the course of the centuries. However, Rothair’s edict does give details about the relationship 
between compensation and wergild. In contrast to the Lombard downgrading of Roman 
citizens in the marriage legislation, we do not find a distinction between Lombard and Roman 
as compensated victims as in the Frankish and Burgundian laws. Even if Romans answered to 
Roman law in the Lombard kingdom, a Lombard killing a Roman would be a case for 
Lombard courts. However, we learn that illegal intercourse with someone else’s Roman slave 
brought a smaller fine of twelve solidi, rather than the twenty solidi due if she was a 
Lombard.783 Neither do we find in writing other differentiations in age, as are found in the 
Visigothic and Frankish laws, and in this matter they do not faithfully follow the Frankish 
code. However, Lombard law did differentiate between male and female, both as killer and 
victim. The legislators paid much attention to the control and protection of women as both 
victims and violators. As previously mentioned, women were not legal persons (Rot.204), but 
there was nevertheless steep compensation prescribed for harming, killing or offending 
women. Women probably had a wergild equal to their male peers.784 
We also see indications that both the wergild and multiple wergild could be the 
anticipated compensation: like the Salic laws, the homicide of a pregnant woman meant 
compensation should be collected for both her and the unborn child, with half her wergild for 
the child (Rot.75). In this case, her status and wergild determined the compensation. 
However, another section stipulated compensation for killing a woman was as much as 1200 
solidi, the highest compensation in the Lombard written laws (Rot.200-201), and higher than 
other Germanic laws. This rule concerned a woman’s unjust death at the hand of her husband. 
The 1200 solidi would be shared between the king and her own relatives, which suggests that 
her natal family would have some interest in her after her marriage or transfer. It also means 
that her kin held the right or duty to avenge her. As a point of comparison, rape of a woman 
was also settled at a high rate. Rape gave a woman’s mundwald (guardian) the right to 
compensation according to her status, that is, 900 solidi for a free woman (Rot.186).785 If the 
wergilds in Lombard law corresponded with differentiations in other Germanic laws, then the 
recorded amounts of compensation were unique to both earlier and later laws. The reason may 
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be the particular Lombard focus on curbing the feud, but more probably the high sums were 
intended to prevent violence generally in the Lombard state. 
According to Rothair’s Edict, women who killed or attempted to kill their husbands 
would lose their lives (Rot.203). Whether this was by the hand of the husband’s relatives or 
by the authorities was unstated. Legislators similarly expected a husband to deal with an 
adulterous wife himself and, apparently, honour killing was due in such cases (Rot.212).786 
However, if the wife was killed without good cause, the same high compensation of 1200 
solidi applied, which would be shared between her kin and the king (Rot.200). Except for 
vengeance against adulterers and thieves, there was no legal acceptance of vengeance as a 
non-recurrent means of conflict resolution in the Lombard laws. Nonetheless, it was 
recognised that it was a frequent form of settlement in Lombard society.  
The legislators did not specify in detail who should give and receive compensation in 
case of homicide, as Salic law did, apart from ‘the relatives’. Regarding the recipients, that is, 
the family of the victim, close male relatives were the natural recipients according to Lombard 
legal culture. As mentioned in the chapter on inheritance, men could also inherit on the 
grounds that women could not raise the feud (Liu.13.VII). Although, based on literary 
sources, Murray has cautioned against interpreting contributors of compensation and those 
involved in the feud as one and the same, Liutprand’s statement indicate that there was a 
connection.787 Likewise, male relatives of legitimate status had precedence over those with 
the status of natural children (Rot.162). It was probably the legitimate-born who also had 
precedence in starting a feud, or natural sons and brothers may have been deprived of this 
right altogether.788 The law did not otherwise state any particular division of the sum, like we 
find in Salic law. Neither do we learn how compensation was to be paid or collected. 
Liutprand demanded the killer’s entire property be confiscated in cases of murder (Liu.20), 
and possibly the underlying expectation was that the payment started with the killer himself, 
without shares or instalments coming from either side of his family. 
A few actions lead to a harsher punishment than compensation, although these were 
admittedly steep. Crimes against the king were of course among these and were listed first in 
Rothair’s Edict (Rot. 1–7). Further, any upheaval against authorities was considered in the 
                                                 
786 See Rot.190-95, Rot.205-17 and Liu.119 on rape, adultery, abduction and eloping, all of which were 
sanctioned as grave crimes but, with exception of adultery, could be resolved through payment of steep 
compensation. See also Tveit, ‘Non enim coitus matrimonium facit’, pp. 79-80. 
787 Murray, Germanic Kinship Structure, p. 136. 
788 Drew, Lombard Laws, p. 244 n. 40 suggests the latter option. 
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same category.789 Parricide would be settled with a harsher punishment, probably the death 
penalty, as the Romans decreed in their laws. A concern was that the killer might be the 
victim’s heir. Therefore, other family members would inherit instead, in case of family 
homicide (Rot.163). On the other hand, planned killings, as defined in the category of murder 
in this study, would actually be remedied through compensation by wergild (Rot.11, Rot.141); 
a failed murder attempt gave rise to a fine of only twenty solidi (Rot. 10, Rot.12, Rot.139). In 
comparison, Roman law and the Visigothic legislators stated this to be as grave as murder and 
stipulated the death penalty. However, there was a distinction between planned murder and 
secret murder, compensation for the latter being 900 solidi (Rot.14). Liutprand’s stricter 
regulation in the eight century demanded full confiscation of the killer’s property to make up 
the compensation (Liu.20). If the value of the property exceeded compensation, the residue 
would be shared between the victim and the king, i.e., the treasury. In this way, a killer’s 
wealth would not make it possible for him to pay his way out of the offence. Whether this was 
part of an attempt by Liutprand to place subjects on equal terms, we cannot say. But, viewed 
together with the previously mentioned ban on duelling and the granting of inheritance rights 
to women (see chapter 6), Liutprand’s legislative contribution could have been due to a notion 
of social change.  
 In the Lombard royal legislation on homicide, we find many of the same features as 
the three other continental legal cultures, alongside some that stand out as unique features 
from the Lombard legal elite. We find tariffs of compensation for homicide, and the tariffs are 
categorised according to the victim’s gender and status. Although Lombard law valued 
women very highly, and it does not bother with age differentiation, the legal thought is 
recognisable. The distinctive character of Lombard law is that at least in the earliest written 
law, compensation was more about avoiding vengeance than punishing the killer. While it is 
easy to read too much into legal platitudes, the interest in avoiding feud is repeated and 
elaborated on by both Rothair and Liutprand, and it must be understood as a significant topic 
giving the Lombard royal legislator some authority. Following on from this, the legislation on 
homicide must be read as a recommendation to reach agreement and keep the peace. In regard 
to transmission of law, the familiarity of Lombard laws with the other Germanic laws, and in 
particular the Frankish laws, is evident. Again, Lombard laws nevertheless have crucial 
differences in the stated regulations concerning compensation for homicide, revealing an 
                                                 
789 To rebel against one’s superior and kill a lord was punished with death (Rot.13, 19), as was sending secret 
messengers to neighbouring lands, as found in the laws of King Ratchis (Rat.9). Causing a disturbance near the 
physical presence of the king could also risk death (Rot.36). 
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independent approach to those loans made from the earlier legislation of neighbouring legal 
cultures. 
 
Conclusion: Roman and Germanic laws on homicide and compensation  
This detailed survey of the content of the Germanic laws has mapped out the similarities and 
dissimilarities in the regulation of homicide. As a preliminary conclusion regarding early 
medieval legislation on homicide and compensation, we can see that the sources revolve 
around the same topics, the same problems and perhaps – apart from the Visigothic laws – 
roughly the same solutions, with compensatory punishment for these crimes. Vengeance was 
not generally accepted legally as a form of conflict resolution, although in particular 
circumstances it was, and it was at least acknowledged by the lawmakers as part of society’s 
system of justice and peacekeeping. 
 However, the different Germanic lawmakers we have examined here had different 
ways of dealing with private violence in the written laws. While the Visigothic kings 
prescribed public proceedings and corporal punishments, the Frankish and Lombard kings 
assumed private agreements of monetary compensation. The Burgundian legal material shows 
a combination of the fine-based legal system and corporal punishment, as seen in the Roman 
and Visigothic codes. Burgundian and Visigothic law are already known as those which 
reflected Roman law in their wording, content and appearance. That may be the reason for not 
devoting much space to the compensatory system in the written laws, although it does appear 
in them. The Visigothic law demands an equal treatment of the Romans and the Goths, which 
is vaguely detected in the earlier Burgundian law as well. The Lombard and Frankish laws 
downgrade Romans, and the Frankish laws also devalue them. Burgundian law contained 
adaptations from Roman law on assigning guilt and meting out punishment, and also on 
distinguishing between types of homicide, with or without intent, and between these and 
manslaughter justified by anger. These distinctions were also included in the other Germanic 
law. But while the Visigothic and Burgundian laws followed the Roman example of assessing 
murder as a capital crime, the two others included compensation even here. The 
differentiation in status can also be assumed to be an inheritance from the Roman legal 
apparatus, which influenced the Germanic. All the Germanic laws in this study include a two- 
or three-part definition of status groups, outside the unfree. The Roman model of honestiores 
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and humiliores were presumably the source of this influence, although the Germanic versions 
had three groups and slightly different Latin names. 
If we then view the findings in light of the hierarchy of probability, we see the same 
transmission in some specific areas of laws regarding compensation. Starting from the 
bottom, with the simple elements of the rules, there are many common features in the 
continental rules on compensation for homicide. Here we look at the terminology, solutions 
and otherwise similar features in the simplest elements of the rules. However, the main terms 
differ between the codes. All four codes have different terminology. While Burgundian law 
uses the Roman term pretium, the Lombards employ the Germanic term wergeld and vague 
references to both appear in Visigothic and Salic laws, together with the term leod. These 
terms still have the same meaning and content in terms of the value of a life. When we look at 
the solutions, the laws also contain the same recompense: compensation. All four jurisdictions 
stipulate compensation based on the wergild in the same law and computed to be either the 
same amount or two- or threefold. Although the stipulated sums of actual compensation 
differ, there is a concurrence between these tariffs that cannot be explained other than by an 
influence or perhaps interdependence between them. Both in contemporaneous and diachronic 
sources, the sums revolve around the value of 150, 200 and 300 solidi, according to status. 
The sums themselves might have been of abstract sizes given the insurmountable values 
stipulated and the realities of these sums. Why the legislators stipulate these sums for wergild 
specifically, and not other sums, is not stated by them. The most obvious thought is a 
common idea of wergild shared between the Germanic legal elite, probably deriving from a 
counting system where these numbers are significant. Burgundian laws did not employ the 
numbers apart from in the rule on wergild, nor did Frankish laws outside giving high-ranking 
servants and slaves of the king a wergild of 300 solidi (PLS.41.8 and PLS.54.2). In Visigothic 
law we find the occasional punishment of 200 lashes, although 100 lashes was more frequent, 
and those causing the disablement of a slave through torture were fined 200 and 300 solidi.790 
Lombard laws otherwise set compensation at 200 solidi in the case of adultery with a nun, or 
breach of agreement, while the numbers 150 and 300 do not occur elsewhere (Liu.42.XIII, 
Liu.76.VII). The sums must therefore derive from copies of earlier laws giving these sums or, 
more likely, from a common Germanic idea of the value of wergild, just as widespread as the 
common idea of the seven-day week and the name of the days.791 The size of the wergild and 
compensation may have been widespread in a similar fashion. 
                                                 
790 For instance, LV.5.4.9, LV.6.1.4, LV.6.2.3, LV.6.3.1,5,6. 
791 Lupoi, Origins, pp. 141-44. 
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Looking then at the composition of the rules, we can discern four different directions 
in the legislators’ arguments for compensation as the solution for homicide. Differences also 
exist in sources originating in the same period. The early sixth-century Burgundian laws make 
a few references to vengeance and more infrequently use compensation as solution. The 
contemporary Salic laws stipulated compensatory punishments and made no references to 
vengeance. The later Visigothic laws from the mid-seventh century provide few references to 
compensatory settlements and even fewer to vengeance. Meanwhile, contemporary Lombard 
law, like the earlier Salic law, incorporated a compensatory system of punishment, but unlike 
the Salic law, Lombard lawmakers strongly stressed the threat of vengeance so that it 
permeated all aspects of private law.  
The most probable evidence of transmission is in copied rules. There exists obvious 
copying of the Frankish laws from the sixth in the ninth century, but otherwise there is little 
copying of entire rules or passages between the Germanic laws. The loan of phrases and 
paragraphs came from Roman law, which did not have the institution of compensation for 
homicide. In these respects, the early Germanic laws that originated in the wake of Roman 
legal culture reveal more differences in addressing private violence than anticipated. Their 
similarities could be the result of similar solutions to similar problems rather than legal 
transmission of intellectual commodities. Nevertheless, the total number of concurrences in 





11. Compensation for Homicide in the English Laws 
 
In the chapter on inheritance in England, the recurring theme was the lack of rules regulating 
inheritance, and thus the few parallels to continental secular laws. Regarding compensation, 
the picture is quite different. Early English legislation is comprised to a large extent of 
crimes/criminal actions and tariffs pertaining to them, either as fines or compensation or both, 
similar to those found in the Frankish and Lombard laws. Hence, there are several comparable 
points between the English laws from the seventh and eighth century and Germanic and 
Roman legislation. The political context of the ninth century onward brought contact with 
Scandinavian legal culture. Thus, this chapter will anticipate some parallels between the 
English laws and those Scandinavian laws from later centuries. The first known attempts at 
written law in the old Roman province of Britannia was the legislation of King Æthelbert, 
assumed to date from the period AD 602–03.792 Roughly contemporaneous with continental 
legal activity, the earliest Kentish laws support the idea of a legal transmission between the 
island and the Continent in many respects, including compensation.  
 
11.1 Continuation of continental compensation in Kent and Wessex 
The law of Æthelbert comprised legislation on theft, fornication and killings in the first 
sections (Ath.1–26). Killing would require compensation in the manner of Frankish law, but 
using a different currency and perhaps at a lower amount. Bede, in praising Æthelbert’s deeds, 
drew attention to his legal activities.793 He wrote that the king, with the advice of learned men, 
gave judicial decrees, ‘iuxta exempla Romanorum’. Bede essentially complimented the king 
on setting compensation for theft from the Church and the clergy. Perhaps Bede also found it 
advantageous to give the first written law a Roman flair, which would also give it a Catholic 
spirit by association. Patrick Wormald suggested that the Romans might have been Franks, 
and the examples of written law might have been the post-Roman secular laws of the 
Continent.794 It is highly likely that the Kentish administration was inspired by the 
contemporary and neighbouring Frankish legislation, as well as through having knowledge 
and access to Roman law. King Æthelbert married Bertha, daughter of the Neustrian king 
                                                 
792 Liebermann, III, p. 2; Whitelock, EHD, p. 357.  
793 Bede, Historia ecclesiastica, no.ii.5;  
794 Wormald, Making of English Law, pp. 29, 97. 
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Charibet and a Christian.795 According to Bede, she laid the groundwork for the re-
Christianisation of the English, which Augustine, sent by Pope Gregory from Rome, later 
continued.796 Bertha also brought a bishop with her and she might have contributed to the 
transmission of written legal concepts or actual texts from the Frankish cultural sphere. For 
those in authority in the Kentish realm, both Christianity and the law would be tools for 
legitimising kingship. What reveals the relationship between the island and the Continent is 
the term for wergild, which is leodgelde (Ath.7, Ath.21), leode being a form of leude in the 
Salic laws (PLS.41.5, PLS.53.8, PLS.63.1) and the laws of Gundobad (LB.101.2).797 In the 
Burgundian law, this constitutes persons of the lower classes. Similarly, Æthelbert’s wording 
states that if a smith or a messenger of the king was killed, then ordinary or ‘middle’ wergild, 
meduman leodgelde would apply (Ath.7).798 That the leodgelde was the basis for 
compensation suggests that the compensation would normally be calculated from wergild. 
Further, the existence of a meduman wergild implies that Kentish legislators operated with a 
notion of wergild according to status. Another rule reads that if one man killed another, 
medume leodgeld of 100 shillings was to be paid as compensation (Ath.21).  
We can assume the ‘middle wergild’ of 100 gold shillings was for average free men 
without any particular rank, that is, not for kings, officials, nobility and so on.799 The early 
laws do not reveal what compensation should be paid for higher-ranking persons, but these 
sums are specified by later Kentish kings, Hlothhere and Eadric (Hl&E.1–4). A nobleman, 
probably with a status equivalent to a thegn, had a wergild of 300 shillings, and the price is 
likened to that of three men or four servants.800 The parallel to the continental laws is obvious, 
but the Kentish laws were not copies or translations of, for instance, Frankish laws, and the 
composition and emphasis in them show originality when contrasted with the Germanic laws. 
Wormald asserted that the Kentish legal enterprise was an ‘emulation, not imitation’ of earlier 
law, which in the scope of this thesis could be classified as influenced by, if not directly 
copied.801 There is nevertheless reason to argue that legal ideologies, motives, contents and 
terminology were transmitted to the legislators of Kent.  
                                                 
795 Lupoi, Origins, p. 62; Bede, I.25. 
796 Bede, I.26. 
797 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 175 n. 2.1; Wemple, Women in Frankish Society, p. 228 
n. 2. 
798 According to Joseph and Elisabeth Wright, Old English Grammar, (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), 
p. 231,§ 446, the infix -uma- formed the superlative of the adjective, giving meduman and medume the meaning 
‘middle’ here. Attenborough translated it to ‘ordinary’, Laws of the Early English Kings, pp. 4-7, 175 n.7, 176 n. 
21.1. 
799 For various views of the Kentish shilling, see Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 176 n. 16. 
800 See Hudson, Laws of England, pp. 201-24, for a survey of Anglo-Saxon differentiation of status. 
801 Wormald, Making of English Law, p. 101. 
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Æthelbert demanded a portion of the transaction as an additional punishment for 
breach of the peace (Ath.2, Ath.5–9). The bot or wite were payments to the state in addition to 
the compensation paid to the family of the victim. The English kings can be seen to make 
regulations that enrich the state from the very first known legal works. Possibly, in this 
respect, the Nordic medieval ‘currency’ of baugr can also be found in the very first of the 
English laws as Kentish king Æthelbert’s sixth section reads of ‘drihtinbeage’ (Ath.6), which 
Frederick Attenborough and Dorothy Whitelock recognise as the archaic form manbot,802 a 
fine paid to the king for the life of a subject. Baugr, meaning rings, was used in defining 
compensation in the Icelandic law Grágás, and defined the reliable kinship groups within the 
Norwegian law of Frostathing.803 Conceptually, the early English laws share terminology and 
contents with both the contemporary continental laws and the later Scandinavian laws.  
As mentioned in the survey of inheritance laws, the main content of the Kentish laws 
was structural power and protection of the peace, not the private subjects of family and 
marriage, although there are some sections in Wihtred against adulterers, ‘unrihthæmde 
mæn’, urging them to set right their unions in a Christian form (Wih.3–4).804 As such, it is not 
a kinship-dominated legal text in the sense of the continental laws, but an early attempt to 
build the institutions of kingship and Church. King Wihtred (r. 690?–725), unlike originators 
of contemporary Germanic law, included several passages on proceedings for clerical staff 
(Wih.16–24), combining canon law directly within his enactments. This is what one might 
have expected more of a Visigothic secular legislator, having such a close relationship with 
the higher clergy. Nevertheless, the lack of tradition for both canon law and secular law 
between the English may have led to such a fusion. Otherwise, the following Kentish 
legislation gives the impression of filling in the gaps in the law of King Æthelbert. Hlothhere 
and Eadric targeted insults and brawls, and Wihtred’s laws fought paganism and heresy 
(Wih.9–15), and accounts for the rights, but also the duties, of clerics.  
The first English laws from the early seventh century contained provisions for the 
killer to pay the entire compensation alone, without help from relatives (Ath.21). Only if the 
killer fled the land, i.e., went beyond the borders of Kent and the jurisdiction of Æthelbert’s 
                                                 
802 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 175 n. 6.1; Whitelock, EHD, p. 357 n. 1. 
803 Bertha Phillpotts, Kindred and Clan in the Middle Ages and After: A Study in the Sociology of the Teutonic 
Races (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), pp. 11-14; Agnes S. Arnórsdóttir, Property and 
Virginity, pp. 49-50; Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, p.195 n. 35. See also chapter 8. 
804 Wihtred’s law against foreigners, who would be exiled if they did not make their relationship legal (Wih.4), 
was also included in Cnut’s law (II Cnut.55). Although there was no standardisation of Christian blessings or 
rites for marriage by the late-seventh century, the early medieval perceptions of what constituted legitimate and 
illicit unions were extensive. See, for instance, Tveit, ‘Non enim coitus matrimonium’, pp. 39-71. 
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law, which was probably territorial, then kin would be held responsible (Ath.23). The early 
English laws differ from the contemporary continental laws, which anticipated a degree of 
assistance from relatives. With the connection between vengeance and wergild, it is relevant 
to consider what implications these regulations might have had on the regulations on 
vengeance and feuding. Specific rules on the target of retaliations were first clearly put into 
writing in the laws of King Edmund (r. 939–946), in which it was stated that the killer ‘should 
take the feud alone’ (II Edm.1). It is not evident from the laws prior to Edmund whether such 
a perception was prevalent. With Wihtred, however, the term ‘healsfang’ was presented 
(Wih.11–12). In the context of later laws, Attenborough interpreted it as signifying the first 
instalment of the compensation, and Whitelock interpreted it as signifying the first heir’s 
share of it.805 They also both suggest that ‘healsfang’ constitutes a surety for avoiding feud. In 
medieval European law, there was no automatic correlation between tolerating vengeance and 
the designated providers of the compensation; still, there are several instances, as in the 
Lombard laws, of division of the sum in relation to the potential to raise the feud. The 
practical usage of ‘healsfang’ suggests that the concept was originally Kentish, and not 
necessarily transmission from the Continent, although it falls into the same pattern of 
motivation as, for instance, Lombard law. 
 Ine (r. 688-726), king of Wessex and a contemporary legislator of Wihtred’s, enacted a 
range of laws which covered more general topics concerning private settlements and crimes 
than the Kentish laws. As before and indeed later in early medieval English history, the 
legislation was greatly occupied with the crime of theft and legalising the killing of thieves. 
Ine’s laws would also accept this, but the killer would have to pledge on oath the guilt of the 
thief (Ine.16). The same section forbids any associates from taking the oath with the killer of 
the thief: ‘nalles ða gegildan’ (without associates). For one thing, that means individual 
responsibility and it also suggests a digression from joint oath-giving in favour of a truth-
seeking oath. This distinguishing of actual guilt tends not to be seen in early medieval laws. It 
did not enter the Nordic legislation before the introduction of a common legal system in the 
respective kingdoms from the thirteenth century. Attenborough has argued through 
interpretation of the term ‘gegildan’ that relatives were held jointly responsible with the killer 
for paying compensation under Ine.806 ‘Gegildan’ would be the killer’s associated 
contributors, i.e., his with-payers. Nevertheless, the term could also signify non-related 
                                                 
805 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 181 n. 11.1; Whitelock, EHD, p. 363 n. 3. 
806 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 185 n. 16.1. 
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associates, as it did later.807 In that case, there was no analogue concept in earlier and 
contemporary continental laws. If associated contributors signify relatives and not friends, 
then the kings of Wessex might have played with the notion of investigation and not the proof 
of oath alone: in other words, the concepts of investigation and individual responsibility.  
Later king of Wessex, by approximately two centuries, Alfred (r. 871–899), would 
make use of the earlier legislation, in particular that of Ine. Wergild as compensation and a 
fine to the authorities were both elements incorporated into the legal code (Alf.1.5, 2.1, 27). 
More importantly, Alfred’s laws also give clues to the anticipated recipients of the 
compensation, although these appear in the law as in the highly irregular situation mentioned 
in chapter 7: if a nun was abducted and had a child as a result, if this child was killed, then her 
relatives were not entitled their due portion of the compensation, although the illegitimate 
father’s relatives would get theirs (Alf.8.3). We must understand the division of the 
compensation between the relatives of the father and mother of the victim accordingly; in case 
of homicide, the maternal family would be entitled to one portion of the compensation, and 
the paternal family to another portion. Similarly, we learn in another rule that between the 
killer's relatives, the compensation should be in the proportion of one-third from the mother’s 
relatives and one-third from the paternal side, the last third coming from the killer himself 
(Alf.30). Thus, we see here a specific division in the collective responsibility of kinship in 
terms of contributing to the compensation. This is different from the continental laws, which, 
apart from Salic law, gave few clues as to the specific mode of sharing, and to the Kentish 
laws, which demanded the killer to make the payment alone. If the killer lacked relatives on 
either side, the killer’s associates would have to contribute. If, on the other hand, the victim 
had no kin, the associates shared the compensation with the treasury due to the lack of 
relatives (Alf.31). Otherwise, the king was entitled to a fine in each case of between 60 and 
120 shillings. Accordingly, ensuring compliance with the legal system must have been an 
important task and source of income for the secular authorities. 
In the West Saxon laws, the stipulation of wergild was divided into groups of 200, 600 
and 1200 shillings according to status (Alf.10, 18, 39, 40). The lowest amount was for the 
ceorls, which were low-status – but free – peasants, while the highest wergild was reserved 
for the thegn, the royal officials. The recipient of the wergild of 600 shillings is not specified 
and the sum disappears in later laws.808 It might have been the wergild of the free peasant 
proprietors, the same group that had a relevant interest in the bookland and folkland discussed 
                                                 
807 See Whitelock, EHD, p. 366 n. 2. She gave one example of such a use in VI Æthelstan.37. 
808 Lyon, ‘Historical Problems’, p. 211. 
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earlier. In his translation, Attenborough points out that the shilling of the West Saxon 
contained four pence, as did the Mercian shilling.809 The shilling of Wessex might have been 
reckoned at four pence up until the period of Alfred, when it changed to five pence.810 
However, Chadwick – and later Lyon – suggested that the differences lay in the weight of the 
penny rather than the shilling.811 The wergild in the laws of Wessex was then not only larger 
in its amount, but the currency was also subject to inflation.  
The wergild of a woman is not given, although we understand that she would have a 
worth according to her status, which again was determined by the rank of her father, or 
husband if married. The killing of a woman would, as for men, be compensated according to 
her wergild. A pregnant woman was compensated plus half the father’s wergild for the unborn 
child (Alf.9). We do not learn exactly what this means, other than the child being valued 
according to who the father was. The rule resembles those of the Frankish and Lombard laws, 
in which the unborn child was also half that of a man’s wergild, while the woman was 
accorded higher compensation. In comparison, Alfred’s laws also follow the continental 
pattern in relation to compensation for insults, rape and abduction (Alf.8, 10, 11, 18, 29, 35). 
The one difference is that verbal insults should be punished, quite surprisingly, by the loss of 
the tongue (molestation), if not compensated by the whole wergild, probably the victim’s 
(Alf.32). This type of punishment is in line with the principles of talionis, with the culprit 
being punished after the fashion of the crime. These types are seen mostly in the later Norman 
laws, although there were also some earlier attempts in the legislation of Cnut (r. 1016-1035), 
in which rapists were to be castrated, thieves would have their hands cut off, and so on.812  
Vengeance was regulated by law, and vengeful homicide was only accepted in the 
case of adultery by the wife. Violent actions (feohtan) were acceptable if a man caught four 
particular female relatives in the act: his wife, daughter, sister or his lawfully married mother 
(Alf.42.7). The offended man would again be protected from vengeance by the offence itself. 
This can be related to the same normative standards we saw in both the Roman material and 
the Germanic laws, although here the honour killings also regarded the sister and mother, 
which is an extension of the practice of Roman law. However, it corresponds to a later 
Norwegian rule, found in both the Frostathing Law and the Gulathing Law, listing the same 
                                                 
809 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 191 n.59.1 and p. 195 n.12.1. 
810 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 191 n. 59.1. 
811 Hector Munro Chadwick, Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1905), p. 12; Lyon, ‘Historical Problems’, pp. 209-10. 
812 The Ten Articles ascribed to William I (WI art), and the laws of Henry I (LHP), contain much of Cnut’s 
secular law, such as the rules about punishment: II Cn. 2.1, 30.4-5, WI art.10. 
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four women (GL.X.11, F.IV.39). It is apparent that the developments of law in Anglo-Saxon 
England share many of the traits also found in Scandinavian law. Adultery with someone’s 
wife could still be compensated for in the same manner as other crimes in the laws of Alfred 
(Alf.10). Compensation was set as a share of the husband’s own wergild, ranging between a 
tenth and a sixth part of the respective status, and thus identifying him as the victim of the 
offence. Private settlement by violence was apparently not a major issue in the earliest 
English laws, although the solution of compensation reveals that it was considered a feasible 
outcome.  
Unlike the situation for inheritance laws, in which scraps and bits had to be puzzled 
together to create some sort of system, the English laws are more rewarding when examined 
for legislation on compensation for homicide and crimes as a whole. The articulation in the 
texts on private violence and the silence on family property in the legal material could, as 
previously suggested, have been the result of the status of the state. The arrangement between 
relatives in terms of succession and the distribution of property would be considered a private 
matter, whereas private violence had implications for society in general and the position of 
secular authority. Hence, the legal work of the kings, both during the Heptarchy and within 
the larger unit of the English kingdom, regulated homicide in greater detail.  
 
11.2 The treaties and compensation 
From the time of Alfred and his successor Edward, we also have the extant controversial but 
rewarding ‘treaties with the Danes’.813 The treaties were written down, respectively, by Alfred 
and Guthrum in the 880s, and Edward and another Guthrum, or more likely a fictitious 
Guthrum, in the early tenth century. The dating of these documents is uncertain, but the first 
Guthrum’s death is believed to have occurred in 890. Thus, Dorothy Whitelock dated the first 
treaty to the late 880s, whereas Liebermann dated it vaguely to the 880s or 890s.814 
Attenborough observes that the Guthrum who made a treaty with Edward could be the 
unknown Danish king mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle who died in 921.815 
Liebermann asserts that the treaty between Edward and Guthrum was not authentic and rather 
                                                 
813 Liebermann II, pp. 126-27; Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, pp. 98-99; Whitelock, EHD, 
no. 34. 
814 Whitelock, EHD, p. 380; Liebermann I, pp. 126-28. 
815 Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, pp. 96-97. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (A), Ann. 921 Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle, ed. and trans. by John Allen Giles (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914), pp. 72-73. 
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a product of Æthelstan’s rule.816 Whitelock, on the other hand, suggested that Archbishop 
Wulfstan was the author of the later treaty, or at least that he rewrote it when he first came to 
York.817 Wormald has also suggested that the treaty was a product of Wulfstan drafted in 
York in approximately 1002, in which Wulfstan backdates some of his ideology to the realm 
of Edgar, or founding the ideology expressed in the treaty in that time.818 
In the context of wergild and compensation, the treaties with the Danes are of great 
interest. As mentioned in chapter 2, the treaties were the crux of English and Scandinavian 
norms, but also the lowest common denominator of what could be agreed upon. We could 
interpret the treaty as the essence of the legal cultures, although we must not disregard the 
particular circumstances under which they potentially originated. Alfred’s army subdued the 
Danes prior to the treaty, and so we can assume that the English ‘agreed’ more than the 
Danes. In any case, the settling of violence in such turbulent times was of importance. No 
later than the second section of the first treaty, wergild is referred to, putting the ‘Engliscne’ 
and the ‘Deniscne’ on an equal footing by setting the same value on the life of each (A&G.2). 
Different from the Frankish laws, where the Frankish ‘coloniser’ and the Roman ‘colonised’ 
were valued unequally, this treaty forced mutual valuation. The given value was eight half-
marks of gold. This was a Scandinavian currency and a high value compared to contemporary 
English wergilds. Attenborough and Whitelock interpreted this sum as being of the same 
value as the theng, which comprised 1200 shillings under Ine and later Alfred (see above, 
Ine.79, Alf.10, 39).819 Stewart Lyon agreed with their conclusion, although he cautioned that 
the ‘answer must remain in doubt’.820 Whitelock also suggested that the sum amounted 
approximately to the highest English status, based on the ratio of gold to silver, which at the 
time was 1:10.821 However, she and Attenborough admitted that the sum could represent the 
Scandinavian wergild recognised at the time.  
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the wergild in the Nordic laws, and especially 
the Norwegian laws, was relatively higher than in other regions. However, these were laws 
from some 200 to 300 years later. The jurist Knut Robberstad identified the wergild of 
eighteen silver marks as the earliest layer in the Norwegian law of Gulathing, G.180 (while 
                                                 
816 Liebermann III, p. 87. 
817 Whitelock, ‘Wulfstan and the So-Called Laws of Edward and Guthrum’, pp. 1-21. 
818 Wormald, Making of English Laws, pp. 339, 389-91. 
819 Whitelock, EHD, p. 381, n. 2; Attenborough , Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 201 n. 2.1. 
820 Lyon, ‘Historical Problems’, p. 216. 
821 Whitelock, EHD, p. 381 n. 2. For the estimation of the ratio of gold to silver, see Munro Chadwick, Studies 
on Anglo-Saxon Institutions, pp. 50ff. 
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later on in G.218–21 the total compensation amounts to seven times that).822 In Archbishop 
Wulfstan’s Sermo Lupi ad Anglos, ‘Sermon of the Wolf to the English’, possibly dating from 
1014, he lamented the practice of the Danes of demanding outrageously high compensation 
for their lowest men, and how the English waivered in the matter.823 In the treaty between 
Edward and Guthrum, compensation was discussed using different terminology, being lahslit 
in the Danish territory and wer(e) among the English (E&G.2.2, E&G.2.3, E&G.6). Lahslit, 
according to Whitelock, signified a breach of the peace, but was ascribed a value according to 
the status of the offender.824 It is not clear whether the Danes demanded compensation 
according to the status of the killer or the victim. The juxtaposition with the English term 
suggests that they had a similar meaning, the wergild being that of the victim. However, the 
idea of using separate terms for Danish and English compensation might suggest that they had 
different meanings. Lahslit could have been a term derived from lagu, law.825 It bore the 
semantics of compensation for broken law and corresponded to the Old English wite, hence 
the juxtaposition in the paragraph. Seemingly, lahslit was the Scandinavian term for 
compensation, although Pons-Sanz has suggested that the usage and a collocation of 
compounds points to an Anglo-Scandinavian coinage of the word.826 After some decades had 
passed between the two treaties, a system better adapted to the requirements and realities of 
each party came to be used for the second treaty. As Patrick Wormald pointed out, the Alfred-
treaty does not resemble the language of Alfred’s Domboc (Doom book) as much as the 
language is echoed in the later English laws from Edward to Edmund, particularly in the 
phrase ‘We declare’.827 This does not mean that the treaty spurred a Scandinavian influence 
on the legislation, but that phrases which were applied sporadically in the late-ninth century 
laws of Alfred became standard terminology among his predecessors. In Norman laws, the 
language and terminology was different from this and the compilers did not always 
understand the right meaning of the words in earlier laws.828 Thus, the Anglo-Scandinavian 
terms have become a determining factor in uncovering the old legal tradition.829 The treaties 
can be claimed as a point of reference regarding adapting to each others’ legal concepts.  
                                                 
822 Robberstad, Gulatingslovi, pp. 373-74. 
823 The Sermon of the Wolf to the English, in Whitelock, EHD, p. 240. 
824 Whitelock, EHD, p. 409 n. 1. 
825 Pons-Sanz, Norse-Derived Vocabulary, pp. 68-69. 
826 Ibid., pp. 119-21. 
827 Wormald, Making of English laws, pp. 285-86. 
828 For example, Lyon, ‘Historical Problems’, pp. 210-11.  




The agreement between the Danes and the English can further be compared to another 
treaty made a century later with the same parties, the English king and the invading 
Scandinavian armies, but perhaps with a different power balance. The Vikings had joined 
forces and demanded heavy tributes to stop ravaging the island, and it seems that Æthelred 
was forced to pay.830 Æthelred also initiated, or entered into, an agreement with Viking 
leaders, among them the later Norwegian king, Olav Tryggvasson. The agreement constituted 
a truce (II Atr.6). It also nullified the claims due to violence experienced by those subjected to 
English law prior to this treaty. The victim’s family had no rights of compensation or 
vengeance for earlier incidents. Furthermore, if someone was killed who themselves 
disturbed the peace by taking vengeance for an earlier crime, this treaty would deprive his 
family of compensation (II Atr.3.4). The rule shows how fragile the peace treaty was, but also 
that the English king would intervene in the traditional legal practices for the benefit of the 
state by imposing martial law. There was a distinction between breaking the peace, a normal 
concept within law, and breaking the truce. A breaking of the truce was not simple homicide 
but the death of at least eight men (II.Atr.5.2). Otherwise, the treaty would hold and normal 
compensation of wergild would apply in incidents that happened after the treaty.  
 The wergild was not specified in this later treaty, but killing between the nations in the 
post-treaty period was set at twenty-five pounds (II Atr.5), which applied both if a Dane killed 
an Englishman and vice versa.831 The sum has been compared to the eight half-marks of gold 
stated in the Treaty of Alfred and Guthrum, and is assumed to represent approximately the 
same value.832 If so, this means that the legal encounter between the English and Danes, 
which was a tense situation of conflict, gave rise to increased compensation. This is possibly 
because of the expectations of the Scandinavians, or possibly because of the tension.  
 
 
11.3 Changes in the tenth-century laws 
From the tenth century, we have the largest compilation of what was intended to be royal 
legislation, with the six series of laws attributed to King Æthelstan (r. 925?–939) comprising 
most of it. Liebermann placed the laws from Edward the Elder (r. 899–924) to Æthelred (r. 
                                                 
830 The tribute was also incorporated into the treaty. II Atr.7.2. Liebermann I, pp. 224-25. 
831 Libermann I, pp. 222-23; EHD I, no. 42.  
832 Agnes Robertson, The Laws of the Kings of England From Edmund to Henry I (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009 [1925]), pp. 47-48; Attenborough, Laws of the Earliest English Kings, p. 201 n. 2.1; 
Whitelock, EHD, p. 381 n. 2-3.  
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1014-1016) together. This is natural, since these form the laws of the domestic kings of a 
united English kingdom, but what is more relevant here in terms of legal development is that 
there are common features in the laws of these kings. The individualisation we find cultivated 
in the laws of Cnut emerged through a legislation focusing slightly more on the power 
invested in kingship and the duties of the subjects, rather than the other way around. In 
Æthelstan’s laws we find a greater concern, or maybe desperation, to control the violence in 
his dominions, which threatened not only the legitimacy of his authority but also directly his 
rule and his life.833 This could be a reflection of the political situation, but it provides even 
greater signs of seemingly more generalised legislation. Æthelstan’s laws borrow from 
Alfred’s, but have a different style, as Wormald has described in detail, expressed as the 
impersonal voice of authority.834 Law was professionalised and with it, royal legal power. V 
Æthelstan was concerned with social unrest and breach of the peace (see V As.prologue). For 
example, Æthelstan’s call for conscription was a greater burden on communities than other 
aspects described in the English laws, with two men on horses for each plough (II As.16). 
And in his ordinance given at Grately, which primarily concerned theft (II As), Æthelstan 
would repeat the long-standing view that a thief should not be avenged if killed (II As.6.2–3).  
Secret murder involving witchcraft would be a non-compensational deed according to 
Æthelstan (II As.6). To clear oneself from the accusation required a massive triple ordeal. 
However, imprisonment for 120 days followed by a payment of 120 shillings to the king’s 
treasury, plus payment of full compensation to the affected kinsmen would apparently 
commute the death sentence. The last part could perhaps stand as an argument for the deep-
rooted tradition of compensation as a means of conflict resolution, or just a testament to the 
power of money, both for expensive kings and injured families. Wormald has interpreted the 
specific rule the other way around, with imprisonment being the normal ordeal and execution 
occurring only upon failure to express a denial of the accusation.835 He compared the rule to 
the anonymous law on arson and secret murder, ‘be blaserum et be morðslihtum’.836 Wormald 
interprets ‘morðslihtum’ not as secret killings, but as all those not happening face-to-face, i.e., 
without the opportunity to defend oneself. Even so, the main regulation of this law was that 
                                                 
833 Wormald, Making of English Laws, p. 307. 
834 Wormald, Making of English Laws, pp. 301-02, 309. 
835 Wormald, Making of English Laws, p. 367. 
836 Ibid. See also Liebermann I, pp. 388-89. 
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Æthelstan did not find compensation to relatives in the case of murder a satisfactory 
solution.837 
In the legislation of Æthelstan, we can find one of the few references to the providers 
and recipients of compensation, normally given as the non-specific ‘magas’ (relatives) (II 
As.11). The procedure described decreed that the one demanding the compensation was to 
come forth with two from the paternal side (of the killed, we must assume) and one from the 
maternal side. Furthermore, the kinsmen were obliged to swear that the relative killed was not 
a thief. They should should also appear at an agreed time at the risk of incurring a rather large 
fine of 120 shillings to the king for failure to appear, probably to ensure that the case was 
solved with peaceful means, and possibly to ensure private settlement was made public. Thus, 
we have a private settlement made in a public display, with a substantial public fine. The 
person making the demand, pronounced in masculine terms, was not specified as a particular 
relative. It is likely that the closest relative or heir was assumed to be the person to put forth 
the claim for compensation, or possibly the head of family. Here again we find the three-way 
partition of the compensation, as seen in the Frankish laws. We are not told if the division 
should be proportional, with two-thirds to the father’s side and one-third to the mother’s. The 
heir was probably counted among the two claimants from the father’s side. As we saw in the 
chapter on inheritance, there was a slight dominance of patrilineal principles in the English 
inheritance system, and the division of wergild might have mirrored this. If so, then the 
distribution of the compensation would be 2:1 between the paternal and maternal relatives. 
However, as mentioned above, the distribution of inheritance for the illegitimate slain child of 
a nun in the laws of King Alfred (Alf.8.3) also spoke of a division between the paternal and 
maternal side, and thus there could be the same differentiation to collecting compensation. 
The Alfredian division of contribution was nevertheless one-third from each side and one-
third from the offender (Alf.30).  
The law referred to as II Edmund, dating from the mid-tenth century and set down by 
King Edmund (r. 939–946), is a piece of legislation directed specifically at the social problem 
of vengeance. The law ties together the relationship between vengeance and compensation by 
demanding that the killer alone should be subjected to the feud, even if his relatives did 
refused to provide to the compensation (II Edm.1.1-2). And he would only be subjected to the 
feud unless he could provide the compensation of full wergild according to the status of the 
victim within twelve months with the help of his friends . The rule reveals that in spite of the 
                                                 
837 This appears to be the case for stoning (IV As.6.5 or VI As.6.3) and molestation (II As.14.1) in Æthelstan’s 
laws, as pointed out by Wormald, Making of English Laws, p. 306. See also Leges Visigothorum 8.6.2. 
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peace project, vengeance was disturbingly normal. However, as pointed out above, the 
authority’s concession of the practice does not mean it was a greater problem than in the 
legislation not mentioning vengeance or feuding. As John Hudson has pointed out, there were 
little evidence of feuding in England, but many indications of vengeance or people taking 
action through vengeance.838 By addressing vengeance, Edmund institutionalised and 
encapsulated it within the authoritative regulation of private violence. We cannot assume that 
Edmund or his medieval peers could completely prevent private violence through the 
resources available to them, but the effort was made through the power of legislating. To 
narrow the target of vengeance to the killer only was also a narrowing of the responsibility to 
the individual. The killer’s kinsmen were free of the burden, but at the same time they would 
legally be deprived of each other’s support. However, the rule of Edmund still included the 
opportunity for relatives to voluntarily help gather the compensation sum. Furthermore, if 
they would not pay but were associated with the killer, they would lose their inviolability (II 
Edm.1.2). If, on the other hand, the victim’s relatives attacked anyone other than the 
individual, they would be subject to the king’s hostility and confiscation of property (II 
Edm.1.3). Such measures were taken to curb vengeance and prevent further violence. The 
involvement of relatives on both sides in a homicide was restricted. If the victim’s relatives 
took revenge, they would immediately be subject to royal judgment, while the first killer 
would by law have the opportunity to provide compensation.  
The time limit is also of interest in the discussion of compensation. The offender was 
given twelve months to amass the full wergild, and thus another aspect of the settlement is 
revealed about which earlier law was silent. As the law states, Edmund added the procedural 
details to ‘stop the feud’ (‘fehðe sectan’) (II Edm.7). The procedure was slightly different 
from that of Æthelstan. Some kind of agreement or placing of guilt had to be clear prior to the 
settlement, as, unlike stealthy murder discussed above, the investigation of the killer would be 
unnecessary. The killer would then give a pledge to the relatives of the dead through a 
mediator, and the one speaking for the victim’s family would give a surety not to harm the 
killer. After agreeing on compensation as settlement, the offender had twenty-one days to pay 
the so-called ‘healsfang’ mentioned above. According to Whitelock, this meant 10 percent of 
the wergild, as surety due to the nearest relative of the victim.839 What might have been 
implied in continental and earlier English laws was put in writing here. 
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839 Whitelock, EHD, p. 363 n. 3 and 392 n. 6. See above, Wih.11-12. 
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In the secular laws of King Edgar (r. 959-975), we are provided with a rendering in the 
middle of the tenth century of what the purpose of compensation should be according to the 
English authorities, namely such compensation ‘as shall be justifiable in the sight of God and 
acceptable in the eyes of men’ (III Edg.1.2).840 Perhaps we should not read too much into the 
use of the phrases here, but it is worth noting that the compensation should satisfy secular 
society (‘worldle/seculum’) and ecclesiastical authority, not only the relatives of the dead.841 
The settlement should satisfy not only the affected families, but the society of which they 
were a part. The sentiment was repeated in the laws of Æthelred (VI Atr.10) and Cnut (II 
Cn.2). Moreover, in the question of whether the compensation for taking a life would amount 
to the wergild, the value of a man, we find that ‘in crimes that admit of compensation, no one 
is to forfeit more than his wergild [wer]’ (III Edg.2.2).842 This rule could be interpreted in 
several ways. Since wergild was the highest form of compensation, this suggests, 
unsurprisingly, that homicide was the gravest crime that could be remedied through 
compensation. At the same time, the rule hinted at parties demanding inappropriately large 
sums both in cases of homicide or other crimes. Edgar’s homiletic law granted the Danes their 
own laws, due to loyalty (IV Edg.12 and 2.1). It may be that the practices of the Danes 
influenced the practices between the English in this matter. 
The forming of kingship in England can be observed from how royal laws displayed 
their legal power through the law. The laws of the rival kings Æthelred and Cnut both paid 
close attention to private violence and legislated to reduce it. They also both borrowed heavily 
from the laws of King Edgar and, like him, they reissued large chunks of Alfred’s law.843 
However, in the case of homicide, we see more of an emphasis on the role of public judgment 
than earlier.  
 Whitelock has demonstrated how Christianity was weaved into the role of the king in 
the later laws of Æthelred.844 These laws have a homiletic style that must be ascribed to the 
achievements of Archbishop Wulfstan, who must be credited as the mastermind behind the 
legislation.845 Wulfstan, together with a proper group of assistants, constituted a legal elite 
who probably had great control over the laws emanating from Æthelred and Cnut. By 
apparently putting aside his qualms concerning the shifting politics, he could shape the law of 
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the English into a peace project permeated with ideologies from a high-ranking ecclesiastical 
position. This of course also covered violence and the violent decades of the late-tenth and 
early eleventh century comes through in the legal texts. The aforementioned source with 
Wulfstan’s own name on it, ‘The Sermon of the Wolf to the English’, criticised the population 
for lacking family feelings and not standing up for each other in grave times. In the textual 
speech, when Æthelred had fled for Normandy and Cnut had settled his rule, the pragmatic 
attitude of the archbishop was revealed, as well as his ability to exploit the situation. The 
‘wolf’ referred to the horror of the time and explained it as a punishment for the sinful and 
unchristian behaviour of the population.846 He thus criticised his flock and also the king for 
poor rule, which had caused the legal situation to become unbearable. He addressed, for 
instance, the enslavement of children for petty theft, suggesting the rulers acted harshly 
against the weak while graver atrocities were rampant and went unchecked. The sermon 
included no appeal to fight the invaders, but Wulfstan instead exhorted his people to accept 
the situation and live chastely and peacefully. The critique of relatives failing each other can 
be interpreted as the archbishop believing in collective compensation. Such a message from 
high-ranking clergy is interesting in the context of a discussion about why the legislation we 
have seen develop up to the eleventh century had changed towards excluding relatives from 
paying compensation and towards public procedure. One would assume that a focus on 
individual responsibility was important within Christian ideology, but the clergy possibly saw 
kinship responsibility as the best way of creating a peaceful society. Maybe the public legal 
system failed to accomplish this with public procedure and corporal punishments. Through 
the works of Wulfstan, secular law was influenced by Christianity, but in the form of ideology 
rather than canon law. 
The post-Conquest legal system, and in particular the Angevin reforms, is a watershed 
in the law on public punishment. As mentioned in chapter 9, some scholars have seen 
compensation in the Anglo-Saxon laws as a tool of conflict resolution, while the later Norman 
legal authority brought in the ideas of crime and punishment.847 Wormald has opposed such a 
view because the distinction is not sustainable.848 Three arguments should be put forward. 
First, Anglo-Saxon legislation saw homicide as a crime and compensation as the punishment. 
That the authorities lacked the means to maintain prisons or engage in policing does not mean 
that society did not view killing as an outrage. The second point to be made is that the pre-
                                                 
846 Whitelock, EHD, pp. 858-59. 
847 For instance, Pollock and Maitland I, p. 74; II, pp. 452, 458. 
848 Wormald, Making of English Laws, p. 26; Lupoi, Origins, pp. 303-04. 
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Conquest secular authorities attempted measures to introduce public punishments and control 
private settlements. The third point is that compensation as conflict resolution continued to 
exist in law and in practice after all these regulations were introduced. Compensation also 
continued to exist in the Angevin legal system and later. Thus, one cannot interpret 
compensation as a primitive mode of settlement, but rather as a functional mode of resolving 
conflict and avoiding further strife. The legislators also saw this advantage of compensation 
and it was never totally abandoned in written law. The late-tenth century laws and Cnut’s 
continuation of these still brought about important changes in the criminal laws. To a greater 
extent, individuals now became responsible for their actions. Moreover, the public was 
responsible for the prosecution of crime according to public methods. Criminal acts were 
previously considered a breach of the peace and the victims would have be involved in the 
process, but according to the new legislation, the state was now entitled to and capable of 
pursuing criminals without the sanction or initiation of the injured party.  
We can detect a fusion between the old system of compensation to avoid vengeance 
and the new state process in a rule in the secular law of Cnut, which demands that 
premeditated murder be treated by an official court, but that the punishment for the accused, if 
found guilty, was to be handed over to the family of the victim (II Cn.56). The secular 
legislating authority would thus be entitled as the legislating and judicial power, although the 
remnants of collective penal systems were still discernible, also in the law. Paul Hyams has 
interpreted this as state weakness and authority’s ‘little part in the process’.849 Wormald 
argued that, compared to earlier English law, this particular rule demonstrates a more direct 
official involvement of the state than earlier written law did. It seems apparent that the 
legislation of Cnut aimed to control the legal system more directly than earlier legislators did, 
and had no intentions of covering up such intentions. In this way the private settlement was 
put into a public frame, much like the procedural instructions in the Salic laws. Whatever 
happened in practice, the motives in Cnut’s written law speak of an active use of law to 
strengthen state administration. The solution of having the public sentencing before letting 
relatives battle it out is also reminiscent of the Visigothic solution to the same issue; if a killer 
sought refuge in a church, he would go through the authority of the priest before being given 
up to the wrath of the victim’s kin (LV.6.5.16).  
Homicide would otherwise be punished with outlawry and the confiscation of property 
(II Cn.6). The descriptions of punishments moved away from settlement by compensating the 
                                                 




loss of the victim and towards the public expelling the offender from society. The same 
ideology prevailed in the laws on theft, adultery and injury, in which earlier compensatory 
punishments were replaced by mutilation and exile (II Cn.6–7, II Cn.30, II Cn.53). Mutilation 
was introduced in grave crimes (II Cn.30.5). In early medieval law, mutilation is rarely found 
as a legal recourse, but the Byzantine Ecloga from the eighth century contain the same types 
of mutilations; here, too, capital punishment was in some cases replaced by mutilation and 
compensation.850 In Byzantine law, the punishment of mutilation was prescribed for 
manslaughter and injury, and sexual offences were punished by cutting off the nose of the 
perpetrator.851 The brutality of the laws is assumed to demonstrate a turn towards Hellenic 
influences and the doctrines of humanitas and philantrophia in Eastern Christianity.852 The 
violator had a visible disfigurement for the rest of his days, but his life was spared and his 
soul could be saved. The same motives might have been behind Cnut’s laws, to avoid the 
death penalty and to save the soul.853 Cnut inserted mutilation for adulterous wives as well, 
who would have their noses cut off (II Cn.53). A husband could not kill an adulterous wife, 
and the guilty man would pay compensation. In this way, Cnut's laws derive from the Latin 
tradition, and possibly also took inspiration from Greek sources, mutilation of the nose was 
the punishment prescribed also in Ecloga (Ek.17.27-28). Whether there was contact between 
Cnut and Byzantine authority is not known, but Cnut’s travels to Rome and other political 
activity might have enabled his legal elite to have contact with the Eastern legal culture. By 
the eleventh century, versions of the Ecloga existed in both Sicily and in Russia.854 Although 
there are no evidence of transmission from these legal cultures, the diffusion of the Greek 
laws implies their contents might have been known to some degree in Latin Europe, too.  
In some ways, Cnut’s laws abolished the approval of vengeance from earlier law, and 
inserted in their place corporal punishments and other procedures that were to be enacted in 
public, which also placed a heavy responsibility on the parties involved. The laws called on 
everyone to purge the country of criminals, give up fugitives and chase outlaws (II Cn.8, II 
Cn.12, II Cn.13, II Cn.15ª). Vengeance, however, was not a responsibility of the family, but 
rather an acknowledged right given, it seems, after proceedings, unlike what we find in other 
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medieval legislation.855 The process that developed in English legislation in the eleventh 
century moved more towards investigation and oath-giving, rather than settlements between 
the parties. This means that either one was found guilty with or without extenuating 
circumstances, or one should be acquitted. Although the reality of the English court systems 
would have been more complicated than this, it is a sign of legal authority with the confidence 
to claim power over the legal system.  
Scholars have asked whether the rule of Cnut in England brought Danish influence on 
English laws, and vice versa.856 The conclusion drawn has repeatedly been that there are some 
similarities in the laws of Cnut, and the later Danish written laws, but rather the differences 
between them are more prominent. Danish laws in Cnut’s time may have been different than 
those in the thirteenth century, from when the extant laws originate. Others have pointed to a 
great deal of novelties that must have derived as a result of close contact with Danes, in the 
wider meaning of Scandinavians.857 Johannes Steensrup argued that Scandinavian influence 
on the Anglo-Saxon legal system was substantial, and that the introduction of outlawry and 
the death penalty was the substance of the transmission from Danish legal culture. However, 
these institutions may have been responses to the tumultuous events of the early eleventh 
century, or arose from a general legal ideology of the period that came out through Wulfstan. 
It is thus little that can be concluded about whether Cnut’s rule in England influenced the 
legal ideologies of Scandinavia and the written laws there, as a result of his rule in England, 
but some points will be made in the following chapter examining the Scandinavian laws from 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
In the Latin translation of early English laws Quadripartitus collected on the order of 
Henry I, the reintroduction of Cnut’s law by Edward the Confessor, and after the Conquest by 
Henry I, was justified. These laws differed little from those of other kings. King Edward was 
stated saying that he would have the laws of Cnut to ‘continue with unshaken firmness’.858 
Yet, the Quadripartitus includes in its versions legislation on wergild from, for instance, Ine, 
Alfred and Edgar, and also the treaties in some versions.859 The system of compensation was 
                                                 
855 Although Hudson interprets an acceptance of vengeance against those not willing to surrender to 
compensation, Hudson Laws of England, pp. 172-73. 
856 Danish scholars only assessing Danish influence, not a general Scandinavian influence: J. F. W. Schlegel, Om 
de gamle Danskes Retssædvaner og Autonomie (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 
1827), p. 74; Peder Kofod Ancher, En Dansk Lov-Historie, vol. 1, (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskab, 1769), p. 27-29; Fenger, Fejde og Mandebod, p. 268. 
857 Phillpotts, Kindred and Clan, pp. 205-44; Karl Kroeschell, ‘I. Die Sippe im germanischen Recht’, Zeitschrift 
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung, 77, 1 (1960), 1-25 (p. 8 n. 35). 
858 Wormald, Making of English Laws, p. 239 n. 313, with translation. 
859 Liebermann I, pp. 529-46; Wormald, Making of English Law, pp. 240-41. 
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transmitted into later legislation of the eleventh century and comprised the basis for the later 
Norman approach to English laws on this topic. 
 As a postlude to the examination of early English law, and as a prelude to the 
Scandinavian law in the next chapter, a note on the development after Cnut can be fruitful. 
Legislation by the Normans in England strengthens the interpretation of a restricted 
continuation of Anglo-Saxon law. After the Conquest, Anglo-Norman legal activity was 
conscious of establishing official procedure and tried to subjugate private settlements, but 
more or less continued the institution of compensation.  
The death penalty by public judgment was supposed to replace compensation or 
vengeance. William I (r. 1066-1087) was also credited with replacing the death penalty with 
the more ‘humane’ punishment of mutilation (WI art.10). Various forms of corporal 
punishment seem to have existed parallel to victims claiming compensation. In the laws of 
Henry I (r. 1100-35), the circumstances of an offence could lead to an additional punishment 
of a corporal character.860 These regulations may have originated in the laws of Cnut, which 
added corporal punishment to compensation (II Cn. 2.1, 30.4-5).  
The laws of both William I and Henry I prescribe compensation to be paid according 
to the wergild of the slain person, and according to the old regional customs (WI art.4, 
LHP.68, 70). As earlier, the king demanded a fine, together with confiscation of property and 
outlawry. The standard compensation was six marks. The stipulated fine to the king was 
substantially larger, at forty marks. And accompanying the six marks to the family, a public 
settlement would be an overwhelming burden for the offender, but an important income for 
the king to control. Rules specified sums both in terms of money and its equivalent in 
livestock and land, which was of course the currency available to most people (Leis WI.8-9). 
Such measures were attempts to institutionalise the settlements that were surely expected by 
the insulted party. The forty marks in the laws of William I and of Henry I possibly also 
corresponds with the eight half-marks of gold that we find in the source of the Treaty of 
Alfred and Guthrum of the 880s, where English and Scandinavian legal traditions met in a 
peace treaty.861 Even more significant, the smaller compensation sum of six marks seems to 
correspond with the old normal wergild of 200 shillings, and as historian John Hudson 
suggests, ‘may point to a pre-Conquest origin to the fine, and one linked to Scandinavians’.862 
                                                 
860 Hudson, Laws of England, p. 410. 
861 Hudson, Laws of England, pp. 408-09. See Lyons, ‘Historical Problems’, p. 210 on the correlation between 
mark and pence around the time of the Conquest. Peter Spufford, Money and its Use. 
862 Hudson, Laws of England, p. 408. 
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A final point is that the Norwegian Code of the Realm from the late-thirteenth century also 
used forty silver marks as the standard fine for offences (see chapter 12). 
 Under the re-imposed laws of Edward the Confessor (r. 1042-1066), compensation 
had to be paid to relatives in the case of a royal pardon (ECf.2, 9ECf.18). Thus, a killer, if not 
sentenced to death, would have to pay compensation to the victim’s relatives to avoid the 
feud. This demonstrates that compensation as a tool for avoiding violence continued to be 
used by the post-Conquest authorities.  
However, mentions of compensation gradually decreased in Anglo-Norman law. 
Hudson has suggested that the Norman French were unfamiliar with the compensation 
system, as compensation was usually described with old English terms and in reference to 
English persons, not the French. However, ninth-century Frankish law, which was more or 
less filled with compensatory solutions, was probably known in Normandy.863 A plausible 
explanation is that the Norman French were acquainted with compensation, and although it 
was not a vital part of feudal law, secular authorities saw an opportunity to increase power 
and to gain from demanding fines. Royal authority demanded a larger fine, while the victim 
was granted a smaller amount of compensation. In order to bring this about, private, out of 
court settlements would have to be brought to court. Later in the mid-twelfth century, Henry 
II (r. 1154-1189) developed this type of solution, possibly intended to replace compensation 
completely.864 Henry II’s reform introduced the concept of trespass, and categorised a larger 
number of crimes as trespasses on the king’s peace, among them certain types of violence and 
homicide. In dealing with these more serious offences, it was vital to develop official 
procedure and investigation.865 With Henry II’s revision of the legal system, a greater 
emphasis was placed on royal execution. Henry II also increased the number of cases where a 
fine had to be paid to the crown, but the people’s demand for compensation led to a continued 
acceptance or tolerance of this form of conflict resolution as added procedure. Killers would, 
in addition to being executed, also forfeit property, partially to the king, but also to the 
victim’s family.866 In cases of the royal pardon of a killer, a substantial fine plus 
compensation could be nevertheless extracted.867 The old system was apparently part of the 
                                                 
863 Ibid. 
864 Pollock and Maitland II, p. 458. 
865 Hudson, Laws of England, p. 737. 
866 Hudson, Formation of the English Common Law, pp. 166-71. 
867 Pollock and Maitland II, pp. 480-81; Hudson, Laws of England, p. 743. The Assize of Clarendon (c.5) 
allowed the property of a convicted person to serve as compensation for a crime, after conviction in a public 
court. The ties of kinship were also severed in the collecting of compensation, as associates, more than kin, were 
mentioned as those who could appeal the crime (Glanvill.14.3), according to Hudson, Formation of the English 
Common Law, p. 167. 
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foundation of the new public procedure in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and it is clear 
that compensation was still an important part of the peace settlement, both inside and outside 
court, though those settlements concluded inside court were more costly.868 The reforms 
brought a greater reliance on investigation instead of on physical proof (such as ordeal or 
combat), and they must have been encouraging to the parties trying cases in the public 
system.869 
 The early English laws follow the same fundamental ideology on homicide: the tool of 
conflict resolution required the offender to compensate the injured party. It was sanctioned by 
secular authority, but therein lies the anticipation of private settlements or settlement 
involving the local witan. This more detailed examination of the laws still revealed several 
differences in terms of the legislators’ attitudes towards the crime of homicide. Moreover, 
during the period from the early seventh century up to the early eleventh century, we have 
seen a particular legal development in the legal sources, from the expectation of collective 
responsibility, to that of determining individual responsibility. The development could be an 
expression of the growing power of royal authority over the legal system. It could likewise be 
a change in legal culture and thus a factor leading to the same growth in royal authority, with 
the ever narrowing of the legal unit from kin to the individual, weakening the power of the kin 
and/or strengthening the role and power of the king. The ‘Sermon’ of Wulfstan supports this 
conclusion. The opportunity to make such laws also suggests a change in the legal culture 
originating among the English legal elite, from an experience of compensation to an 
expectation of public procedures. Nevertheless, the concept of compensation did not 
disappear, as can be seen in the Normans’ endeavours relating to the tradition. In several 
instances from all these periods of legislation, there are rules and concepts foreshadowing the 
Scandinavian contact. Due to lack of contemporary written law from Scandinavia, the 
comparative juxtapositions in the following chapter must be done with law originating 
centuries later. 
 
Conclusion: English laws on compensation for homicide 
The Anglo-Saxon material shows an attempt to regulate violence through monetary 
compensation in the same manner as in the continental laws. Furthermore, the duty to uphold 
                                                 
868 Hudson, Formation of the English Common Law, p. 169. 
869 Hudson, Formation of the English Common Law, p. 172. 
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the peace is placed on the subjects in the local community. Still, we find an incremental 
emphasis on individual responsibility, both in vengeance and in compensation. This 
development is taken a great step further by legislation under Cnut, which focuses primarily 
on the individual wrongdoer and also demands public proceedings before any private 
punishments are executed. 
 English laws from the seventh century up to the reign of Cnut do not relate to a 
consistent period in legal history. The examination reveals some consistencies in the 
underlying norms on homicide, both compared synchronically to the continental legislation 
and diachronically through the centuries over which the English kingdom was created. If we 
apply the model to the probability of transmission, the findings fall into separate groups. 
Regarding the features of the rules, the comparison displays a range of similarities. Following 
the hierarchy of probability, we can only conclude that the instances of transmission by copy 
are those internally from the English legal culture. Likewise, the instances of translation are 
translation into Latin from earlier English laws. The early English laws are special due to their 
vernacular form, which sets them apart from contemporary continental laws sharing the Latin 
language.  
However, on the second level of probability, a number of similarities appear regarding 
contents, particularly concepts and motives. Terminology related to the wergild and 
compensation resembles the continental Latin and Germanic words. Wergeld, were and leod 
appear to be similar to the Germanic tradition as the name of compensation, although we find 
Norse-related words, such as bot and lahslit, with the same meaning. The solution to homicide 
is another common feature in the early English laws, which consists mainly of compensation. 
The first codes from Kent almost take the form of tariffs, as do the Frankish codes, listing the 
crimes and the fines. The contents of the rules are thus also similar to those from the 
Continent. In those from eighth- and ninth-century Wessex, we can also discern some 
explanations for the compensatory sums, which appear to be more original contributions. The 
basis and motivation for compensation included references to preventing enmity. An 
important common feature was the stipulated size of the compensation, centred around 200 
shillings for the average person and 1200 shillings for nobility, proving transmission of these 
features. Moreover, the dissimilarities found in the sources support the argument that the 
given amounts were not unconscious copies of earlier law, but were considered the legitimate 
price of compensation, exemplified by the disappearance of the 600 shillings as the value of 
wergild from the late-ninth century. 
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Royal legislation tried to institutionalise vengeance. Legislation in the period from 
Æthelstan to Æthelred also included attempts to downplay compensation and increase fines to 
the treasury. Nevertheless, the concept was the same as in Germanic law, and compensation 
continued in written law. Regarding the content of the rules on homicide, we can therefore 
assume that there was a transmission from continental law of the concept of a compensation 
system as solution to homicide and also transmission of the notion of amount and distribution. 
Nevertheless, the persistent use of compensation as a solution for homicide and various 
crimes was the result of a continuation of the legal culture rather than transmission from 
outside. The underlying motivation for regulating compensation in written law was also to 
suppress vengeance in English society by legislation. In both the shorter lists of amounts of 
compensation and in the longer passages of the tenth-century legislators, the peace project 
always formed the basis for making the rules. The differences lie in the composition of the 
rules, rather than in the given motivation for regulation. As we have already learned from the 
Frankish and Visigothic laws, the texts may not have spelled out that compensation was a tool 
for avoiding further violence, but other factors expose this relationship. As for the English 
legislators, the connection between compensation and violence appears to have been a 
premise for making law in the first place. 
The English legislators made good use of the laws of their predecessors, and the 
copying of rules was a mark of respect as well as a form of pragmatism. As Alan Watson 
argues, utility is the main reason why lawmakers borrow rules from earlier law.870 Scholars 
have pointed to the inheritance from King Ine’s laws in the legislation of King Alfred and to 
the borrowing from Edgar’s laws in those of his successors, Æthelred and Cnut. We have seen 
that the rules on homicide have much in common in terms of content, although the texts in the 
rules were slightly rewritten or modified depending on the law in question. Thus, we see that 
throughout the period from AD 600 up to the reign of Cnut, royal authority relied on the 
culture of compensation to sustain the legal system. The regulations promoted stronger public 
intervention, the replacement of compensation with corporal punishment, as well as the 
increase in fines to the king, imply that the authorities displayed strength, but only using the 
tool of compensation. The Norman legislation downplayed the institute of compensation, but 
it did not disappear. Compensation as a legal solution in the case of violence prevailed in the 
post-Conquest laws in England, although it was diminished. 
                                                 
870 Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception’, pp. 335-39. 
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Compensation as conflict resolution was an important pillar of the contemporary 
Scandinavian written laws. As has been hinted at in this chapter, early English laws shared 
many concepts with the later Scandinavian laws. These similarities will be discussed further 





12. Compensation for Homicide in the Scandinavian Laws 
 
The Scandinavian provincial laws emerged as written laws during the period of the rise of the 
universities, and the revival of Roman law. One should expect a great deal of transmission 
from Roman law in the Scandinavian laws, and also general influence on the legal work of the 
Scandinavian legal elite as a result of their education at the universities. Roman influence is 
visible when sought.871 Nevertheless, what characterises the written laws is the domination of 
compensatory solutions, not characteristics of Roman law. When the Norwegian laws were 
put into writing around the late-eleventh or early twelfth century, compensation was the 
backbone of the legal system. Further, the system of compensation appears as a well-
established institution in conflict resolution at the time the rules set down in writing. It is thus 
of interest to see which of the ideas about compensation were adopted and adapted in the 
written sources as transmission from other European sources, and what was original legal 
thought.  
 Liebermann accepted the notion that the English laws influenced the Norwegian 
through the Christianisation of the land by King Olav Haraldsson (St Olav) and his bishop 
Grimkell, who was brought from England.872 Later Scandinavian researchers have noticed 
possible links between Scandinavian law and the English, as mentioned in chapter 8. This 
appears to be mostly in Anglo-Norman law, but there are also connections with the Anglo-
Saxon and Christian laws. Absalon Taranger found that the Norwegian Christian laws echoed 
English secular laws, while Knut Helle has pointed to correspondences between the Gulathing 
Law and the early English laws.873 The linguistic evidence of contact has already been 
considered in previous chapters. However, it is also possible that the early English laws 
contain concepts originating within the Scandinavian legal culture from the centuries when 
we have no written law from the Nordic region. Unfortunately, we cannot contrast 
contemporary law from England and Scandinavia from the seventh to the eleventh century, 
due to the lack of written evidence from the latter region. However, the evidence allows for an 
interesting comparison with the Anglo-Norman period, although this area and time period, 
with its feudal nature, falls outside the scope of this project. 
                                                 
871 See, for instance, Tore Iversen, ‘Property and Land Tenancy in Norwegian Medieval Laws and the European 
Learned Law’, in How Nordic Are the Nordic Medieval Laws?, Proceeding from the First Carlsberg Conference 
in Medieval Legal History, ed. by Per Andersen, Ditlev Tamm and Helle Vogt (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2005 [2nd 
edn 2011]), pp. 135-76; Iversen, ‘Landskapslovene og kanonisk rett’, pp. 147-70; Fenger, Romerret i Norden. 
872 Liebermann III, p. 168; Helle, Gulatinget og Gulatingsloven , pp. 18, 177. 
873 Taranger, Den angelsaksiske kirkes indflytelse, pp. 296-335; Helle, Gulatinget, p. 35. 
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As Helle Vogt has already provided a thorough discussion of the Danish, Swedish and 
Norwegian rules on wergild and compensation, it is unnecessary for me to repeat many of the 
topics other than by reference.874 However, there are details of the regulations concerning the 
procedure regarding compensation for homicide, as well as its size and distribution, which I 
will examine more closely in line with the aim of the present study.  
 What characterises the Scandinavian laws on homicide is the emphasis on the 
involvement of relatives, to a greater extent than we have seen in earlier laws. Otherwise, we 
find compensation to be a much-used solution in laws on crime in general, and compensation 
can also be found in the laws on homicide. Legislation on homicide in the Scandinavian 
provincial laws is marked by the division between homicide that are compensational and of 
non-compensational killings (óbotemál).875 The grave deeds that fell under the term 
niðingsverk, meaning a deed that was deceitful or evil, were theft, stealthy murder, rape and 
adultery.876 The same differentiation exists in the earlier legislation of the Continent and in the 
English laws, but not as a concrete method of placing responsibility. In the Scandinavian legal 
material, guilt was individual, but the legal responsibility of the kin still applied to 
compensational deeds. Of course, the relatives could only really contribute to the conflict 
settlement with hard currency. Still, vengeance could afflict innocent relatives and 
associations, and shame and isolation from society could affect those associated with an 
offender. All the Scandinavia laws uses the wider kin group as the basis for compensation, 
coming under that which Vogt identifies as canonical kinship.877 The level of details on which 
relatives were obliged to contribute is still different between the provincial laws.  
We also find a great variety in the prescribed amounts of compensation. The Danish 
provincial laws differ from law to law, showing regional differences, while the Norwegian 
have variations within the same law, revealing changes over time. These differences in space 
and time could be due to the price of silver and the overall changes necessary in paying larger 
or smaller amounts of compensation. The differences in need of paying a larger compensation 
could be connected to how great the threat of vengeance was towards the offender, or how 
much power the offended party had to enforce his claims of compensation. In the following 
chapter, I will go through the main principles of differentiation, size and distribution within 
the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish provincial laws, together with the Norwegian Code of 
                                                 
874 Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 125-53. 
875 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, p. 165. 
876 Imsen, ‘Den gammelnorske drapsprosessen’, p. 186. NgL V, p. 472. See, for instance, EsL.3.41, F.4.1-4. 
877 In the Norwegian Gulathing Law, the kin group was wider than the canonical one, having eight degrees 
(G.235). See Hansen, ‘The Concept of Kinship’, p.190. 
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the Realm. Due to the particular nature of the Norwegian compensation system, most of the 
discussion is devoted to these laws, and to the diachronic changes within the Norwegian legal 
culture. A survey of the main principles in the Danish provincial laws makes for a good 
starting point. 
 
12.1 Compensation for homicide in the Danish provincial laws 
The system of compensation is absent from the first Danish provincial laws.878 This 
understandably leads to the conclusion that compensation for homicide did not exist in the 
legal culture of the Danes before the beginning of the thirteenth century. Another explanation 
is that the first laws were not written down until after the central authorities had already 
succeeded kin and the local community as the framework overseeing settlement.879 As Vogt 
points out, the very name of the first laws, dating to the 1170s, The Book of Inheritance and 
Non-Compensational Crimes (A&O), implies that compensation was a known solution.880 By 
arguing ex silentio, we could even assume that it was a well-established procedure within the 
Danish realm, so common that it was unnecessary to mention it. Another noteworthy element 
is that, in the thirteenth century, Valdemar’s Law of Zealand contains only wording indicating 
individual responsibility that assumes knowledge of the institution of compensation 
(VsL.1.139). However, the later provincial laws all acknowledge the collective contribution to 
compensation, and also the kin’s right to receive compensation (JL.2.27). While written law 
distinguished between stealthy murder and homicide, there were also a distinction between 
wilful homicide and accidents leading to death, as we saw in the Roman and Germanic laws. 
In case of accidents due to mishap or carelessness, the killer paid a smaller fine of three marks 
of silver (EsL.2.59-65) or nothing at all (EsL.3.15), similar to the differentiation made in the 
Roman and Germanic laws regarding culpa. 
In The Book of Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes, the term for wergild was 
expressed as the manbotunum/manboth, etc. (A&O.3.2).881 However, the amounts of 
compensation, and how they were estimated, are obscure. In the rule above, twenty-four 
marks were due to the king and the same to the heir, besides the wergild. There is sparse 
evidence of the wergild being a permanent sum in the Danish laws. In several instances, the 
                                                 
878 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, p. 311. 
879 Wührer, ‘Mansbot – Danmark’, p. 330 suggests such an explanation; he writes that the provincial laws were 
recorded in writing in an age when the ‘old arrangements were about to dissolve’ (my translation). 
880 Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 128, 134. 
881 DgL VII, p. 71. 
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compensation was based on the wergild, without disclosing what that was considered to be 
(ex. JL.3.25). However, the Law of Jutland states that a full wergild was three times eighteen 
marks of coined silver or the equivalent value (JL.2.9). We can assume fifty-four marks as a 
standard compensation in the thirteenth century. The Law of Scania reads that, in case of 
wounds, a man should not receive more than five marks of weighed silver (SL.96). Given the 
ratio of weighed to counted silver in thirteenth-century Denmark, this should amount to 
fifteen marks of counted coin.882 This wergild was due to a grown free man, and it is also what 
Wührer interpreted as the Danish wergild.883 We learn that a fifteen-year-old would pay 
compensation for his misdeeds, but the law does not reveal age-differentiated wergilds or 
compensations. Neither does written law describe specific amounts of compensation 
according to the victim’s gender or status. We thus do not know if women were valued 
higher, lower or equal to their male peers, as we have seen examples of in early medieval 
material. Killing someone in a sacred or inviolable space, such as at the þing, in a church or 
while the victim was working in the fields, brought with it an additional fine. The fine of 
twenty-four marks should go to the relatives and a similar fine to the king (EsL.3.4, SL.87, 
JL.3.22). The Law of Jutland from the mid-thirteenth century includes a description of 
compensation of three times eighteen marks in coins (JL.3.21), but does not specify who the 
three recipients were to be. These were probably a member of the father’s side, a member of 
the mother’s side and the heir, as in the laws of Zealand. These fines could amount to as much 
as fifty-four plus forty-eight marks, totalling 102 marks in coin. Even though the coined silver 
was only worth one-third of the weighed, this would still be a substantial sum.  
The system drawn in the Danish legal material was less intricate than the northern 
Scandinavian systems described below. In Eric’s law, it was stated that the compensation 
would be distributed according to the inheritance system (EsL.3.28), but only the male heirs 
were involved. The male relatives on both parents’ side would contribute the compensation 
according to their distance in degrees from the killer. They would, according to Erik’s Law of 
Zealand, raise the whole sum, even if they were only a few male relatives to share the burden 
(EsL.3.26). Women were thus excluded from the distribution, both as recipients and 
contributors, something also found in the law of Jutland. It is plausible that ascribing the 
compensation duties to male relatives was connected with the male relative’s responsibilities 
in taking vengeance, as was obvious in the Lombard laws. Although the law regulated against 
vengeance from about 1200, it still affected legislation in Denmark as elsewhere. Similar to 
                                                 
882 Nils Ludvig Rasmusson, ‘Mark (Mark penningar)’, in KLNM, vol. 11, p. 437. 
883 Wührer, ‘Mansbot-Danmark’, pp. 330-32. 
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the other secular European legislation, to kill a man caught having had sex with one’s wife 
was not compensated (A&O.2.1, JL.3.37). In other legislation, the adultery of a daughter was 
included in such regulation, but we do not find that here. 
Relatives of the victim would likewise have the compensation distributed among them 
according to degree of kinship, where the sum was halved for each more distant degree 
(SL.92). Similar to what we find in the Salic laws and the laws of the West Saxon king 
Alfred, compensation should be divided in three on the providing side. One-third each was 
provided by the maternal and paternal side, along with the offenders own third (EsL.2.38, 
SL.85).884 The provincial laws differ, but the main structure is that the homicide victim’s 
representative would receive compensation, which would be paid in three parts in three shares 
or instalments, the first by the offender, the second by his father’s kin and the third by his 
mother’s kin. These instalments would be handed over after a mirroring system, the 
offender’s share to the direct heir, the paternal share to the relatives of the victim’s father, the 
maternal share to the relatives of the victim’s mother. The extent of the kin obliged to 
contribute to the payment reached four degrees in the law of Jutland (JL.1.25). The Jutish law 
here aligned with the earlier Fourth Lateran Council, contrasting with inheritance laws that 
extended to seven degrees (see chapter 8). 
 In the law of Scania, we find reason to believe that the makers of written law 
anticipated the laws to be in use, or at least that the regulations on homicide could contribute 
to real cases: the laws imagine a likely event that persons could be related to both the killer 
and the victim (SkL.97). In such cases, the degree of kinship that was nearest would 
determine if they were obliged to pay or to receive payment.  
The Danish material demonstrates that time was a central component in the system of 
paying compensation. The amount of time between the crime, the settlement and the transfer 
was specified in the laws. Further, the laws insisted on the above-mentioned instalments – the 
thirds – handed over with time intervals between them. Not only as an absolute deadline of 
payment, but also as a minimum of time between the transfers (ASun.48). However, these 
intervals could according to Eric’s Law of Zealand, only extent to a year (EsL.3.26). To 
legislate a postponement might have been a delicate attempt at cooling down the conflict 
between the parties. The whole amount was not supposed to be surrendered at the time of the 
worst grief and anger, but after some delay when the sorrow might have eased. Another point 
was to ensure that the killer paid the first contribution (SL.85), so as to limit the financial and, 
                                                 
884 See also EsL.3.15, 31, SL.92, ASun.48. 
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we must imagine, mental burden he laid on his male relatives. On the other hand, one can 
imagine that years of being tied to a conflict could tear open the wounds and create long-term 
hatred between families for each instalment. Possibly, the instalments were given to secure 
time for the contributors to collect the amount. Royal legislation sought to regulate the time 
aspect of private settlements, just as much as the amount and sender/recipient of the 
compensation. A supplement to the Law of Scania is a royal decree from December 1200, 
which is dedicated to regulations of compensation for homicide (SL.Till.A.1). Here, King 
Cnut VI (r. 1182-1202) addresses a problem of certain people using compensation for 
personal gain, by killing and then involving ‘all kinds of kin, even strangers’885 to extract 
payments from them, and apparently taking the money for themselves. In the king’s attempt 
to smoke out such unacceptable theft, he ordered that no payments from any kin should be 
transferred before the killer had provided his third of the compensation. The other two thirds 
would be transferred to the killer and then to the offended party on the day prescribed, not 
before. In this way, the killer could not run off with, spend or lose the portion. We see that 
time was an important aspect in all stages of the law concerning the procedure of 
compensation. The brother of Cnut, King Valdemar II (r. 1202-1241) went even further on 
responsibility, and in a decree demanded that the perpetrator provided all three repayments 
himself (SL.Till.A.II). This should take place at the three following provincial assemblies. If 
he was unable or unwilling or absent, first his father’s relatives and then his mother’s relatives 
were obliged to offer compensation, but only what amounted to two-thirds.886 King Valdemar 
also decreed the abolition of the ordeal (SL.Till.III), a further step towards legal authority for 
the centralised powers.  
Helle Vogt identifies an important development in the Danish material concerning 
procedure that reveals the lessening of the legal power of kin and the expansion of the legal 
power of the king.887 The Book of Inheritance and Non-Compensational Crimes decreed that 
the king could not overrule the outlawry of a killer without the permission of the victim’s 
relatives, while in the roughly seventy-year-younger Eric’s Law of Scania, it was added that 
the kin could not accept compensation from the outlaw without the permission of the king 
                                                 
885 ‘Consanguineos annumerant, licet extraneos’ – interpretations of this passage have been many, from the 
expanded kin group, to those outside the kin group, to the group of associated alliances. For different readings of 
the passage, see: Kroman and Iuul, Skaanske Lov, p. 84, for one interpreted translation into modern Danish (no 
relation); and further Fenger, Fejde og Mandebod, p. 363 n. 85 (remote kin); and Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 
135-36 n. 31 (outside the canonical kin). I interpret this wording as mere exaggeration from the legislator, 
although it possible refers to those outside the fourth degree of kinship. 
886 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, pp. 174-75, argues that, on closer reading, this wording actually indicates that the 
collective responsibility of the kin was not reduced at all, although legal historians would have it so.  
887 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, p. 168. 
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(ESL.2.9).888 The king would still confer with the family before accepting peace with the 
outlaw. According to the Law of Scania and amendments of King Cnut VI (r. 1182-1202), it 
was vital that the killer paid the first instalment, to avoid abuse of the obligations of relatives 
(SL.85, SL.Till.I.1-3). The amendment even stated that the killer could not force his relatives 
to pay, but that the relatives themselves would encourage each other to fulfil their obligation. 
In his Latin edition, Anders Sunesen (†1228) addressed this very arrangement – the 
unsatisfactory situation that the law demanded only a third from the killer himself (ASun.45). 
Fenger suggested that Anders Sunesen himself thought it less than acceptable to divide the 
guilt within a kin group, and not let the offender bear the burden alone.889 Sunesen’s clerical 
background is also thought to be the motivation behind inserting Christian ideas of guilt and 
punishment into Danish law. As we have seen, this were the ideas current in the rest of the 
Latin sphere, and at this point could be the result of general legal ideologies just as much as 
transmission of specific ideologies from the Church. Sunesen was himself apparently present 
at the Fourth Lateran Council, and was probably the driving force behind many of the 
initiatives to harmonise Danish law in accordance with the definitions accepted there.890 
 From the laws’ emphasis on fines to the king, the placing of guilt on the individual 
culprit and regulation of the procedure dealing with compensation, we can view the Danish 
laws in light of the motives behind Cnut’s English laws, which likewise demanded public 
procedure of private settlements and individual guilt. Perhaps the similarity does not come 
from a shared Danish legal ideology, but rather from an attempt in the tenth century onward to 
curb vengeance, control the compensatory system and gain legal authority through reducing 
the responsibility of kin and emphasising the individual legal subject. However, contrasting 
with Cnut’s law is the procedure describing just these kinship responsibilities in rather more 
detail than the English laws do. Danish laws also make the effort to ensure the mode of 
paying compensation is described, which must be about calming the tension between the 
parties, although we could question whether it was to satisfy or pacify the victim’s relatives. 
The Norwegian laws focused more on the distribution of compensation, rather than the 
transfer. 
 
                                                 
888 DgL III, p. 224. 
889 Fenger, Fejde og Mandebod, pp. 370-71. 
890 Fenger, Fejde og Mandebod, p. 375. 
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12.2 Compensation and state formation in the Norwegian laws  
A characteristic of the Norwegian provincial laws is the exceptional level of detail in the 
explanation of the high number of relatives that should be involved in the distribution of 
compensation. Another is the elaborate way in which the many transactions are described. 
The Norwegian laws on homicide show a textbook example of how we imagine legal 
development and state formation to be, from what seems to be very particular case solutions 
in the first provincial laws to a generalised law, with general principles, where legal authority 
was held by official authority. The overall image given by the written law is of an early legal 
system in the Gulathing Law, where both the initial procedure and the final settlement would 
be the responsibility of the parties themselves, i.e., the offender, the victim and their relatives, 
to a situation where the state controlled the legal system and the law, as indicated in the 
Frostathing Law from early 1200 and in the Code of the Realm from 1274. As Jørn 
Øyrehagen Sunde has noted, the response to all the cases in the Gulathing Law that called for 
vengeance, i.e., cases of injury, adultery, insults and theft, was altered to encompass a more 
public legal solution in the later laws.891 The reality of administration of justice was not as 
clear, but we can see in written laws a motivation to gradually obtain power from the legal 
assembly, the þing, through these laws.  
It is difficult to say to what degree each society was violent or not, and it is not the 
task to do so here. However, it is relevant to assess what the expectations of the legislator 
were concerning the level of violence, homicide and vengeance. As mentioned above, the 
work The Peace in the Feud contradicted the idea of the feud-discourse we find in sources 
from early medieval Europe being an image of violence, and that it rather can be interpreted 
as a language of peacekeeping.892 Similar thoughts have been proposed regarding medieval 
Iceland and early modern Scottish society.893 Likewise, interaction in Norway was less 
directed by vengeance and violence than the provincial laws and sagas portray. Robberstad 
explained the high sums of some compensation (see below) as due to Norwegians being more 
eager to use vengeance as a means of conflict resolution in the twelfth century, when civil war 
raged the Norwegian realm.894 Sverre Bagge asks whether the image Snorri presented of the 
feuds of King Olav (†1030, later sainted) in Heimskringla was not violent enough, and 
                                                 
891 Sunde, Speculum Legale, 58-61. 
892 Gluckman, ‘Peace in the Feud’, pp. 1-14. 
893 For instance, Jenny Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud, kindred and government in early modern Scotland’ Past & 
Present 87 (1980), pp. 54-97; William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and peacemaking: Feud, law, and society in Saga 
Iceland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 179-299. 
894 Robberstad, Gulatingslovi, p. 374. The civil war is traditionally dated from 1130 to 1240. 
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suggests that Snorri’s understanding of feud in Norway was based on his Icelandic 
background.895 Bagge here refers to the actions of the Norwegian political elite in the eleventh 
century, and not necessarily the actions from the time when each of the vengeance regulations 
was included in the Gulathing law. However, it is relevant to assume that the lawmen of the 
Norwegian provinces anticipated violence as a potential solution to conflict.  
We can argue that the Gulathing Law was the most violence-orientated set of rules 
from among the source material, with detailed descriptions of the potential injuries and 
situations where death might occur among its subjects.896 In spite of this, or possibly rather 
because of this, it is also orientated around the process that should follow, for instance, 
homicide. This includes both the actions to be taken immediately after the incident, by the 
killer and by witnesses, and the actions in the aftermath, with the victim’s family notifying the 
community and summoning the thingmen to the site (G.151). The circumstances of the 
homicide affected the procedure, and the surrounding community were encouraged to violent 
policing. If someone was killed in a group, the others had a duty to run after the killer 
(G.152); if someone was killed on a ship, the rest of the crew should shove the killer 
overboard or set him ashore (G.171). However, this was not about vengeful kindred, but about 
policing that was carried out by associates of the victim. Furthermore, the victim’s kin had the 
right to take vengeance: this provincial law allows vengeance to be sought instead of 
compensation (G.187). It states that a man was only allowed compensation three times ‘if he 
doesn’t get revenge once in a while’. This is generally interpreted as an old law or as a 
reaction to the compensatory system thrust onto society by the Church.897 One view have been 
that the Church introduced compensation to Norway. I find this unlikely, given the traces of 
compensation in pre-Christian Scandinavia, and the existence of compensation in the rest of 
northern and western (Christian) Europe. The population of Norway had substantial contact 
with the rest of Europe long before both written laws and the kingdom originated.898 We must 
assume that compensation for homicide was as much a transmission of legal ideas from the 
Continent as from the Church. Surely, the developing Church in Norway would encourage 
peaceful solutions instead of vengeance, and ideas brought in from the Continent were indeed 
ideas supported by the Christian peace movement. Also, the above-mentioned rule in the 
                                                 
895 Sverre Bagge, ‘Mellom kildekritisk og historisk antropologi. Olav den hellige, aristokratiet og rikssamlingen’, 
Historisk Tidsskrift , 81 (2002), 197-98. 
896 For instance, G.4.18-30, 36, 38-46 gives graphic examples of wounds and violence. 
897 Sunde, Speculum Legale, p. 346 n. 62. 




Gulathing Law demanding action and not merely accepting payment could be a reaction to the 
Church’s teaching on the subject. Nevertheless, the system of compensation could be a 
solution to conflict in non-Christian societies, and moreover was a most useful tool of law for 
both the victims and the secular authorities. In addition, the first churchmen in Norway had 
low status in society, if we are to believe the law mentioned in the Gulathing Law abolishing 
the whipping of priests, a treatment usually reserved for slaves (G.15). The system of 
compensation and the allowing of vengeance would be policing tools for the administration, 
lacking such an apparatus. We cannot assume that violent vengeance was desired by all 
victims, especially those incapable of taking it. Therefore, it is a probable statement that rules 
regulating compensation, and rules accepting vengeance, were intertwined as two sides of a 
peacekeeping system. The compensation we find in the Norwegian written laws was not a 
transmission from Christian ideology, but was possibly supported by the growing Church in 
the kingdom. 
The process was very similar in the Frostathing Law, but with important adjustments. 
At every stage, there were simple changes that shifted the responsibility for justice from the 
victim’s family to the local ombudsman and the official apparatus. First of all, the 
responsibility was shifted from the victim to the killer and his or her kin, to take the necessary 
and legally required steps in right process. Notification of the community was required (F.4.1, 
F.4.7) to obtain temporary grið – protection from vengeance – and the killer must also make 
an appearance at the next þing (F.4.22). If the killer escaped or was unknown, the basis for the 
crime changed and the case was to be treated murder, which was non-compensational (F.4.9, 
F.4.14). In these cases, confiscation of property and outlawry applied (F.4.2-3), similar to 
earlier English laws from Edmund, Cnut and William, and the contemporary laws of Henry I.  
As in the Germanic laws, if a woman was the killer, then the Frostathing Law put her 
fate in the hands of the victim’s family (F.4.33, 35). She could be killed to obtain vengeance, 
if she had not gone into exile within the prescribed number of days and compensation would 
be drawn from her property. If the victim was a woman, her heir would be entitled to her 
wergild according to the Gulathing Law (G.201). In cases of adultery, the usual right of 
vengeance against the wife and closely related women applied (G.160, F.4.39, F.5.46). 
Although this right was continued in King Haakon’s revision of the Frostathing Law, sections 
in both of the provincial codes also opted for a more peaceful solution. The offended man 
could be compensated to the amount of the woman’s wergild (G.197, G.201, F.3.4). However, 
we do not learn the size of this wergild. In the Frostathing Law, adultery also carried a 
separate penalty, payment of three marks to the bishop, and if the adultery did not stop, the 
277 
 
adulterers continued to pay up to eighteen marks, after which confiscation of property and 
banishment applied (F.3.4-5, F.3.7). The involvement of the Church in the matter of adultery 
demonstrates transmission from canon law into secular legislation. This becomes even more 
evident when the same terms applied in case of male adultery or incest (F.3.1, F.3.3, F.3.1.5-
6, F.5.25). The growing power of the Church introduced peaceful alternatives to violence, and 
the organisation received jurisdiction in secular legislation, through the clergy’s involvement 
in the legislation process as the legal elite. 
The elaborate descriptions of distributing compensation of a given amount came in 
several sets with minor and major differences between them.899 Without going into all the 
details, a few common traits should be mentioned. First of all, there are six main sums, 
ranging from six marks, then five marks, four marks, three marks, two and half marks and two 
marks, all of gold (F.6.2, 13, 20, 27, 34 and 41). The written law informs us that these were 
differentiators according to status, and the law also notes that the sums should not be decided 
by those negotiating settlement, who might force the amounts up or down (F.6.1). The 
legislating authority thus claimed the right to operate with fixed sums, and explicitly states 
that private agreements, subjected to the parties’ power, should cease. Although the wergilds 
were given in amounts of gold, the distribution scale was described in marks of silver.  
The laws divided each relative’s sum due according to intricate descriptions of degrees 
of relationship that basically fell into three groups, following the gradual system of counting 
degrees of kinship (F.6.). The first group consisted of the closely related agnatic males, the 
second of the cognatic male relatives in the second degree, and the third group of the more 
remote male relatives up to the sixth degree.900 Even though the numerous degrees of relatives 
are listed, the prime heir of Ego was generally favoured with the greatest portion by far (see, 
for instance, F.6.2-3). The next heir in line, according to the corresponding inheritance 
system, would be granted a smaller, but still substantial portion of the total sum. We could 
therefore ask whether or not the distribution of compensation actually followed the same 
pattern as seen in some of the other European legislation, as Alexander Murray demonstrated, 
with the heir receiving one portion, and the maternal and paternal relatives receiving one 
portion each, although unequal portions.901 Only here, the shares to patrilateral relatives add 
up to more than one-third.  
                                                 
899 For a detailed discussion of the differentiations in amounts in The Law of Frostathing, see Torben Anders 
Vestergaard, ‘The System of Kinship’, pp. 160-93; Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, pp. 191-95. 
900 Hansen‚ ‘Concept of Kinship’, p. 192. 
901 Murray, Germanic Kinship, pp. 139-44. See chapter 10.  
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Likewise, the relatives next in line as heirs were to receive significantly smaller 
portions of the full compensation. The systems can as such be tied to the order of succession, 
although some of the sets mentioned later lie beyond the limits of the inheritance system. 
Moreover, these were the male relatives, thus revealing the correlation between vengeance 
and compensation according to the theory used with Lombard law and Danish law. 
In the Gulathing Law, we find five different calculations of compensation, with 
corresponding patterns of distribution of the compensation.902 Knut Robberstad suggested that 
these were different sets of compensation, all of which survive in the extant written copies.903 
The different values and historical price increases in the compensation reveal not only the 
differences of status, but also an increase of the wergild over time. The law assumed to be 
oldest, G.180, explains how the amount of the wergild or compensation was related to status. 
The tariffs for the compensation given started with the ‘hauld’ (G180, G.200). A ‘hauld’ was 
a free, landowning peasant, with a respectable status without being nobility.904 The status 
would then rise or fall from eighteen marks, according to the status presumably of the victim. 
The law assumed to be youngest, G.316-20, from the early 1200s, had a gradation from three 
to six marks of gold, which was delineated in values of silver. Thus, the wergild varied within 
the law, from eighteen marks of counted silver to six marks of gold, or the equivalent of forty-
eight marks of silver. The law differentiated in relation to status, but no information is 
available about the wergild according to age, as in the continental laws. However, the section 
on marriage does state that a husband could demand a wergild for his wife as for himself, 
implying that women held a wergild equal to their male peers (G.52).  
The king was entitled to a fixed sum in each case, which in the assumed older parts of 
the laws was fifteen marks, and forty marks in the newer.905 The fine of forty marks 
corresponds with those fines due in cases of homicide in the Norman English laws, also from 
the twelfth century.906 The forty-mark fine also continued in the laws of Henry I and in the 
Norwegian Code of the Realm from 1274, where other compensation was omitted. 
Apparently, the discontinuation of compensation for homicide and the continuation of a forty-
mark fine was a legal trend in the North Sea states in the thirteenth century.  
                                                 
902 G.180, G.218-28, G.229-35, G.236-42, G.243-52 and G.316-20. 
903 Robberstad, Gulatingslovi, pp. 370-75. 
904 Arne Bøe, ‘Hauld’, i KLNM, vol. 6 (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1961), pp. 251-54.  
905 Karl Lehmann, Der Königsfriede der Nordgermann (Berlin: J. Guttentag, 1886), §21. See, for instance, 
G.199-200. 
906 For instance, King Magnus Erlingsson in G.2, and possibly earlier G.20, G. 149.  
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Though these tariffs were from different periods, the system of distribution appears 
similar in the laws. However, Hansen has identified three particular systems of paying wergild 
in the Norwegian provincial laws.907 Some of the gradations described relate to a system with 
the total sum distributed according to degree of kinship, with the closest kin taking the largest 
cut, which is the system most similar to other secular law. Another system included a 
mirroring of the two parties, where each relative of the offender pays the corresponding 
relative of the victim. With several varieties, this system shows what Hansen has termed 
‘reciprocal kinsmen’, where a relative would pay the corresponding relative, but also the 
kinsmen related in the same degree to Ego.  
In this system, as elsewhere, the closest heir received a major part of the total 
compensation. In figure 16 below, we see that, although there are numerous recipients, the 
first male heirs of the victim, i.e., son, father, brother and uncle – which, with exception of the 
missing ‘brother’s son’, corresponds to the Icelandic baugatal 908 – were entitled to most of 
the compensation. More distant relatives were left with fractional amounts. This leads to the 
conclusion that compensation was a pacifying tool in the Norwegian laws, where the needs of 
those having reason to seek vengeance were considered.  
An example of legal transmission on a micro level is Bjarni Marðarson’s reciting of 
saktal, that is, the system of collecting and distributing compensation for murder. Marðarson 
was a leading legal authority from the northernmost province in the kingdom of Norway in 
the late-twelfth and early thirteenth century.909 In the late-twelfth century, Marðarson was 
involved on the losing side in the last remnants of the civil war in the kingdom. In beginning 
of the thirteenth century, he was appointed lagmann and apparently took some part in the 
further political structuring of the authorities.910 In the Gulathing Law, we find Bjarni 
Marðarson’s saktal as a new supplement.911 The section is very interesting, for three reasons. 
First, Marðarson proclaimed a new or revised system of calculation for payment of 
compensation. Second, the section was included at the time of the Fourth Lateran Council and 
relates to degrees of kinship, and thus could reveal a contemporary understanding of kinship. 
                                                 
907 Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, pp. 186-95.  
908 Vilhjálmur Finsen, ed., Grágás efter det Arnamagnæanske haandskrift nr. 334 fol., Staðarhōlsbōk (Odense: 
Gyldendal, 1879), pp. 24-26. 
909 For a discussion of his position, and of the status of Hálogaland, the northernmost province of Norway, see 
Miriam Tveit, ‘The Introduction of a Law of the Realm in Northern Norway’, in Legislation and State 
Formation- Norway and Its Neighbours in the Middle Ages, ed. by Steinar Imsen (Trondheim: Akademika 
forlag, 2013), pp. 41-54. 
910 Jakob Schøning, ‘Lagmenn i Nordlandene og Finnmark mellem omtr. 1200 og 1797’, Håløygminne, 4 (1930), 
179-94 (p. 181). 
911 NgL I, pp. 316-20. 
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Third, it is an example of legal transmission from a jurisdiction assumed to be low status 
within Norway to one regarded as prestigious. Bjarni Marðarson’s knowledge of penal law 
appears persuasive and thorough based on the extensive insertion in the Gulathing Law. He 
quoted long passages of distribution systems for the fines. Since this was around 1215, the 
reduction of canonic kinship from seven to four degrees is relevant here. The obligation to 
pay wergild for relatives extended to the sixth canonical degree in this scale.912 It might be 
that Marðarson introduced some adaptation of the already revised Frostathing Law from eight 
degrees to four. Or, he ignored, or was ignorant of the restrictions of the Fourth Lateran 
Council. Vogt finds it probable that the decisions of Fourth Lateran Council were unknown 
within the Norwegian legal system when Marðarson recited the wergild system at the western 
assembly.913 Since the puzzling inscriptions of kinship responsibility exceed that of normal 
practice within Catholic Europe, Sunde has suggested a theory of Marðarson’s saktal being 
much older law, knowledge that was forgotten in the Gulathing district but rekindled by a 
legal authority from another jurisdiction.914 A third possibility regarding the number of 
degrees being out of kilter with the latest canonical decisions is that they need not have been 
imitatively followed, but transmitted into the peripheral jurisdictions gradually. 
 
  
Figure 16: The pattern of distribution in the Danish and English laws. 
 
In the Danish and English laws, we saw that one pattern of distribution was a threefold 
system, where the killer, his father’s side and his mother’s side would pay one-third of the 
total amount each. Accordingly, the paternal heirs and the maternal heirs would receive one-
                                                 
912 Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, pp. 200-01. 
913 Vogt, Function of Kinship, p. 147. 
914 Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde ‘“De skal vere samde menn” – Ei vitskapleg fundering og spekulasjon over den eldste 
norske prosessen’, in De lege, ed. by Petter Asp (Uppsala: Juridiska fakulteten i Uppsala, 2007), pp. 307 n. 6, 
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third each. No more specific details were found necessary on how, and if, the relatives should 
divide their share, except possibly a portion for the victim’s closest heir.915 In the Norwegian 
provincial laws, the system was described in minute and accurate detail, both regarding which 
relative should pay, who would receive a particular share, and not least, the exact size of each 
of the relative’s payments. Figure 17 below is a division of the total compensation as given in 
the Gulathing Law assumed to be the youngest description of division, covering the 
gradations of Bjarni Marðarson, which illustrate the complexity of the system and the large 
number of people involved. Here, we have relatives up to the sixth degree mentioned as 
receiving a share of the compensation.  
Some of the laws assumed to be older which prescribe the pattern of payment and 
receipt of compensation include kin as far as eight degrees (G.235). This is of course baffling, 
being a step further than the comprehensive incest prohibition of the Church. Suggestions 
have been made that this dates these laws to somewhere before the Norwegian archdiocese 
was established in 1152/53 and coincides with a dispensation of a mere six degrees limit to 
marriage.916 Conversely, it is asserted by Hansen that this reveals the intricate system as a 
‘construct’ and that the last degrees were added after 1152/53.917  
The rules of the Frostathing law, listing the number of kinsmen who should contribute 
with the killer to pay the compensation, follow a similar pattern, although the relatives were 
additionally classified into groups of contributors (F.6.2-47). The classifications follow the 
gradual system of inheritance rights, which was explained in chapter 8, but included more of 
the cognatic kindred than those found in the inheritance system of the same Frostathing law. 
The groups were the bauggildi, comprised of the seven prime male patrilineal relatives, the 
major nefgildi, being the patrilateral male relatives through women and the matrilateral male 
relatives, and the minor nefgildi made up of relatives in the third degree on both sides.918 
Thereafter, the relatives are more remote, up to the sixth degree from Ego.  
 
                                                 
915 See chapter 11. 
916 DN.XVII no. 8. 
917 Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, p. 190. 




Figure 17 Distribution 
pattern according to the 
gradations of Bjarni 
Marðarson – six marks of 




 Possibly due to the expectation to take 
vengeance, it was primarily male relatives who were 
among those listed on both sides of the transaction. 
Female relatives were listed as mediums through which sons had claims or duties (F. 6.7-8). 
However, woman who was the sole heir of the person killed could provide and receive 
compensation until she married (F.6.4). A section on gifts from the women on the killer’s side 
to the women on the victim’s side, such as mother, daughter, sister and wife, were included in 
one of the sets in the Gulathing Law (G.245).  
Thus, the main feature of the concept of compensation in the Gulathing Law and the 
Frostathing Law is the detailed enumeration of the kinsmen who should be involved in case of 
a homicide. Hansen has reckoned that the regulations of the Frostathing Law imply a 
minimum of 210 and a maximum of 240 transactions in case of a homicide, if applied 
directly.919 As he points out, there are no sources testifying to a homicide settlement being this 
complex. This obscure pattern of distribution is what sets the Norwegian provincial laws apart 
                                                 
919 Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, p. 190 and n. 29. 
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from earlier and contemporary western European secular legislation. However, we do find the 
same pattern in the Icelandic laws,920 which is, of course, one of the reasons for suggesting a 
western Nordic legal culture separate from an eastern one. The system may constitute an 
original contribution to medieval law. The Norwegian Code of the Realm only follows suit 
with the level of detail within the inheritance section, as described in chapter 8. The 
contributors and recipients appear as a confusing number of relatives. However, if we 
categorise them into maternal and paternal relatives, where in-laws and step-family represent 
the side they are connected with, we see that the compensation distribution in the Norwegian 
laws also fall into three thirds, albeit favouring the paternal kin slightly. The heir received 
one-third, and the maternal and paternal kin shared the rest according to their degree of 
relationship. Alexander Murray likened the distribution system in Norwegian laws to that 
described in Frankish laws, where the heir and the wife received large shares, and the rest 
being divided among the closest relatives according to degree of relationship in the ratio of 
6:2:1.921 This similarity was first pointed out by Bertha Phillpotts.922 Arguing a transmission of 
law between Frankish and Norwegian law, based only on this parallel, would be too uncertain. 
A retrospective perspective is more reasonable: the apparently exaggerated descriptions in the 
Norwegian laws were imagining typical systems of distribution of compensation in medieval 
societies, only that here the legislators and legal elite made the effort to write this down. If we 
compare the detail in the Norwegian distribution with the detail of the Salian laws, the level of 
detail in the Norwegian laws surpasses the latter. Other receptions from the Frankish society 
have been suggested. Geir Atle Ersland has, for instance, pointed out the likeness between the 
Norwegian defence system of leidang, naval conscript, and the Frankish and Anglo-Saxon 
systems.923 
But what could be the reason for the descriptions of relatives, and, moreover, 
involving so many different ones? Helle Vogt has argued that it was way to teach the 
Norwegians canonical kinship, and thus it had a pedagogic function.924 This assertion 
presupposes that the elaborate net of kindred was unknown or was not part of the concept of 
kinship in Scandinavia before the twelfth century. However, she maintains that the period of 
unrest during the so-called Norwegian civil wars encouraged closer family ties, in this 
                                                 
920 Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, pp. 195-97. 
921 Murray, Germanic Kinship Structures, pp. 142-43. 
922 Phillpotts, Kindred and Clan, p. 266. 
923 Geir Atle Ersland, Norsk forsvarshistorie,1: Krigsmakt og kongemakt (Institutt for forsvarsstudier, Eide 
forlag, 2000), pp. 45-49. 
924 Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 147-48. 
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instance by describing those family ties in the laws. This might also explain why legislating 
kings would allow and encourage the use of compensation as conflict resolution to a large 
extent; unstable political conditions call for a reliance of peacekeeping with the help of the 
population, before the authority was powerful enough to rely on its own force (or, more the 
threat of its own force). As has been suggested earlier in this chapter, the legislating power 
would want control of the legal system, but could only claim control, not enforce it. Hansen 
has also suggested that the elaborate kinship structure related to canonical kinship.925 Another 
possible reason is that involving as many as possible in the aftermath of a homicide attempted 
to eliminate all possible candidates for vengeance, and thus eliminate further enmities. The 
intricate system could also have a preventive function for the same reason, because the 
offence caused the offender to involve a great number of his kin. The kin group would then 
correct each other, and moderate themselves responsibly. A similar reckoning has been 
thought to lie behind the increase of the incest regulation from four to seven degrees in the 
first place.926 The fact that those responsible for compensation was extending those with rights 
of inheritance to the same Ego, is interesting. Hansen suggest could be to include as many 
relatives as possible.927 This was presumably to ensure that each member’s actions affected as 
many others in the network, so that the system itself kept violence at bay. If interpreted in this 
way, we see that the system of compensation could be used as a tool of to curb vengeance and 
violence in society. 
 The intricate system of contribution of payments was abolished in 1271 by decree, 
which was included in the Code of the Realm. Helle Vogt has argued that the system of 
distribution was abandoned because it was unnecessarily complicated.928 The complexity 
possibly contributed to the abolishment, but the system was not replaced by a simpler general 
wording, as found in other European secular legislation. It was a demonstration of the strength 
of King Magnus that he was able to remove the system of compensation, and it clearly 
expresses development towards individual responsibility. Legal developments had been 
taking place throughout the last half of the thirteenth century. 929 First, King Haakon 
                                                 
925 Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, p. 201. 
926 Along with many other reasons suggested for the Church to severely limit the number of possible marriage 
options. See Bouchard, ‘Consanguinity and Noble Marriages’, p. 270; Gies, Marriage and Family, pp. 83-84; 
Herlihy, ‘Women, Family and Society’, p. 102; Gelting, ‘Marriage, Peace and the Canonical Incest Prohibitions’, 
p. 93. 
927 Hansen, ‘Concept of Kinship’, pp. 190, 193. 
928 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, pp. 182, 190.  
929 See, for instance, the decrees on right summoning and procedure MLL.1.9-11, in the last one of which we 
find the statement that the king is above the law; Taranger has interpreted this as an influence from the Roman 
formula Princeps legibus solutus est: Taranger, Magnus Lagabøters Landslov, p. 16. The phrase is found in the 
Digesta 1.3.31 (Ulpian) and would have been part of the principles discussed on legal studies in Europe. See also 
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Haakonsson decreed in an addendum in c. 1260 that no one other than the one guilty of 
homicide should pay compensation and fines, thereby releasing the family of the offender 
from the burden (MLL.10.1.2). Later, his son, King Magnus further constrained responsibility 
in cases of homicide, by making the killer responsible for paying the compensation, and the 
victim’s closest heir became the recipient of it (MLL.4.13, MLL.10.2.5). According to the 
Code of the Realm, those who refused to pay compensation would face harsher sanctions 
(MLL.4.21); outlawry and increased fines were levied.  
Another relevant development in relation to the provincial laws is that first Haakon 
and later Magnus reduced the fines due to the king in each instance by two-thirds 
(MLL.10.1.1). The reason was probably that making the killer alone responsible for 
producing the sum made it likely that it would be impossible to produce the whole sum. To 
avoid a binding judgment not being fulfilled, reducing the sum was a pragmatic solution. 
As in the earlier European laws, killing adulterers (of closely related women) was still 
accepted, although proof that the adulterers had been caught in the act would have to be 
produced. The act of adultery was made both a non-compensational deed, where the adulterer 
would be banished (MLL.4.1), and compensational, where the husband would be entitled to 
compensation for his adulterous wife, and half-wergild for his adulterous daughter, sister and 
mother (MLL.4.5). The latter rule stipulated the compensation in relation to the wergild of the 
adulterous man, not the woman, as before. The contradiction reveals the possible 
inconsistencies in legislative work. 
The revisions of King Magnus saw changes to procedure that brought the Code of the 
Realm into line with European developments of legal thought and procedure. A clearer divide 
between homicide in the first and second degree was made in general terms, so that murder 
would be punished with outlawry and/or the death penalty, which also brought these rules into 
line with the English laws of Henry I described earlier. Execution was a public matter, and 
only an officially appointed executioner was acceptable according to the Code of the Realm 
(MLL.4.9). The law included procedural innovations in the case of homicide. Rules on 
investigation were added, with the so-called prov, proof, in which a description of the events 
should be written down. The investigation would then be used to determine what verdict 
should be handed down to the killer through an exploration of the graveness of the action 
(MLL.17-18). Would compensation do, or was complete confiscation of property or possibly 
execution the proper outcome? The emphasis on investigation and evidence was in line with 
                                                 




the Norwegian legal reformation of the late-thirteenth century (see, for instance, on the oath 
of the jurors MLL.1.3). Moreover, the role of authority was strengthened through the king 
investing himself with the right to show mercy to the outlaw, with, as Steinar Imsen has 
shown, the possibility that the kings profited from this.930 However, prior to investigation, the 
Code of the Realm informs us that the initial steps taken after a killing occurred would be the 
responsibility of the killer. General procedures followed those of the Frostathing Law, with 
the killer having the responsibility to announce the homicide (MLL.4.2, 12.1). But if he did 
not inform those in the surrounding community of his guilt for the homicide, a different set of 
rules applied, where the charges changed to murder, and both the offended party and the 
official authorities would take action (MLL.4.12.3-7). This pattern is similar to that seen in 
the Danish laws on murder. 
In the Norwegian provincial laws, compensation appears as a means of settlement, 
rather than punishment. The legislators had in mind a restoration of the peace, more than 
harsh retribution. The sum and number of relatives involved might thus be an attempt at 
preventive legislation. Ideologically, the royal legislator’s motivations for compensation 
would try to pinpoint the guilt of the individual, and remove the kin-based solution for the 
conflict. The steep fines added, and later removed from, the compensation, show us a 
conscious usage of an existing compensation system to enrich the treasury, all the while 
strengthening royal legislative authority.  
The wergilds in the Norwegian laws were high compared to other European law, but 
they fell in line with the Scandinavian tradition we saw in the English material. Little effort 
was made to ascribe differences in the sums according to status, gender or age. This must 
have been the basis for the dialogue between the parties, which aimed at reaching an 
agreement of the compensation in real cases. Or, those who set these rules down in writing 
did not know or care for any differentiation in wergild, although the tariffs are based in an 
understanding of status. What appears original in the Norwegian laws on homicide was the 
system of distribution, with details of both provider and recipient, and an inclusion of a large 
number of relatives on each side. When it comes to a legal assessment of conditions 
surrounding the homicide, we find that the actions of those witnessing the act, more than 
where or when it happened, were of importance. In the Norwegian laws, we thus find points 
of concurrence with both the continental and early English systems, and also similarities to 
                                                 
930 Steinar Imsen, ‘Den gammelnorske drapsprosessen’, Historisk Tidsskrift (2009), pp. 185-229 (p.186). 
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Roman law. The Norman English laws regarding public fines in case of homicide could also 
be a source of influence for the legal elite in Norway.  
 
12.3 Compensation and state formation in the Swedish laws  
Coming to the Swedish provincial laws, we see that the process of exchanging compensation 
with public procedure and public punishment was taken one step further. The laws emerging 
were in part royally sanctioned regional laws promulgated in the decades leading up to the 
Black Death. We expect that those laws being revised by royal authority would include 
conscious choices of prescribed solutions to homicide and violence. With the exception of the 
law of Västgötaland, which originates from the early thirteenth century, the various laws were 
written during a process of development that began in the 1270s during the reign of King 
Magnus III.931 The royal authorities issued letters of affirmation to the Law of Uppland, as 
well as to other laws from other provinces.932 When King Magnus Ericsson issued a Code of 
the Realm, possibly in the late 1340s, the institution of compensation disappeared from 
written law, similar to the Norwegian process.933 Two-thirds of the original total of forty 
marks continued to go to the king and the Church. However, the system of compensation for 
homicide was not declining in previous provincial laws. Thus, we can argue that omitting 
compensation from the Code of the Realm was the result of a conscious choice made by the 
legal elite involved in the making of a law for the whole kingdom. If the loose formation of 
the Swedish state at this point influenced legislation on grave violence, it might explain the 
emphasis on vengeance and compensation in the laws. The thirteenth century was a period of 
political unrest in the region, Magnus III himself being a rebellious usurper. Eventually the 
unrest ended in the consolidation of the landscapes into one kingdom.934 With the turmoil and 
few tools for enforcing law, the basis of a culture of vengeance was present. Continuation of 
the institution of compensation may have resulted from influences from the Church in the 
absence of powerful secular authority. Still, from the late 1200s, legislative activity was high, 
as it was in northern Europe as a whole. Probably influenced by its neighbouring legislative 
activity in Norway and Denmark, written law included the regulation of compensation, size 
                                                 
931 Vogt, Function of Kinship, p. 52. 
932 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, pp. 100-02. 
933 MEL.Dr1.1; Holmbäck and Wessén, Magnus Erikssons Landslag, 234 n. 3. 
934 Vogt, Slægtens funksjon, pp. 100-02. 
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and procedure. We still know that vengeance continued under the consolidating states; thus, it 
is natural that the system of compensation as legal solution continued as well. 
Among the number of provincial laws from Sweden, examples from four of them can 
illuminate the synchronic differences as well as the diachronic development in the 1200s. The 
first two, the earlier Law of Västgötaland (VgL) and its younger counterpart (VgLY), and the 
Law of Östgötaland (ÖgL), the provincial code that originated later, represent western Nordic 
(and western Swedish) legal culture, and the two other late-thirteenth century laws, the Law 
of Uppland (UL) and the Hälsinge Law (HL), represent the eastern legal culture. In these 
laws, there are several references to vengeance, called oran, as a possible cause of action, 
similar to the description in the Danish laws. A system of compensation was the norm in case 
of homicide that were not murder or otherwise heinous, which was considered a breach of the 
so-called edsöre, the peace. To seek vengeance in any matter after compensation was agreed 
upon would be considered a breach of the peace (ÖgL.E.2, ÖgL.E.7, ÖgL.Dr.9). We also find 
detailed rules on how the person with a claim to vengeance and the person targeted should 
deal with each other to reduce stress. If they belonged to the same community and attended 
the same church or local gatherings, they should avoid the same roads and entrances 
(ÖgL.Dr.VII). If a man should find a body by the road, he should not announce it in a village 
where someone had a claim to vengeance on him (oran), but in the next village (UL.M.12). 
In the Östgöta Law, we find a non-acceptance of taking vengeance on someone other 
than the offender (ÖgL.E.2). To kill or harm his kin or associates would be considered a 
breach of the peace. The legal material further encouraged public procedure in private 
conflicts, although the community involved was responsible for bringing evildoers to the þing 
for a hearing. In both this law and in the Law of Uppland, homicide was settled with 
compensation, and stealthy murder was prescribed the death penalty.935 Interestingly, in the 
Östgöta Law and the Law of Uppland, stoning was the prescribed punishment for women (Ex. 
ÖgL.E.17, UL.M.13). This punishment is highly unusual in the European legal context, and 
one of the few known examples of this being carried out comes from Sweden: the English 
missionary Eskil was stoned and martyred by the Swedes.936 One finds stoning again in the 
Swedish Code of the Realm as punishment for murder (MEL.H.1, MEL.H.8), and in the 
Norwegian laws concerning theft. 
We see that provisions in the laws tried to constrain vengeance, and invited enmity 
and hostility to be taken to the assembly for peaceful settlement by compensation. At the 
                                                 
935 For instance, ÖgL.E.25, ÖgL.E.29, ÖgL.Dr.3, UL.M.15, UL.M.19. 
936 ’Eskil, Srt.’, in Svensk konversacionslexikon, vol. 1 (Stockholm: P.G. Berg 1845), pp. 440-41. 
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same time, instant vengeance was more readily accepted by the lawmakers; at least, it was an 
acknowledged outcome of a homicide. In the Västgota laws, vengeance connected with the 
instant reaction to a crime against one’s person was legal (VgL.M.6, VgLY.Dr.17). A killer 
who was killed instantly would not be compensated and his killer not persecuted. If someone 
was killed, an immediate slaying of a killer by his victim’s kin would not require 
compensation (ÖgL.Dr.2). According to the Law of Östgötaland, the kin of the dead killer 
still had to compensate the first victim’s family. Maybe this law was accepted because such 
an immediate reaction was considered a satisfactory solution by the communities and by the 
legal authorities which had little means of policing subjects. Any delay in retaliation meant 
that the offender should be taken to court instead. According to the western laws, adultery by 
the wife justified vengeance against the couple if caught in the act, and if the husband 
announced the killing immediately at the þing in the same manner as in other Nordic laws 
(ÖgL.E.26, VgL.M.11, VgLY.Dr.22). No compensation was required from the killer. The 
anger of the situation justified the action. The eastern Law of Uppland quite oppositely, 
intentional killing of an adulterous wife should be punished with execution by stoning 
(UL.M.13). However, in Law of Uppland and the Hälsinge Law, vengeance was also given as 
an alternative to compensation for the kin in case of homicide (UL.M.8, HL.M.38). The 
acknowledge was still present in written law, of vengeance as settlement of a homicide. 
If we compare the Swedish provincial laws’ treatment of homicide with the legislation 
on theft, we see that strict measures were taken in case of the latter. Legislators’ crackdown 
on theft was a recurring theme of medieval legislation, and in Sweden, too, thieves were given 
the death penalty, although the Law of Östgötaland prescribed slavery for women.937 To let a 
thief escape carried a fine, and the thief should be contained and led to court (UL.M.39, 
ÖgL.V.33). Relevant here is that Swedish provincial laws did not accept killing as self-justice 
to guard oneself from thieves, but stated that a man who witnessed stealing should bring the 
thief to justice, as we find in the Danish and later Norwegian laws. Maybe influenced by the 
neighbouring legislation, Swedish laws demanded the right of authorities to take care of legal 
protection.  
The Hälsinge Law also include a particular list of compensations due to where a man 
was killed also use the term bogh, where the similarity with the term baugr in Norwegian and 
                                                 
937 For instance, UL.M.37, UL.M.49, ÖgL.E.32, ÖgL.V.4, ÖgL.V.33-41. The Law of Uppland also graded the 
graveness of theft according to the object stolen, and minor theft would be fined with an equivalent sum 
(UL.M.32-37); alternatively, the judge could choose mutilation. 
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Icelandic law has been pointed out by Brink (HL.M.6.2).38).938 The Hälsinge Law otherwise 
followed the Law of Uppland closely, but on the issue of the rights of kin the former diverges 
from the latter. In its total amount, the stipulated compensation for homicide was reckoned 
together with the fine to the king. The earliest provincial law, the Older Västgöta Law, stated 
a compensation of twenty-one silver marks, where the heir would have nine marks and the 
other kin twelve marks (VgL.M.1.4). A sum which of totally 12 marks was also to be paid to 
the kin (VgLY.Dr.5-7), so that the final sum totalled almost forty marks. As we saw in the 
contemporary Norwegian and Danish laws, the sum of forty silver marks was a recurrent 
standard. A similar division is found in the Östgöta Law, where forty marks was divided 
between the victim’s kin, the king and the community.939 We find the total of forty marks also 
expressed in the Law of Uppland (UL.M.10.1), suggesting the amount was a common 
standard in Scandinavian legal culture.  
Status was significant for the stipulation of the wergild of a man. The old and younger 
Västgöta Law (VgL.M.5, VgLY.Dr.10) decreed thirteen and a third marks as the wergild for 
those who came from Sweden, but were not under the Västgöta Law. One was not to be 
outlawed for killing those who came from outside Sweden, ‘utländskan man’ (VgL.M.5.3-6, 
VgLY.12). Similar to other European secular law, those outsiders had lower wergilds; 
according to the younger Västgöta Law, those from Norway, Denmark and England, and 
‘southerners’, had a wergild of nine marks (VgLY.Dr.13,15), although those with the status of 
a priest had the same wergild as a Swede, even if he was foreign (VgLY.Dr.14). If the killer 
was a woman, then her closest male relative would bear the brunt and be outlawed (ÖgL.Dr.8-
9). The compensation was further differentiated according to the victim’s age and gender. 
This feature is not found in the other provincial laws of the western or eastern Nordic region. 
Killing of women gave a higher compensation, as it did in Frankish and Lombard laws 
(UL.M.11, UL.M.29.3, DL.M.3).940 A woman killed in her own home was a breach on the 
peace, on the ‘edsöre’, but still compensational. Her relatives could demand eighty marks, and 
if she was pregnant, then forty marks were added (ÖgL.E.33). Women and minors were not in 
the position to regain the honour by vengeance, and thus a number of fines did not apply 
when they were the offender or the victim (ÖgL.E.15, ÖgL.Dr.11). Furthermore, children and 
elderly people should be compensated with a double amount of grown men (UL.M.11.2, 
                                                 
938 Brink, ‘Hälsinge Law’, pp. 46-47. 
939 Per-Edwin Wallén, ‘Mansbot – Sverige’, KLNM, vol. 11 (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1966), p. 328. 
See also Robberstad, Gulatingslovi, p. 371 n.5.  
940 Wallèn, ‘Mansbot’, p. 329. 
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HL.M.21), which is opposite to what we read in the Germanic laws. Thus, the size of wergild 
in Sweden was not necessarily based on the victim’s potential labour or fertility. We can thus 
assume that wergild and compensation were stipulated on principles of protection for the 
innocent and weak, rather than their potentiality in life.  
As the provincial laws differ in other aspects, they also differ in the prescribed 
distribution of the compensation. Some of the laws give clear procedures; the killer had to pay 
a share of the sum, the relatives were responsible for the rest. The killer paid one instalment, 
and the paternal and maternal side paid one instalment each (UL.M 11). Another system was 
to divide after the familiar ratio 2:1 between the paternal and maternal relatives, as we see in 
the Östgöta Law (ÖgL.Dr.7). Vogt reads these responsibilities as direct transfers between the 
relatives on each side, as a peace token and not a part of the compensation.941 However, this 
kind of direct involvement was present in the Norwegian provincial laws and the laws of 
Æthelstan. It was certainly a gesture to keep the peace, but also considered a part of the full 
settlement of the homicide. Vogt further interprets the ratio 2:1 between the relatives as 
mirroring the new inheritance system appearing in the later 1200s.942 This interpretation is 
probably sound, given that it was introduced into both the eastern and western Swedish 
provincial laws, including the Östgöta Law (Ögl.Ä.2, see chapter 8). Nevertheless, we must 
remember that the laws of King Alfred operated with the same ratio on paying compensation, 
where the paternal relatives were responsible for two-thirds, and the maternal relatives for 
one-third. Seeing that distribution was similar in the Danish and Norwegian laws, we can 
conclude that there was a common idea among secular lawmakers in northern Europe that 
compensation should be distributed this way. It is difficult to point to any particular source of 
transmission into or within the Scandinavian laws. But, since the English laws are earliest, 
this at least suggests possible transmission of legal ideas from England to Scandinavia. 
 The distribution given in the Hälsinge Law is also different. Here we again find the 
mirroring system, where each relative both pays and receives compensation according to 
degree of relation to the killer or the victim (HL.M.38). The rule includes specific descriptions 
of what each relative was due to pay and receive, with parents, brother and wife of the victim 
being the three foremost relatives, and cousins in the fourth degree the last listed. This was 
possibly a textual transmission from the Norwegian laws, although the Hälsinge Law belongs 
                                                 
941 Vogt, Function of Kinship, pp. 140-41. 
942 Ibid., p. 141. 
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to the group of eastern laws believed to be influenced mainly from east and south.943 Stefan 
Brink has demonstrated the connection between the Hälsinge Law and Norwegian legal 
terminology, particular for rules on compensation.944 Given that the compensation was 
distributed among relatives up to the fourth degree, the list of relatives could also be another 
attempt to sort out the relatives belonging to the kin group according to the Fourth Lateran 
Council. In any case, the reduction of degrees in the marriage legislation in 1215 apparently 
had great consequences for Scandinavian secular regulation of both inheritance and 
distribution of compensation. However, the rule also includes the total of the combined fine 
and compensation, which was four plus seven silver marks, respectively. The translators see 
this as inexpensive compared with the law of Uppland which they interpret as thirteen and 
one-third marks each being due to the victim, the king and the hundred (UL.M.9.2).945 That 
the total amount in the Hälsinge Law was approximately one-third of the total amount in the 
Uppland Law may suggest a reduction of the total amount contemporaneous with the 
reduction we saw in the Norwegian Code of the Realm. If so, then the Hälsinge Law would 
include transmission from both provincial laws and the national law of Norway. The 
landscape of this area bordered the two regions partly under the Frostathing jurisdiction, that 
is, Jämtland and Härjedalen.946 It is probable that the listing of relatives and the reduction of 
the fine was a transmission from the Law of Frostathing. 
 The Law of Uppland omitted the responsibility of relatives, and demanded that the 
killer produce the compensation alone (UL.M.9-10). The same is absent in the Laws of 
Södermannaland and Västmannaland, and Vogt has pointed out that these were royally 
sanctioned provincial laws.947 This omission could mean that secular authority had an interest 
in subduing kin-based responsibility, together with being the result of a general influence 
from Roman legal concepts. 
                                                 
943 Stefan Brink, ‘The Hälsinge Law between South and West, King and Church, and Local Customs’, in New 
Approaches to Early Law in Scandinavia, ed. By Stefan Brink and Lisa Collinson, Acta Scandinavia, 3 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), pp. 37-56 (pp. 37-39). 
944 Brink, ‘Hälsinge Law’, pp. 44-49. 
945 Holmbäck and Wessén, Svenska Landskapslagar III, p. 356 n. 201. 
946 The demarcation between the Norwegian and Swedish landscapes can be found in Holmbäck and Wessén, 
Svenska Landskapslagar III, pp. 398 and 408 n. 9, On demarcation: Holmbäck and Wessén, Svenska 
Landskapslagar IV, pp. xii-xiii, and in NgL IV, pp. 667ff. ‘Om islendskr perg 4:o’. The demarcation can be 
found in several manuscripts, among them AM 60, assumed to be from 1330s; NgL IV, pp. 547-48. See further 
MS B in NgL II, pp. 487ff. AM.114 (see AM.322). On the legal jurisdiction of Jemtland, see Magne Njåstad, 
‘“The Eastern Realm”: The King of Norway and the Border Province Jemtland’, in Rex Insularum. The King of 
Norway and His “Skattlands” as a Political System c.1260-c.1450, ed. by Steinar Imsen (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, 2014), pp. 323-45. 
947 Vogt, Function of Kinship, p. 141. 
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In the Swedish Code of the Realm from the mid-fourteenth century, the institution of 
compensation was curbed, as it had been in the Norwegian law. The legal elite of King 
Magnus Ericsson, who had the code assembled, made thorough changes to the compensation 
system. That is, they failed to include aspects of homicide legislation that played such an 
important role earlier. The law specified that vengeance on innocent people was outlawed, 
and thus equalled with homicide (MEL.E.13).948 Vengeance on the killer would be punished 
as regular homicide, with fines to the king and the community (MEL.D.3-5). Also, the law 
hardly mentions compensation (MEL.D.13-14), and does not include any stipulated wergild. 
The fine to the king was a third of the amount of forty marks, and again we see a numerical 
parallel to the Norwegian legal development, where king Magnus reduced the punishment to 
one third of forty marks. Finally, the law held the killer solely responsible for compensation.  
To the Swedish legal elite participating in constructing provincial law, compensation 
appears to have been both a punishment and a means of reaching agreement. By allotting 
some of the compensation to the community, the notion of a crime committed against the 
public, and repentance towards the republic, are present. The emphasis on individual 
responsibility in the royal law tells us that the state sought to suppress the kinship structures 
dominating the legal system. However, the regions in the process of becoming the Swedish 
state had a significant relationship with the institution of compensation for homicide, through 
its complex system of distribution (between society, Church and victim). It is possible that 
influences from other Scandinavian and European legal thought were well known in Sweden. 
The particularly brutal punishments of stoning and burning have unknown origins, although 
they are well known from biblical sources and the town laws of Denmark and Sweden.949 
These particular features could stem from customs in the Swedish regions, or other sources of 
influence, for instance, a literal interpretation of the Old Testament. 
Swedish laws have some of the same values we find in the later Norwegian laws, for 
example, a total wergild of forty silver marks. However, the amounts are not identical, and 
they are divided differently between recipients than as they are divided in the neighbouring 
Scandinavian laws. There is also differentiation in the amounts according to gender and age in 
these laws, something we frequently find in the western European secular laws, but to a much 
lesser degree in Norwegian or Danish provincial laws. One possibility for this is that such 
                                                 
948 Which Holmbäck and Wessés parallel to the Norwegian attempts to the same in the thirtheenth century. 
Holmbäck and Wessén, Magnus Erikssons Landslag, p. 205-06 n. 34. See also MEL.E.22. 
949 Vogt, Helle, ‘Danish Penal Law in the Middle Ages: Cases of Homicide and Wounding’, in New Approaches 
to Early Law in Scandinavia, ed. by Stefan Brink and Lisa Collinson, Acta Scandinavia, 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
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categories derive from European legal influence, for instance, knowledge of Germanic laws. 
Swedish laws also include an assessment of conditions surrounding the homicide, apart from 
the usual feature seen in several other laws of whether it was committed in secret. In the 
Swedish laws, both the scene of the crime and the time at which the crime occurred mattered. 
In general, the examples of the Swedish provincial laws include a variety of particularities 
that make them stand out in their content more than other Scandinavian provincial laws. 
Further research might uncover other points of comparison with eastern laws, from the Greek 
sphere. 
 
Conclusion: Scandinavian laws on compensation for homicide 
Following the model of probable transmission, some elements of the rules were similar in the 
Scandinavian laws. The wergilds were given in the same currency, the mark. Although the 
total amounts change within each jurisdiction and at different times, they change to and from 
the same amounts in all the provincial codes. The legislators provided similar descriptions of 
right process in cases of homicide and what constituted compensational homicide, though the 
process was in development. The main pillars were that the killer should admit guilt 
immediately, and then a hearing should take place at the next assembly. A significant change 
in the Scandinavian legal development was how officials gained ever more responsibility in 
the process. 
When summarising the probability of transmission of law between the Scandinavian 
laws, it becomes clear that, in spite of obvious and numerous similarities, they have unique 
features concerning content and motivation. Danish provincial laws emphasised the time 
period for paying compensation, and provided details of expiry dates in payment of 
instalments. Norwegian provincial laws emphasised the very many contributors to and 
recipients of compensation, before the Code of the Realm removed the whole system. 
Swedish laws, on the other hand, emphasised the problematic social aspects of a homicide, 
where the urge for vengeance made precautions necessary. The particularities in Danish law 
not found in Swedish or Norwegian laws may be connected with transmission from ideas 
subsisting in another legal culture, rather than with particularities in the other two 
Scandinavian laws. In the specific rules on homicide, the composition of the rules varies from 
Swedish to Danish to Norwegian legal texts. As with the inheritance laws, several identical 
formulas exist in the respective laws within these legal cultures; the Danish laws are copied 
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from each other, the Norwegian are as well, and some of the Swedish are, too. Thus, we must 
assume that the provincial laws in one kingdom formed part of a legal culture. It is also 
between the provincial laws that the examples of copied texts emerge. Nevertheless, the 
copying of existing law was modified, not necessarily to fit a different set of norms in another 
region, but to fit growing royal intervention, as seen, for example, in the adjustments from the 
elder Gulathing Law in the Frostathing Law, and from the use of the law of Uppland in the 
Hälsinge Law. This supports the argument that borrowing from existing law texts was the 
easiest mode of making law in the Middle Ages, but also that adjustments usually occurred. 
For these reasons, it is fruitful to compare these different sets of law to law outside 
Scandinavia. Apart from numerous linguistic parallels with early English laws, there is little 
evidence of direct copying of rules or phrases on compensation from other secular law, 
although there are examples of translation of standard phrases elsewhere in other sections of 
the laws. More interesting parallels appear connected to the second level of probability, 
regarding motivation and basis. As we have seen from the survey, a shared idea of the 
distribution of compensation seems to have existed among the legal elite involved in writing 
the laws. The Scandinavian laws assumed a tripartite compensation, where the maternal and 
paternal side contributed or received one part each, and the offender and the closest heir, 
respectively, paid and received the last third. The basic principles are the same as found in 
earlier English and Frankish laws, and must be regarded as a continuation of this principle. 
These thirds were of unequal sizes in the Norwegian and Frankish laws, giving preference to 
paternal kin, as at least Norwegian laws did in all instances in inheritance laws. According to 
Danish and Swedish laws, the thirds were apparently of equal size, as the English laws 
assumed – if we regard the heir as receiving one-third, reflecting an inheritance system of 
parentela principles.  
Regarding the lowest level in the hierarchy of probability, regarding procedural 
descriptions, this is where the Scandinavian laws include the original descriptions mentioned 
above. However, when it comes to sentences and other content, there are numerous parallels, 
some which are obvious. The existence of a compensatory system is common and shared with 
European law, and the use in written law of the Scandinavian currency of the mark show that 
the institution was adjusted to the regions currency, although stating the amounts in the 
monetary value give the flare of compensation as a symbolic value, instead of a pragmatic 
solution to homicide. The aforementioned payment system in shares between relatives of 
maternal and paternal kin is common and parallel to European written laws. Other similarities 
with European laws that fall outside the actual institution of compensation but are nonetheless 
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linked to it are more subtle, such as the added fine to the king, where Scandinavian laws 
operated with forty marks as compensation, as in Norman law. 
The strengthening of public procedures had features similar to Henry II’s legal 
programme. Presumably, the revisions of King Magnus saw changes to the procedure that 
brought the Norwegian Code of the Realm into line of those in the Angevin reforms and in 
European legal developments. Both the legal regions of Scandinavia and England follow a 
development towards a more public system of conflict resolution, although the written laws in 
both Anglo-Norman England and Norway continued to allow for the traditional compensation 
system to remain in place. In law and in practice, it can be seen that compensatory 
punishments seem to play a vital role in conflict resolution, in order to restore equilibrium 
between parties. Still, public authority became a more decisive third party in any conflict and 
was ever more involved in trying to reach solutions through the making of laws. 
We must assume that the system of compensation to the victim in cases of homicide or 
violence that we find in Danish and Norwegian written laws was influenced in part by early 
English law. However, it is also possible to easily argue that the Anglo-Saxon laws were 
influenced by Scandinavian legal culture, at least in terminology. Attempts to bring the 
settlements under the control and fee of royal authority were already present in early English 
laws. Nevertheless, administrative developments and the extensive use of the death penalty 
and fines to the king might have been the result of contact with the legal system of twelfth-
century England. Somewhat delayed, Norwegian law follow Norman and Angevin 
development on compensation. Compensation for homicide and other crimes constituted a 
common feature in the Scandinavian laws, despite the differences in composition of the rules 
and differences in stated procedure. The question is whether it was a longstanding tradition in 
the legal culture of Scandinavia before written laws emerged. Vogt has argued that the 
detailed descriptions of kinship and the distribution of compensation imply that those who 
executed and were subjected to the law needed to learn the nature and extent of canonical 
kinship. Thus, the collective compensation system possibly was little known in Scandinavia 
before a forced introduction from the twelfth-century onward. Even if we see examples in 
other law detailing pedagogical listings of kin, as in Visigothic and Roman law, the familiar 
names of relatives in the earliest laws of Gulathing imply that the components of a clan, ‘ætt’, 
were known in Scandinavian society, if not in the canonical fashion. The vague references in 
the English laws to the lahslit of the Danes strengthens the argument that compensation was 
part of Scandinavian legal culture long before Scandinavia saw written laws. Even if notions 
of the ætt included both blood-relatives and friends, and the notion of contributors to 
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compensation included the same groups, the system of compensation was present in 
Scandinavian legal culture. We find the clearest attempts to replace the kin-based legal system 
with a state legal system in the Swedish and Norwegian national laws. The most important 
development in legislation on crimes in Scandinavia was probably the shift to individual guilt 
in law. The examination of royal legislation shows that the legislating king’s individualisation 
of his subjects was connected with his search for legal power. However, the examination 
revealed little concerning what influenced this tendency. Possible explanations emerging in 
the survey include influence from the Church and influence from Roman legal principles. 
Nevertheless, the survey of early medieval law provided many examples of secular authority 
trying the same, before the revival of Roman law, and supporting arguments claim that the 
Church gained more from a system of collective compensation than from other modes of 
punishment. Legislators in England also operated at the intersection of making acceptable law 
according to their legal culture, and furthering their own power in the legal system. Internal 
motives in the jurisdiction for breaking the kin-based system could explain the move to 











This comparison of about forty legal sources from different geographical regions covering a 
period of approximately nine hundred years has produced a range of indications of legal 
transmission. The ambition was to test whether it is possible to identify transmission within 
written secular laws of western medieval Europe, with a focus on the laws on inheritance and 
compensation for homicide. One general conclusion is that there is clear evidence that those 
who set laws down in writing in the Middle Ages were familiar with much earlier, secular 
written laws, but there is less evidence of the actual transmission of law, and from where the 
transmission came. It is nevertheless possible to argue the probability of a transmission and a 
probable source of influence in each instance. The thesis has confirmed to a large degree the 
findings of other studies on the connection between different regions, but the results suggest 
that our conception of the range of transmission of law in the Middle Ages should be 
expanded. The legislators’ apparent knowledge of other secular law is not surprising in itself, 
but this comparison has exposed the existence of the continuation of several concepts in 
western European legislation. It seems that the legal elite who worked for the legislative 
authorities not only knew of law books, but had an understanding of some general legal 
principles regarding inheritance and compensation for homicide that left traces in the written 
law, albeit often with genuinely original twists on the formulation of the rules.  
The juxtaposing of legal sources from a larger area has provided a better overview of 
the common legal principles than when examining only one or two. Those parallels that 
appear in two neighbouring sources could be assumed to derive from a shared legal ideology 
between these two, but when compared with a wide range of sources, other patterns emerge. 
We see that a principle may not only be found in the nearest contemporary legal culture, but 
in older laws or those from more remote legal cultures. Some features are shared by all the 
legal sources examined here. For example, the existence of a concept of legitimate heirs, as a 
result of the need for prioritising, or the acceptance of the killing of an adulterous wife or 
daughter, because of the grievance connected with it. Such overall parallels suggest that the 
principle concerned was a general principle in the legal ideology, and therefore more a result 
of spread of legal concepts than of direct transmission of written law. Other features are 
shared by many legal sources, for example the exclusion of women in the distribution of 
compensation even in societies with bilateral inheritance systems, because of the connection 
between compensation and vengeance. Furthermore, some particular principles appear to have 
taken hold in the individual legal cultures as a result of the legislators’ adaptation of known 
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legal concepts such as the partite inheritance to daughters, shared by both patrilineal and 
bilateral systems, and the shared anticipation of partite distribution of the compensation into 
thirds, the portion of the paternal and the maternal relatives, and the heir. One contribution 
made by this thesis is therefore the mapping of legislation across a wide range of material on 
inheritance and compensation for homicide over a long timespan. The possibility to observe 
development and continuity of written secular law from the end of the Roman empire to the 
coming of the Black Death is alone a significant outcome of the study. 
Regarding transmission of law in a process of state consolidation, I put forward the 
theories of Alan Watson on the ease of legal transplant, and Pierre Legrand’s 
counterargument that transplanted law would be rejected by the legal culture it was applied to. 
The intention was to investigate if transmission with or without adjustments was involved in 
the process of making written law in these forming states. Watson’s main argument was that 
legal transplants happen because it is easier to borrow law than to make new law. The 
parallels we find in secular written laws are sufficient to support this argument. In the written 
laws regulating inheritance and compensation for homicide, much of the basic regulations are 
the same, indicating that legislators used known concepts and shared legal ideologies, which 
were sometimes due to influences and sometimes due to direct borrowing. However, this 
theory must be modified in accordance with Watson and Legrand’s discussion of the filtration 
of law. The material from each legal culture has so many variants and features particular to it, 
regulating specific situations, that we must conclude that the legal elites knowledge of legal 
concepts elsewhere were not borrowed without careful adaptations. The local variants make it 
difficult to argue for unrestricted legal transmission of large quantities of written law in 
medieval Europe, as a result of easy access and the ease of borrowing, as Watson has argued. 
This is not only because local legal culture would reject the imported law, but also because 
variations probably happen in the transmission. Whether such adaptations were done 
consciously to fit the local legal culture, or they were coincidental changes added in the 
process of transmission, is not always detectable. Nor can we tell if the adaptations were a 
result of the whim of the legal elite involved in the writing of law, but some probable 
directions of influence can be pointed out. 
In the introduction, the comparative method was introduced as a possible approach to 
a study of transmission of laws from many regions and periods. This method has formed the 
basis of the analysis, but a more overarching conclusion should be presented at this point. 
This is the suggestion of crucial causal factors that meant that the laws with different bases 
achieved a similar result, and of crucial variables that explain how apparently similar written 
301 
 
laws resulted in different outcomes in regard to the same topic. Many individual topics and 
principles in the laws on inheritance and compensation for homicide have emerged through 
this comparison, both particular and more general features. The parallel concepts in the legal 
sources will not be repeated in detail, but some significant observations can still be expressed. 
More general features include, for instance, the classification of the inheritance laws 
into two main systems, the gradual system and the parentela system. Although the models 
have been constructed by modern scholars on the basis of medieval Nordic inheritance 
systems, it has proved fruitful to apply this classification to the western European written 
laws. The legal culture could be sorted roughly into one or the other system, and we even saw 
development from one to another – always from gradual principles to parentela principles – in 
Roman law and Scandinavian laws. The existence of parentela principles can be found in late 
Roman law and Visigothic law, and also in the eastern Scandinavian laws. In the Frankish and 
English laws, inheritance rights according to parentela principles can be detected in the first 
parentela, while the more remote relatives inherited according to gradual principles. 
Suggestions are therefore that the existence of parentela system in the written laws point to an 
influence from the original Roman legal ideology as the common crucial variable. It could be 
argued that the direction of this development indicates that the presence of the parentela 
system in state laws suggests stronger state authority. The Germanic laws, which otherwise 
share several points, differed in the systems of inheritance they espoused. The Visigothic and 
the Frankish laws, which presented the parentela system, both had a bilateral kinship system, 
while the Lombard and Burgundian laws, which presented a gradual system of inheritance, for 
the same reason appeared as a mainly patrilineal system of kinship. All four legal cultures 
reveal transmission from Roman law in other, particular, aspects. The one feature shared by 
the Germanic gradual laws is a reduced focus on individual responsibility for the 
compensation for homicide, something they also share with the English laws before Æthelstan 
and the western Scandinavian laws also adhering to the gradual system. This is construed as 
the common crucial variable. The parallel could explain the gradual system as representative 
of a society of kin-based settlements, and collective solutions instead of individual guilt, 
which again confirms that the gradual system could be a sign of a weak state authority, or 
rather a legislating authority yielding to pressure from those advocating interests of 
landowners. 
Another general feature of significance is the existence of wergild and the system of 
compensation in the rules from the fifth to the fourteenth century. It has proved difficult to 
give a conclusive explanation to the origins of compensation in written law, but the existence 
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of compensatory solutions prior to the writing down of laws according to the Roman model 
may be one explanation. The usefulness of such a legal solution in forming states is an even 
better explanation as to why the principles continued in medieval Europe. The legal 
authorities needed compensatory settlements to have an existing legal system, and wove the 
solution into the fabric of law to assume control over private settlements. We could argue that, 
despite encouraging the use of public procedure and not vengeance, secular authorities not 
only acknowledged violent settlements, but also found them useful as means of policing their 
society. Put into formal legislation, the compensatory system worked as a tool of creating a 
rule of law for legislating authority in this respect.  
A more particular feature found in the laws was the corresponding concept of allowing 
partitioned inheritance to daughters. This was found directly or indirectly, as gifts, in several 
of the inheritance laws, either already existing or, as in the early Lombard laws of Rothair, 
and in the earliest Norwegian provincial laws, and the Swedish provincial Law of 
Västgötaland, developing through the phases of law-making. Only these legal cultures 
originally postponed daughters from inheriting in the default inheritance system. Then we 
could ask, what were the crucial causal factors that created these laws allowing partitioned 
inheritance to daughters, and caused the other secular laws to include this feature, although 
they otherwise differ on many points? Though this might be the wrong question to ask, 
because, as the feature was so widespread, a crucial factor would be difficult to identify. 
Another possibility for letting daughters share in the inheritance could be the motive 
suggested in Liutprand’s legislation, that allowing daughters to inherit was a desired 
development in itself, and not necessarily reception of law. However, the comments in high 
medieval Swedish legislation on how inheritance to a daughter had been distributed earlier, 
and how it was distributed now, suggest that in this case the change was forced. While the 
Swedish legal elite transmitted the European inheritance principles, they were consciously 
doing it. If we then look further, another feature corresponding in the written laws, and only 
added later in the Lombard, Swedish and Norwegian laws, was the right of representation for 
grandchildren. Regarding the rights of representation, however, the examination of the 
sources has revealed that this was a principle that was forming in most of the legal cultures, as 
we saw in chapter 6-8. In Roman law, Germanic law and Scandinavian law, the rights of 
grandchildren to inherit in the place of a deceased parent was a principle that was being 
established. The son of a son often had a favoured position in this respect. As we have seen, 
granddaughters and grandchildren by daughters were not automatically given inheritance 
rights, even if their parents had rights and even if the default system followed bilateral 
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concepts of kinship. In the Roman legal culture, the discussion apparently related to the rights 
of the paterfamilias. In the medieval legislation, the discussion also related to how the family 
property would be divided, where paternal, male relatives had priority over grandchildren by a 
daughter. Inheritance rights for grandchildren were introduced in the Germanic laws and in 
the Scandinavian laws. Only Visigothic law presented a full parentela system exhausting 
descendants, which most probably was a reception of late Roman law. What we can suggest 
from the similarity of inheritance rights for daughters and all grandchildren is that these 
principles were transmitted throughout Europe, most likely through the spread of Roman legal 
concepts. 
A related topic is the emphasis on legitimacy in the legal sources. In the Scandinavian 
legal sources from the thirteenth century, legitimate birth and baptism was an important 
priority in the inheritance system. Because of the powerful position of the Church in Europe 
in this period, it is natural to assume the principle of priority by legitimacy to be a part of the 
Christian influence on the European authorities at the time. However, the corresponding 
differentiation between a legitimately born heir and an illegitimate born heir in the seventh 
century Lombard and Visigothic laws, and also in the pre-Christian Roman law, tells us that 
the high medieval legislation was based on earlier concepts. The legal subordination of 
illegitimate children in the Middle Ages was of course connected with Christian definitions of 
what constituted legitimacy, but the reason for adopting such principles had as much to do 
with passing on the family property as with Christian ideology. It would be in the interest of 
both land-owning families and legislative authorities to have a neat inheritance system. In 
extension to the rights of representation and the priority of legitimate children in the 
inheritance system is the categorisation of landed property. Also relevant for regulating family 
property is the development of division of status in landed property and allodial rights. This is 
found in all the legal cultures examined here, although with very distinct features in each. 
Something that is similar, though, is the idea of prescriptive rights to land after a certain 
amount of time. The Germanic laws and Norwegian law both increased this time prescription 
from thirty to sixty years, and although each system of land ownership appears to be different, 
the concept of time prescription in the later law was perhaps inspired from the Germanic idea 
of the length of time prescription.  
Relating to the latter, we could then ask why other principles from Roman law were 
not transmitted to all European secular laws. The logical answer is that the legal elite 
borrowed what was currently available and desirable at the time of legislation. The existence 
of compensation for homicide was something that distinguished medieval law from Roman 
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law. Nevertheless, there are indications that Roman law included the principle of 
compensating offences, and that Roman law may have been influenced by Germanic law in 
this respect. In the Kentish laws, we saw linguistic familiarities with the Frankish 
terminology, while the following English laws demonstrated a similar tripartite distribution 
among the maternal and paternal side. English laws also contrasted with the contemporary 
Scandinavian traditions when it came to the size of the compensation and differentiation 
according to status, although much of the terminology was used. Scandinavian laws reveal 
that compensation was in existence prior to the writing down of the laws. The influence of 
Roman law in the twelfth century did not immediately wipe out this system, which was the 
core of secular Scandinavian law. Compensation was first individualised and then omitted 
from the Code of the Realm in Norway and Sweden from the late-thirteenth century, and this 
may have resulted from new sources of influence from Norman England, but also from the 
general view of the legal system and state authority in this period. The system of 
compensation for homicide presented in the English and Scandinavian laws was probably a 
reception from Germanic laws, although the notion of compensating possibly evolved 
independently of each other. 
Another principle suggesting transmission of law that was related in the same way to 
the legislators’ interests in kinship structures is the way these legislators expressed how 
compensation for homicide should be distributed among relatives. The survey in chapters 10 
to 12 demonstrated that, although the institution of compensation was differently presented in 
the written laws, a core of understanding of the way such dramatic compensation should be 
paid and received, and thus of the function of the compensation, existed. Excepting Frankish 
law, the Germanic laws studied here included only the paternal side, reflecting their 
inheritance system, or said nothing on the matter as part of hiding the existence of 
compensation, as in Visigothic laws. The Frankish laws made the distribution system reflect 
the inheritance system, and involved both the maternal and the paternal side, including female 
relatives. The secular laws that came later also included both the maternal and paternal sides 
as contributors and recipients of the total amount, without reflecting the inheritance system. 
Thus, the tripartite distribution system in Frankish law was a crucial similarity in later 
legislation, all including the compensation system. Frankish principles seem to have been 
spread through transmission into other secular written laws. The differentiation of the 
compensation according to gender, age and status was a major part of the Germanic regulation 
of homicide, but is found only indirectly in the Scandinavian laws apart from the reduced 
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compensation for strangers in Swedish laws. This suggest again that, the shared legal concepts 
were the result more of a transmission of legal ideology, than of written law directly. 
Contrasting from the systems of distribution and the principles adopted in the 
legislation on inheritance and compensation for homicide, the smaller elements in the laws 
provide stronger indications on transmission of law. Correspondences in the relevant degrees 
of kinship, the sizes of compensation, terminology regarding the transaction and currency 
have been demonstrated in the previous chapters. A striking point is nevertheless that 
legislators appear to have been conscious of the details of the contents of written law, and 
therefore conscious about introducing law from other sources. Compared with each other, we 
find that the differences between the written laws reveal a distinct homemade adjustment to 
borrowed law. One example of such original content includes the Visigothic and Frankish 
legislation on compensation for homicide, and their differentiation of persons according to 
age, sex and status. They both have detailed regulation on this, but the actual differentiations 
are different, and to a degree opposite to each other, with regards to the value of boys and 
girls, young and old, men and women. The concept of distinguishing the wergild was also 
common for the other European legal cultures, but the value placed on each category was 
apparently adjusted in accordance with regional norms, and, more than any other example, 
reveals the regional adaptations made to legal concepts that were probably borrowed. 
However, even if the specified amount to a specified category of status, age or gender 
differed, the very categories and amounts themselves were parallel in the various laws, 
suggesting a shared concept of differentiating wergild and compensation in early and high 
medieval Europe.  
 
The major patterns of legal transmission that have emerged through this investigation indicate 
that the sources include evidence of transmission from several different sources and 
predominantly a single one. This is, of course, particularly true for the Scandinavian laws, 
which originated later in time, and could have been influenced by both neighbouring regions 
in England, and earlier laws from the Continent, or through the influence of Roman and canon 
law via university students and clergy in their respective kingdoms. Scandinavian laws reveal 
an interdependence. Particularly, Swedish provincial law appears to include transmission 
from Danish and Norwegian law. Further, Scandinavian laws relate to Roman law in the 
description of relatives, developing the parentela system, legitimacy and the subordination of 
illegitimacy. The linguistic similarities with early English laws suggest a considerable 
exchange of legal concepts between these legal cultures. The similarity with later English 
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laws of the size of fines to the king, and the laws generally include a similar focus on public 
procedure and individual guilt was probably due to legal transmission in the thirteenth 
century. Scandinavian laws adhere to Germanic law regarding the distribution of the 
compensation. The detailed description of the kin group within Norwegian law may be 
original, but finds a basis in Roman and Visigothic adaptations. Danish laws have the most 
similarity with Lombard laws and Roman law, regarding the partitioned inheritance of 
daughters.  
The earliest English laws show signs of transmission from Germanic laws, specifically 
Frankish laws, when it comes to the distribution of the compensation for homicide, and the 
division among status groups. Inheritance laws may also have connections with the Frankish 
inheritance system, combining parentela and gradual principles. The English laws from the 
ninth and tenth century display a connection with Scandinavian legal culture, in respect of 
both terminology and concepts, due to contact. The compensation system otherwise seems to 
develop along the same lines as continental laws. The laws of Cnut include an emphasis on 
corporal punishment, possibly an eastern European influence, while his, and the other English 
laws, relate to Roman legislation on legitimacy and illegitimacy. 
The Germanic laws reveal reception from Roman inheritance regulations, ecpecially 
regarding giving daughters extended inheritance rights. Here, the Visigothic law follows late 
Roman law closely, and laws on degrees were directly copied. The number of counting 
relatives within six degrees received from Roman law apparently became a standard within 
Germanic laws. Regarding compensation for homicide, the Germanic laws display an 
interdependence with each other. This is particularly true of the Lombard connection with 
Frankish laws. Germanic laws coincide also regarding the wergild and the system of 
differentiation according to context, status and gender, although the particular stipulations 
vary. The categorising of compensations according to status was probably a particular feature 
developing in the Germanic legislation, but the concept of division and the terminology still 
appear to derive from Roman late concepts. 
Roman law, unsurprisingly, appears to have influenced medieval legislation in several 
periods of jurisdictional activity. As the examination has revealed, however, reception of legal 
principles also appears to have taken place in the late roman legislation. Germanic notions of 
emancipation and compensation possibly influenced the Roman legislation of the fifth and 




This study has transgressed some of the traditional demarcations of historic periods, both 
regarding general medieval history and periods of legal history. In this way, the European 
legal enterprises have been juxtaposed in a new way, comparing studies of the legal material 
far apart in time and geographical distance. This approach offers the opportunity to review 
development over a long time-span. Thus, the thesis contributes to the available research on 
medieval legislation at different points in time, and discusses how existing European law 
influenced other secular legislating apparatus, either directly or conceptually. Such a wide 
perspective has brought forth evidence of legal transmission between the legal cultures in 
Western Europe that can be considered dissimilar or not comparable.  
What is lost by such an approach, however, is the opportunity to do an in-depth 
analysis of how and by whom transmission of law happened. All the legal exchange among 
the European legal works happened through persons, most probably legally trained, but 
finding who was responsible for which legal transmission goes beyond the remit of the 
present study. Further, the possible source of influence could be many and varied in many 
instances in the cases in this study. Although this thesis attempts to discuss the most probable 
source in cases of transmission, a much more detailed study in each instance would provide 
more definitive conclusions. Conceivably, this study may form a basis for other studies 
exploring the correspondences of medieval law, where others may conduct a more thorough 
analysis based on the findings here, or make comparisons with other legal sources excluded 
from this thesis. Also, this study has concentrated on two particular themes in law, inheritance 
and compensation for homicide. These topics are extensive in and of themselves, and the 
present study has only discussed the main aspects of the related regulations in the written 
laws. Nevertheless, a comparison with a focus on other topics would possibly confirm and 
expand the correlations between the written sources and their legislators. The juxtaposing of 
Western European legislation constitutes in itself a basis for future research on legislating 
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